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Abstract  
This thesis examines the role of the Air League of the British Empire and the Navy League 
– founded in 1909 and 1895 respectively – in the (re)militarisation of state and civil society 
in interwar Britain. More broadly, it considers the place of militarism, militarisation, and 
military culture at a time when internationalist counter-currents enjoyed significant 
resonance in British society. Both Leagues occupied a position between ‘high’ and ‘low’ 
politics, and their case offers new insights into the susceptibility of British popular and 
political culture to militarism. The two organisations played a prominent part in national 
debates on militarism, internationalism, youth, modernity, and rearmament. Their activities 
thus allow us to re-consider familiar themes in the history of interwar Britain in a fresh and 
conceptually challenging way – national defence, contested notions of Britain’s national 
status, the impact of war on British society and politics, political activism, and the 
relationship between state and civil society.  
 
This thesis draws on a wide range of sources, including minute books, private papers, 
memoirs, parliamentary proceedings, posters, pamphlets, government records, local and 
national newspapers, journals, oral testimony collections, newsreels, photographs, and 
satirical cartoons. The discussion is divided into two main parts. The chapters in Part A 
analyse the ways in which the Air League and Navy Leagues engaged with different political 
questions and contexts. The analysis developed shows how both Leagues promoted aerial 
and naval rearmament while having to negotiate the rise of issues such as disarmament, arms 
limitations, pacifism, collective security, and international diplomacy. The chapters in Part 
B detail how each League addressed civil society. Their focus on young people is traced 
through their educational ventures and youth organisations (the Air Defence Cadet Corps 
and the Sea Cadet Corps), while their targeting of mass audiences is explored through their 
staging of large-scale celebrations on Trafalgar Day and Empire Air Day.  
 
With the principal exception of David Edgerton’s work, most studies of British militarism 
terminate in 1914. However, the outbreak of the First World War did not constitute a 
terminus for organised militarism, nor did it mark the end of martial values or militaristic 
sentiment in mainstream British political culture. Overall, this thesis contends that 
militaristic leagues, the type of which featured prominently in the liberal political culture of 
Edwardian Britain, occupied a similar, if more contested and complex, place in the 
associational culture of interwar Britain. It argues that institutional, cultural, and popular 
forms of militarism were able to continue despite the growth of internationalism, fears that 
society had been brutalised by the experience of the First World War, the popularity of 
interwar peace movements, and the widespread support for issues such as disarmament and 
collective security. Finally, this thesis demonstrates the ways in which the Air and Navy 
Leagues contributed to the military preparedness of the nation upon the outbreak of the 
Second World War. 
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Introduction 
In her 1976 article, ‘Militarism in Britain before the Great War’, Anne Summers bore 
witness to her realisation that there ‘was such a phenomenon as British militarism’.1 British 
militarism, Summers argued, was distinctly divorced from ‘Prussianism’ which, with its 
politically influential military caste, compulsory military service, and large standing army, 
was often seen as being synonymous with militarism. This was a view shared by many at 
the time. As Max Scheler, the German philosopher, wrote in 1915: ‘Militarism was simply 
the natural organic form in which the Prussian spirit expressed itself’.2 For Summers, 
however, British militarism was ‘more than a ruling class ideology, and far more than an 
ideological instrument of the professional armed forces’. It became an ‘integral part of the 
liberal political culture of the country’.3 Summers pointed to the popularity of the Victorian 
Volunteer Forces, and the success of militaristic extraparliamentary associations such as the 
Navy League and the National Service League (NSL), as evidence of the development of 
both institutional and associational forms of militarism before 1914. For Summers, patriotic 
and militaristic leagues represented a prominent element of the political and cultural 
landscape of the period. This thesis contends that this prominence and importance did not 
end with the First World War. Indeed, it argues not only that the Air League of the British 
Empire and the Navy League (founded in 1909 and 1895 respectively) occupied a similar, if 
 
1 Anne Summers, ‘Militarism in Britain before the Great War’, History Workshop Journal, vol. 2, no. 1 (1976), 
p. 104.  
2 Cited in Martin Ceadel, Thinking about Peace and War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 23. For 
Prussian/German militarism see Gerhard Ritter, The Sword and the Sceptre: The Problem of Militarism in 
Germany, 4 vols (Eng. tr., London: Allen Lane, 1972–3); Nicholas Stargardt, The German Idea of Militarism: 
Radical and Socialist Critics, 1866–1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Geoff Eley, 
Reshaping the Radical Right: Radical Nationalism and Political Change After Bismarck (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1991). For military culture, see Isabel V. Hull, Absolute Destruction: Military 
Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2005).   
3 Summers, ‘Militarism’, p. 105.  
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more complex and contested, place in the associational culture of interwar Britain, but also 
that they were important in the re-militarisation of state and civil society in the period.  
Prior to Summers’s article, the British historical experience of militarism was 
portrayed in rather different terms.4 Writing in 1902, the Italian historian Guglielmo Ferrero 
noted that militarism in England was ‘reduced to a minimum’.5 Albert Lauterbach, writing 
in 1944, observed that militarism was traditionally less ‘absolute and aggressive’ in Britain 
than in Germany.6 Caroline Playne advanced similar arguments in her 1928 account of the 
‘pre-war mind’ in Britain. She observed that, while militarism existed in Britain, and was 
therefore not a uniquely Prussian experience, it was less natural in comparison to other 
European societies:  
The Briton has little of the sense of the glory of fight and conquest, of the pure, simple military 
spirit . . .  Neither does the Briton care for the order and method of Militarism, the fashion and 
show of Militarism, which appeal to the German. He has no need for conscious display of 
power, no conception of collective ordering of might.7   
For Playne, militarism was ‘acquired rather than instinctive’, and was the ‘product of 
imperialism’.8 That militarism in Britain was ‘reduced to a minimum’, less ‘absolute and 
aggressive’, or less natural than in other countries, seemingly pointed to a continuity in 
British political history. What emerges from such accounts is an image of British 
exceptionalism; militarism in Britain was ‘exceptional, archaic, even exogenous’.9 The 
strength of existing political and parliamentary institutions, as well as social attitudes, so this 
 
4 Olive Anderson’s study of ‘Christian militarism’, which examines the interrelationship between military and 
religious practices and ideals in Britain following the Crimean War, provides another notable contribution to 
the study of militarism in Britain. Olive Anderson, ‘The Growth of Christian Militarism in Mid-Victorian 
Britain’, The English Historical Review, vol. 86, no. 338 (1971), pp. 46–72. 
5 Guglielmo Ferrero, Militarism: A Contribution to the Peace Crusade (London: Ward, Lock & Co., 1902), p. 
279. 
6 Albert T. Lauterbach, ‘Militarism in the Western World: A Comparative Study’, Journal of the History of 
Ideas, vol. 5, no. 4 (1944), p. 458.  
7 Caroline E. Playne, The Pre-War Mind in Britain: An Historical Review (London: Allen & Unwin, 1928), p. 
125.  
8 Ibid., p. 126.  
9 Although militarism in modern societies is conventionally viewed in similar terms. See John R. Gillis (ed.), 
The Militarization of the Western World (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1989), p. 3.  
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narrative ran, consolidated by a peaceable national character meant that where militarism 
existed in Britain, it did so in a muted form. Militarism was constructed as being 
fundamentally divorced from British ideas, values, and sentiments. However, Summers’s 
article challenged these conventional wisdoms and pointed to a number of ways in which 
militarism, in certain guises, was actually both relevant and popular within British society.  
Summers’s analysis has been influential for scholars working in this area since the 
1970s. However, for all the conceptual and analytical rigour of Summers’s article, her 
assertion that ‘popular British militarism after 1918 had nowhere very much to go’ requires 
revision.10 As this thesis demonstrates, institutional, cultural, and popular forms of 
militarism were, in fact, able to continue despite the fear of post-war brutalisation, anti-war 
sentiment, the growth of internationalism, the popularity of inter-war peace movements, 
pacifism, and the support for disarmament and collective security.11 Her conclusion does, 
however, draw attention to a wider problem in debates about British militarism.  
Militarism in Britain, in the last few decades, has been the subject of serious scholarly 
debate. As evidence of militarism in Edwardian Britain, scholars point to the success of 
organisations such as the NSL, the Navy League, and the Imperial Maritime League (IML), 
alongside the growth of martial and militaristic values.12 Similarly, the rise of paramilitary 
 
10 Summers, ‘Militarism’, p. 121.  
11 Jon Lawrence, ‘Forging a Peaceable Kingdom: War, Violence and Fear of Brutalization in Post-First 
World War Britain’, Journal of Modern History, vol. 75, no. 3 (2003), pp. 557–589. 
12 For the Navy League see, in particular, Summers, ‘Militarism’; W.M. Hamilton, Nation and the Navy: 
Methods and Organization of British Navalist Propaganda, 1889–1914 (New York: Garland, 1986); Chapter 
3 of Matthew Johnson, Militarism and the British Left, 1902–1914 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); 
and Chapters 1, 4, and 5 of Frans Coetzee, For Party or Country: Nationalism and the Dilemmas of Popular 
Conservatism in Edwardian Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990). For the National Service League 
see Chapter 4 of Johnson, Militarism; Chapter 2 of Coetzee, For Party of Country; RJQ Adams, ‘The National 
Service League and Mandatory Service in Edwardian Britain’, Armed Forces & Society, vol. 12, no. 1 (1985), 
pp. 53–74; and Matthew Hendley, ‘“Help us to Secure a Strong, Healthy, Prosperous and Peaceful Britain”: 
The Social Arguments of the Campaign for Compulsory Military Service in Britain, 1899–1914’, Canadian 
Journal of History, vol. 30, no. 2 (1995), pp. 261–288. For the IML, see N.C. Fleming, ‘The Imperial Maritime 
League: British Navalism, Conflict, and the Radical Right, c. 1907–1920’, War in History, vol. 23, no. 3 (2016), 
pp. 296–322.  
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youth organisations, such as the Boys’ Brigades, the Lads’ Drill Association, the Jewish 
Lads’ Brigade, and Baden-Powell’s Boy Scouts, as well as the spread of martial juvenile 
literature, has been highlighted to point to the existence of militarism.13 Yet, most current 
studies of British militarism terminate in 1914 and so, in a sense, reflect Summers’s 
account.14 N.C. Fleming’s observation that ‘few militaristic leagues survived the Great War’ 
may be true, however the 1914–1918 conflict did not mark the end of martial values or 
militaristic sentiment in mainstream British political culture.15 This thesis shows that certain 
elements of the popular culture of militarism, alongside militaristic discourses, ideas, and 
practices, were able to survive in the post-war world.16  
 
 
II. The Air and Navy Leagues in Interwar Britain  
One reason why militarism in the interwar years has not received more attention is because 
these years have been widely regarded as ‘a halcyon period for liberal internationalists’.17 
Yet, the Air and Navy Leagues were linked to the two technological arms, accorded the 
 
13 See, for example,  J. O. Springhall, ‘The Boy Scouts, Class and Militarism in Relation to Youth Movements 
1908–1930’, International Review of Social History, vol. 16, no. 2 (1971), pp. 125–158; John Springhall, 
Youth, Empire and Society: British Youth Movements, 1883–1940 (London: Croom Helm, 1977); Martin 
Dedman, ‘Baden-Powell, Militarism, and the ‘Invisible Contributors’ to the Boy Scout Scheme, 1904–1920’, 
Twentieth Century British History, vol. 4, no. 3 (1993), pp. 201–23; Richard A. Voeltz, ‘...A Good Jew and a 
Good Englishman’: The Jewish Lads’ Brigade, 1894–1922’, Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 23, no. 1 
(1988), pp. 119–127; and V. Bailey, ‘Bibles and Dummy Rifles: The Boys’ Brigade’, History Today, vol. 33, 
no. 10 (1983), pp. 5–9.  
14 See, for example, Anne Summers, ‘The Character of Edwardian Nationalism: Three Popular Leagues’, in 
Paul Kennedy and Anthony Nicholls (eds), Nationalist and Racialist Movements in Britain and Germany 
before 1914 (London: Macmillan, 1981), pp. 68–87; Hamilton, Nation and the Navy; Johnson, Militarism; 
Coetzee, For Party or Country; and N. P. Quinney, ‘Edwardian Militarism and Working-Class Youth’ (unpub. 
D.Phil thesis, Oxford University, 1987). 
15 Fleming, ‘The Imperial Maritime League’, p. 321.  
16 The way in which such discourses, ideas, and practices undermines British exceptionalism also raises an 
interesting comparison when examining the extent to which imperial Germany was following a Sonderweg. 
Particularly relevant for the present study is Chapter 3 of Thomas Weber, Our Friend “The Enemy”: Elite 
Education in Britain and Germany before World War 1 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), pp. 
99–136. Weber challenges both the Sonderweg thesis and notions of British exceptionalism and, in studying 
university students in pre-1914 Heidelberg and Oxford, suggests that militarism (both elite and participatory) 
was less prominent among the former and far more prominent among the latter than has traditionally been 
assumed.  
17 Michael Pugh, Liberal Internationalism: The Interwar Movement for Peace in Britain (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), p. 2.  
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highest military and strategic priority by the state in the interwar years, the Royal Air Force 
(RAF) and the Royal Navy. Neither League acted as a mere conduit for the espousal of Air 
Ministry or Admiralty views; indeed, each League at times acted as their most vociferous 
critics. However, links of personnel and objectives often meant that an almost symbiotic 
relationship existed between League and each service department.  
Alongside the Air and Navy Leagues, the Army, Home and Empire League (Army 
League) was formed in 1937 by Leo Amery, the Conservative MP and staunch opponent of 
appeasement, to promote rearmament and campaign for the introduction of conscription.18 
Founded as a non-political organisation, its purpose was to help make ‘defence a national 
issue’.19 The Army League had a membership of several thousand and carried out 
propaganda in a similar style to the Air and Navy Leagues, producing an official organ, 
several publications, and holding public meetings, although on a much smaller scale to either 
organisation. Its leadership, like the Air and Navy Leagues, included ex-servicemen, former 
cabinet ministers, MPs, and military theorists. 
Like the Air and Navy Leagues, the Army League could certainly be considered 
militaristic – indeed, its publications sought to avert potential accusations of militarism – 
and therefore worthy of study in the context of this thesis.20 While there were elements of 
rivalry between the three organisations, they had pronounced and important links in terms 
of objectives and personnel – in fact, the Army League was even founded using the Navy 
League as inspiration.21 Amery was a long-standing Navy League member, while Lord 
 
18 Renamed the Citizen Service League in 1938. 
19 David John Mitchell, ‘The Army League, Conscription and the 1956 Defence Review’ (unpub. PhD thesis, 
University of East Anglia, 2012), p. 93. See Churchill Archives Centre, Churchill College, Cambridge 
(hereafter CHUR), The Papers of Leopold Amery, GBR/0014/AMEL, AMEL 1/7/78 and AMEL 1/7/82, as 
well as The National Archives (hereafter TNA), WO 32/4644, Army and Home and Empire Defence League, 
for the early activities and organisation of the Army League. 
20 Mitchell, ‘The Army League’, p. 80.  
21 Ibid., p. 79.  
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Lloyd, Navy League president in the 1930s, was a member of the Army League’s Council.22 
The Army League also published in support of Air League schemes as we shall see. 
However, as the Army League’s influence was more marginal than either the Air or Navy 
League’s, as it has already received recent scholarly attention, and finally due to limitations 
of time and space, it will not be the focus of study here. It does, however, provide further 
evidence of the existence of organised militarism in the 1930s. 
This thesis is a study of ‘politics in its widest social setting’ as manifested through 
popular leagues, extraparliamentary associations, and social movements not always directly 
linked with political parties.23 One fundamental aim of this thesis is, of course, to situate the 
ideas, activities, and development of the Air and Navy Leagues more firmly within the wider 
landscape of politics, culture, and society in the interwar years than has previously been the 
case.24 The value of studying the aims, ideas, values, practices, and policies of the Air and 
Navy Leagues is that it reveals much about political and associational culture in interwar 
Britain. Both Leagues occupied an intermediate position between ‘high’ and ‘low’ politics, 
and their case offers new insights into the susceptibility of British popular and political 
culture to militarism.25 The two organisations played a prominent part in national debates on 
militarism, internationalism, youth, modernity, and rearmament. Their activities thus allow 
us to re-consider familiar themes in the history of interwar Britain in new and conceptually 
challenging ways – national defence, contested notions of Britain’s national status, the 
 
22 ‘The Army and Home and Empire Defence League’, Rising Strength, August 1938, p. ii.  
23 As defined by Lawrence Black, Redefining British Politics: Culture, Consumerism and Participation, 1954–
70 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 2–4.  
24 The principal exception to such neglect is Philip Noel-Baker, The Private Manufacture of Armaments: 
Volume I (London: Victor Gollancz, 1936), pp. 290–345 which pointed to the influence of private 
manufacturers and bemoaned the Air and Navy League’s constant opposition to collective security and 
disarmament. Alfred Gollin, The Impact of Air Power on the British People and their Government, 1909–1914 
(London: Macmillan, 1989) examines the Air League, although only up until the First World War, while 
Duncan Redford, ‘Collective Security and Internal Dissent: The Navy League’s Attempts to Develop a New 
Policy towards British Naval Power Between 1919 and the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty’, History, vol. 96, 
no. 321 (2011), pp. 48–67 examines the Navy League up until 1922.  
25 Much like the organisations studied by Coetzee. Coetzee, For Party or Country, p. 6.  
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impact of war on British society and politics, political activism, and the relationship between 
state and civil society.  
This thesis will, however, go beyond simply examining the institutional and 
organisational minutiae of each League, and will also explore the place of militaristic 
associational practices, as carried out by each organisation within the interwar years. It will 
also consider Alfred Vagts’s assertion that, ‘generally speaking, militarism flourishes more 
in peacetime than in war’.26 Manifestations of military culture – air shows, naval 
commemorations, and militaristic youth organisations – gained widespread support in the 
1920s and 1930s, despite pacifist and liberal internationalist counter-currents. The Navy 
League – whose raison d’être of achieving, ‘as the primary object of the national policy “the 
Command of the Sea”’– was Britain’s largest naval lobbying organisation in the interwar 
years and, as such, formed an important part of the associational and political culture of the 
period.27 The Air League’s aim of securing ‘the maintenance of an Air Force capable of 
obtaining the mastery of the air wherever it may be called upon to operate’ as well as ‘the 
establishment of a thriving aircraft industry’ was, despite opposition, eventually achieved.28  
The Air and Navy Leagues never publicly embraced their associations with 
militarism and each League went to great lengths to reject the epithet ‘militaristic’. The Navy 
League positioned itself as ‘above party’, as a non-partisan organisation, as well as being a 
‘peace society in the truest sense of the word’, yet it clearly had militaristic overtones.29 The 
Air League, which also claimed to be ‘above party’, was similarly accused of being both 
 
26 Alfred Vagts, A History of Militarism: Civilian and Military (London: Hollis & Carter, 1959), p. 15.  
27 Marine Society & Sea Cadets Archive, London, Navy League Papers (hereafter MSSC), Navy League 
Minute Book 1895 (hereafter NL Minute Book), Meeting held on 11 December 1894, p. 2. See also, ‘The 
Objects of the Navy League’, The Navy League Journal, December 1895, p. 1. 
28 ‘The Policy of the Air League’, Air League Bulletin, December 1923, p. 8. The Aerial League became the 
Air League following a resolution passed on 26 March 1920. The Air League, London, (hereafter AL), Air 
League Minute Book (hereafter AL Minute Book), Extraordinary General Meeting, 26 March 1920, p. 1. The 
‘Imperial Air League’ was initially suggested, although this was dropped – after the Home Office objected to 
the use of ‘imperial’. TNA HO 144/1487/353595, Title Royal: Imperial Air League – Refused, 1917. 
29 Noel-Baker, The Private Manufacture of Armaments, p. 294.  
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‘militaristic’ and ‘reactionary’ but stressed that ‘nothing could be further from the truth’. 
The League argued that it was ‘not militaristic but realistic in its outlook’.30 Stephen 
Marples, the Air League’s first secretary, argued that the it was not ‘an association of 
scaremongers’ and was not characterised by ‘sensationalism’, however this did little to fend 
off such accusations.31  
If, however, one accepts the interpretation advanced by Jon Lawrence that, following 
the First World War, Britain became a ‘peaceable kingdom’ – ‘a nation where both state and 
people had renounced the barbarism of war and turned their back on the “militarist spirit” 
that it had fostered’ then there should be little room for the study of militaristic 
organisations.32 This is supported by current scholarship on both Leagues. One reason for 
this may be the strength of liberal internationalist, pacifist, and anti-war sentiment during the 
interwar period, which has led to the construction of a narrative, encapsulated in recent work 
by Helen McCarthy and Matthew Hendley, which argues that the post-war evolution of 
associational bodies rested on an ability to embrace a non-partisan and domestically 
orientated agenda, free from militaristic discourse.33  
The presence, and relative success, of groups such as the League of Nations Union 
(LNU), created in 1918; the Union of Democratic Control (UDC), formed in 1914; the No 
More War Movement, founded in 1921; the Women’s International League for Peace and 
Freedom, established in 1915; and the Peace Pledge Union (PPU), formed in 1936 and with 
a membership of 130,000 by 1939, appears indicative of such a narrative.34 Indeed, as 
 
30 ‘The Air League to its Members’, Air Review, October 1934, p. 14.  
31 ‘The Mansion House Meeting and its Lessons’, Flight, 10 April 1909, p. 204.  
32 Lawrence, ‘Forging a Peaceable Kingdom’, p. 588. 
33 Helen McCarthy, The British People and the League of Nations: Democracy, Citizenship and 
Internationalism, c.1918–1945 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2011); Matthew Hendley, 
Organized Patriotism and the Crucible of War: Popular Imperialism in Britain, 1914–1932 (Montreal: McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 2012). 
34 For peace activism in the interwar period see Martin Ceadel, Pacifism in Britain 1914–1945: The Defining 
of a Faith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980); Chapters 8, 9, and 10 of James Hinton, Protests and Visions: 
Peace Politics in 20th Century Britain (London: Hutchinson Radius, 1989); Chapters 3, 4, and 5 of David 
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McCarthy shows, ‘whatever its ultimate failures as a mechanism of collective security’, the 
LNU inspired ‘a rich and participatory culture of political protest, popular education and 
civic ritual’.35 Its membership was, at its peak, over 400,000.36 In 1933, the LNU’s journal 
Headway could boast that over one million people had belonged to the Union since its 
inception.37 Assessing the significance of the Air and Navy Leagues is also problematic 
when viewed in the context of the emergence, following the First World War, of an 
international society, of transnational non-state actors, and the wider spirit of 
internationalism.38 However, as this thesis will demonstrate, the Air and Navy Leagues were 
able to survive – and even prosper – in this seemingly inhospitable political and social 
landscape.  
This thesis challenges the idea that there was a straightforward ‘dissolution of 
organized militarism’ following the First World War or that ‘[m]ilitaristic values were 
unacceptable’.39 It argues that Hendley’s assertion that the ‘historiographical consensus on 
continuity between the pre-war and interwar period needs to be expanded to include patriotic 
 
Cortright, Peace: A History of Movements and Ideas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); 
Chapters 3 and 4 of Cecelia Lynch, Beyond Appeasement: Interpreting Interwar Peace Movements in World 
Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999); Chapters 5 and 6 of Richard Overy, The Morbid Age: 
Britain and the Crisis of Civilisation, 1919–1939 (London: Allen Lane, 2009); and Chapters 5 and 6 of Michael 
Howard, War and the Liberal Conscience (London: Temple Smith, 1978). David C. Lukowitz, ‘British 
Pacifists and Appeasement: The Peace Pledge Union’, Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 9, no. 1 (1974), 
p. 117. Even the British Legion could claim a membership of 400,000 by 1938. Niall Barr, The Lion and the 
Poppy: British Veterans, Politics, and Society, 1921–1939 (London: Praeger, 2005), p. 58. 
35 McCarthy, The British People, p. 1.  
36 Ibid., p. 4.  
37 Ibid., p. 4. See ‘The Million’, Headway, April 1933, p. 1. 
38 See, in particular, Daniel Gorman, The Emergence of International Society in the 1920s (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012); Akira Iriye, Global Community: The Role of International Organizations 
in the Making of the Contemporary World (Berkley, CA: University of California Press, 2002); Daniel Laqua 
(ed.), Internationalism Reconfigured: Transnational Ideas and Movements Between the World Wars 
(London: I.B. Tauris, 2011); Chapter 6 of Casper Sylvest’s British Liberal Internationalism, 1880–1930: 
Making Progress? (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009); and Pugh, Liberal Internationalism. For 
the intellectual antecedents of interwar liberal internationalism, see Sandi E. Cooper, Patriotic Pacifism: 
Waging War on War in Europe 1815–1914 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991); and Martin H. Geyer and 
Johannes Paulmann (eds), The Mechanics of Internationalism: Culture, Society and Politics from the 1840s to 
the First World War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).  
39 Bernhard Rieger, Technology and the Culture of Modernity in Britain and Germany, 1890–
1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 268; Hendley, Organized Patriotism, p. 228. 
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and imperialist organizations’ must also incorporate militaristic organisations.40 The First 
World War did not mark a terminus for organised militarism. It demonstrates that militarism 
was able to manifest itself in myriad ways and that, even in an age of internationalism, 
militarism was able to enjoy resonance in the popular and political culture of interwar 
Britain. The Air and Navy Leagues successfully countered the propaganda of liberal 
internationalist, pacifist, and anti-war organisations, although met with staunch opposition 
from such groups. This thesis also argues that, through the militarisation of sections of 
British youth and the promotion of rearmament and military strength in the form of popular 
civic ritual, both the Air and Navy Leagues were able to contribute to the military 
preparedness of the nation at the outbreak of the Second World War. The thesis contends 
that, far from being marginalised for their associations with militarism as one might expect, 
both the Air and Navy Leagues were able to carry out their work on a local, national, and 
imperial scale, and were able to command the support of figures from the political, social, 
and military elite. 
The remainder of this introduction will first explore the theoretical and conceptual 
issues surrounding militarism, and the similarly amorphous concepts of military culture and 
militarisation, before examining how relevant these were to the British state, and wider civil 
society, in the interwar period. In doing so, it contends that militarism is an important 
category of historical analysis. The introduction will conclude by outlining the structure and 
organisation of the thesis. 
 
 
III. Understanding Militarism  
While this thesis does not attempt to achieve a conceptual or epistemological re-examination 
of militarism, or offer any new definitional framework, it seeks to address some of the main 
 
40 Hendley, Organized Patriotism, p. 4.  
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debates surrounding the term as a necessary precursor to exploring militarism as a 
phenomenon in the interwar years and how militaristic organisations operated more broadly 
within civil society. As an analytical and explanatory term, militarism has eluded any sort of 
discernible scholarly consensus.41 Attempts to historicise the conceptual and theoretical 
debates surrounding its meaning even form the basis of study in its own right.42 Militarism, 
militarisation, and even military culture, often overlap in scholarly literature.43 Where the 
term ‘militarism’ is used, it is altogether too frequently misunderstood, used polemically as 
a term of abuse, or simplistically conflated with terms such as fascism or imperialism.44 As 
Matthew Johnson has observed, negative connotations surrounding the term have been 
apparent ‘since the first recorded usage of the term in English, in the 1860s, when the Italian 
patriot Giuseppe Garibaldi’s disdainful reference to ‘that disease of modern times, known 
under the sinister name of militarism’ was widely reported in the British press’.45 Michael 
Howard has similarly warned that militarism ‘has become a term of such general illiterate 
abuse that the scholar must use it with care’, although his advice has not always been 
heeded.46 Arguments such as Hendley’s that, following the First World War, there simply 
existed a ‘hostility to militarism’, or that ‘the post-war world was not a hospitable place for 
militaristic Edwardian patriotic leagues’ are therefore particularly problematic.47  
Militarism is traditionally understood as militancy, or aggressive foreign policy on 
the part of the state, a preponderance of the military in the state, and, finally, and most 
 
41 Indeed, little has changed since the German socialist Karl Liebknecht pointed to the multifarious nature of 
militarism over a century ago. Karl Liebknecht, Militarism and Anti-Militarism (Eng. tr., Glasgow: Socialist 
Labour Press, 1917). 
42 Volker R. Berghahn, Militarism: The History of an International Debate 1861–1979 (Leamington Spa: Berg, 
1981).  
43 As Laurence Cole makes clear in his study of military culture and popular patriotism in Austria. Laurence 
Cole, Military Culture and Popular Patriotism in Late Imperial Austria (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2014), p. 12. 
44 Berghahn, Militarism, p. 2.  
45 Johnson, Militarism, p. 4.  
46 Michael Howard, War in European History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), p. 109. 
47 Hendley, Organized Patriotism, p. 10 and p. 64.   
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commonly, the problem of civil-military relations.48 As Johnson notes, militarism – 
understood as conflict between civil and military spheres of society – may refer ‘broadly to 
the excessive or disproportionate political influence of a military caste within societies 
nominally under civilian leadership, or to the freedom of the armed forces to act 
independently of civilian political oversight and control’.49 Certainly, Vagts understood 
certain aspects of militarism in such institutional terms. Militarism, for Vagts, represented 
‘a domination of the military man over the civilian, an undue preponderance of military 
demands, an emphasis on military considerations, spirit, ideals and scales of value, in the 
life of states’.50 However, Vagts did also outline the ideological elements of militarism such 
as ‘the qualities of caste and cult, authority and belief’.51 The political role of the military in 
society is clearly a common theme within the scholarly literature on militarism. Such 
definitions are, of course, problematic and in part neglect the fact that civil and military 
spheres of any society often overlap. Indeed, defining militarism simply in institutional 
terms, as the disproportionate political influence of a military caste or purely as an 
overemphasis on the military considerations of the state, ignores many of the broader cultural 
and social aspects of militarism. Understood in such terms, militarism had little relevance to 
the British political system in the interwar years.  
Stig Förster’s definition of militarism ostensibly adopts a similar line. For Förster, 
‘militarism means the purposeful appropriation of the armed forces for internal politics 
and/or foreign aggression, along with an overemphasis on military policy compared to other 
areas of politics’.52 However, as Förster stresses, in order to understand militarism, a broader 
appreciation of the social and cultural implications of the term is necessary. The advantage 
 
48 For civil-military relations generally, see Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and 
Practice of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957).  
49 Johnson, Militarism, p. 5.  
50 Vagts, History of Militarism, p. 14.  
51 Ibid., p. 13.  
52 Cited in Cole, Military Culture, p. 12.  
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of a broadly conceived understanding of militarism, Förster argues, ‘lies in the fact that it 
allows for a broad spectrum of manifestations to be grasped. This is especially relevant to 
the fact that the phenomenon of militarism is in no sense confined to the military sphere.’53 
This distinction, and necessarily broad definition of militarism, is significant and particularly 
pertinent to the British case. As Nicholas Stargardt has demonstrated in his work, militarism 
is not merely about institutions and power, but also about ideas, culture, and society.54 Given 
such terminological variations, it is indeed difficult to offer any general definition of 
militarism or even to speak of militarism as one phenomenon. Militarism was certainly not 
a crude, monolithic entity, but a much more multifaceted problem.55 Militarism was 
appropriated differently by different states, by different organisations and groups. As John 
Gillis argues, ‘judging one’s own society against this “other”, even if it is an ideal type, begs 
the question of whether militarism itself might mean different things in different societies’.56  
As well as being understood as a problem of civil-military relations, there are also 
distinctions between ‘official’ and ‘popular’ forms of militarism. As Laurence Cole outlines, 
‘official’ militarism includes ‘foreign policy, the state’s policy towards its armed forces, 
army politics, preparation for war, and financial and practical support for a public ‘military 
culture’’. ‘Popular’ militarism, on the other hand, has two principal attributes. In institutional 
terms, Cole argues that popular militarism is independent of the state ‘even if it may 
cooperate with organs of the state, receive official backing from government, and include 
employees of state institutions among its proponents (albeit acting in a private capacity as 
citizens)’. The second feature of ‘popular’ militarism ‘implies the spontaneous and active 
participation of broad sections of the population – not just of the social elites and bourgeoisie 
 
53 Cole, Military Culture, p. 13.  
54 Stargardt, German Idea of Militarism, p. 5.  
55 Johnson, Militarism, p. 10.  
56 Gillis, The Militarization of the Western World, p. 2.  
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– in activities which support the armed forces or help to cultivate a ‘military culture’ in 
society at large’.57 For Cole, the exploration of militarism in terms of its social and cultural 
manifestations has led to the increasing relevance of the notion of ‘military culture’. Isabell 
V. Hull understands military culture in a largely organisational and institutional sense, to 
assess ‘why an army acts as it does in war’.58 Yet, such an approach neglects the important, 
and in many ways more interesting, interaction between civil and military spheres in 
peacetime as Cole has noted. He instead employs a broader approach to military culture to 
incorporate the place, meaning, and impact of military symbols, ideas, and behaviours in 
society much more widely.59 In attempting to explore such symbols, ideas, and behaviours, 
Cole is particularly interested in ‘patriotic activities in the public sphere that revolved around 
the military’ as well as military veterans’ associations.60 This thesis is similarly interested in 
military culture, as defined by Cole, in interwar Britain.  
 
 
IV. Militarism in Interwar Britain? 
War, and the preparation for war, was rarely regarded as a normal or desirable social activity 
in Britain in the interwar years.61 There were fears that the First World War had had a 
brutalising impact on British society, a very palpable anti-war sentiment in the period, 
perhaps most vividly expressed in the ‘King and Country’ debate in the Oxford Union in 
February 1933, the East Fulham by-election in October 1933, numerous anti-war 
publications, demonstrations, and parades which had the purpose of ‘awaken[ing] people to 
 
57 Cole, Military Culture, p. 13.  
58 Hull, Absolute Destruction, p. 93.  
59 Cole, Military Culture, p. 16.   
60 Ibid., p. 17. 
61 According to Michael Mann, this is as a central facet of militarism: Michael Mann, ‘The Roots and 
Contradictions of Modern Militarism’, New Left Review, vol. 162 (1987), p. 35.  
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the evils of war’.62 There was also, of course, understandably a concern about the 
psychological trauma of the First World War.63  
If ‘the British took pride in their own distinctive militarism’ prior to the First World 
War, this pride appeared far less prominent in the aftermath of the conflict.64 Perhaps the 
most obvious repudiation of militarism, and expression of a desire for peace, was the Peace 
Ballot of 1934 to 1935. The Peace Ballot was a LNU initiative in which almost 12 million 
adults voted on questions relating to the League of Nations and collective security. Philip 
Noel-Baker, Labour MP and a founder of the LNU, argued that the Ballot ‘proved beyond a 
doubt that the British people understood the policy of world disarmament and the collective 
security of the league’. Lord Robert Cecil, the LNU’s president, agreed, stating that Britons 
had shown ‘overwhelming approval’ of collective security.65 The Ballot, however, has been 
interpreted in a number of ways. The LNU’s refusal to denounce the international use of 
force led Winston Churchill to note that the Ballot ‘combined the contradictory propositions 
of reduction of armaments and forcible resistance to aggression’, while Lord Beaverbrook, 
proprietor of the Daily Express, described it as the ‘ballot of blood’.66 Since then, historians 
have offered several different readings. Martin Ceadel argues that the Ballot revealed the 
strength of public feeling behind collective security, only if understood as a ‘middle way 
between isolationism and militarism’.67 David Edgerton similarly notes that the Ballot is 
 
62 Lawrence, ‘Peaceable Kingdom’; Lukowitz, ‘British Pacifists and Appeasement’, p. 115. For the Oxford 
Union debate, see Martin Ceadel, ‘The King and Country Debate’, Historical Journal, vol. 22, no. 2 (1979), 
pp. 397–422. For the East Fulham by-election, see Martin Ceadel, ‘Interpreting East Fulham’, in C. Cook and 
J. Ramsden (eds), By-Elections in British Politics (London: Macmillan, 1973), pp. 94–111.  
63 Susan Kingsley Kent, Aftershocks: Politics and Trauma in Britain, 1918–1931 (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2009).  
64 Martin Pugh, State and Society: A Social and Political History of Britain Since 1870 (London: Bloomsbury 
Academic, 2012), p. 116.  
65 Philip Noel-Baker, The First World Disarmament Conference 1932–1933, and Why it Failed (Oxford: 
Pergamon, 1979), p. 141; J.A. Thompson, ‘The Peace Ballot and the Public’, Albion, vol. 13, no. 4 (1981), p. 
381. 
66 Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: Volume One: The Gathering Storm (London: Cassell, 1950), 
p. 152; Stephen Koss, The Rise and Fall of the Political Press in Britain (London: Fontana, 1984), p. 538.   
67 Martin Ceadel, ‘The First British Referendum: The Peace Ballot, 1934–5’, The English Historical Review, 
vol. 95, no. 377 (1980), p. 838.  
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‘often misleadingly treated as an endorsement of pacifism’, while Donald Birn claims that 
the assertion that the Ballot showed that public opinion was pacifist was ‘one of the great 
myths’ of the 1930s.68 Approaching the topic from a different angle, McCarthy interprets the 
Ballot as a case study in the democratisation of foreign policy and international relations.69 
Ceadel’s classification of war and peace is helpful to consider when exploring the 
place of militarism in the interwar years. For instance, the actions of the state cannot be said 
to encompass militarism, or at least Ceadel’s definition of militarism. Ceadel argues that 
militarism ‘is the view that war is necessary to human development and therefore a positive 
good. All wars are justified . . . even aggressive ones.’70 However, this definition is rather 
limited and, as A.J. Coates has observed, underestimates ‘the diffusion and consequent 
influence of militarism’.71 More relevant to British military policy, perhaps, is Ceadel’s 
notion of ‘crusading’ – a justification of an aggressive war as a promotion of justice, order, 
or ideological ends.72 The imperial aspect of British aviation certainly had elements of 
‘crusading’ as demonstrated by British ‘air policing’ in Iraq in the early 1920s.73 The 
application of aviation and naval policy domestically seems to have had elements of 
‘defencism’ – preparing for, and if necessary, engaging in war of a defensive nature – as did 
the construction of the Singapore Naval Base in the 1920s and 1930s.74 Ceadel’s typology 
has, however, met with strong criticism. Coates argues that Ceadel’s treatment of militarism 
is far too ‘narrow’ and also rejects the notion that there is any distinction between 
 
68 David Edgerton, Warfare State: Britain, 1920–1970 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 54; 
Donald Birn, The League of Nations Union 1918–1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 143. 
69 Helen McCarthy, ‘Democratizing British Foreign Policy: Rethinking the Peace Ballot, 1934–1935’, Journal 
of British Studies, vol. 49, no. 2 (2010), p. 361. 
70 Ceadel, Peace and War, p. 4.  
71 A.J. Coates, The Ethics of War (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), p. 40.  
72 Ceadel, Peace and War, p. 43. 
73 See Chapter 2 of David E. Omissi, Air Power and Colonial Control: The Royal Air Force, 1919–1939 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990). 
74 Ceadel, Peace and War, p. 72.  
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‘militarism’ and ‘crusading’.75 ‘The hallmark of militarism’, for Coates at least, is a ‘lust for 
war’.76 However, as Johnson has noted, Coates fails to acknowledge that Ceadel’s typology 
is not one of ‘empirical or descriptive categories’ but one of ‘ideal types and paradigms’.77 
As Ceadel himself observes, ‘almost every typology suggests that its categories are more 
rigidly differentiated than they in fact are: in reality they usually blur into each other’.78 
While Ceadel’s definition of militarism is perhaps too narrow, his wider typology of war and 
peace provides a useful model for thinking about the actions of the British state in the 
interwar years.  
Edgerton’s definition of liberal militarism, dependent on state support for military 
science, technology, and industry as opposed to Prussian-style conscription, is particularly 
relevant to this thesis.79 According to Edgerton, the British state was the ‘pioneer of modern, 
technologically focused warfare; its naval and air forces long led the world’.80 Britain was 
thus developing as a ‘warfare state’. The scale of interwar British naval and aerial 
expenditure appears contradictory given supposed commitments to internationalism, peace, 
disarmament, and collective security.81 It is, of course, ‘one of the principal responsibilities 
of governments to make provision for the nation’s defence, and the fulfilment of this duty 
does not in itself constitute a manifestation of ‘militarism’’. As Johnson notes, ‘what 
distinguishes the latter phenomenon . . . is the implication that military, (or naval [or aerial]) 
expenditure is significantly in excess of the actual defensive needs of a state or that concern 
 
75 Coates, Ethics of War, pp. 40–42.  
76 Ibid., p. 43.  
77 Johnson, Militarism, p. 8.  
78 Ceadel, Peace and War, p. 19.  
79 Edgerton, Warfare State and David Edgerton, ‘Liberal Militarism and the British State’, New Left Review, 
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80 Edgerton, Warfare State, p. 1.  
81 How far Britain had committed to the process of disarmament is the source of considerable debate. See John 
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with military or naval [or aerial] power has become an overweening obsession’.82 As well 
as maintaining high levels of defence expenditure, Edgerton has also noted that ‘the 
Edwardian tradition of thinking about warlike strategy in political-economic terms was also 
very evident in the 1930s’. Basil Liddell Hart’s concept of the ‘British Way in Warfare’, the 
practice of ‘minimising resources devoted to warfare and of economy in the use of force’, 
had air and sea power at its core.83  
Two distinct forms of militarism in the period, then, seem to have existed – naval 
and aerial militarism – making the focus of this thesis all the more relevant. The main, and 
most vocal, proponent of naval militarism (or ‘navalism’) in the interwar years, despite the 
perceived decline of the Royal Navy, was the Navy League. Navalism, defined by ‘big 
navies, high level of naval armaments, and an escalating maritime arms race’, had been a 
‘central part of the discourse on militarization before the outbreak of World War I’.84 The 
Navy League’s conception of navalism, however, also went far beyond understanding the 
navy in terms of national defence. As Johnson writes, navalism must be understood as ‘a 
political, indeed ideological, movement, based on a conception of naval power not simply 
as a legitimate arm of national defence but as the basis of national might and prestige’.85 
There remained cultural and institutional expressions of navalism in the interwar years – in 
many respects, there still existed a ‘cult of the navy’ – which represented an important aspect 
of British national identity.86 In terms of naval strength, one historian has argued that ‘no 
 
82 Johnson, Militarism, p. 67.  
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84 Dirk Bönker, Militarism in a Global Age: Naval Ambitions in Germany and the United States Before World 
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doubt exists that the British Navy was the strongest in the world when the Second World 
War broke out in 1939’.87 
Can one also point to the existence of aerial militarism in the interwar years? The 
imperial role of the RAF in the 1920s – it was, as Edgerton has noted, the ‘only air force in 
the world whose primary mission was strategic bombing’ – and the priority given to aerial 
rearmament in the 1930s has led Edgerton to refer to the phenomenon of ‘airforceism’.88 
From its inception, the Air League had the principal aim of emphasising the importance of 
aerial strength to the British Empire, ‘upon which its commerce, communications, defence 
and its very existence depended’.89 The League advanced this aim through a programme of 
public education and political lobbying. This programme included lectures, tours, pamphlets, 
printed propaganda, exhibitions, newspaper articles, and the creation of the Air Defence 
Cadet Corps (ADCC). Such activities were characteristic of interwar extraparliamentary 
associations. Less common, however, and perhaps the Air League’s most effective tool for 
the cultivation of ‘airmindedness’ and aerial militarism, was the introduction of Empire Air 
Day as will be explored in Chapter 7.  
The Air League’s promotion of airmindedness was both a cultural and political 
phenomenon.90 Moreover, the League’s conception of aerial power, much like Johnson’s 
definition of navalism, was concerned with projecting images of might and prestige as well 
as national defence. Brett Holman’s distinction between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ forms of 
airmindedness is also useful in understanding the form of airmindedness promoted by the 
Air League. Positive forms of airmindedness, Holman notes, embraced aviation as a peaceful 
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and beneficial tool for ending wars, promoting trade and commerce, and as something which 
had the potential to transform society. Conversely, negative, more militaristic, forms of 
airmindedness encompassed fears that, in the next war, aeroplanes would lead to the ruin of 
civilisation and the death of millions through aerial bombardment.91 Holman’s distinction is 
neatly encapsulated in the reflection of the first Englishman to fly a circular mile and Air 
League stalwart, J.T.C. Moore-Brabazon, that ‘[f]light, which was to knit the world together 
into a true internationalism, where to know all was to forgive all, has become the bogey and 
terror of the world from which we hide like rats’.92 Of course, in practice, positive and 
negative forms of airmindedness often overlapped as we shall see.   
 
 
V. The Militarisation of Interwar Britain? 
Studying militarism requires reflection upon the methodological and theoretical issues 
surrounding the related concept of militarisation. Is it profitable, or even possible, to speak 
of a militarisation of state or society in the interwar period? In 1940, Britain had the largest 
naval and aircraft production of any world power. In terms of defence expenditure and 
military preparedness, Britain was one of the most heavily militarised, modern states in 
Europe.93 The nation’s technological, industrial, and military capacity seems remarkable – 
even paradoxical – in the context of a long-established historical narrative which presents 
interwar Britain as a nation which had repudiated militarism, embraced disarmament, and 
relied upon international diplomacy for the preservation of peace. The promotion of military 
supremacy lay at the heart of Air and Navy League policy in the interwar years and, in a 
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93 Edgerton, Warfare State, p. 58.  
21 
 
sense, this can be seen as an attempt to achieve the militarisation of both state and civil 
society. However, militarisation is also a problematic term with multiple meanings.  
According to Gillis, ‘militarism is the older concept, usually defined as either a 
dominance of the military over civilian authority, or more generally, as the prevalence of 
warlike values in society’. Militarisation for Gillis, ‘does not imply the formal dominance of 
the military or the triumph of a particular ideology’.94 Johnson expands this definition and 
outlines two distinct forms of militarisation. First: 
where the subordination of society to military needs takes the form of an acceptance of military 
claims on economic or material resources, and where the energies of the state are channelled 
accordingly into military priorities such as armaments production rather than being exerted in 
other social or civilian directions, we might talk of the militarization of the state. 
Second: 
where, on the other hand, we are dealing with military attempts to harness not merely the 
economic or industrial resources of a society but the civilian population itself – that is to say, 
where the state endeavours to ‘make a soldier out of each civilian’, where the nation is 
conceived as the ‘quiescent army’, and where the problem concerns nothing less than the 
transformation of civilian society – it is more helpful and accurate to talk of the militarization 
of society.95  
Defined in such terms, one can reasonably speak of a militarisation of the state, as the high 
level of defence expenditure and military preparedness outlined suggests. The Air and Navy 
League attempted to create a particularly militarised, technocratic, and modern air-and-sea-
mindedness in the interwar years and attempted to shape the ideas and attitudes of civil 
society in a particularly militarised fashion.  
If militarisation is understood as ‘the contradictory and tense social process in which 
civil society organizes itself for the production of violence’ alongside the promotion of 
militaristic and martial values by militaristic extraparliamentary associations, then, perhaps, 
 
94 Gillis, The Militarization of the Western World, p. 1.  
95 Johnson, Militarism, p. 6.  
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Britain was more susceptible to the process of militarisation than previously understood.96 
In considering the militarisation of society, Emilio Willems has argued that three different 
processes need to be included within any definition of the concept:  
first, the establishment and development of structures within society, such as paramilitary 
organizations or patriotic associations, which assist in and enable the expansion of the armed 
forces . . . secondly, the development of an ideological system, which views war as essential 
and historically necessary, and argues that readiness for armed conflict must take priority over 
other political goals, create propaganda to these ends, identify enemies to be overcome, and 
seek to establish a consensus within society around a militaristic programme; and thirdly, the 
spread of military values, ideals, styles of behaviour, and thought across all sections and 
classes of society.97 
Emerging from Willems’s definition is the importance of exploring the cultural 
manifestations of militarisation. This thesis will particularly focus on the first and third 
elements of Willems’s definition. It understands the militarisation of society as ‘a way of 
denoting the increased deployment of material and financial resources towards military 
activity, the greater involvement of social actors in military institutions, and the growing 
visibility and prominence of the military in cultural terms’.98 It also understands 
militarisation as a historical process, an ‘ever-changing set of relationships between military 
and society’.99 
 
 
VI. Organisation of the Thesis  
In examining these issues, this thesis uses a diverse range of sources, including minute 
books, private papers, memoirs, parliamentary proceedings, posters, pamphlets, government 
records, local and national newspapers, journals, letters, oral testimony collections, 
newsreels, photographs, and satirical cartoons. As well as drawing on more traditional 
sources, the thesis is also interested in the visual and material culture of conflict – which will 
 
96 Michael Geyer, ‘The Militarization of Europe, 1914–1945’, in Gillis (ed.), The Militarization of the Western 
World, p. 79.  
97 As cited in Cole, Military Culture, pp. 14–15.  
98 Ibid., p. 13.  
99 Gillis, The Militarization of the Western World, p. 3.  
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be principally explored in chapters on Empire Air Day, Trafalgar Day, as well as chapters 
on the ADCC and the Navy League Sea Cadet Corps (SCC).  
This thesis is organised thematically, rather than chronologically, and is divided into 
two parts. Part A (Chapters 1–3) looks at the relationship between the Air League, the Navy 
League, and the state. It examines how each League attempted to shape official policy and 
how they negotiated the rise of internationalist sentiment. Although each League were the 
most vocal proponents for military supremacy in the period, neither were unrelenting 
detractors of the state; indeed, there existed many formal (and informal) linkages between 
the state and each League as Part A will show. Chapter 1 will provide an organisational and 
institutional overview of the Air and Navy Leagues from their inception through to the 
outbreak of the Second World War and sets up the following chapters. Chapter 2 examines 
how both Leagues negotiated the rise of – and interacted with – issues of disarmament, arms 
limitations, pacifism, collective security, and international diplomacy. Chapter 3 looks at 
how the Leagues attempted to promote aerial and naval rearmament respectively. At the core 
of the Air and Navy League’s ethos, for the most part, was the promotion of military 
supremacy, yet this was not always without controversy as Chapters 2 and 3 highlight. 
Part B (Chapters 4–7) details how the Leagues attempted to promote an air and sea-
mindedness within society. Chapters 4 and 5 examine the educational efforts of the Air and 
Navy Leagues and the creation of militaristic youth organisations in the form of the ADCC 
and the SCC. The ethos of each Corps – much of which revolved around service, discipline, 
patriotism, and duty – linked citizenship, physical culture, and a militarised masculinity 
among boys. The ADCC and SCC were used to extoll the virtues of air and sea power to 
both state and civil society alike, to legitimate the Air and Navy League’s aims and 
objectives, and to draw together civil and military spheres of society. Chapter 6 highlights 
the Navy League’s interaction with public ritual and military ceremony in the form of its 
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celebration of Trafalgar Day, held annually to commemorate the death of Admiral Horatio 
Nelson, while Chapter 7, the final chapter, examines the Air League’s construction of a 
distinctly militarised aerial theatre in the form of Empire Air Day.  
The nature, causes, and consequences of militarism in interwar British society are 
something this thesis will examine in detail. Although the place of militaristic leagues in 
interwar Britain indicates continuity, militarism, in all its forms, was clearly unacceptable to 
a nation ravaged by war. Aerial and naval militarism was particularly technocratic, modern, 
and encompassed both ‘official’ and ‘popular’ forms of militarism as the thesis will show. 
Certain forms of institutional, organisational, and cultural militarism were able to exist, 
although they often met with opposition. The relationship between militarism and 
internationalism was oppositional, tense, and often ambiguous as we shall see. In terms of 
spending on armaments and military preparation, the British state, much as it was prior to 
the First World War, was one of the most heavily militarised states in Europe. Militarism in 
interwar Britain was able to exist as an ideological, cultural, political, and military 
phenomenon; the Air and Navy Leagues played an important role in this.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part A: 
Militarism and the State 
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Chapter 1: Scaremongers and Sensationalists? The Origins, Aims, and 
Activities of the Air and Navy Leagues, c.1895–1939  
Hendley has recently argued that the ‘history of patriotic and imperialist organizations in 
early twentieth century Britain is incomplete. There has been little effort to establish 
continuity between the pre-war and post-war periods.’ As Hendley notes, much of the 
historiography on organised patriotism has taken its chronological lead from works such as 
Arthur Marwick’s The Deluge, which argues that ‘most of the existing social attitudes and 
social structures were swept away by the war’. Adopting this narrative of rupture, existing 
studies of organised patriotism terminate in 1914 ‘as if no further comment were necessary’.1 
Hendley instead argues that the First World War was a ‘crucible’ for organised patriotism, 
but it did not destroy it.2  
According to Hendley, however, militaristic organisations were not able to survive 
the ‘crucible’ of war, yet this ignores many nuances and notable continuities – and indeed 
discontinuities – between pre-war and interwar British political culture.3 This is especially 
difficult to justify, as Hendley only engages with one militaristic, single-purpose 
organisation, the NSL. As this thesis demonstrates, organised militarism did, in fact, survive 
the ‘crucible’ of war. Indeed, in certain forms, popular, cultural, and institutional types of 
militarism were able to flourish as we shall see. This chapter will focus on the origins, aims, 
and activities of the Air and Navy Leagues, their political complexion, their membership 
composition, and their relationship with officialdom. It will also consider the role of women 
within each League, as well as the finances and charitable endeavours of each organisation, 
and how, despite their militaristic nature, they were able to find a place – often complex and 
contested – in post-First World War Britain.  
 
1 Hendley, Organized Patriotism, pp. 2–3. Arthur Marwick, The Deluge: British Society and the First World 
War (London: Bodley Head, 1965). 
2 Hendley, Organized Patriotism, p. 4.  
3 Ibid., p. 10; p. 64; p. 228.  
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I. The Formation of the Navy League and the Command of the Sea 
The first page of the first issue of The Navy League Journal – the Navy League’s official 
organ until replaced by The Navy – warned that ‘by the Navy we stand or fall: if that is weak, 
there is unspeakable trial of war before us, war in which we must be worsted and trampled 
upon by our conquerors’.4 Founded in 1895, the League’s raison d’être focused, as has been 
noted, on securing, ‘as the primary object of national policy, The Command of the Sea’. The 
League aimed to ‘spread information showing the vital importance to the British Empire of 
the naval supremacy upon which depend its trade, empire & national existence’.5 As one of 
the largest extraparliamentary associations in Britain prior to the First World War, and a key 
part of the liberal political culture of the period, the Navy League was responsible for 
exerting considerable influence over government naval policy.6 On the eve of the First World 
War, the Navy League boasted nearly 125,000 members in more than 150 branches and so 
represented one of the largest associational presences in Edwardian Britain.7 While it could 
claim 250,000 members by 1916, its appeal for one million members was never achieved in 
the interwar years. The League was not, however, the only organisation interested in 
Britain’s naval defences.  
The IML was formed in 1907 by two former Navy League members, Harold Frazer 
Wyatt and Lionel Graham Horton-Smith, a product of divisions over the style of navalism 
pursued by the Navy League. As Fleming notes, since its advent, two contending approaches 
to activism had existed within the Navy League. The first position, maintained by an albeit 
 
4 Cited in Noel-Baker, The Private Manufacture of Armaments, p. 291.  
5 MSSC, NL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 11 December 1894, pp. 3–4. 
6 The League’s influence was demonstrated during the 1909 naval estimates crisis and the January 1910 general 
election. The ongoing refrain ‘we want eight, and we won’t wait’ from the Navy League in favour of the 
construction of dreadnoughts was particularly significant. See Robert J. Blyth, Andrew Lambert and Jan 
Rüger (eds) The Dreadnought and the Edwardian Age (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011). Coetzee, For Party or 
Country, p. 121.  
7 ‘Navy League Presentation to Mr. Robert Yerburgh, M.P.’, The Navy, November 1913, p. 314. For pre-First 
World War membership figures see Coetzee, For Party or Country, p. 138. 
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influential minority within the League, saw the organisation as ‘an unofficial overseer of 
naval policy, and were prepared to use politics to exert pressure against the decision-making 
processes of naval professionals and ministers’. Conversely, the vast majority of members 
were more cautious of antagonising the Admiralty and instead stressed the importance of 
public education.8 It was the clash of these contrasting positions that led to the formation of 
the IML. Viewed as ‘a group of malcontents to whom every official action is ipso facto 
foolish if not traitorous’ by The Navy League Journal, the IML was concerned almost 
entirely by navalist preoccupations. Yet, as Fleming highlights, the advent of the IML did 
not precipitate an exodus of members from the Navy League.9  
The IML frequently held public meetings, published pamphlets, books, letters, and 
other ephemera, and launched a number of public campaigns to strengthen Britain’s 
defences. However, while the IML was influential in its early years, by the outbreak of the 
First World War its influence had somewhat waned (both Wyatt and Horton-Smith had 
resigned by this point). The relationship between the IML and the Navy League had initially 
been hostile, however, by the outbreak of conflict, it was agreed that ‘both organisations 
should join forces and pursue united activities’.10 The IML finally wound up in April 1921 
‘owing to a lack of public interest’, although not before approaching the Navy League to 
combine into one organisation.11 The Navy League’s terms for the amalgamation were 
rejected by the IML, drawing an end to the divisive relationship between the two bodies.12 
 
 
 
 
8 Fleming, ‘The Imperial Maritime League’, p. 297.  
9 Ibid., pp. 296–297.  
10 Ibid., p. 320. 
11 Ibid., p. 321; MSSC, NL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 11 March 1921, p. 1. 
12 MSSC, NL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 21 March 1921, p. 2. On the Society of 
Islanders, a more ‘secret’ organisation than either the Navy League or the IML, see Michael Humphries, 
‘‘Perfectly Secret and Perfectly Democratic’: Lord Esher and the Society of Islanders, 1909–1914’, The 
English Historical Review, vol. CXXXVII, no. 528 (2012), pp. 1156–1179. 
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II. An ‘Association of Scaremongers’? The Formation of the Air League  
The Air League was formed by Marples and Colonel H.S. Massy, the ex-Bengal Lancer and 
the League’s first president, with its early Executive Committee comprised almost entirely 
of ex-servicemen or serving officers.13 The League’s inaugural public meeting was held at 
Mansion House, London in April 1909. Addressing those gathered, Lord Montagu of 
Beaulieu, one of its founding members, moved the following resolution:  
That this meeting of the citizens of London . . . regards with considerable anxiety the rapid 
development of the science and practice of aerial navigation by other nations, and deplores the 
backwardness and apathy shown by this country regarding this new means of communication, 
which is of vital importance from a commercial as well as from a national defence point of 
view; and pledges itself heartily to support the object of the Aerial League of the British 
Empire.14 
The gathering marked the first attempt by the Air League to promote the development of 
aviation for communication, commerce, and national defence on a nationwide scale. Marples 
was careful to stress that the Air League was not ‘an association of scaremongers’ with ‘an 
alarmist programme’ – and Flight similarly warned the League that it should avoid ‘the 
gospel of sensationalism’ – yet the meeting certainly underscored the importance of aviation 
to the nation in fairly alarmist terms.15  
The coverage of the meeting underlined the importance of achieving aeronautical 
mastery for the preservation of Britain. While some newspapers stressed the importance of 
disavowing ‘all intention[s] of acting the part of “scaremongers”’, other reports were 
couched in precisely the sort of alarmist language that Marples attempted to distance the 
 
13 AL, AL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 3 May 1909, p. 2; p. 4. 
14 ‘Flight at the Mansion House’, Flight, 10 April 1909, p. 209. Lord Montagu’s papers at the King’s College 
London, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives (hereafter KCL), unfortunately contain little material 
covering pre-1910: Douglas-Scott-Montagu, Brig Gen John Walter Edward, 2nd Baron (GB0099 KCLMA 
Douglas-Scott-Montagu). However, the Correspondence and Papers of Alfred Charles William Harmsworth, 
Viscount Northcliffe (Add MS 62153-62397) at the British Library (hereafter BL) does include correspondence 
between Montagu and Northcliffe from 1908 onwards (Add MS 62165 B).   
15 ‘The Mansion House Meeting and its Lessons’, Flight, 10 April 1909, p. 204; ‘The Awakening of Public 
Opinion’, Flight, 10 April 1909, p. 213. On scaremongering and rearmament in the period more broadly, see 
A.J.A. Morris, The Scaremongers: The Advocacy of Rearmament, 1896–1914 (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1984). 
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League from.16 For example, The Daily Telegraph warned its readers that: ‘The conquest of 
the air has been achieved . . . the question now is not the conquest of the sky, but which 
nation shall secure its sovereignty . . . it behoves this country to wake up at once.’17  
Much of the Air League’s early work focused on lobbying the political and military 
elite, although it was keen to celebrate the individual feats of aviators and was also concerned 
with education and youth. Unlike the Navy League, the Air League had no official journal 
to publicise its own activities or information initially. It therefore relied heavily on local and 
national newspapers – and on specialist aviation journals, particularly Flight, The Aero, and 
Aerocraft (all founded in 1909), as well as the more polemical The Aeroplane (founded in 
1911) – to detail its work. Membership numbers were not published by the League, and 
while members of the public could join for one guinea, there appear to have been few 
attempts to attain a broad, cross-class, membership.18 Of course, membership numbers were 
not necessarily representative of the overall significance of the League. Prior to the First 
World War, the League focused on securing the support of an array of eminent social, 
political, and military figures, as well as many high-profile members, and it was largely 
successful in this endeavour.19 The Liberal peer Lord Esher was appointed president of the 
League in September 1909, but his tenure was not a harmonious one.20 By December that 
year, he had resigned following a period of increased political lobbying against the Liberal 
 
16 ‘Future of the Flying Machine’, Dundee Evening Telegraph, 6 April 1909, p. 2; ‘Editors Notes’, Aberdeen 
Press and Daily Journal, 7 April 1909, p. 4.  
17 ‘Today’s News’, The Daily Telegraph, 6 April 1909, p. 10.  
18 ‘Aerial League of the British Empire’, London Evening Standard, 20 December 1909, p. 9. 
19 Arthur Balfour, Austen Chamberlain, the Marquis of Salisbury, Sir Edward Grey, Lord Roberts, Lord 
Curzon, Winston Churchill, Rudyard Kipling, H.G. Wells, and others all supported the League in its various 
activities. ‘Navigating the Air’, The Army and Navy Gazette, 10 April 1909, p. 345; Michael Paris, Winged 
Warfare: The Literature and Theory of Aerial Warfare in Britain, 1859–1917 (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1992), p. 90; ‘The Aerial League’, The Times, 25 May 1911, p. 8. 
20 Privately, Esher appeared to have been reluctant to align himself with the Air League from the very beginning 
(his initial response to the League was to offer them a ‘snub’ and ‘throw over the whole thing’). Maurice V. 
Brett (ed.), Journals and Letters of Reginald, Viscount Esher: Vol. 2, 1903–1910 (London: Nicholson 
and Watson, 1934–1938), p. 396. 
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government and a trip by Massy to India (which Esher had not been informed of) to promote 
aviation to Indian officialdom.21  
The outbreak of the First World War, perhaps unsurprisingly, affected the League’s 
activities, with a variety of its schemes being suspended.22 One pressing concern for the 
League throughout the First World War remained the lack of a high-profile president 
following Esher’s resignation in 1909. In late 1917, the League’s long search came to end 
when Lord Montagu agreed to serve as president.23 Montagu oversaw the restructuring of 
the League, the transition from war to peacetime, and was, perhaps most importantly, well-
known throughout the political and aviation community. Montagu’s tenure at the helm of 
the League ended in March 1920 – although he continued to be involved with the 
organisation – when J.E.B. Seely (later Lord Mottistone), former Secretary of State for War 
and Under-Secretary of State for Air, became the League’s new president.24 Unfortunately 
for the League, however, after a year, Seely intimated he would no longer be able to 
continue.25 After the matter was held in abeyance, the Duke of Sutherland took the role in 
March 1922.26 Thankfully for the League, Sutherland’s presidency was a long one, lasting 
until 1944.27 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21 Brett, Viscount Esher, p. 425.  
22 Accordingly, the Executive Committee decided not to hold its usual fortnightly meeting, instead meeting 
whenever it was deemed necessary. AL, AL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 17 September 
1914, p. 1. From late 1914 until mid-1917, the League was effectively moribund: it only met three times in 
1915; twice in 1916; and, in 1917, it did not meet until late June (over a year since its last meeting). It did hold 
public lectures and meetings on topics such as ‘Aircraft in the Great War’, but lecturing tours were 
understandably on a much smaller scale than before the outbreak of war. ‘R.A. Institution’, The Broad Arrow: 
The Naval and Military Gazette, 7 January 1916, p. 10. 
23 AL, AL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 2 October 1917, p. 1.  
24 AL, AL Minute Book, Special Meeting of the Executive Committee, 24 March 1920, p. 1.  
25 AL, AL Minute Book, Special Meeting of the Executive Committee, 7 July 1921, p. 2.  
26 AL, AL Minute Book, Special Meeting of the Executive Committee, 7 March 1922, p. 1.  
27 See Appendix I for the Air League’s Executive Committee throughout the interwar years. 
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III. Organisation and Aims of the Navy and Air Leagues 
Navy League 
The Navy League employed a variety of techniques to preserve maritime and navalist values 
within civil society in interwar Britain. The League’s attempts to educate the British public 
on the value of seapower, and to maintain popular pride in Britain’s rich naval heritage, was 
achieved by distributing textbooks to schools, sending letters to the press, hosting public 
meetings and lectures, issuing pamphlets, leaflets, and films, through the publication of its 
official organ, The Navy, through the annual commemoration of Trafalgar Day, and through 
the activities of the SCC. Like the Air League, local and national newspapers reported 
extensively on the Navy League’s work. While the League’s membership numbers were 
certainly in decline, they are more difficult to assess following the First World War.28 
Membership subscription and branch donations were both less than £100,000 each year 
following 1919, while the number of branches was in steady decline from 1918 onwards.29 
By 1939 there were around 100 units of the SCC and around 10,000 cadets.   
The Navy League’s leadership in the interwar years included ex-servicemen, 
politicians, technocrats, military theorists, barristers, and members of the popular press. The 
Navy League was largely in patrician, Conservative hands during this period. The Duke of 
Somerset was president from 1918 to 1922. Somerset was educated at Britannia Royal Naval 
College, seemingly ‘destined for the Navy’, but later joined the 60th Rifles and took part in 
the Red River expedition of 1870.30 Somerset’s tenure was tumultuous, overseeing the 
abandonment in the early 1920s of what many viewed as some of the core tenants of Navy 
 
28 ‘The Navy League’, The Times, 7 July 1916, p. 21.  
29 See Figures 1 and 2 in Redford, ‘Collective Security’, pp. 64–65.  
30 ‘Duke of Somerset’, The Times, 22 October 1923, p. 14. 
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League policy. The appointment of the Duke of Sutherland in 1922, however, saw the Navy 
League once again assume its role as the protagonists of British naval interests.  
The Duke of Sutherland, who was also president of the Air League and the Primrose 
League, the latter an extraparliamentary organisation formed in 1883 to promote 
Conservative values, as well as Under-Secretary of State for Air from 1922 to 1924, was 
Navy League president from 1922 to 1924.31 While Sutherland oversaw the League’s return 
to a policy more closely resembling its pre-war programme, when navalism was at its zenith, 
he felt his involvement with the air made him unsuitable to continue as the League’s 
president. Despite serving in the Royal Naval Reserve during the First World War, he 
informed the League’s Grand Council Meeting in 1924 that: ‘I have always made it my duty 
to watch the interests both of the Navy and of the Air Force, but I feel I cannot adequately 
do both, and I feel that it is primarily the duty of an ex-Minister from the Admiralty to watch 
these great interests in the Navy’.32 Lord Linlithgow was the figure chosen to replace 
Sutherland.  
Linlithgow had served with the Lothians and Border Horse regiment throughout the 
First World War, ending with the rank of colonel, and later commanded a battalion of 
the Royal Scots. From 1922 to 1924, he served as Civil Lord of the Admiralty and later 
became the Viceroy of India.33 Despite presiding over a period of increased political activity, 
especially surrounding the closure of the Singapore Naval Base in 1924 and the failed 
Geneva Naval Conference in 1927, Linlithgow was replaced by Lord Lloyd in 1930. George 
Ambrose Lloyd, 1st Baron Lloyd, was a diehard Conservative politician and one of the 
 
31 Duke of Sutherland, George Granville Sutherland-Leveson-Gower, Looking Back: The Autobiography of the 
Duke of Sutherland (London: Odhams Press, 1957), p. 105. 
32 ‘Annual Meeting of the Grand Council’, The Navy, June 1924, p. 159.  
33 Robin J. Moore, Hope, Victor Alexander John, Second Marquess of Linlithgow (1887–1952), Oxford 
Dictionary of National Biography. 
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earliest advocates of rearmament within his party.34 Lloyd had previously been Governor of 
Bombay and later High Commissioner to Egypt. His attention in the 1930s, however, turned 
to national defence. The Navy League provided a platform for Lloyd to lobby both public 
and parliamentary circles for rearmament and he did so tirelessly, with ‘his debunking of 
collective security turn[ing] him into the bugbear of idealistic internationalists’.35 
All the League’s presidents had some form of military experience; all of the League’s 
permanent general secretaries in the interwar years were ex-servicemen; two of the League’s 
four chairmen were ex-servicemen; all of the League’s deputy presidents were ex-
servicemen or had held positions in the Admiralty; and a number of the League’s honorary 
treasurers also had a military background.36 The League’s Executive Committee throughout 
the interwar years was also often full of ex-servicemen. Of course, having served in the 
military did not necessarily make these figures militaristic or martial in their outlook, but it 
is important to note the strongly military complexion of the League’s most senior figures. 
As well as attempting to operate effectively in the post-war period, there were efforts 
by the Navy League to achieve closer co-operation with the Air League and even an 
amalgamation of the two bodies. Initial approaches in the early 1920s were welcomed by 
Sutherland – then also Navy League president – but others on the Air League’s Executive 
Committee such as P.R.C. Groves, influential air power theorist and later Air League 
secretary general, and Ivan Davson, Conservative politician and long-standing vice chairman 
of the League, were less receptive to the idea.37 Discussions continued until mid-1923, 
however talks did not progress and so, with the Navy League tired of the Air League’s 
 
34 John Charmley, Lord Lloyd and the Decline of the British Empire (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1987), 
p. 1.  
35 Jason Tomes, Lloyd, George Ambrose, First Baron Lloyd (1879–1941), Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography. 
36 See Appendix II.  
37 AL, AL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 27 July 1922, p. 1.  
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indecision, the matter was held in abeyance.38 The Navy League did, however, approach the 
Air League again in 1927 to assist it in its anti-disarmament propaganda as Chapter 2 will 
discuss.  
Alongside opposition to disarmament, some within the Air League held ‘a peculiar 
fascination’ with the pre-war naval competition, with Philip Foster, Conservative MP and 
chairman of the League from 1918 to 1929, hoping that Air League members ‘would help 
make the League what the Navy League had been before the war – a great constructive force 
in our national affairs’.39 In his autobiography, Colonel Norman Thwaites, editor of the Air 
League’s journal Air and acting secretary general of the League in the late 1920s and early 
1930s, argued that the ‘teachings of the Navy League had informed the nation’, while 
Moore-Brabazon felt that the Air League must do the ‘same for aviation as the Navy League 
has done for the Navy’.40 However, despite such pronouncements, the League often felt it 
was unable to occupy public platforms with the Navy League owing to the incompatibility 
of aims in relation to national defence.41 Less controversial for the Air League was the Navy 
League’s suggestion that it might co-operate in the publication of a map of the world, 
showing both the air and sea routes, which it agreed to do.42  
 
 
Air League 
Like the Navy League, the Air League’s Executive Committee and list of vice presidents 
throughout the 1920s and 1930s contained an eclectic array of politicians, military theorists, 
journalists, ex-servicemen, technocrats, and figures from the social and political elite. Upon 
 
38 AL, AL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 25 April 1923, p. 3; MSSC, NL Minute Book, 
Meeting of the Executive Committee, 17 May 1923, p. 2.  
39 Cited in Noel-Baker, The Private Manufacture of Armaments, p. 327.  
40 Lieut-Col. Norman Thwaites, Velvet and Vinegar (London: Grayson & Grayson Ltd., 1932), p. 15; ‘The Air 
League Comes of Age’, Flight, 16 May 1930, p. 532.  
41 AL, AL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 9 January 1928, p. 1.   
42 AL, AL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 29 November 1929, p. 5.  
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its formation, the Air League, as has been noted, aimed to promote the importance of aerial 
supremacy to the British Empire, ‘upon which its commerce, communications, defence and 
its very existence depended’. The League also had a number of aviation pioneers who served 
on its Executive Committee or as vice presidents. Such figures included Alan Cobham, best 
known for his flight to Australia and back in 1926, Moore-Brabazon, the Marquis of Douglas 
and Clydesdale, the first pilot to fly over Mount Everest’s summit, and Alan Bott, the First 
World War flying ace. The League also made sure to celebrate the feats of pioneer aviators 
and held receptions or established memorials for figures such as Claude Grahame-White, 
Charles Rolls, S.F. Cody, Lindsay Campbell, A.V. Roe, James Sadler, Charles Lindbergh, 
and a number of others.43 
By 1919, the League had an official organ – Aerial League Bulletin, although this 
was subsequently replaced by Air League Bulletin, Air, Air and Airways, and finally Air 
Review. The League’s journal contained information on its activities, news and opinions on 
aviation matters, and information for its members. This was not the sole – or perhaps even 
the most effective – vector of transmitting information on the Air League’s aims and 
activities. Fortunately, however, local and national newspapers, and all the major aviation 
journals, reported on the work of the League.  
Membership numbers for the Air League were never higher than 8,000, not including 
4,000 junior members.44 Although the ADCC could claim over 20,000 members by late 
1939, such figures arguably suggest that organised militarism was indeed in decline.45 In its 
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very first edition, Aerial League Bulletin declared that ‘the strength of the League is its 
membership. If we can double our membership, then we treble the power of the league to 
reach its great objective – the sustained supremacy of the British Empire in the air both in 
commerce and war.’46 Viewed in terms of membership, the Air League failed in this 
objective. However, membership numbers were never a reflection of the League’s impact. 
Like the Navy League, the Air League’s membership comprised influential figures from the 
political, military, and societal elite. 
Throughout the interwar years, the League organised lectures, issued pamphlets and 
letters to the press, staged exhibitions, hosted public meetings, lobbied in parliamentary 
spheres, organised Empire Air Day, and created the ADCC. While the League was often 
militaristic in tone, it was certainly not an unrelenting detractor of the state or the Air 
Ministry. In fact, the League’s policy in the late 1920s and early 1930s was even considered 
pacific by some, leading to the resignation of several members as Chapter 2 will explore. 
For most of the 1920s and early 1930s, the League’s public profile was fairly modest. Indeed, 
the League’s lack of public visibility was even criticised in 1934 by Groves, who argued that 
‘unfortunately the Air League, though it was responsible for considerable criticism in 
parliament and the press, was not strong enough to carry out its propaganda on a nation-wide 
scale’.47 While this may have been true for the Air League during Groves’s tenure, this was 
certainly no longer the case following J.A. Chamier’s appointment as secretary general in 
1933 as we shall see.  
The Air League was not the only organisation which had an interest in aviation. It 
was closely linked to the Royal Aero Club (RAC) and the Royal Aeronautical Society 
(RAeS). The Aeronautical Society (which became the Royal Aeronautical Society in 1918), 
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whose membership comprised engineers and scientists, and which held a long-standing 
belief in the mechanical possibilities of flight, was formed as early as 1866. The Aero Club 
(which became the Royal Aero Club in 1910) was formed in 1901 and was primarily 
interested in ballooning and other forms of flight.48 In order to define the nature, scope, and 
activities of each society, the three organisations first met in April 1909. It was agreed that 
the Aeronautical Society would be the ‘paramount scientific authority on aeronautical 
matters’, the Aero Club would be recognised as ‘the paramount body in all matters of sport, 
and the development of the art of aeronautics’, and the Air League would serve as ‘the 
paramount body for patriotic movements and for education’.49  
The Tripartite Agreement between the three bodies was a feature of the Air League’s 
re-organisation in the mid-1920s. The League agreed that it could co-opt two members from 
both the RAC and RAeS to serve on its Executive Committee for a period of one year (a 
feature of its Committee in the past), yet this was rejected by both organisations. However, 
the RAC was still ‘most anxious to assist and support the Air League’, while the RAeS 
assured the League that it wanted to help in ‘every possible way’.50 The League then 
proposed a joint committee for discussing policy between the three groups, although this 
again was rejected.51 Discussions continued, however, and it was eventually proposed that a 
Committee of Enquiry (to be known as the Burnham Committee) would be established to 
examine the organisation and work of the League.52 
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Chaired by Viscount Burnham, proprietor of The Daily Telegraph until 1928, the 
Burnham Committee was highly significant in the shaping of Air League policy. The 
Committee was formed in response to criticism levelled at the Air League, chiefly that it 
‘had failed to carry out its function as a propaganda body and had neither aroused the public 
conscience to the need for a stronger Air arm in Imperial Defence, nor to the vital importance 
of Civil aviation’.53 Eight meetings took place over four months, considering the constitution 
and conduct of the League, as well as how it could form a policy to rouse public interest and 
educate public opinion.54 In examining the minutiae of the League, it was decided to form a 
Joint Standing Committee – comprising members of the RAeS and the RAC – and that the 
appointment of an efficient organising secretary was required, with Groves (a former 
member of the League’s Executive Committee) the figure chosen. Groves agreed to the 
position, on the proviso that he would be given free rein in the reorganisation of the League. 
Groves, who had served in the Royal Flying Corps (RFC), became the Director of Flying 
Operations at the Air Ministry in 1918, and was a representative at the Paris Peace 
Conference, eventually retiring in 1922. Groves was also instrumental in popularising the 
‘knock-out blow’ theory as will be explored.55 More controversial than Groves’s 
appointment, as Chapter 3 will highlight, was Frederick Handley Page’s offer of an annual 
sum of £5,000 for two years on the condition that Groves was appointed with a free hand.  
Following the Burnham Committee, there were further attempts to improve the 
relationship between the Air League, the RAC, and the RAeS. At a meeting in April 1932, 
Frederick Guest, then chairman of the League, stressed that the League could not be effective 
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unless it worked in close harmony with other aeronautical bodies, principally the RAC, 
RAeS, and the Society of British Aircraft Constructors (SBAC).56 While the Air League was 
still chiefly responsible for propaganda, it was agreed that members from both the RAC and 
RAeS would be appointed to the League’s Executive Committee. Two members from the 
RAC, Lord Gorrell and Lindsay Everard, and two members of the RAeS, Griffith Brewer 
(who became deputy chairman of the League shortly afterwards) and Lawrence Wingfield 
(replaced by W.O. Manning after little over a month) joined.57 This was shortly followed by 
the appointment of Chamier as secretary general, while Seely became chairman at the same 
meeting, leading Sutherland to express his satisfaction that ‘the Air League management has 
never been in better hands’.58 The League’s increased activities following these 
appointments, as we shall see, certainly suggest this was the case.  
 
 
IV. Above Party?  
While both the Air and Navy Leagues portrayed themselves as independent of party or 
vested interests, one can certainly question each organisation’s claim to be ‘above party’. 
For instance, if one examines the Air League’s Executive Committee or list of vice-
presidents throughout the 1930s, one can note its strongly Conservative complexion, with 
few prominent Liberal or Labour representatives.59 Unlike the Navy or Army League, the 
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Air League significantly contained no ‘dissident’ Conservatives on its Council by 1938, 
although this did not prevent the League from calling for higher levels of rearmament.60 
In his exploration of the Navy League in the Edwardian era, Johnson notes that 
historians ‘interested in British navalism have typically portrayed it as a phenomenon of the 
political right’.61 In fact, as Johnson demonstrates, navalism was not merely the preserve of 
the political right, but instead appealed to figures across the political spectrum. In particular, 
Liberal participation with the navalist agenda and the Navy League itself was much greater 
than has previously been acknowledged, with more than a third of its support in the House 
of Commons found on the Liberal benches.62 However, while it is true that the League’s 
claim to be above party was not disingenuous, and that liberal participation with the 
organisation should not be neglected, there were certainly strong links with the Navy League 
and the political right in the interwar years.  
Each League had a number of both funding and personal links with far-right, fascist, 
and pro-German organisations such as the British Union of Fascists (BUF), the January Club, 
the Anglo-German Fellowship, and The Link.63 The Navy League also relied on donations 
from several individuals on the political right. Lady Houston, owner of the right-wing 
Saturday Review and a critic of Ramsay MacDonald’s National Government, donated £5,000 
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to the SCC in 1933 and later donated a further £10,000 to the League in 1936 to carry out a 
national propaganda campaign.64 As well as financing the SCC as Chapter 4 will discuss, 
Lord Nuffield, philanthropist and motor manufacturer, was also a financier of Oswald 
Mosley’s New Party, as well as its journal, Action, and the party’s youth movement 
thereafter.65 Lord Lloyd also suggested to the League’s Executive Committee that General 
Blakeney of the British Fascists might be approached for assistance in raising funds on 
Trafalgar Day.66 Perhaps more notable, however, were links of some of the most senior 
figures within the Navy League and the political right.  
Viscount Lymington, the Navy League’s chairman from 1934 to 1936, was an 
important member of the English Mistery, a ‘reactionary ultra-royalist, anti-democratic 
body’, and later formed the English Array, a back-to-the-land movement and ‘more 
specifically pro-Nazi than the Mistery’.67 He had met both Göring and Hitler in 1931, was a 
member of the January Club, and later became a member of the far-right group, the British 
People’s Party.68 He also went on to form an anti-war body, The British Council Against 
European Commitments, which believed that war would ‘benefit no one but the Jews and 
the international communists’.69 Lord Sydenham of Combe, deputy president of the League 
from 1926 to 1932, was a member of a number of right-wing organisations, such as the 
Liberty League, the Britons, the Centre International d’Études sur le Fascisme, and was also 
a leading writer for the pro-German newspaper, The Patriot.70  
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Other figures within the League also had links to the political right. For example, Sir 
Edmund Freemantle, an Executive Committee member in the 1920s and former vice 
chairman of the League, was a member of the British Fascists.71 Michael Beaumont, the 
Conservative MP and member of the League’s Executive Committee, was a member of the 
January Club and the English Mistery, while Victor Raikes, fellow Conservative MP and 
Navy League member, was a founding member of the English Review Group and the pro-
Franco group, Friends of Nationalist Spain.72 Admiral Wilmot Nicholson was a member of 
the Right Club, the Anglo-German Fellowship, and was a signatory of the ‘Link letter’ sent 
to The Times on 12 October 1938 which called for closer ‘friendship and cooperation 
between Great Britain and Germany’ to establish ‘enduring peace’.73 Captain Bernard 
Acworth was also a signatory of the letter and founded the anti-Semitic Liberty Restoration 
League.74 Nicholson and Acworth’s political associations in particular were, at times, a 
source of concern for the League. For example, after a lecture given in Kensington to a local 
Navy League branch by both men in 1935, The Jewish Chronicle accused them of using their 
platform for anti-Semitic propaganda.75 It reported that ‘malicious aspersions against Jews 
were uttered’ by both Nicholson, Acworth, and by members of the BUF who had attended 
the meeting in uniform.76 The League distanced itself from the statements made – and 
Acworth eventually won a libel action against the newspaper (which admitted its report was 
inaccurate, apologised for the publication, and granted Acworth a cash settlement) – yet the 
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political affinities of its members were clearly possible of damaging the League’s claims to 
be above party or non-partisan.77  
Other members of the League who had links with the political right, or were involved 
in far right groups following their time with the Navy League, included Patrick Hannon, 
Arnold White, and Colonel John Gretton.78 Others, such as Leo Amery, Admiral Sir Sydney 
Freemantle (Edmund’s eldest son), and Lord Carson were all members of the English 
Review Luncheon Club, while Lymington also wrote for the far-right journal, English 
Review. The Luncheon Club, which hosted speeches from Navy League figures such as 
Amery, Carson, and Lloyd, was launched by Douglas Jerrold, the editor of English Review. 
One of the most notable moments in connection with the Club and Navy League members 
came in a meeting in 1933 (chaired by Lord Carson) in which it was proposed that Lord 
Lloyd could directly challenge the Baldwin government – and ultimately become a 
prospective temporary dictator.79 This was not, as Bernhard Dietz notes, purely the ‘fantasy 
of rightist intellectuals’, but was also spoken of in similar terms by the Daily Express, who 
suggested Lloyd would make ‘an excellent dictator . . . He is an almost fanatical patriot’.80 
Others also saw Lloyd’s potential leadership qualities in a similar vein, with Lady Houston 
offering £100,000 to run a campaign based on ‘good old-fashioned Conservative policy’.81  
Ultimately, the leadership bid involving Lloyd failed, but this was not Lloyd’s only 
connection with the political right. Lloyd was a member of the January Club and spoke at 
the Club’s meetings (albeit on the condition that his speeches were not published).82 Lloyd 
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also apparently indicated to Mosley his willingness to join the BUF, and, according to 
Labour Party research, was among a number of financial backers of the BUF.83 On the Navy 
League’s Ladies’ Committee, Christobel Nicholson was a member of the Right Club and the 
Anglo-German Fellowship. Along with her husband, Admiral Wilmot Nicholson, she was 
also close friends with Captain Ramsay, founder of the Right Club, and Admiral Domville, 
founder of The Link.84 Also on the Ladies’ Committee was Lady Sydenham of Combe, who 
was a member of the British Fascisti, Britain’s first fascist movement, and director of its 
youth group, the Fascist Children’s Club.85  
Like the Navy League, the Air League also had various links to the far right. Chamier 
and Thwaites were associates of the January Club – the former was apparently also a 
generous financial backer of the BUF, while the latter became the Club’s chairman in 1934 
(and later a member of the Anglo-German Fellowship).86 Rear Admiral Sueter was a member 
of all the main pro-German and pro-air leagues in the 1930s, Sir William Joyson-Hicks, an 
Air League vice president, was of the political right, while Colonel the Master of Sempill, a 
senior Air League member and a Navy League associate, was also a member of the Anglo-
German Fellowship and The Link.87 Moore-Brabazon, at various times a member of the Air 
League’s Executive Committee and a vice president, was a long-time friend of Oswald 
Mosley, nearly joined his New Party in the early 1930s, and was still speaking in support of 
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Mosley in 1939.88 The Marquis of Douglas and Clydesdale was a member of the Air 
League’s Executive Committee and also a member of the Anglo-German Fellowship.89 Sir 
Harry Brittain, an Air League member and on the Council of the ADCC, was similarly a 
member of the Anglo-German Fellowship, as well as serving as the president of the Friends 
of Italy, while another member of the League’s Executive Committee, Francis Yeats-Brown, 
best known as the author of The Lives of a Bengal Lancer, was also later a member of the 
January Club, the Anglo-German Fellowship, and an admirer of Mussolini.90 Finally, a 
number of Air League members also later became members or patrons of the Right Book 
Club, a publishing house formed in response to Victor Gollancz’s Left Book Club, including 
Yeats-Brown, Thwaites (on the Club’s selection committee), Sempill, Brittain, and Sueter.91 
Meanwhile Lord Mottistone, the Air League’s chairman from 1932, was an ‘intimate 
of Ribbentrop’s . . . and a considerable apologist for Nazi Germany’.92 Indeed, while serving 
as the League’s chairman, Mottistone had visited Joachim von Ribbentrop in 1933 and 
returned to Germany onboard his boat, Mayflower, in 1935.93 He informed the House of 
Lords in May 1935 that his ‘many interviews with Herr Hitler’, whom Mottistone described 
as a ‘remarkable man’, had convinced him that the German leader was ‘absolutely truthful, 
sincere and unselfish’.94 He also later described himself as an ‘unrepentant believer’ in the 
policy of appeasement.95 
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Although a number of these figures were key in the formation of Air League policy, 
most of these affinities were kept private and it is difficult to trace their bearing on the 
League’s activities or aims. Moreover, such individuals staunchly promoted rearmament – 
thus confirming Edgerton’s observation that being pro-German did not necessarily mean 
being anti-rearmament.96 While the League was not altogether of a right-wing composition, 
there certainly appears to be overwhelming links with leading figures in the aviation 
community and the far-right as noted by several scholars.97 Indeed, a further example can be 
found in Lord Londonderry, Secretary of State for Air from 1931 to 1935, and his 
relationship with Hitler and the Nazi Party.98 These links certainly give credence to Robert 
Wohl’s assessment that ‘although there is nothing inherently fascist about flying, in the 
atmosphere of the 1930s it is easy to see how people could make the connection’.99 
 
 
V. The Navy League, the Air League, and Officialdom 
As well as numerous links between both the Air and Navy Leagues and the political right in 
the interwar years, there were also various ties between each organisation and the state – 
particularly the Air Ministry and the Admiralty. For instance, ex-servicemen and retired 
officers made up a significant section of the Navy League’s membership and the League was 
certainly valued by members of the political and military establishment as a vehicle through 
which public opinion could be educated on the importance of seapower. By 1934, as The 
Times pointed out, every Admiral of the Fleet on the active and retired list had consented to 
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become honorary vice presidents of the League without exception.100 This was also 
commented upon by Noel-Baker, from a more critical perspective, who asked: ‘is it not 
certain that the Admiralty, the Department which buys our ships of war, and indeed the 
public, are likely to listen with attention to a body with such eminent support?’101 While it 
may not be the case that the Navy League supported the Admiralty uncritically, relations 
between the two bodies were certainly stronger than prior to the First World War. Indeed, 
David Beatty, First Sea Lord of the Admiralty from 1919 to 1927, felt that it was ‘wholly 
desirable that there should be some such organization as the Navy League’, while the then 
Fourth Sea Lord Ernle Chatfield stated that ‘if we had not a Navy League now we should 
have to create one’.102 As Geoffrey Calander, the naval historian and Navy League member 
wrote, the League’s primary goal was to ‘remind each generation of the lessons of the past; 
to awaken the intelligence of Britons at home and abroad by an educative process to a living 
sense of their imperial needs’.103 
The League was conscious of the naval-orientated nature of its leadership and the 
strength of its relationship with the Admiralty. Indeed, in considering the appointment of a 
new chairman in 1933, Lloyd felt that ‘it was important that the position should be occupied 
by a civilian and somebody who held a prominent position in political life rather than a 
distinguished Naval Officer’.104 Despite desires to separate itself from the Admiralty, myriad 
figures all publicly supported the Navy League, particularly in its commemoration of 
Trafalgar Day and in the creation of the SCC as we shall see.105 Of course, alongside moral 
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and political support, there were more practical forms of support given by the Admiralty to 
the Navy League as later chapters will explore.  
Following the First World War, the many links of personnel between the Air League 
and Air Ministry goes some way to explaining the often close relationship between the two. 
To begin, the Duke of Sutherland was Under-Secretary of State for Air from 1922 to 1924, 
during Sir Samuel Hoare’s first tenure as Secretary of State for Air (1922 to 1924). 
Sutherland was also Lord Londonderry’s cousin. Chamier had served in the RFC in the First 
World War and remained as the Corps was transformed into the RAF.106 He became 
Technical Director at the Air Ministry in 1927 and then Air Commodore in 1928, holding 
this position until his retirement in 1929.107 Chamier also served as secretary for the Air 
Ministry’s Civil Air Guard (CAG), an organisation which aimed to provide a body of men 
and women between the ages of 18 to 50 ‘with a knowledge of flying to assist in time of 
emergency the Royal Air Force or in any other direction concerned with aviation for which 
their services might be required’.108  As we have seen, Groves was also a senior member of 
the Air Ministry. Lord Mottistone briefly served as Under-Secretary of State for Air in 1919, 
while Moore-Brabazon had served as Churchill’s Private Secretary when the latter was the 
Secretary of State for War and Air.109 
On the list of the League’s vice-presidents in the early 1930s, Frederick Guest, 
chairman of the League, was Secretary of State for Air from 1921 to 1922, Sir Ernest Dunlop 
Swinton served in the Civil Aviation department at the Air Ministry, while Lord Weir was 
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president of the Air Council in 1918, Industrial Advisor to the Air Ministry, Personal 
Advisor to Lord Swinton during his time as Secretary of State for Air from 1935 to 1938, 
and, significantly, was on the first Defence Requirements Committee Meeting.110 Lord 
Thomson, Secretary of State for Air in 1924, and again from 1929 to 1930, was also a vice 
president of the League, albeit not during his time at the Air Ministry.111 The League invited 
Hoare to become a member of its Executive Committee in 1930, following his second tenure 
as Secretary of State for Air (1924 to 1929), although he was unable to join, citing numerous 
other commitments.112 The Burnham Committee did, however, contact Hoare when 
considering the reorganisation of the League, stating that in order for the Air League ‘to 
fulfil its role in awakening popular interest in aviation, the recognition, and even the support 
on appropriate occasions, of the Air Ministry is essential’.113  
Other members of the League later joined the Air Ministry, such as Harold Balfour 
who became Under-Secretary of State for Air from 1938, although this was long after his 
departure from the League on the basis that it was ‘too pacific’.114 He did, however, support 
the League in its creation of the ADCC as we shall see. Sueter was an important wartime 
naval aviator, while Sempill, like many of his fellow Air League members, served in the 
RFC. Admiral Mark Kerr, Deputy Chief of the Air Staff at the Air Ministry in 1918, was on 
the League’s Executive Committee for a time and attended several of the League’s Annual 
General Meetings. Sir John Salmond, the retired Marshall of the RAF, also served on the 
League’s Executive Committee and was the ADCC’s chairman. Finally, there were links of 
personnel between the Air League and the RAF Benevolent Fund (established by Air 
Marshal Sir Hugh Trenchard in 1919 to provide assistance to RAF personnel and their 
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dependents). Lord Wakefield, chairman of the Fund, was a vice president of the League, 
while both Mottistone and Sutherland (and several other Air League members) were vice 
presidents.115 Wakefield also supported the League financially, donating to the Young Pilots’ 
Fund and the ADCC.116 While such links do not necessarily imply an affinity between Air 
Ministry and League, and some figures only acted in an ex-officio capacity, this pattern may 
explain why the League was not always the most vociferous critic of the Air Ministry.  
The Air League also ran a number of schemes directly with the Air Ministry – or that 
required Air Ministry support – and, as has been noted, had a number of figures who had 
previously held important roles within the Ministry, or within the RFC and RAF, engage in 
work on its behalf. One of the most notable figures was Sir William Sefton Brancker, who 
had retired from the RAF as Master-General of Personnel in 1919 and was appointed 
Director of Civil Aviation in 1922. Brancker initially carried out propaganda work for the 
League, interviewing lord mayors, provosts, and mayors in towns and cities with regard to 
organising public meetings for the Air League.117 He was fairly active in League activities, 
was present at meetings, worked on its behalf to find a new president, and also directed 
League propaganda away from ‘industrial centres’ in the early 1920s, arguing that it should 
instead be carried out in places such as Eton, Harrow, and Oxford, as well as at Chambers 
of Commerce and Rotary Clubs in other towns and cities.118 It was also Brancker who 
suggested – albeit on behalf of the Civil Department of the Air Ministry – that the Air League  
should produce a booklet (which became Facts About Flying and the Civil Uses of Aviation) 
to be published in all primary, secondary, and private schools.119 Finally, Brancker, along 
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with Sempill, suggested to the League that it might hold an “Air Day”, with the assistance 
of the Air Ministry, at the British Empire Exhibition at Wembley in 1924. However, the 
scheme met with an ‘apparent unwillingness’ on the part of the Empire Exhibition 
Authorities and so it was abandoned.120 Nevertheless, it is clear that the Air League’s work 
in relation to education, and later Empire Air Day, had fairly long-standing links with the 
Air Ministry. It is also evident that links in personnel between the Air League, Air Ministry, 
and Air Council were not merely symbolic, rather they had a direct bearing on policy, 
activities, and organisation.  
In terms of the Air League and its influence upon Air Ministry policy, Brancker was 
the League’s representative on the Civil Aviation Advisory Board (a body which aimed to 
act in close relation with the Air Ministry on civil aviation matters), while the Air Council 
also invited the League to nominate a representative to serve on its Air Conference 
Committee in 1922.121 Brancker was nominated, but was in Iraq at the time, so Colonel 
Davson took his place.122 Brancker did, however, speak at the conference itself on behalf of 
the League, as did Sir Charles Bright, engineer and a vice president of the League. Similarly, 
Sutherland, who felt that the Conference represented ‘the Parliament of the Air’, spoke, and 
chaired a session, at the Conference in 1923.123 The Air Conferences, held in 1920, 1922, 
and 1923, were an important forum in which members of the Air Ministry, prominent figures 
within aviation circles, and others, presented and discussed matters of civil and military 
aviation.  
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While the Air League was clearly more than simply a conduit for the dissemination 
of Air Ministry views, having served in fairly senior roles within the Air Ministry, many 
within the League had first-hand experience of inter-service rivalry and machinations and 
knew the difficulty in securing the support of other government departments for Air Ministry 
schemes. Indeed, associations with the Air Ministry were so strong that J.M. Kenworthy 
(later Lord Strabolgi), addressing the League’s annual dinner in 1929, felt the need to assure 
his audience that he was not merely ‘Lord Thomson’s gramophone’.124 Air League members 
also, at points, advised closer cooperation between the League and Air Ministry. For 
example, Moore-Brabazon told the League’s Executive Committee in late 1929 that the Air 
League ‘had attacked the Air Ministry and the man in the street was not interested . . . It was 
necessary to see where the League could work side by side with the Air Ministry and help 
them get ahead.’125 The Air League had significant propagandistic value for the Air Ministry 
and it accordingly supported the League’s activities in a number of areas – particularly the 
ADCC and Empire Air Day – as well as allowing the League advertising space in its Hendon 
programmes.126  
 
 
VI. Women in the Navy and Air Leagues  
The promotion of aerial and naval supremacy was not an exclusively male domain. Indeed, 
women’s League-related activism, particularly using public platforms to promote navalism 
and aerial strength, challenges the ‘age-old binary opposition twinning femininity with the 
values of pacifism and masculinity with those of militarism’.127 Of course, as McCarthy 
notes, such oppositions are always ‘imaginatively ‘constructed’’, yet the ‘maternalist-
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pacifist discourse has proven highly resilient’.128 In contrast to this discourse, popular 
militarism, modernity, and patriotism were championed by women within both the Air and 
Navy Leagues and is important to highlight. However, alongside promoting the more 
militaristic aspects of each League’s work, women were also involved in less controversial 
pursuits such as charity, philanthropy, and the organisation of social events, producing a 
somewhat ‘paradoxical mix of gender traditionalism and gender modernity’.129 
One of the most significant areas of work performed by women in the Navy League 
was the Ladies’ Emergency Committee (LEC). Presided over by Lord Beresford, former 
Admiral and MP, the LEC was formed immediately following the outbreak of the First 
World War and undertook an extensive programme of providing  ‘comforts’ such as ‘warm 
garments, games, tobacco, and other articles for officers and men in the Fleet’, with notable 
contributors including Queen Mary.130 In early 1915, the Committee had already collected 
7 tons of chocolate alone and, by 1916, the Committee estimated that it had sent parcels of 
warm clothing and over 600,000 items to more than 700 ships, had forwarded over 31 tons 
of hospital equipment to naval hospitals, and was sending parcels of food and clothing to 
Royal Naval prisoners of war in Germany and Turkey.131 In 1917, as the Admiralty had 
commenced issuing free clothing to men in the Admiralty, the Committee instead focused 
on the importance of recreation for men in the Fleet, noting that it had sent 484 gramophones 
to various ships (as well as still providing clothing and medical equipment to ships and 
hospitals).132 By 1918, the Committee estimated that ‘[m]any millions of garments’ had 
passed through its hands, as well as 600 gramophones, and sporting equipment for cricket 
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and football all for the recreation of the Fleet. It also estimated that it had supplied over 82 
tons of hospital equipment to Royal Naval Hospitals, Hospital Ships, and had sent vast 
amounts of food and clothing to prisoners of war in Germany, Austria, and Turkey. 
The Committee was not without private criticism for the conditions in which 
prisoners were held, noting that they faced hardship and suffering in every country: ‘In 
Hunland – the rifle butt and bayonet; in Turkey – flogging and the bastinado; in Bulgaria – 
many punishments’. The Committee did, however, acknowledge that ‘Austria alone of the 
enemy powers has shown some sporting spirit’ and that the country had treated prisoners 
humanely.133 Press appeals also focused on the importance of prisoner wellbeing, with one 
appeal quoting a repatriated prisoner saying that, without the assistance of the Emergency 
Committee, prisoners ‘would absolutely starve’.134 Although it is difficult to measure the 
impact of such propaganda, the importance of the Committee’s work is in less doubt. Women 
in the Navy League also played a similar role in the Second World War, taking an active 
part in the Navy League Comfort Fund, an organisation with a similar purpose to that of the 
LEC.135  
Women served on the League’s Executive Committee for the most part of the 
interwar years – although it remained male-dominated – and were active at League events, 
such as its Grand Council Meetings and Trafalgar Day dinners. Women performed 
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secretarial roles for the Overseas Relief Fund (ORF) and for the SCC, served on the 
Executive Committees of local branches, and also spoke on public platforms for the League 
as lecturers throughout the country. Lectures were given in schools, libraries, to local Navy 
League branches, Boys’ Clubs, Rotary Clubs, the National Federation of Women’s Institutes 
(NFWI), and a number of other forums. Women were often far more active than their male 
counterparts in lecturing.136 As lectures formed an important part of the League’s work, such 
activities should not be undervalued.  
Alongside lecturing, women also played an important part in the more ceremonial 
and symbolic aspects of the League’s work. It was predominantly women of the League who 
would place a wreath at the foot of Nelson’s tomb in St. Paul’s Cathedral on Trafalgar Day. 
In the Antipodean context, the Navy League also displayed both ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ 
characteristics with women playing a prominent role in branch activities – with branches 
recording sizeable female membership – further complicating Hendley’s binary divide 
between militaristic and masculine leagues and domestic and feminine ones.137 However, 
while women undoubtedly played an important role in the League’s daily affairs, on a local, 
national, and global scale, the Ladies’ Committee itself does not seem to have been involved 
in activities much beyond hosting social events.138 
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Alongside the Air League, a Women’s Aerial League (WAL), similarly a self-
avowed non-party organisation, was formed in May 1909.139 Lady Alice O’Hagan occupied 
the chair, while Aimee Watt Smyth was the League’s secretary. Among its founding 
members, were Agnes Baden-Powell, Mary Fraser, Ellen Blount, Beatrice Fry, and Anna 
Massy.140 While the WAL was separate from the main Air League, there were links of 
objectives and personnel, close contact between each League, and considerations for an 
amalgamation of the two Leagues on several occasions.141  
The objects of the WAL were outlined at its inaugural meeting in July 1909: 
The objects of this society . . . are to encourage and stimulate the invention of aerial craft and 
the things appertaining thereto. To disseminate knowledge and spread information, showing 
the vital importance to the British Empire of aerial supremacy, upon which its commerce, 
communication, defence, and its very existence must largely depend. To use every 
constitutional means to bring about the objects for which the League is established, and to 
invite the support of men and women of all shades of opinion throughout the Empire.142 
The WAL was far more militaristic in tone than the early pronouncements of the Air League, 
stressing that it was resolved ‘from purely defensive and patriotic motives that England 
should build more airships than any other possible combination of countries, and that she 
should build them quicker and better’. The League called for ‘supremacy in the air 
complementary to, but no less absolute than, that supremacy on the seas which had been 
England’s boast since navies were’.143 Unlike the Air League, the WAL also spoke in 
support of other militaristic organisations such as the NSL.144 Of course, associating with 
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the cause of national service did little to help fend off accusations of militarism or 
scaremongering.  
The activities of the WAL, described somewhat unfairly as ‘window-dressing’ by 
Michael Paris, consisted largely of public education and political lobbying. In attempting to 
counter the perceived apathy towards aviation throughout Britain, the WAL organised 
lectures and tours, wrote newspaper articles, held public meetings, and distributed leaflets 
and pamphlets.145 Less characteristic of pressure group practices were attempts to collect 
funds to build an all-British airship. Lauded as ‘a tangible illustration of the energy and 
patriotism of the women of Great Britain’, the scheme was about the promotion of British 
engineering, science, and technology, but it was also about pride, patriotism, and national 
identity.146 While The Morning Post’s airship scheme, launched in June 1909, praised the 
technological progress of France and Germany, the WAL’s scheme instead called for an 
airship built ‘by British workmen of British material, from the women of the Empire in 
defence of the British Empire’.147 Despite the early success of the WAL, and despite the 
support it accrued from a range of influential figures, it was unable to enjoy the same 
longevity as the Air League and wound up voluntarily in July 1915.148 
The question of an Air League Women’s Committee or Ladies Auxiliary Committee 
was brought up on a number of occasions in the 1920s, yet the form and scope of suggestions 
were far more limited than the pre-war WAL. For example, in considering forming a Ladies 
Auxiliary Committee in 1923, the League suggested that the Committee could ‘assist in the 
promotion and organisation of the social events and functions of the League’, could ‘provide 
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a rota of members for the purpose of staffing the Air League stalls – interesting visitors, 
distributing literature and enrolling members, etc., – at places and special functions where 
the League is represented’, could ‘create and organise a bureau of women speakers prepared 
to address women’s meetings on the subject of the need for British Air Supremacy’, and 
finally could ‘co-operate in the establishment of branches of the Air League throughout the 
country and Empire’.149 However, despite the limited nature of proposals, it seemed to go 
little further than discussions within the League’s Executive Committee.  
When plans for an Air League Women’s Air Circle were placed before the League 
by Lady Elibank in 1928, it conceived of such a group in similar terms, noting that it ‘might 
be useful in organising social functions, dinners, receptions etc., but that any new 
organisation with separate offices and subscriptions was not desirable’.150 The Women’s 
Committee (also described as the Ladies’ Sub-Committee) was created in 1928 and included 
many prominent female aviators on its Council, with most other members either holding a 
pilot’s license or having expressed an interest in acquiring one.151 Although the Duke of 
Sutherland felt the Women’s Committee had ‘rendered an invaluable service to the League 
and to the cause of British aviation’, the Committee never had much involvement with 
League affairs.152 The League did invite notable female aviators such as the Duchess of 
Bedford and Lady Bailey to become vice presidents of the League, and appointed two 
women – initially Lady Heath and Madame de Landa (chair and deputy chair of the 
Women’s Committee respectively) – to the League’s Executive Committee (Kathleen, 
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Countess of Drogheda, Eileen Forbes-Sempill (née Lavery), and Elibank also later served 
on the Committee).153 
One of the first activities of the Women’s Committee, perhaps unsurprisingly owing 
to the League’s objectives for the Committee, was to host a luncheon for Amelia Earhart, 
championing her achievements as an aviator.154 However, the Committee was not without 
wider ambition. Lady Bailey, who had replaced Lady Heath as chair in January 1929, 
proposed the formation of Women’s Committees in every county throughout the country, 
yet the League’s Executive Committee made clear it could not involve any expense for the 
League and so was not pursued.155 By late December 1932, the reorganisation of the 
League’s Executive Committee to include members from the RAC and RAeS meant the 
resignations of Drogheda and Elibank from the League’s Committee – this was the last time 
women served on the Committee throughout the 1930s.156 By May 1933, the League was 
already talking of ‘reviving’ the Women’s Committee, indicating that it had ceased 
activities: all evidence suggests this is the case.157 The final consideration for a Women’s 
Committee in the interwar years came in 1938 with Salmond suggesting that, rather than 
taking the same form as it previously did, ‘a better plan would be to divide the country up 
into small areas or sections, and appoint a lady in each to foster the Air League’s interests, 
arrange tea parties, etc., and act as a focal point for the Air League in that district’.158 
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VII. Finance and Charity  
As well as engaging in propaganda, both the Air and Navy Leagues were involved in a 
number of charitable schemes, either at the suggestion of the Air Ministry or Admiralty, or 
that contributed to the schemes of either department. While there is no space to adequately 
examine the charitable endeavours of each League in depth, a brief overview will be 
provided.  
The Navy League, in particular, made charitable work a focal point of its activities 
during the First World War, as seen in the case of the LEC. Indeed, by the end of the conflict, 
the following charities were under control or directed by the League: the ORF, the 
Minesweepers’ Fund, the Merchant Service Fund, the Navy League Education Fund, the 
Nelson Day Fund, the LEC, and the Royal Navy Prisoners of War Fund.159 Voluntarism, 
charity, and philanthropy were key elements in the League’s wartime work. The ORF was 
established following the Battle of Jutland in 1916, with Lord Beresford taking the chair 
until being replaced by V. Biscoe Tritton, the League’s chairman from 1916 to 1922, 
following the former’s death, in 1919.160 The Fund’s purpose was to provide general relief 
and educational assistance to the orphans and other dependents of those who lost their life 
in the Navy and Merchant Service during the First World War. In 1920, a trust was 
established by the Charity Commission, under which the funds remaining were devoted to 
purely educational purposes.161 
 
159 ‘Navy League Charities’, Hampshire Telegraph, 5 July 1918, p. 7. On philanthropy, charity, and 
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Alongside the ORF, the League was engaged in several other charitable endeavours 
throughout the First World War. The Sailors’ Day Fund was inaugurated by the formation 
of a Joint Committee of the Navy League and the British and Foreign Sailors’ Society, with 
an appeal being issued by Beresford to the heads of all municipalities throughout Britain. 
The Fund was largely for the benefit of the Mercantile Marine and for the training of boys 
for sea services.  
The League also organised the Jack Cornwell Memorial Fund in July 1916. Cornwell 
was only 16 when he suffered mortal wounds at his post during the Battle of Jutland, for 
which he was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross medal, with his bravery attracting 
much attention. The Fund asked schoolchildren throughout Britain and the empire for 
donations which would fund the establishment of a ward for disabled sailors at the Star and 
Garter Home in Richmond. Publicly supported by figures such as Beatty, the response was 
high with millions of schoolchildren reportedly subscribing a penny to the fund (in return 
for a stamp bearing Cornwell’s portrait), with the first instalment of £18,000 being presented 
to Queen Mary at Buckingham Palace in early 1917.162 A figure of £500 was also raised to 
provide Cornwell’s mother with a weekly pension of 10s.163 
The other principal charitable endeavour the League was involved in was the 
Trafalgar Day Orphan Fund. The Orphan Fund was financed by a flag day held at Trafalgar 
Square, street collections, as well as collections in all naval establishments, on board ships, 
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and at the home ports in aid of the orphaned children of petty officers, non-commissioned 
officers, and men of the Royal Navy and Royal Marines.164 The Fund was integral to raising 
funds for the SCC.  
The Navy League itself relied on donations and membership subscriptions. The 
League also sent appeals for funds and members to local and national newspapers, often 
drawing on naval themes or key moments in British naval history. One such appeal was the 
Jutland Day appeal in 1923 on the seventh anniversary of the Battle of Jutland. In issuing 
the appeal, Sir Cyril Cobb, then chairman of the League, stressed that the maintenance and 
safety of the empire depended on sea power. Cobb was careful to emphasise that such 
sentiments were not ‘actuated by a jingoistic or warlike spirit’, but rather that a strong British 
navy constituted ‘the greatest moral and material assurance of the world’s peace’.165 This 
was not the first time, however, that the League had considered commemorating the Battle 
of Jutland. Indeed, in 1916 the long-time member of the League, Arnold White, had 
proposed replacing the commemoration of Trafalgar with Jutland in order not to offend 
Britain’s allies, yet the League did not adopt the suggestion.166  
While the Air League was not particularly active during the early years of the First 
World War, like the Navy League it was concerned with those who would be affected by the 
conflict domestically, forming the Royal Flying Corps Families Relief Fund (RFCFRF) in 
1914. This was designed to ‘help and comfort’ the wives and children of men of the RFC 
who would be killed or wounded in war.167 The League worked closely with the War Office, 
which sent lists of RFC casualties to the League, as well as to the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ 
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165 ‘May 31st – Jutland Day’, The Shields Daily News, 30 May 1923, p. 4.  
166 National Maritime Museum (hereafter NMM), Greenwich, Arnold White Papers, WHI/118, 1916.  
167 AL, AL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 14 August 1914, p. 1.  
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Families [and Airmen’s from 1918] Association.168 By February 1915, the RFCFRF had 
raised £422.19.4, although it had yet to receive claims, and by 1916 it was registered under 
the War Charities Act.169 
Charity remained important for the League following the First World War. 
Accordingly, in May 1919, the Executive Committee considered proposals for the creation 
of an Orphan Fund for the education and maintenance of children of members of the RAF 
who lost their lives during the First World War.170 Although the League viewed its 
involvement in charitable funds in June 1920 as ‘vital to the successful development of the 
Air League’ and, more broadly, as ‘essential to the progress of civil aviation’ by October the 
same year, its Executive Committee resolved to hand the remaining funds over to the Royal 
Flying Forces Memorial Fund.171 Despite this, the work of the RFCFRF had laid the grounds 
for the RAF Memorial Fund (which became the RAF Benevolent Fund in 1933).172  
The Air League itself relied upon donations, membership subscriptions, and appeals 
for funds, yet its financial position throughout the interwar years was often parlous, and it 
rarely created revenue. Of course, it was not immune from national economic decline, with 
Sutherland noting that the League was ‘among the first to feel the effects of financial 
stringency’ following the Great Depression.173 Indeed, Guest informed the League’s 
Executive Committee in April 1932 that ‘unless immediate steps were taken to strengthen 
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the financial position of the League, bankruptcy was inevitable’.174 By 1935, however, the 
League was financially stable enough to stress that its purpose was ‘not to accumulate money 
and therefore efforts should be made to spend as much as possible in the cause of British 
aviation’.175  
 
 
VIII. Conclusion 
This chapter has charted the organisation, ideas, and personnel of the Air and Navy Leagues 
from their inception through to the interwar years. It has highlighted the numerous official 
and unofficial links between each League and the service departments, as well as 
associations with the political right. In some respects, each League connected officialdom 
and the far right in the interwar years, with modern technology providing an important 
unifying link. Such links were rarely explicit, and were often informal, yet there were 
nevertheless discernible ties between aviation and naval groups, pro-German and fascist 
organisations, and officialdom. This chapter has also briefly explored the role of women 
within each League, questioning Hendley’s divide between militaristic and masculine 
leagues and domestic and feminine ones. It has also considered the charitable endeavours of 
each organisation. In doing so, the chapter has shown that the historiographical consensus 
on continuity between pre-war and interwar Britain should also be extended to include 
militaristic, as well as patriotic and imperialist, organisations. The First World War did not 
mark the end of organised militarism, although as the next chapter will demonstrate, it did 
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influence the nature and character of each League. Indeed, faced with the growth of 
internationalism, pacifism, and calls for disarmament and collective security, both Leagues 
met with opposition from a number of individuals and organisations on the political left. 
However, as will be revealed, organised militarism was able to endure such challenges. 
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Chapter 2: ‘Public Confidence Could Not Alone be Gained by Talking of 
Bombs and Battleships’: The Air League, the Navy League, and 
Disarmament 
The strength of liberal internationalist, pacifist, and anti-war sentiment during the interwar 
period suggests that expressions of militarism or the promotion of armaments may have held 
little political or cultural purchase. Indeed, in reflecting on the causes of the First World War, 
many statesmen, diplomats, politicians, and intellectuals concluded that, as the arms race 
had played a principal part, the potentially ‘destabilizing effect of armaments’ should be 
eliminated through disarmament.1 However, while the interwar years may have been ‘a 
halcyon period for liberal internationalists’ and, while disarmament was considered as the 
‘great uniting issue of the interwar peace movements’, the peace movement was not a single, 
unified (or necessarily unifying) phenomenon and there was opposition to calls for 
disarmament, collective security, and the internationalisation of aviation – not least from the 
Air and Navy Leagues.2  
Accordingly, this chapter will chart the ways in which the two Leagues negotiated 
the rise of – and interacted with – issues such as disarmament, arms limitations, pacifism, 
collective security, and international diplomacy. It will also explore how the leading actors 
within both institutions responded to the growth in pacifist, internationalist, and anti-war 
sentiment. While Britain may have remained a martial nation and a warfare state after 1918, 
there was an obvious surge of anti-war sentiment.3 This posed problems for the Air and Navy 
Leagues, both of which featured the idea of national defence at the centre of their ethos 
during the period. However, neither, perhaps surprisingly, were unrelenting critics of plans 
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for reductions in aerial and naval armaments respectively. In the early 1920s, the Navy 
League supported the Washington Naval Conference, while in the late 1920s and early 
1930s, the Air League altered its aims by focusing more on civil and commercial aviation, 
rather than solely promoting its military potential. Conscious of anti-war sentiment, as well 
as public support for pacifism and internationalism, the policy of each League seemed to 
mark a point of departure from the previously militaristic programme pursued by both. Much 
in the same way that groups such as the LNU curtailed the more ardently pacific and anti-
militarist supporters within its movement, both the Air and Navy Leagues attempted to rein 
in the more overtly militaristic elements of their respective memberships.4 Seen by many as 
an abandonment of the key principles of each organisation, these policies lost them support 
from many rank and file members, led to a number of high-profile resignations, and 
threatened the stability and even existence of each League. Support for disarmament and 
collective security was not, however, a long-lasting feature of either the Air or Navy 
League’s work and each quickly reverted to a programme which lobbied for aerial and naval 
strength.  
While the Navy League’s support for collective security and failure to lobby for naval 
supremacy surrounding the Washington Naval Treaty has been documented by Duncan 
Redford, his analysis does not extend beyond the early 1920s. The Navy League’s 
fragmentation in this period did indeed point to the difficulties facing militaristic pressure 
groups following the First World War, however it did not represent the ‘collapse of British 
navalism’.5 This chapter differs from Redford in that it explores how the Navy League 
negotiated questions of disarmament and collective security far beyond the early 1920s and 
demonstrates that, contrary to Redford’s assertion, navalism was able to occupy an important 
 
4 McCarthy, The British People, Chapter 5.  
5 Redford, ‘Collective Security’, p. 48. 
69 
 
place in the post-war landscape. The Air League’s attitude towards such issues has hitherto 
received no scholarly attention. This chapter seeks to redress this neglect by arguing that the 
Air League played an important part in debates on disarmament, collective security, and the 
internationalisation of aviation.  
As this chapter deals with both the Air and Navy Leagues, it is organised 
thematically, rather than chronologically. While this entails some chronological jumps, the 
chapter is broken down into the following sections to avoid confusion. The first section 
explores the abandonment of navalism within the Navy League in the early 1920s, before 
looking at how it approached questions of disarmament and arms limitations for the rest of 
the decade. It then examines how the Air League similarly abandoned a long-held policy 
which promoted military supremacy in the late 1920s and early 1930s. The next section 
highlights how each League interacted with the LNU – the largest liberal internationalist 
organisation within the interwar years. It then briefly details the ways in which both the Air 
and Navy Leagues came into conflict with other organisations and figures on the political 
left who advocated disarmament, pacifism, or collective security. The chapter then moves 
on to the policy of each League at the time of the Geneva Disarmament Conference, before 
examining the Navy League’s opposition to the second London Naval Treaty. Finally, the 
chapter examines the Air League’s opposition to the internationalisation of aviation and calls 
for an international air police force.  
 
 
I. ‘Pacifist Tendencies’: The Navy League, the Air League, and the 
Abandonment of Militarism?  
The policy adopted by the Navy League in the early 1920s, and by the Air League later in 
the same decade, was one which represented a fundamental departure from the principles, 
nature, and aims of each League prior to that point. For both Leagues, it threatened to cause 
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instability and led many to question the very purpose of each organisation. There was a clear 
desire by certain League members to steer away from a policy that could be considered 
militaristic, to one which supported arms limitations, or (in the Air League’s case) focused 
on non-military elements of aviation. For both Leagues, this change in policy was only 
temporary, and it was not long until each was again lobbying both public and parliament for 
a strong navy and air force.  
One of the most significant changes to occur within the Navy League during the 
interwar years arose from its policy surrounding the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922. This 
agreement, which marked the concession of formal parity with the US Navy, has been 
described by one historian as ‘one of the major catastrophes of English history’.6 It is perhaps 
surprising therefore, given the Navy League’s extensive programme of political pressure for 
British naval supremacy prior to the First World War, that the Treaty was commended by 
the League for its ‘noble aims’ and for ‘the highest ideals of British policy’. While the 
League stressed that ‘the primary object for which the Navy League exists remains unaltered 
– namely, to secure the adequate naval protection of British subjects and commerce the world 
over’, this radical departure from its traditional message is significant.7 The League’s 
argument in 1921 that ‘today civilisation is not threatened by any maritime power’ and that 
‘there is no alternative to competitive building of ships of war except an international 
agreement’ was at odds with the dominant ideas, sentiments, and values of British navalism, 
particularly as expounded by the League prior to the First World War.8  
Enacted by Biscoe Tritton and Rear Admiral Ronald Hopwood, the League’s 
chairman and general secretary respectively, the Navy League’s policy shift towards 
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embracing international ideals of collective security and the preservation of peace through 
international agreement, thereby sacrificing British naval supremacy, was a radical departure 
from its traditional policy. Indeed, it even led to the resignation of five senior members from 
its Executive Committee.9 The failure of the League to lobby for the maintenance of British 
naval supremacy led to, as Redford has observed, a schism ‘that threatened to destroy’ the 
League.10 Among the dissenting voices was Patrick Hannon, who wrote that the policy 
would convert the ‘Navy League from a movement organised as the protagonist of British 
Naval interests into a subordinate of the League of Nations Union’.11 Admiral Freemantle 
was of the opinion that ‘by persisting in its attitude of apathy, the League was failing to 
justify its existence’.12 
In one respect, the League’s support of arms limitation on moral, as well as practical, 
grounds represented an abandonment of the ideological principles of navalism causing the 
character and identity of the League to be called into question. The organisation’s raison 
d’être appeared to be fundamentally altered. It also suggested a sensitivity towards being 
associated with militarism, with the League arguing that ‘expenditure on the navy is not in 
the nature of “militarism” . . . but of necessary insurance’.13 However, the decision taken by 
the Navy League to support the Washington Naval Treaty, and in effect adopt a policy of 
naval realpolitik, was clearly not at odds with the political, intellectual, and indeed financial 
climate of the period. As N.H. Gibbs writes ‘whatever the criticisms of the Treaty, it did 
prevent, for the immediate future, a costly naval arms race which Britain was in no state to 
 
9 ‘Navy League “Apathy”’, The Times, 4 March 1921, p. 6.  
10 Redford, ‘Collective Security’, p. 49. See also NMM, Arnold White Papers, WHI/136.  
11 Parliamentary Archives, London, Papers of Sir Patrick Joseph Henry Hannon, HNN, Letter from Hannon to 
Duke of Somerset, 12 October 1921, p. 1. Arnold White similarly described the League as a ‘Branch of the 
League of Nations’ in a letter to Somerset. NMM, Arnold White Papers, WHI/136, Letter from White to Duke 
of Somerset, 9 January 1922, p. 1.  
12 ‘Navy League “Apathy”’, The Times, 4 March 1921, p. 6. 
13 ‘Our Empire’s Shield’, The Times, 20 October 1923, p. 15.  
72 
 
sustain’.14 If the Navy League was generally supportive of arms limitation in the early 1920s 
– even to the point where it threatened its very existence – then the tone of its public 
statements on the reduction of arms and wider disarmament radically changed shortly 
thereafter.  
The League was a vocal and vehement critic of the decision by Ramsay MacDonald’s 
Labour Government to suspend construction on the Singapore Naval Base in 1924. As 
Rhiannon Vickers has noted, from the early 1920s the internationalist, anti-war section of 
the party (initially highly critical of the League of Nations) strongly influenced Labour Party 
thinking on foreign policy and international affairs.15 MacDonald certainly feared that any 
proposed international agreement on disarmament might be hampered if Britain went ahead 
with the construction of the Naval Base, yet this was strongly denounced by the Navy 
League.16 While the League commended the government’s decision to increase Britain’s 
aerial strength, it warned that the ‘paralysis of all industry at home and slow starvation 
through the cutting off of our supplies’, which could result from the loss of the base in 
Singapore, would be ‘no less painful an end than extermination by high explosives or poison 
gas’.17 The League circulated a statement to all its branches, and to the popular press, urging 
that ‘the essential safety of the Empire should be secured so that no foreign rival may be 
tempted by our weakness to reach out the hand for the “glittering prizes” which a disarmed 
British Empire would offer . . . more than any other nation we depend upon Sea Power’.18 
At the annual Grand Council Meeting in 1924, Sir Cyril Cobb accused the government of 
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not having ‘a proper sense of Empire . . . nor do they care much whether the Navy, so far as 
we can judge from their actions, is in a proper position to protect not only the Empire, but 
all our great trade routes throughout the Empire’.19 The closure of the Singapore Naval Base 
provided a catalyst for renewed Navy League activity. As Cobb underlined, ‘we are now in 
a position of a League that has something very definite to fight’ which resulted in a ‘much 
more definite programme than we had two or three years ago’.20  
Navy League opposition to the closure of the Singapore Naval Base was strongly 
supported by a number of influential figures, such as Lord Curzon, Leo Amery, and Winston 
Churchill, all of whom attended a public meeting arranged by the League as a protest against 
its abandonment. The League was similarly supported in its policy Stanley Baldwin, who 
wrote that he was ‘delighted to learn that the Navy League is taking up the question of 
Singapore with a view, no doubt, to educating opinion on what is a very vital matter’. He 
argued that ‘there are certain facts which, surely, no sane person can dispute. They are that 
our Navy is essential to our existence, to the maintenance of our trade routes . . . and to the 
security of our Empire.’21  
While other organisations were ‘committed to creating and defending a space within 
associational life which was free of partisan or sectarian conflict’, the Navy League at times 
struggled to position itself outside the realm of party politics.22 Although the League was 
avowedly non-party and non-partisan, Liberal or Labour representation, in the interwar years 
at least, was fairly minimal as has been noted. The League was evidently an important 
platform for diehard Conservative figures such as Curzon, Amery, and later Lloyd, while 
other Conservative figures such as Baldwin and Churchill, the latter far more frequently, 
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also supported the League. If groups such as the NFWI, the LNU, the British Legion, and 
Rotary International attempted ‘to create a distinctive kind of sociability, and to defend it 
from what were perceived to be the destructive forces of partisanship’, then the Navy League 
was seemingly less hesitant to engage in partisan or politically sectarian activities.23 
However, this did not mean that the League was an auxiliary for the Conservatives Party 
and, as we have seen, Lloyd in particular was willing to challenge Conservative leadership. 
While disarmament had become a clarion call for liberal internationalist (as well as 
European socialist) campaigns focused on strengthening collective security in the late 1920s, 
for the Navy League it raised concerns for Britain economically, morally, and strategically.24 
Alongside its propaganda surrounding the Singapore Naval Base, the League was 
particularly outspoken in its opposition to the failed Geneva Naval Conference in 1927. The 
Conference (attended by Britain, the US, and Japan) attempted to halt the increase in the 
types of vessels omitted from the Washington Naval Treaty. However, owing to the 
entrenched positions adopted by those at the Conference, particularly Britain and the US, 
over the type and number of cruisers, the lack of preparation, and the influence of the service 
departments upon government policy, the Conference was a failure.25 The government’s 
intransigence was supported by the Navy League, which had adopted a resolution at its 
Grand Council Meeting that year, stating that the League, ‘while welcoming any 
international agreements that would lessen the chances of friction between nations’, was of 
the opinion that Britain had the ‘inalienable right to decide the necessary naval strength of 
the Empire’.26 Such sentiments were also clearly supported at the Conservative Party 
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Conference that year, which supported a motion praising Baldwin’s refusal to limit Britain’s 
naval strength.27 Indeed, as Dick Richardson has shown, the Conservative Party in general 
‘tended to distrust both the League [of Nations] and disarmament’, while most of the foreign 
policy-making elite during this period were ‘sceptical of, if not outrightly opposed to, the 
whole movement for arms limitation’.28 Such views were not, however, supported by all.29  
Alongside hostility towards the Geneva Naval Conference, the Navy League also 
denounced the signing of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. The Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, also 
known as the Paris Peace Pact, outlawed war as an instrument of national policy and, as 
Daniel Gorman argues, ‘signalled a normative shift towards viewing war as illegitimate’.30 
Yet, this was not how the Navy League viewed the Pact. The League argued that while ‘there 
is no race more desirous of peace than is the British race’, the signing of the pact altered 
little in reality. It feared that ‘it will encourage some people to believe the pacifist 
propaganda which is at present raging for great reduction in our navy’ and stated that 
‘[t]reaties, pacts, and other solemnly signed documents are all very well in their way, but, as 
we have learnt from bitter experience, they become “Scraps of Paper” when a nation decides 
on war as a continuation of policy’.31  
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Much in keeping with its policy surrounding the Singapore Naval Base, the Geneva 
Naval Conference, and the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the Navy League was also a staunch 
opponent of the London Naval Conference in 1930. The Conference, and subsequent Treaty, 
set a tonnage ratio for cruisers and destroyers of 5:5:3.5 for the US, Britain, and Japan 
(although this was not agreed upon by France or Italy), while also calling for further cuts in 
battleship numbers.32 On the eve of the Conference, the League held a public meeting at 
which Lord Bridgeman, First Lord of the Admiralty from 1924 to 1929 in Baldwin’s 
government, spoke on the importance of the sea to the nation, the empire, and British trade. 
Lloyd likewise stated that, although he wished the Conference success and stressed that the 
League wanted peace, the maintenance of a strong British fleet was a ‘matter of life and 
death’. He felt that the reduction in British naval armaments seemed only to augment the 
armaments of other world powers.33  
The greatest publicity generated, however, revolved around a meeting convened by 
the Navy League with Churchill as its principal speaker. While the Navy League welcomed 
the publicity Churchill brought, Churchill also viewed the Navy League as an important 
platform from which to oppose disarmament. For instance, in a letter to Lord Arthur Balfour, 
former Prime Minister, Churchill noted that he had received an informal communication 
from the Foreign Office, informing him that a ‘speech threatening the Government if they 
gave way any more would be extremely welcome’. Accordingly, Churchill wrote that he was 
going to ‘give his Majesty’s Government the support of a good hearty kick’.34  
 
32 Joseph Maiolo, ‘Naval Armaments Competition Between the Two World Wars’, in Thomas Mahnken, 
Joseph Maiolo, and David Stephenson (eds), Arms Races in International Politics: From the Nineteenth to the 
Twenty-First Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 100.  
33 ‘Tory Fears for the Navy’, Daily Herald, 16 January 1930, p. 2.  
34 CHUR, Sir Winston Leonard Spencer Churchill Papers (hereafter Churchill Papers), CHAR 2/169/55-56, 
Public and Political: General Correspondence, 1930, Letter from Churchill to 1st Lord Balfour, 22 February 
1930, p. 2. 
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At the meeting, Churchill spoke of the ‘profound and growing anxiety’ among the 
public and hoped that ‘amid the froth and confusion of our present situation the British nation 
would still have the sanity and resolution to sustain that ancient naval power which across 
four centuries had so often defended good causes and had never defended good causes in 
vain’.35 He added that ‘British naval requirements ought to be fixed by ourselves alone, 
because our life depends on the sea’.36 Shortly thereafter, the LNU also privately recorded 
its anxiety at the seeming lack of progress at the Conference.37 However, figures such as 
Gilbert Murray, the LNU’s chairman, spoke with more confidence in regards to the Union’s 
propaganda surrounding the Treaty. At a meeting of the LNU’s General Council, Murray 
was satisfied that it was ‘quite clear that what I may call the militarist party – the party that 
objected to an agreement is beaten . . . They fight like a minority, they speak like a minority, 
they feel like a minority. This is a great thing.’38   
Despite such criticism, Churchill evidently viewed Navy League meetings as an 
important opportunity to lobby the government. So, too, did the Admiralty. For instance, in 
an Executive Committee meeting in late 1930, Commander Denny, the League’s general 
secretary revealed to those assembled that the Admiralty had informed him ‘that they would 
like the Navy League very much to emphasise that the full amount of tonnage allotted under 
the Navy Treaty should be provided for’.39 Clearly, while the Admiralty was cautious to 
publicly align itself with the League, privately it acknowledged its propagandistic value 
surrounding issues of disarmament. By the early 1930s, the League’s public pronouncements 
 
35 ‘British Naval Needs’, The Times, 27 February 1930, p. 16. For the full speech, see CHUR, Churchill Papers, 
CHAR 9/9/A–B, Speeches, Non House of Commons, 1930, Navy League Speech, 26 February 1930, pp. 221–
229.  
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37 BLPES, LNU 2/10, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 6 March 1930, p. 5.  
38 BLPES, LNU 1/2, Minutes of a Meeting of the General Council, 26–27 June 1930, p. 60. 
39 MSSC, NL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 6 November 1930, p. 4.  
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revolved around several themes: national and imperial strength, patriotism, duty, naval 
tradition, and a hostility to disarmament and collective security. The League had reassumed 
its role as ‘the public guardians of British naval supremacy’.40 
 
 
Air League 
The Navy League was not alone in (temporarily) abandoning long-held principles 
advocating military strength. The Air League was also conscious of anti-war sentiment and 
its own militaristic appearance and, much like the Navy League, the policy adopted was one 
that (briefly) threatened its stability and future. Among the changes resulting from Groves’s 
appointment as secretary general in 1927 was a consolidation of the League’s aims and 
objectives. As Groves outlined in June 1927, the principal aims of the League were: ‘To 
secure a Home Defence Air Force equal to any other Air Force within striking distance of 
Great Britain, and the provision of adequate additional air force to meet the requirements of 
the Navy, the Army, and Imperial defence’, ‘To ensure the fullest development of British 
Civil and Commercial aviation’, and ‘To foster British interest in the encouragement of 
British Experiment and research in the Science of Aeronautics’.41 While such aims closely 
resembled earlier calls from the Air League for an air force ‘capable of obtaining the mastery 
of the air’, there was opposition to the policy adopted. For example, Sempill informed the 
League’s Committee that ‘objection had been raised to the first of these Aims as being 
militarist’ and so it was decided that a special meeting of the Committee would be called to 
discuss the matter.42  
 
40 Duncan Redford, ‘The Royal Navy, Sea Blindness and British National Identity’, in Duncan Redford (ed.) 
Maritime History and Identity: The Sea and Culture in the Modern World (London: I.B. Tauris, 2014), p. 73.  
41 AL, AL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 2 June 1927, p. 3.  
42 AL, AL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 6 February 1928, p. 1. Its aims were even 
criticised by the BBC, with the corporation describing the first aim as ‘controversial’, later banning a proposed 
Air League broadcast because it ‘amounted to a serious attack upon the present policy of Air Defence’. ‘The 
Banned Broadcast’, Air, December 1927, p. 56.  
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Held in early 1928, Lieut. Colonel Mervyn O’Gorman, a member of the League’s 
Executive Committee, proposed that the wording of the League’s first aim should be altered 
to read: ‘To secure an adequate Home Defence Force in relation to any other air force, etc’. 
In support of this, O’Gorman stated that while he entirely agreed that we should have an Air 
Force equal to any other within striking distance, many people considered that the aim 
‘savoured of militarism’. By altering the wording, O’Gorman argued, the League could 
dispel any suggestion that it was ‘too militarist’, without fundamentally altering its 
programme. Groves rejected the proposal on the grounds that, ‘in view of the peculiar 
vulnerability of this country to aerial attack, “equality” was the minimum requirement for 
national safety’. Groves stated that if the proposed alteration was accepted, he would be 
unable to carry out propaganda on behalf of the League – that the amendment ‘would modify 
a basic principle for which the League had always stood’. Groves then threatened to resign 
if the amendment was passed and so the motion was subsequently withdrawn.43  
Following Groves’s tenure, however, the Air League’s aims became a feature of 
Executive Committee discussions once again.44 Indeed, by late 1929, Dr Gerald Merton, the 
League’s then chairman, stressed that the aims should be altered so that ‘less emphasis 
should be placed upon the military spirit now expressed in the first item of the “Aims” and 
that civil and commercial aviation should be given predominance’. He then suggested the 
League should ‘change its focus . . . and thereby add new members of more pacific frame of 
mind’.45 Merton felt that public confidence, as he argued at a later meeting, ‘could not alone 
be gained by talking of bombs and battleships’.46 Merton’s proposals for shifting the 
 
43 AL, AL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 8 March 1928, pp. 1–2. Emphasis in original. 
44 Groves reportedly resigned because he had to move abroad ‘on account of his wife’s illness’, although he 
later criticised the League publicly and cut ties altogether by resigning as a vice president in 1931. AL, AL 
Minute Book, Annual General Meeting, 26 June 1930, p. 1; AL, AL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive 
Committee, 15 September 1931, p. 1. 
45 AL, AL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 7 October 1929, p. 2.  
46 AL, AL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 15 January 1930, p. 2.  
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League’s focus to commercial and civil aviation were agreed upon by those on the Executive 
Committee, with Yeats-Brown noting that ‘the military idea did not appeal to people’ and 
Moore-Brabazon stating that the policy of the League had ‘hitherto been too much inclined 
to tell people that they would be murdered in their beds. This no longer frightened them . . . 
peace is what appeals to the Englishman today.’47   
The Air League subsequently favoured the advertisement of civil, rather than 
military, aircraft in its publications, wrote more frequently on civil and commercial aviation, 
was part of Alan Cobham’s flying tours, and put in motion plans for the creation of an 
International Civil Air Week.48 The published aims of the League also reflected its shift in 
emphasis towards civil and commercial aviation. As outlined in Air and Airways, the 
League’s revised aims were to ‘ensure the fullest development of British civil and 
commercial aviation’ and to ‘secure the maintenance of adequate air forces and of reserves 
for Empire and Home Defence’.49 On air disarmament, the League’s Committee agreed in 
June 1930 that  
It is not within the competence of the Air League to put forward, officially, disarmament 
schemes which are bound to be of a technical nature. It should, however, be the policy of the 
Air League to support the ideal of general disarmament . . . and to help towards a reasonable 
international agreement.50 
Considering that the League boasted, at various points, aircraft engineers, manufacturers, 
aviation pioneers, air power theorists, and figures with experience at the highest levels of the 
Air Ministry among its members, this reluctance to engage with questions of disarmament 
due to a lack of technical expertise appears odd and it was not long until divisions arose over 
the League’s shift of policy.  
 
47 AL, AL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 7 October 1929, p. 2. 
48 AL, AL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 15 January 1930, p. 2. 
49 ‘Air League of the British Empire’, Air and Airways, May 1931, p. xix. 
50 AL, AL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 18 June 1930, p. 2. 
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In a meeting in April 1931, Balfour stressed that ‘the policy of the Air League should 
be one of full blooded patriotism’. He felt that the League’s policy was not nearly ‘aggressive 
enough as regards the national air strength’.51 Balfour resigned shortly thereafter, stating that 
the League’s policy was ‘too pacific’, while Yeats-Brown, citing the “pacifist tendencies” 
of the League, also resigned.52 At the same meeting, the League dispensed of Thwaites as 
acting secretary general. Thwaites vacated the role, but not before informing the Committee 
that the ‘relegation of National Defence to the background’ was a ‘radical departure from 
the League’s principles laid down over twenty years ago’.53 Finally, reflecting upon his 
resignation from the Air League, Groves likewise bemoaned the influence of the League’s 
‘pacifist chairman’.54  
 
 
II. A ‘Purely Nationalist Outlook’? The Air League, the Navy League, and 
the League of Nations Union  
While influential elements within the Air and Navy Leagues may have been willing to 
engage with issues of disarmament and arms limitation throughout the 1920s and early 
1930s, there was a much greater reluctance to associate with liberal internationalist 
organisations such as the LNU. This is important to note for several reasons. First, the LNU, 
whatever the ultimate failure of the League of Nations as an instrument of collective security, 
promoted widespread engagement with the formulation of British foreign policy, the 
limitation of armaments, and international cooperation. As a major presence within the 
political culture of the interwar period, representing one of the largest voluntary associations, 
it was important to both the Air and Navy Leagues that they actively challenged the LNU. 
In promoting military strength, the Air and Navy Leagues often clashed with the LNU and 
 
51 AL, AL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 14 April 1931, p. 2. 
52 AL, AL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 16 June 1931, p. 1. 
53 Ibid., p. 5.  
54 Groves, Behind the Smoke Screen, p. 277.  
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it was important to each League to counter the Union’s attempted mobilisation of public and 
parliamentary support. 
The activities of the Air and Navy Leagues was clearly something which likewise 
rankled the LNU. Indeed, both the Air and Navy Leagues came into conflict with the Union’s 
most senior leadership (chiefly Robert Cecil, Gilbert Murray, Philip Noel-Baker, David 
Davies, Norman Angell, Will Arnold-Foster, and Maxwell Garnett, the League’s secretary). 
Beyond the institutional level, the attitudes of the two Leagues towards the Union sheds 
much light on their broader views on issues such as disarmament, collective security, and 
international diplomacy.   
Much of the reluctance to engage with the LNU resulted from misconceptions within 
both the Air and Navy Leagues over the Union’s apparent support for unilateral disarmament 
– despite its explicit and repeated denial – and over the organisation’s seemingly pacific 
nature. This opposition, and uncertainty about what the LNU stood for precisely, was 
something that Robert Cecil, as president of the Union, was acutely aware of. As he later 
lamented: ‘our opponents of the Right had got into their minds that the League [of Nations 
Union] was just a piece of unpractical pacifism, while on the Left it was said by some . . . 
that we were war-mongers’. The Union was accused of being both ‘too militarist’ and, 
conversely, a part of ‘new-fangled pacifism’.55 In 1932, Norman Angell, the well-known 
writer and one of the founders of the UDC (as well as a member of the LNU’s Executive 
Committee), similarly queried how Lord Lloyd could accuse the LNU of “sentimental anti-
militarism” when the ‘commonest jibe flung by the anti-League press at the Union (and the 
League) this last few months has been the accusation of “militarism”’.56 Such ideological 
 
55 Viscount Cecil of Chelwood, All the Way (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1949), p. 170. 
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markers were important, especially as debates between the Air League, the Navy League, 
and the LNU were played out in public. 
By the late 1920s, the Navy League was, once again, an avowed opponent of 
disarmament and an ‘unrelenting detractor’ of liberal internationalist groups such as the 
LNU.57 Some within the League merely considered the Union a ‘dangerous society’, while 
other figures spoke in more hostile terms, with Lady Lloyd referring to the ‘bacillus of what 
we may call the spirit of the League of Nations Union’ which had ‘infected’ the British 
people.58 Publicly, Lord Lloyd described the LNU as ‘neither British nor in favour of 
freedom’, while the Navy League dismissed the Union as a ‘pacifist organization which 
masquerades under the title of the League of Nations’ and stated that any support for the 
LNU was both ‘unwise and unpatriotic’.59 The League’s self-appointed role as guardians of 
British patriotism – often through the evocation of Nelsonian principles and the promotion 
of navalism – was commonly framed in opposition to groups such as the LNU. Although 
debates between the League and the LNU often predictably focused on disarmament and 
patriotism, this was not the sole topic of conflict.  
Responding to claims that the LNU’s Grand Council had passed a resolution 
requesting public authorities to refrain from encouraging the attendance of schoolchildren at 
naval, military, and air displays, the Navy League criticised the resolution as being 
‘unpatriotic and contrary to the best interests of the Empire’.60 The LNU’s General Council 
had indeed resolved in late 1927 that ‘in view of the urgent necessity for moral disarmament 
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as a condition of the material reduction of arms’ it would request the Union’s Executive 
Committee to ask public authorities to refrain from allowing children to attend military 
displays, because ‘the mind of a child, lacking an adult’s mature knowledge of the horror of 
war, is likely to be carried away by its meretricious glamour’.61 Murray saw fit to issue a 
lengthy response to the Navy League, noting that the LNU itself had not passed such a 
resolution, but had instead referred the matter to its Education Committee. The latter had, in 
fact, only agreed to protest against the more militaristic aspects of the display (rather than 
the event as a whole).62 In reference to military displays, Murray wrote that he, like the 
Education Committee, only objected to the martial and militaristic nature of the bombing of 
a “native village” at air displays. He felt it was ‘not a piece of fun, nor a thing over which 
children should be encouraged to crow with delight’.63  
The education – and potential militarisation of youth – was an enduring point of 
conflict between the LNU and the Navy League. Addressing those assembled at the Navy 
League’s Grand Council Meeting at Caxton Hall in 1932, Lloyd stated that wherever the 
Navy League went ‘they found they had to deal with the union’s teachings, which were 
opposed to the ordinary doctrines of patriotism’. Referring to the League’s SCC, Lloyd felt 
that it was the 
only organisation which is not ashamed to teach boys to defend their country. For a long time 
past there has been a sentimental idea that there is something to be ashamed of in holding a 
rifle or a gun . . . You may call it militarism if you like. I call it the cultivation of that national 
spirit without which every country has failed and fallen.64 
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The address, described by the Daily Telegraph as a ‘vigorous protest against a “sentimental” 
aspect of anti-militarism’, also attracted the attention of Norman Angell.65 Angell objected 
to Lloyd’s suggestion that the LNU ‘teaches indifference to national defence or security’.66 
As an alternative to the competitive building of armaments, Angell instead stressed that the 
Union relied upon international law and collective security and that it was ‘simple distortion 
to imply that it is the repudiation of national defence’. He concluded by stating that the 
‘world has come near to destroying itself through being guided by a certain type of “national 
spirit”. If it is to save itself, if the nation is to be saved, it must discover by disciplined 
thought where that spirit has gone wrong.’67 The hostility between the LNU and Navy 
League regarding questions of national defence, militarism, and the more nebulous concept 
of ‘national spirit’, was even more pronounced surrounding matters of disarmament. 
In a joint memorandum issued with the Air League to The Times in February 1928, 
the Navy League objected to a policy of unilateral disarmament as favoured by a number of 
alleged ‘extremists’ within the LNU. The memorandum stated that the Air and Navy 
Leagues disagreed with ‘those who advocate one-sided disarmament’ and that any further 
reduction of armaments by Britain that was not matched by other nations would ‘not only 
jeopardize the security of this Country and the Empire but will imperil world peace’. It 
concluded by warning that it would be a ‘real danger to the Empire if the influence of the 
extremists should become supreme in the League of Nations Union’.68 Despite the tone of 
the piece, it had originally been written with a view to gaining LNU support for opposition 
to one-sided disarmament, although it was unsurprisingly unable to secure the Union’s 
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backing. Indeed, Groves contacted Cecil directly writing that it had ‘occurred to me that it 
would help the cause of disarmament if the Navy League and the Air League of the British 
Empire were to lend their support to the League of Nations Union by publicly endorsing its 
aims’. This, Groves argued, would go some way to countering the ‘widespread impression 
that the League of Nations Union stands for one-sided disarmament’.69 
Cecil felt that he was unable to give Groves his backing personally as the three 
organisations were ‘necessarily pursuing objects which are different though not necessarily 
contradictory. The two Service Leagues desire to maintain the Navy and Air Force at full 
strength for the present. The Union is aiming at the establishment of Peace by International 
Co-Operation.’ While Cecil remarked that there was nothing ‘necessarily antagonistic 
between the two points of view’, a compromise was unlikely to be reached because the ‘two 
Leagues are essentially national in their outlook, the Union is primarily international’.70 
While the LNU may have operated within national and international contexts, the Air and 
Navy Leagues were often firmly nationalist in orientation and perspective – or at least 
perceived to be so by liberal internationalists. 
Seemingly chagrined at the lack of cooperation on the part of the LNU over the 
memorandum, Groves issued a further appeal to The Times several months later, protesting 
against the ‘unauthorized propaganda of these misguided extremists’ and called for the 
LNU’s General Council to publicly repudiate such propaganda.71 A letter in the same 
newspaper from John Hills, the LNU’s acting chairman, agreed with Groves that the LNU 
 
69 BL, Cecil of Chelwood Papers (hereafter Cecil Papers), Correspondence and Papers, 1893–1953, Add MS 
51165, Letter from P.R.C. Groves to Lord Robert Cecil, 21 December 1927, p. 1.  
70 BL, Cecil Papers, Add MS 51165, Letter from Cecil to Groves, 23 December 1927, p. 1. The LNU did also 
emphasise to the Air League that it would ‘most cordially welcome and would greatly value the endorsements 
of its aims by the Navy League and the Air League’, yet it likewise noted that ‘[s]ome of the objectives of the 
three organisations are in fact distinct and could hardly be expressed in a common document’. BLPES, LNU 
2/8, Revised Draft of a Reply from the L.N.U. to the Air League, 30 January 1928, p. 1. 
71 ‘Disarmament and the League’, The Times, 17 July 1928, p. 12.  
87 
 
did not stand for unilateral disarmament, but argued that, as the Union had already made this 
explicit, it could do little more to distance itself from such a policy.72 Groves later admitted 
that the assumption that the LNU advocated unilateral disarmament was mistaken (and even 
agreed to join the LNU’s sub-committee on the internationalisation of civil aviation and the 
creation of an international air force).73 However, he still felt that the ‘hysterical clamour’ of 
those within the Union, who were adherents of unilateral disarmament, meant many possible 
supporters shunned the LNU ‘as the arch-protagonist of national and Imperial abasement 
and defeatism’.74 
 During the interwar years, militarism was not entirely antithetical to those on the 
political left or liberal internationalist groups such as the LNU. An important ideological 
marker, then, is Ceadel’s distinction between ‘pacifism’ and ‘pacificism’. The former is the 
‘belief that all war is always wrong and should never be resorted to’, whereas the latter is 
the ‘assumption that war, though sometimes necessary, is always an irrational and inhumane 
way to solve disputes, and that its prevention should always be an overriding political 
priority’.75 This distinction is significant when considering the work of the LNU. As 
McCarthy observes, the LNU – including leading figures such as Cecil and Murray – 
remained firmly ‘pacificist’ in nature to the extent that the Union even accommodated 
‘certain elements of the popular culture of militarism’.76 
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Despite assurances that it did not stand for unilateral disarmament, the Navy League 
was again accusing the LNU of precisely that by the early 1930s. The Navy League was 
confident that its activities were ‘instrumental’ in countering the alleged ‘long-continued 
endeavours’ of the LNU to promote unilateral disarmament. It hoped that, as a result of its 
work, the British public was beginning to see through the ‘fog of pacifist propaganda’.77 The 
accusation that the LNU stood for unilateral disarmament was a long-standing feature of 
Navy League work. Indeed, even by 1936, Lily Yorke-Triscott, the secretary of the League’s 
Kensington Branch, saw fit to send a letter asking Cecil ‘What protest has the League of 
Nations Union uttered’ against unilateral disarmament ‘which had reduced the Defence 
Forces of the Crown to their present condition?’78 
Such accusations undoubtedly reflected an increasing sense of alarm within the Navy 
League over the effectiveness of LNU propaganda. Indeed, referring to LNU propaganda, 
and a meeting of the leaders of the three main political parties to consider the question of 
disarmament, Gretton considered the situation ‘absolutely terrifying’. In response, a sub-
committee was formed to consider questions of Navy League propaganda.79 With Lloyd as 
president, heralded as an ‘apostle of nationalism’ by some within the organisation, the Navy 
League dismissed those at the Albert Hall meeting as ‘defeatists’ and charged the LNU with 
trying to ‘persuade themselves and everybody else that the great thing that the Empire owed 
to mankind was to disarm as quickly as possible, whatever other nations might be doing’.80  
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In response to such pronouncements, Headway stressed that: ‘Certain sections of 
opinion in the country might possibly wish the Union did advocate that [unilateral 
disarmament]. But the hard fact is that it never does and never has.’81 To avoid any further 
confusion, subsequent issues of the journal then printed the following disclaimer: 
‘Disarmament, in any reference to the subject in HEADWAY, must be understood to mean 
the reduction and limitation of national armaments by international agreement’.82 Murray 
remonstrated with the Navy League more directly, lambasting the ‘blindness’ of a ‘purely 
nationalist outlook’ and accused the League of not confining its ‘propaganda within the 
limits of common sense’.83 Noel-Baker likewise spoke of the ‘Navy League mind’ and the 
‘old Navy League point of view’ in parliament.84 He described such a mindset in the 
following terms: ‘they never did believe in disarmament; they do not believe in it now’.85  
Hostility towards the LNU reflected a growing concern within the Navy League over 
Britain’s perceived naval decline and indicated an unwillingness to engage with liberal 
internationalist ideas about national defence. As Lloyd articulated, there was clearly a sense 
within the Navy League that it was ‘up against the “active and hostile propaganda of the 
League of Nations Union”’.86 However, the LNU’s response to Navy League 
pronouncements suggests that it was likewise concerned about the ‘active’ and ‘hostile’ 
propaganda of the League.87  
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Much like the Navy League, there was also opposition to the LNU from within the 
Air League, despite concerns about its militaristic public image. Hostility towards the Union 
was particularly evident in the opposition towards Murray’s suggestion in 1930 that the 
League could prepare a proposal for international air disarmament for discussion with the 
LNU. Balfour argued that the Air League should not be ‘allying itself with a definite body 
of pacifism and extreme radicalism’, Sir Charles Delme-Radcliffe ‘distrusted and disliked’ 
the Union, while Sempill felt any association would ‘undoubtedly alienate the sympathies 
of many supporters’. Merton informed the Committee that, while there may have been some 
‘out-and-out pacifists’ within the LNU, Murray had a more balanced view in relation to 
disarmament. Yet, owing to the outlined opposition, the matter was dropped.88  
Perhaps the greatest conflict between the Air League and the LNU, as the chapter 
will later examine, arose over calls for the internationalisation of aviation and proposals for 
the formation of an international air police force.89 For many liberal internationalists, the 
modernity, the transformative qualities, and the ‘inherently international nature of aviation’ 
provided an opportunity to bring the world closer together – although only if ‘freed from the 
shackles of the nation-state’.90 There was widespread faith by figures on the left that aviation 
could be both ‘civil and liberating’ and long-standing hope that aviation could serve as an 
important technology of communication and commerce, capable of abolishing frontiers and 
ensuring peace.91 However, although the ‘aerial internationalism’ preached by figures on the 
left – characterised by ‘an enthusiasm for the possibilities of modern science and scientific 
invention’ – was supported by a range of influential figures, it was also met with ambivalence 
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and even hostility by some.92 For instance, the Air League was a vehement critic of both 
schemes for the internationalisation of aviation and an international air police force, clashing 
most frequently with eminent LNU figures such as Noel-Baker and Davies. 
 A further significant point of potential conflict in the interwar years can be found in 
the Peace Ballot. Despite covering the limitation of armaments, the abolition of aircraft by 
international agreement, and the private manufacture of arms, all subjects which concerned 
the Air League, the League provided curiously little in the way of opposition to the Ballot. 
Indeed, it did not offer any public comment, other than to note in Air Review that, in relation 
to the fact that over a million people voted against the abolition of naval and military aircraft, 
‘It appears that, in spite of the blood-curdling prophecies regarding air warfare, many people 
still remember that war is older than aviation, and have not been deluded into the belief that 
the abolition of aircraft would bring peace on earth’.93  
 
 
III. The Air League, the Navy League, and ‘Insidious Pacifist Propaganda’ 
Alongside opposition to LNU propaganda, both the Air and Navy Leagues were vocal critics 
of other events that were seen as an endorsement of pacifism. For example, writing of the 
Oxford Union Debate – in which the Oxford Union carried the motion that ‘this House will 
in no circumstances fight for its King and country’ by 275 to 153 votes – The Navy described 
those at the debate as ‘young disloyalists yearning for notoriety’. The journal wrote that 
‘[m]entally blinded by insidious pacifist propaganda these young men have failed to realise 
that no one is a worse enemy of peace than he who poses as a pacifist by profession’. The 
article argued that, rather than achieving peace through disarmament and pacifism, the ‘only 
true way to avoid war is to have the will to peace and the strong arm ready and able to support 
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that will’. The piece concluded by again dismissing the resolution as ‘disloyal’ and 
‘irresponsible’, asking readers to instead remember the Oxford men who ‘rush[ed] to the 
defence of their King and Country with the same glorious spirit of loyalty and devotion that 
was shown by those gallant other of their kind in the year 1914’.94 While the Navy League’s 
description may have mirrored the reports of contemporary newspapers on the political right, 
it is significant to note that, while the League engaged with liberal internationalist groups 
such as the LNU, it also attempted to counter more radical pacifist sentiments in the 1930s. 
As well as conflict with the LNU, both the Air and Navy Leagues met with opposition 
from a number of pacifist, anti-war, or left-leaning organisations in the interwar years. 
Indeed, as will be explored, Empire Air Day was criticised by a number of groups, including 
the PPU, the UDC, and the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB). Noel-Baker also 
criticised Empire Air Day, yet the LNU itself was careful to distance itself from public 
expressions of direct anti-militarism. Other notable Air League activities, such as the 
publication of its book, Facts about Flying and the Civil Uses of Aviation, and the ADCC, 
were opposed by the Labour-controlled London County Council (LCC).  
Meanwhile, the Navy League’s opposition to the LNU also brought it into conflict 
with other organisations. For example, the Executive Committee of the NFWI resolved in 
1934 that ‘in view of the fact that some of the speakers sent out by the Navy League have 
violated the principles of the Women’s Institute by attacking the League of Nations and 
pacifism’ it would no longer invite Navy League lecturers to meetings.95 Lloyd met with 
Lady Denman, the Institute’s president, to discuss the matter, but, clearly angered by the 
decision, accused the NFWI of being a pacifist body.96 In response, Denman wrote that, 
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while NFWI members could ‘organize a meeting to advocate militarism or pacifism’ as 
individuals or as members of other bodies, most members believed that ‘to resist by force is 
morally wrong’ and that to use a meeting to attack pacifism was an infringement on the 
NFWI’s policy of avoiding any party political or sectarian ground.97 
Others on the left, such as the Independent Labour Party (ILP), also opposed both 
the Air and Navy League – particularly for their stance on armaments.98 Indeed, support for 
organisations such as the Air and Navy Leagues could prove contentious for politicians. For 
instance, the Derby Council for the Prevention of War recorded its ‘strong protest’ against 
J.H. Thomas, Labour MP and former Secretary of State for Colonies, for supporting the Air 
League. The Council called for ‘all citizens to refrain from supporting any organisation 
whose aims and objects include the increase of armaments’.99 Alongside the Council’s 
opposition, the Midland Divisional Council of the ILP considered an emergency resolution 
in 1928 calling for the expulsion of members of ‘bellicose organisations’ from the Labour 
Party. While there was opposition to the resolution, with one member dismissing it as ‘awful 
twaddle’, others felt that membership of either the Air or Navy League was ‘incompatible 
with the ideals and principles of the Labour movement’. As one member stated, if the ILP 
‘stood for anything it was peace’. The same member asked what the use would be of any 
member of such organisations and the ILP ‘going out to preach anti-militarism’.100  
The Daily Herald was similarly wary of such organisations, dubbing the Navy 
League a ‘band of fanatics’ over its Singapore Naval Base policy and went as far as to label 
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the League ‘warmongers’ in the early 1930s.101 The same newspaper was particularly critical 
of the Navy League over its opposition to disarmament in the early 1930s, with one article 
stating that it was the ‘job of responsible Ministers to keep the experts under control’. Citing 
Lord Salisbury, the former Prime Minister, the article continued: ‘If you give them their way 
. . . you will soon be garrisoning the moon as protection against an invasion by Mars.’102 
Such criticism of the League is noteworthy, especially given that the Daily Herald was one 
of the most popular newspapers in the interwar years and Labour’s ‘unofficial newspaper’.103  
Individuals associated with both Leagues were also either subject to accusations of 
militarism, or felt the need to emphasise that their writings or views were not militaristic.104 
Harold Laski, the socialist intellectual, dubbed Lord Lloyd a ‘Supreme Autocrat’ and wrote 
that ‘[l]ife for him is a battle which the big artillery is decisive . . . International peace, as 
Geneva views it, he looks upon as sentimental vapouring.’105 Opposition towards the Air 
and Navy Leagues, and key figures within each organisation, was chiefly directed towards 
the more militaristic elements of their rhetoric and, indeed, towards the ‘purely nationalist 
outlook’ which it was claimed often characterised both organisations.  
 
 
IV. ‘Militarist Saboteurs’, the Geneva Disarmament Conference, and the 
Second London Naval Treaty  
The Geneva Disarmament Conference opened on 2 February 1932 with representation from 
fifty-nine states, including all the major powers. The Conference, long in the making after a 
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Preparatory Commission had been established in 1925, met with millions of petitions from 
across the world expressing hopes for peace.106 Yet, despite such enthusiasm, the Air and 
Navy Leagues objected to disarmament on practical, strategic, and even moral grounds. 
The Air League’s policy regarding the Geneva Disarmament Conference was 
initially ambivalent. Concerns about the Air League’s perceived pacifism have been noted 
and the League’s response to the Conference was certainly not one resembling ‘full blooded 
patriotism’ as some members had hoped. Indeed, the fact that Merton even accepted an 
invitation to serve on a LNU sub-committee on the internationalisation of civil aviation and 
the creation of an international air force (while he was Air League vice chairman) suggests 
that certain members were not prepared to fully lobby against aerial disarmament.107  
The issue of Air League policy in relation to the forthcoming Geneva Disarmament 
Conference was initially raised by Bott in July 1931. While Bott stressed that a definite 
policy should be drafted so that the League might be properly prepared, others on the 
Committee stated that it was ‘difficult to formulate policies on specific questions such as 
“parity” until it was known what other nations were prepared to do’.108 Nevertheless, Bott 
persevered in his conviction that it was ‘advisable to set up machinery to ascertain the views 
of experts in the many spheres of aviation’ so that the League could ‘formulate a definite 
policy and be ready to engage in opportune propaganda when the chance arose’.109  
While a Sub-Committee was formed to consider Bott’s proposals, the Executive 
Committee instead agreed – somewhat remarkably – with Kenworthy, a member of the 
LNU’s Executive Committee (although he frequently missed meetings) while he was an Air 
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League member, who suggested that the League ‘would be well-advised to abandon all 
further action [regarding the Disarmament Conference] as the subject was extremely 
complicated and one which was beyond the scope and capabilities of the League to deal 
with’.110 Similar sentiments were echoed by Guest in his capacity as chairman of the League. 
Addressing the Committee, Guest asserted that, while ‘there was a section of the public that 
maintained that the Air League should follow the Navy League’s principle by pressing for 
increased armaments’, he thought that there was ‘no great need . . . to pursue that principle, 
and suggested that the greater part of the League’s energies should be directed towards the 
development of civil and commercial aviation’.111  
Such proposals did not, however, involve the abandonment of long-standing Air 
League principles in toto. At the Annual General Meeting in 1932, Sutherland warned that 
it would be necessary for the League to formulate a new policy with regard to ‘Military 
Aviation if the Disarmament Conference lasted many more months’. Yet, Thwaites again 
charged the League with having relegated national defence to the background and that the 
abandonment of its military policy had resulted in its restricted activities.112 The League’s 
state of inertia abruptly came to an end with the issuing of a manifesto, written in conjunction 
with the RAC and RAeS, to The Times in late 1932.  
Patrick Kyba notes that, at the time of the Geneva Disarmament Conference, 
‘organised anti-disarmament pressure group activity . . . was slight’.113 The Air and Navy 
Leagues were, in fact, among the few organisations to protest. The manifesto in The Times, 
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also issued to every MP, was published in response to a parliamentary debate in November 
1932 in which Guest had pressed the Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald on ‘whether it is 
clear that nothing in the line of the abolition of the Air Force can possibly take place without 
the permission of the House’. MacDonald’s response that the ‘Government must be free to 
negotiate the abolition or the extension of anything’, but that any negotiations would be 
conducted with the understanding that ‘final consent remains with this House’, was clearly 
not enough to assuage the Air League.114 In the letter, the League claimed that MacDonald 
had granted ‘plenary powers’ to the country’s representatives at Geneva. It was urged that 
‘only the possession of adequate air forces can give us a reasonable measure of security at 
home and overseas and enable us to seek world peace and ensure it’.115  
While the influence of the manifesto is difficult to measure, Noel-Baker bemoaned 
the League’s opposition to the Conference at length in The Private Manufacture of 
Armaments.116 Likewise, in his statement to the Royal Commission on the Private 
Manufacture of and Trading in Arms, Noel-Baker noted that the activities of the ‘“Patriotic” 
Societies’, who were concerned with air power (the Air League being at the forefront of such 
organisations), were ‘particularly intense’ during the Disarmament Conference.117 He 
asserted that the campaign of those with air interests – ‘patriotic’ societies, officials, writers 
in the aviation press etc – ‘was a principal factor in defeating the success of proposals for 
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Air Disarmament in the Geneva Conference’.118 However, Kyba notes that anti-disarmament 
opinion during the first year of the Disarmament Conference was a ‘weak, fragmented 
phenomenon’, and it seems unlikely that Air League propaganda had any direct influence on 
the Conference.119  
Although the League was hesitant to intervene in discussions surrounding the 
Conference initially, it was far more vocal in its opposition to disarmament following the 
appointment of Chamier as secretary general. Indeed, Chamier, who wrote that the Air 
League was inspired neither by ‘jingoistic or pacifist ideals’, argued that the reason 
disarmament conferences tended to fail was because they attempted too much and that 
‘[e]xtreme measures spell extreme risks, and no sensible nation dares to take extreme risks 
at the present day’. He continued, stating that the League supported the limitation of 
armaments, and that this was ‘desirable in the interests of peace and prosperity’, but that it 
could not be at the expense of the security of the nation or empire, urging ‘we should be 
inferior to no other power in the air’.120 
 
 
Navy League 
In his final address as Navy League president before being replaced by Lord Lloyd, 
Linlithgow warned that ‘any extremes on the part of the League, any jingoism or any sign 
by which it might lead to the charge of being cranky, would deprive the League of its useful 
services’.121 Despite describing the LNU in similar terms, some within the League’s 
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Executive Committee also feared being labelled as ‘unreasonable extremists’ surrounding 
its disarmament policy.122 Fears of sensationalism, scaremongering, and jingoism were held 
by many within the League at various points throughout its existence; yet, despite such 
warnings, the League’s pronouncements surrounding the Geneva Disarmament Conference 
were at times suffused with all three. Indeed, both the Navy League and the Air League were 
among those dubbed as ‘militarist saboteurs’ by Noel-Baker who, in considering their 
relationship with private manufacturers of armaments in relation to disarmament, reflected 
that the ‘sinister support for the military-industrial complex had some importance, since it 
created the illusion of public support for the militarist Ministers in the Government’.123  
Much Navy League propaganda surrounding Geneva was, of course, influenced by 
the LNU’s work. Addressing a Navy League meeting three weeks after the Conference 
began, Lord Lloyd told those gathered to do what they could to recruit members for the 
League and that such efforts were necessary in view of the LNU’s ‘persistent propaganda’.124 
The Geneva Disarmament Conference was also a feature of the well-publicised Navy League 
New Year messages. For example, the League’s New Year message in 1933 spoke of how, 
at Washington in 1922 and London in 1930, Britain was ‘fettered and bound by treaties 
which denied us the right exercised since the days of the Saxon Kings to maintain the sea 
power that our special national conditions demand’.125 Navy League rhetoric surrounding 
disarmament, and in particular the Geneva Conference, was not limited to merely 
denouncing pacts and treaties, however, but also emphasised the long-standing importance 
of the sea to Britain’s national identity. 
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The Disarmament Conference was high on the agenda at the League’s Grand Council 
Meetings from 1931 to 1934. For instance, at the Grand Council Meeting in 1931, the Navy 
League stalwart Leo Amery called for clear thinking as to what constituted the conditions 
and foundations of peace. He bemoaned the ‘incredible amount’ of ‘loose thinking’, as well 
as ‘loose’ and ‘sloppy talking’, about peace and disarmament. Amery was particularly 
scathing about the suggestion that an absence of arms would lead to peace, dismissing such 
a view as ‘dangerous folly and a menace’. It was not armaments that caused war, Amery 
argued, but conflict in ideas and ideals between nations. Drawing on Britain’s status as an 
island nation, Amery concluded by urging that the strongest guarantee of peace was the 
maintenance of a navy strong enough to act as a deterrent and strong enough to counter any 
aggressor nation.126 Lloyd then moved a resolution calling upon the government to build up 
the tonnage allowed by the London Naval Treaty to the fullest extent. This was followed by 
a further resolution, proposed by Sir Sydney Freemantle, calling for no further reductions in 
naval strength at Geneva. In an impassioned plea, Freemantle declared: ‘We have made 
concession after concession, gesture after gesture, none of them have been reciprocated’. As 
a result, ‘We have seriously imperilled our security; we have lost prestige; we have lost 
influence and power’.127 For the Navy League, disarmament was not something that would 
only imperil trade, food supplies, commerce, and the empire; it would also constitute a blow 
to national might, national identity, and the prestige which had been accorded by its long-
standing naval supremacy.128 When speaking on Navy League policy surrounding Geneva, 
those gathered at Grand Council Meetings were careful to stress that it did not make them ‘a 
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society in aid of militarism’ and that the League’s policy was not one of ‘swank and 
swagger’, but of self-preservation.129  
Navy League activities surrounding the second London Naval Conference of 1935 
to 1936 were similar to its previous campaigns surrounding disarmament. Convened on 9 
December 1935, attendees included Britain, the US, France, Japan, and Italy. Britain 
proposed that nations should disclose future naval building programmes, although Japan 
refused. When no agreement was reached over Japanese demands for a common upper limit 
(parity), Japan withdrew from the Conference in January 1936.130 Further discussions 
centred around qualitative limitations – principally gun calibres and tonnage of certain 
vessels – rather than limitations on the overall size of fleets and was eventually signed by 
Britain, the US, and France on 25 March 1936.131 At its Grand Council Meeting in 1935, the 
League had moved a resolution which urged the government to enter no further agreement 
which would limit its ability to build its navy to the fullest extent upon termination of the 
Washington and London Naval Treaties (due for reconsideration at the end of 1935).132  
The Navy League was likewise opposed to the 1935 Anglo-German Naval 
Agreement, which fixed a ratio allowing the total tonnage of the German navy to be 35% of 
the total tonnage of the Royal Navy.133 The German disclosures of its naval programme was 
met with alarm by some within the League, yet Lloyd tempered calls from members of the 
Executive Committee for immediate statements supporting an acceleration of Britain’s naval 
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building.134 Lloyd did, however, open a debate within the House of Lords in which he 
expressed his uneasiness about the nature of the Agreement. He questioned the decision to 
accept the Agreement, an infringement of the terms laid out in the Treaty of Versailles, 
without consulting France or Italy and that such action ‘was bound to be painful to our old 
Allies’. He concluded by stressing that ‘Naval security was far more important than naval 
limitation, and this agreement was enfeebling throughout and strengthening of all the forces 
which were bad to this country and the world’.135 Yet, if Lloyd was the principal vehicle for 
the dissemination of Navy League propaganda surrounding the Anglo-German Naval 
Agreement, the second London Naval Treaty provided an opportunity for more widespread 
activities.  
In late 1935, the League was starting to acquire funds to launch a national propaganda 
campaign.136 Lloyd deemed the naval situation significant enough to consider accepting 
donations from armament firms, something which the League was publicly opposed to until 
this point, alongside funds promised by Lady Houston.137  However, both Lloyd and Michael 
Beaumont emphasised that the League’s propaganda campaign should ‘not embarrass our 
representatives at the Conference, nor draw the Navy League into unwise controversy’.138 
This did not stop the League being critical of the purposes of the Conference. For instance, 
in its New Year message in 1936, it wrote that it ‘seems certain that the Conference will end 
without any real advance towards the objective of disarmament’. It bemoaned that through 
‘years of neglect, muddled idealism, and false economy, we have hazarded by default the 
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glory and honour of our race’. For the Navy League, the lessons were clear; Britain ‘must 
be free to build the ships we need’.139 The Navy published a series of articles on the 
Conference, largely critical and dismissive in tone, and the League carried out an increased 
lecturing programme in local and regional settings, yet it did not carry out the same national 
propaganda as it had done surrounding previous naval treaties.140  
There was concern from within the Navy League that the government might commit 
to further naval limitations at the Conference, however Admiral Thursfield, Navy League 
member and naval correspondent for The Times, assured the League’s Executive Committee 
that the Admiralty were ‘alive to the danger and that no such situation was likely to arise’. 
Lloyd also stressed that, as the government was due to issue a White Paper on defence, the 
League might be best advised to limit its propaganda surrounding the Conference until this 
had been published.141 The government Defence White Paper in 1936, which emphasised 
the ‘overwhelming importance of the Navy’ for preserving sea communications to ensure 
the supply of food and raw materials as well as the passage of troops and supplies, clearly 
allayed the League’s concerns.142 Indeed, Lloyd suggested to the League’s Executive 
Committee that, owing to the White Paper, it would be best ‘for a month or two to reduce 
propaganda work to a minimum’.143 After this time, he argued the League would be in a 
better position to see whether the government intended to carry out its proposals. Lloyd also 
suggested that government policy and the recent White Paper was ‘largely the result of the 
propagandist work of the Navy League up and down the country in the face of pacifists and 
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those who represented a dangerous ideology’.144 While this may have overstated the 
influence of the League’s propaganda, it again highlighted its continued opposition to those 
who advocated disarmament and pacifism. The League welcomed the government’s 
intention to increase its armed forces at a public meeting after its Grand Council Meeting 
that year, yet, it also expressed concern about the increased propaganda in favour of air 
power, fearing this would be at the expense of the navy.145 As Chapter 3 will discuss, 
following the second London Naval Treaty the League continued to press for a strong navy, 
although its chief concerns were the SCC, the Merchant Navy, and the influence of air power 
propagandists. In many respects, the Conference itself ‘marked the end of the naval arms 
control experiment initiated in 1921. The naval arms race had already begun.’146 
 
 
V. ‘When Nations go to War the Policeman is Impotent’: An International 
Air Police Force and the Internationalisation of Civil Aviation  
The German withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference in October 1933 – and the 
subsequent Japanese withdrawal from the Washington and London Naval Treaties – were 
ominous developments for proponents of disarmament. Accordingly, proposals for the 
internationalisation of civil aviation and the creation of an international air police force – 
seen by many historians as a sincere attempt to achieve collective security or disarmament 
– received widespread enthusiasm across the political spectrum. 
As has been noted, there existed an enthusiasm among liberal internationalists for the 
potentially transformative aspects of aviation in relation to commerce, communications, and 
the maintenance of peace. The extent to which liberal internationalists engaged with 
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technology, technocracy, modernity, and even militarism in the interwar years (in the form 
of calls for an international air police force and the internationalisation of civil aviation) has 
been the subject of several studies in recent years.147 Calls for the formation of an 
international air police force in the British case are often explained through the ‘long-
standing liberal belief that international law could prevent war’ and, chiefly, as a 
manifestation of the ‘shadow of the bomber’ and corresponding fears of aerial 
bombardment.148 In contrast, Waqar Zaidi argues that there was enthusiasm from liberal 
internationalists for aviation – and bombing in particular – which was much closer to 
militarist, than pacifist, streams of thought.149  
Largely absent from such accounts, however, is a consideration of the Air League’s 
response to such issues. While the Air League had been initially reluctant to engage with the 
Disarmament Conference or questions on the internationalisation of aviation, this ceased to 
be the case after the appointment of Chamier as secretary general. Issues surrounding the 
abolition of bombing, the international control of civil aviation, and, in particular, the 
formation of an international air police force proved to be a catalyst for renewed Air League 
activities. Its argument was perhaps most succinctly outlined in an article in Air Review 
which declared ‘disarmament will avail nothing . . . Peace in the next few generations of the 
machine age, at least, will be had only be accepted by those equipped to maintain it.’150  
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The idea of an international air police force had widespread support from a number 
of influential liberal internationalists and those on the political left in the 1930s, such as 
Angell, Davies, and Noel-Baker.151 One of the most influential proposals for an international 
air police force was that advanced by Noel-Baker in his contribution to Challenge to 
Death.152 He proposed the creation of ‘one single homogenous corps, recruited, organised, 
equipped, armed and paid by an international authority, the League of Nations, and owing 
allegiance to the League alone’.153 He argued that internationally controlled planes could, if 
an aggressor persisted in bombing civilians, ‘bombard his cities until he stopped’.154 Even 
though Noel-Baker emphasised that it would be a ‘desperate measure, undertaken in the last 
resort’, this reflected an apparent inconsistency in the notion of an international air police 
force – that aggression could ultimately be halted in the form of reprisal bombings.155 Liberal 
internationalist calls for an international air police force provide, for Michael Pugh, an 
example of ‘militarised internationalism’ and they certainly can be seen as a ‘pacificist’ 
understanding of military aviation.156  
Clement Attlee, Labour Party leader from 1935, also supported the concept. Attlee – 
described as a ‘fool’ in certain aviation circles – published on the topic in 1934 (following a 
resolution at the Labour Party Annual Conference in 1933), arguing that an international air 
police force could be responsible for ‘preserving order in unquiet areas on the borders of 
civilisation’.157 An earlier Labour proponent of the international air police force was Hugh 
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Dalton, the Labour MP who had made numerous speeches in favour of disarmament in the 
mid-1920s.158 He likewise argued in favour of the abolition of military aircraft and suggested 
that an international air force, under the control of the Council of the League of Nations, 
could replace national air forces.159 That Labour members supported such a scheme is 
somewhat unsurprising. When Labour again took office in 1929, it set about implementing, 
under its Foreign Secretary Arthur Henderson, a ‘League of Nations policy’.160 For much of 
the 1930s the official Labour Party foreign policy was to oppose rearmament, commit to 
arbitration, international co-operation, and disarmament, whilst maintaining a belief in the 
ability of the League of Nations to deter aggression.161 L.E.O. Charlton, the air power 
theorist, was also a staunch supporter of the international air police force idea. He felt it was 
unlikely to be achieved, however, when ‘[m]ilitarism, in many insidious forms, permeates 
our social fabric’.162  
The idea of an international air police force was not only supported by those on the 
left; it was introduced in bills to Parliament on several occasions and supported by all the 
main parties at certain times – with Stanley Baldwin speaking favourably of ‘the abolition 
of the air forces of the world and the international control of civil aviation’.163 Although the 
concept of an international air police force may well have been a panacea for many on the 
political left, it clearly transcended political boundaries.164 Basil Liddell Hart, the military 
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theorist, supported calls for an international air police force for a time, as did figures who 
had been associated with the Air League such as Moore-Brabazon and Thwaites.165  
On an associational level, there was also a number of proponents of an international 
air police force. For instance, Lord David Davies founded the New Commonwealth Society 
(NCS) in October 1932, a body concerned with the promotion of an international air police 
force. Among those later dismissed by E.H. Carr as a ‘utopian’ and ‘idealist’, Davies had 
previously formed the Chair and Department of International Politics at Aberystwyth, a 
position used to increase understanding of the League of Nations, and was a founding 
member of the LNU.166 Davies set out his views on the creation of an international air police 
force in The Problem of the Twentieth Century, arguing that although ‘in the course of time 
the chariots of air will play a decisive part in the service of the international authority’, they 
were not then in a position to do so.167 However, as Holman has pointed out, in reality the 
NCS published frequently on the concept of an international air police force.168 The Society 
was of the opinion that an international air police force could apply military sanctions ‘which 
can be exerted upon states for the purpose of maintaining peace’.169 The NCS’s membership 
was fairly limited, having reached little over a thousand members by mid-1936, yet its 
Council contained a number of influential figures (notably Winston Churchill, who became 
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president in 1936).170 Others on the political right, including Alfred Duff Cooper and 
Mottistone, were vice-presidents of the Society, further highlighting its cross-party appeal.  
Other organisations, particularly the Liberal-dominated centrist Next Five Years 
Group, also urged the government to ‘consider without prejudice’ the formation of ‘an 
international air force with the limited function of preventing misuse of civil aircraft’.171 Its 
founder, Clifford Allen, the pacifist and leading figure in the ILP, was convinced that 
‘aviation will either destroy or save our civilization’.172 Likewise, by 1935, the LNU also 
supported the idea of an international air police force.173 Aviation was clearly important to 
organisations on the left who displayed clear signs of liberal militarism as well as liberal 
internationalism.  
Being anti-war did not always entail being consistently pacifist, anti-armament, or 
anti-militarist. Indeed, in the late 1930s – admittedly at a time when calls for collective 
security and disarmament no longer held much sway – the ‘liberal conscience was militant 
rather than appeasing’ and, by 1939, ‘the liberal conscience endorsed a national struggle as 
a just war’.174 For all the LNU’s association with pacifism, British liberal internationalists 
‘were not pacifists, but willing upholders, with force if necessary, of a liberal international 
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order’.175 Militarism was able to cut across conventional dividing lines of party politics 
within the interwar years, much as it did prior to the First World War.176 Liberal 
internationalist views within the interwar period, at least in terms of aviation, were clearly 
not anti-militarist or pacifist as Zaidi has noted.177 Likewise, Edgerton argues that Britain 
developed a ‘strategy of liberal militarism alongside its liberal internationalism’.178   
Pacifists such as Helena Swanwick, however, were less receptive, arguing that as a 
knock-out blow would arrive with no warning ‘all the International Force could do, perhaps, 
if not too late to do anything, would be to devastate the aggressor country and its 
inhabitants’.179 The notion of an international air police force was seen as a ‘utopian method 
of ensuring peace’ by former Air League members such as Groves and similarly later 
lambasted as a ‘purely utopian project’ by E.H. Carr.180 The most public denunciation of 
calls for an international air police force, however, came from the Air League itself.  
The concept of an international air police force – as well as the internationalisation 
of civil aviation – once again brought the Air League into conflict with an array of liberal 
internationalists. Pithily conveyed in the two cartoons by Wyndham Robinson, the political 
cartoonist for the Morning Post, the League viewed the internationalisation of aviation ‘as 
impracticable, undesirable, and contrary to the national interest’.181 Printed in The Aeroplane 
and Air Review respectively, both cartoons highlight the perceived futility of ideas for the 
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internationalisation of civil aviation and plans for an international air police force. Figure 1 
draws attention to the contested and conflicting nature of an international air police force – 
especially its potential use of reprisal bombings – while Figure 2 highlights the issue of 
convertibility in respect to civil aeroplanes, the result being the same whether bombs are 
dropped from military aeroplanes or converted civil aeroplanes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: 
‘Join the 
International 
Air Force and 
Bomb the 
World’, The 
Aeroplane, 22 
August 1934, 
p. 214. 
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The fear of both was apparent in a speech made by the Duke of Sutherland at the Air 
League’s Annual General Meeting in 1933. Sutherland regarded the concept of an 
international air police force with ‘grave concern and considered that it prejudiced our safety 
while contributing nothing to the progress of disarmament’.182 He noted that: ‘Experiments 
in idealism have been made and history records the consequences. In dealing with the 
complex problem of air disarmament, the Air League asks for realism and moderation.’183 
Of course, labels of ‘idealism’ and ‘utopian’, used by contemporaries and by historians such 
as Carr since, were fairly common in connection with the notion of an international air police 
force.184 For The Aeroplane, an international air police force was one of the ‘most persistent 
heresies of the present day’ and represented the ‘folly of internationalism’.185 For the Air 
League, the international air police force was little more than a ‘fallacy’ and ‘would not be 
a police force at all, but a plain military force armed with weapons of immense power’. The 
League suggested that, as the League of Nations could already employ military sanctions 
under Article 16 of the Covenant (which permitted the use of collective armed force against 
an aggressor in certain scenarios) an international air police force was also unnecessary.186 
Davies responded by arguing that League failures – notably its inability to intervene in the 
Manchuria Crisis of 1931 – only served to highlight the current weakness of the threat of 
military sections (and seemingly collective security), thus strengthening calls for an 
international air police force which could act as a deterrence.187 Again, the Air League was 
far from receptive to such sentiments:  
The League of Nations has a great role to play in the world but its paths must be the paths of 
peace. It is designed to be the conciliator, the arbitrator, the tactful friend, the originator of 
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useful social international legislation . . . It is not right to set it up as a super State, armed 
against all comers: nor is it practical to do so.188  
 
 
In practical terms, the League stressed that even if an international air police force 
might act as a deterrence, it could not prevent a frontier from invasion, nor was such a force 
a weapon of defence or measure of security. Moreover, in using an international air police 
force as a tool of international arbitration and justice, the Air League emphasised that any 
action taken against a potential aggressor could ‘result in the ruin of a whole people’.189 An 
international air police force, and potential aerial bombardment, meant putting the ‘most 
feared and hated means of warfare in the name of peace and the League of Nations’ and, 
according to the Air League, it was ‘not for such bloody tasks that the League of Nations 
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was formed’.190 For the League, an international air police force – and the militarised form 
of internationalism this entailed – was both impractical and incongruous with the purpose of 
the League of Nations. 
In response to its pronouncements on an international air police force and the 
internationalisation of civil aviation, the Air League once again faced charges of militarism, 
with Air Review noting the League had been ‘accused of being a reactionary and militaristic 
organisation’. ‘Nothing’, the journal stressed, ‘could be further from the truth’.191 However, 
if the League wished to distance itself from such associations, the shift in tone towards an 
international air police force in late 1934 did little to help. For example, as Chamier declared 
in November that year: 
A school of thought has arisen that seeks to persuade our people that the only answer is to take 
all potent weapons, and particularly the air weapon, away from the nations, and entrust the 
maintenance of the world’s security to a League of Nations Air Force, so strong as to be 
unchallengeable . . . Descriptions of this kind are misrepresentations based on misconception. 
When nations go to war the policeman is impotent: the resort must be to force, brutal and 
undisguised.192 
Of course, in referring to ‘brutal’ and ‘undisguised’ force, the League was in part merely 
outlining the potential of aerial warfare. Yet, its later statements were more controversial.  
In considering schemes proposing the abolition of bombing in 1934, the Air League 
asserted that it supported the retention and use of bombing aeroplanes and ‘denied the 
premise, so often assumed, that air power is essentially inhumane and must be specially 
discriminated against’.193 Rather, for the League, air control (the use of bombing aeroplanes 
on frontiers) was both ‘humane and effective’.194 Mottistone believed that ‘the conquest of 
the air by man was a great civilising power and capable of bringing great benefits to 
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mankind’, including the possibility to make war ‘less inhumane’ and ‘less cruel’.195 Yet, a 
writer in Air Review went further: ‘at its worst, compared to an ordinary army – underpaid 
and bloodthirsty – cleaning up a village street, the bombing aeroplane is a dove of peace’.196 
The Air League objected to ideas of the internationalisation of both civil and military 
aviation on the very grounds of morality. Unsurprisingly, this contradiction with earlier 
pronouncements was questioned by figures such as Noel-Baker, who noted that the 
‘bombing plane, which is “humane and effective” in the hands of a national State, which is 
a “dove of peace” compared to “an ordinary army”, becomes the “most feared and hated 
means of war”, when it is a question of enabling the League of Nations to check aggressive 
use of civil aircraft’.197 Accordingly, the League’s statements were dismissed by Noel-Baker 
as ‘not a serious contribution to the discussion of any problem of Disarmament, or even of 
national defence’.198 
The Air League’s opposition to the international air police force seemingly had little 
influence at the level of grand strategy and the formulation of state policy, but it represented 
an important moment in the history of the League itself. It would soon begin to promote 
rearmament and British military prowess through Empire Air Day, as well as setting in 
motion plans for directly contributing to the military preparedness of the state through the 
creation of the ADCC. In some respects, the League’s pronouncements echoed the 
sentiments of the Air Ministry surrounding an international air police force and so 
contributed to a political, and indeed moral, atmosphere in which the Ministry could act in 
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accordance with (at least some) areas of public opinion. Indeed, as David Reynolds has 
observed, pressure groups such as the Air and Navy Leagues had the ability to shape the 
ideological framework in which issues of national defence were discussed.199 It was also, of 
course, important that the League did not allow liberal internationalist sentiments on aviation 
go unchallenged.  
 
 
VI. Conclusion  
As this chapter has demonstrated, the rise of internationalism, pacifism, and anti-war 
sentiment in the interwar years – alongside calls for collective security and disarmament – 
posed myriad challenges for both the Air and Navy Leagues. In attempting to respond to 
such issues, the policies adopted by each organisation were, if only briefly, radically 
different from what had gone before. This reflected an endeavour to find a place in a postwar 
society that may have indeed been inhospitable to certain elements of organised militarism. 
Fears of being labelled as alarmists, scaremongers, jingoists, and militarists were 
understandable concerns for both Leagues; yet, in shifting towards more moderate policies, 
the character and ideological stance of each organisation appeared compromised. Ultimately, 
however, support for disarmament and shifts towards a more pacific policy were not long-
standing features of either League’s work. After reverting to back to policies which 
advocated military strength, each League increasingly came into conflict with pacifist, anti-
war, and liberal internationalist streams of thought. Liberal internationalists and key figures 
in the LNU such as Cecil, Angell, Davies, Murray, and Noel-Baker all directly attempted to 
counter Air and Navy League propaganda at some point, as did other anti-war and pacifist 
organisations. While it may have been the case that public confidence could not be gained 
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by talking of ‘bombs and battleships’ alone, following the apparent failures of collective 
security and disarmament, both the Air and Navy League once again focused on the 
promotion of military strength. 
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Chapter 3: ‘The British Lion is Old, His Claws Are Cut, His Teeth 
Decayed, and His Spirit Gone’: The Air League, the Navy League, and 
Rearmament  
Given the nature and tone of Air and Navy League pronouncements surrounding issues such 
as disarmament, collective security, pacifism, and liberal internationalism, one might expect 
the late 1930s – when rearmament had become accepted as a necessity by many within state 
and society – to have represented the zenith of Air and Navy League militarism. However, 
the political promotion of aerial and naval supremacy in the late 1930s by each League was 
not overtly militaristic, but almost surprisingly measured and restrained. Neither called for 
unrestricted armaments and propaganda directed towards the state was significantly less 
hostile than it had once been. Once the expansion of the RAF and Royal Navy began, the 
energies of each organisation were channelled elsewhere. The Air League started to lobby 
for increased attention to Britain’s defensive measures to protect from aerial bombardment 
– which in certain respects did call for a militarisation of civilians – while the Navy League 
increasingly called for the deficiencies of the Merchant Navy to be remedied.  
In part, the Air and Navy League’s limited calls for aerial and naval supremacy after 
1936 was due to the increasingly symbiotic relationship between each organisation and the 
service departments. As Part B of this thesis will highlight, each organisation was largely 
dependent on the support of the Air Ministry and Admiralty respectively to carry out their 
most significant activities. More broadly, however, each organisation was alive to the limited 
nature with which rearmament could be carried out. Yet, the state’s awakening to the 
necessities of rearmament did not mark the end of the Air or Navy League’s activities. As 
Part B will explore, militarism and the promotion of aerial and naval supremacy did, in fact, 
enjoy particular resonance in the late 1930s, albeit not primarily through political or 
parliamentary channels.  
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This chapter will discuss a number of areas relating to Air and Navy League 
propaganda surrounding the question of rearmament. In doing so, it will first look at the Air 
League’s contribution to the knock-out blow theory. The chapter will then examine the 
political promotion of air power by the Air League, before moving on to highlight the Navy 
League’s response to the rise of airpower and the League’s attitude towards rearmament in 
the mid-1930s. It will then discuss existence of other air leagues (and the implications of 
these leagues) in the 1930s. It will then detail the relationship between each League and the 
private manufacturers of armaments, before looking at the Air League’s response to the 
threat from the air and the promotion of civil defence. Finally, the chapter will explore the 
Navy League’s propaganda surrounding the Merchant Navy and the approach of war. 
 
 
I. Nerve Centres and the Knock-Out Blow 
If the interwar period was characterised by ‘doomsday scenarios of the next war’, then the 
Air League’s role in the creation of such scenarios warrants examination.1 This is especially 
so as one area in which the League proved particularly influential was in the construction of 
the knock-out blow theory. Much has been written about the shadow of the bomber in the 
interwar years and the anticipation of strategic bombing.2 This is unsurprising given the 
extent to which apocalyptic warnings about the bomber featured in literature, art, films, 
newspaper columns, and the pronouncements of military theorists and politicians of all 
stripes. The previous chapter has outlined liberal internationalist responses to the threat of 
 
1 Haapamaki, The Coming of the Aerial War, p. 3.  
2 See e.g. Uri Bialer, The Shadow of the Bomber: The Fear of Air Attack and British Politics (London: Royal 
Historical Society, 1980); Barry D. Powers, Strategy Without Slide-Rule: British Air Strategy, 1914–
1939 (London: Croom Helm, 1976); Tami Davis Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution 
of British and American Ideas about Strategic Bombing, 1914–1945 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 2002); Richard Overy, The Bombing War: Europe 1939–1945 (London: Penguin Books, 2014), pp. 19–
55. See Holman, The Next War in the Air, pp. 16–18 for one of the most up-to-date discussions. On the history 
of aerial bombing more broadly, see Thomas Hippler, Governing from the Skies: A Global History of Aerial 
Bombing (London: Verso, 2017) and Sven Lindqvist, A History of Bombing (London: Granta Books, 2002).  
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the aeroplane and the ways in which the Air League sought to counter such sentiments, yet 
the construction of the knock-out blow theory as a reflection of Air League policy – or as 
the initiative of Air League members – has been underexamined. This is curious, especially 
because the Air League certainly had a reasonable intellectual base. It had a strong core of 
military theorists and technocrats, some of whom were widely influential. The Edwardian 
‘cult of the expert’ was undoubtedly evident in the Air League’s work, even if its rhetoric 
was sometimes characterised by ‘warlike overtones’.3 The League was able to influence 
government and aviation circles as many themselves were pioneer aviators, had served in 
the RFC during the First World War, or had experience within the Air Ministry.4  
One of the earliest figures to warn of a knock-out blow was Lord Montagu of 
Beaulieu. At a meeting of the National Defence Association in early 1909, Montagu 
explained that London lay open to strategic air attack.5 Although aviation was still in its 
infancy, Montagu spoke of ‘nerve centres’ (government buildings, the Houses of Parliament, 
railway stations, the stock exchange etc) and the ‘paralysis which would result from a single 
well-directed blow’. He warned that ‘airships would come so swiftly, and strike so directly 
at the centres that the nation would be almost paralysed before armies or navies could come 
to her aid’.6 The threat posed to civil liberties – and the blurring of civil and military spheres 
 
3 Johnson, Militarism, p. 65; Harald Penrose, British Aviation: Widening Horizons, 1930–1934 (London: 
HMSO, 1979), pp. 223–224. 
4 Although Conservative members of the Air League who were ex-servicemen and MPs after the First World 
War represented only a very small number of the 448 Conservative MPs who also had fought in the War, most 
held high positions and had very close associations with the Air Ministry. See Richard Carr, Veteran MPs and 
Conservative Politics in the Aftermath of the Great War: The Memory of All That (Farnham: Ashgate, 2016). 
5 The National Defence Association was an organisation comprising civilians interested in military matters, 
alongside officers in the army and navy. Gollin, The Impact of Air Power, p. 7.  
6 ‘Aeronautics’, The Times, 26 April 1909, p. 19. Others were slightly more sanguine in their predictions at the 
time. For example, Rudyard Kipling wrote to Massy that he did not think ‘yet that air ships can paralyze a 
country or a fleet’, although he admitted ‘it won’t be many years before they do’. Thomas Pinney (ed.), The 
Letters of Rudyard Kipling: Volume 3: 1900–10 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004 ed), p. 406. Public 
interest in aviation was also fuelled by the publication of H.G. Wells’s prophetic The War in the Air (1908) 
and R.P. Hearne’s Aerial Warfare (1909) – both of which anticipated the effects of bombing on Britain and 
underscored the importance of science and technology for the preservation of the country. H.G. Wells, The 
War in the Air (London: George Bell and Sons, 1908); R.P. Hearne, Aerial Warfare (London: John Lane, The 
Bodley Head, 1909). Both Wells and Hearne were early supporters of the Air League, with the latter expressing 
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of society – which featured in Montagu’s speech would prove a prescient warning. As 
Holman has pointed out, Montagu’s nerve centre theory was highly influential – particularly 
his emphasis on the erosion of any distinction between combatant and civilian – and he was 
to be echoed in the rhetoric and discourse surrounding the knock-out blow in the interwar 
years.7  
Indeed, as early as 1919, Moore-Brabazon argued that industrial centres would be 
the first object of an air attack in any future war and that ‘there is no defence against aircraft 
today . . . The only answer is to have a bigger Air Force so as to have the potential power of 
hitting back’.8 More influential in popularising the theory of a knock-out blow, however, 
was P.R.C. Groves.9 As part of a series of highly publicised letters to The Times on aviation 
starting in early 1922, Groves predicted that in future air wars ‘each side will at once strike 
at the heart and nerve centres of its opponent . . . at those nerve ganglia of national moral – 
the great cities’. Groves argued that ‘owing to the development of aviation war has altered 
its character’ and that a future war would take place across ‘areas’, not ‘fronts’. He bemoaned 
the size of Britain’s aircraft industry and warned that, if the Britain’s air force remained 
small, only ‘death, damnation and disaster’ awaited.10 While Groves was not formally 
appointed to the Air League’s Executive Committee until June that year, he was working 
 
a desire to serve on the League’s Executive Committee. AL, AL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive 
Committee, 19 May 1909, pp. 1–2. 
7 Holman, The Next War in the Air, p. 32.  
8 Commons Sitting, Pay, Etc., of the Royal Air Force, HC Deb 15 December 1919 vol 123 cc87-147. Others 
who would later become important figures within the Air League also portrayed a future war in similar terms. 
For instance, J.M. Kenworthy warned that ‘[m]an’s conquest of the air must be followed by man’s conquest of 
war, or by the end of civilisation’. J.M. Kenworthy, Will Civilisation Crash? (London: Ernest Benn Limited, 
1927), p. 264. 
9 On Groves, see Robin Higham, The Military Intellectuals in Britain: 1918–1939 (New Brunswick, N.J.: 
Rutgers University Press, 1966), pp. 170–176.  
10 ‘Our Future in the Air’, The Times, 21 March 1922, pp. 13–14.  
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with the League before then, resolving to contact the Air Ministry on the matter of the air 
defence of Britain.11  
As well as including two of the most notable knock-out blow theorists within its 
leadership, the Air League also considered appointing Air Commodore L.E.O. Charlton, the 
distinguished RFC pilot and air force officer, as secretary general following the resignation 
of Groves. Charlton was another well-known air power theorist and one of the chief 
protagonists of the knock-out blow theory in the 1930s.12 However, although Charlton was 
willing to entertain the Air League’s proposal, no such offer was forthcoming due to lack of 
funds.13 While Charlton did not become secretary general, he later supported the ADCC.  
The theory of the knock-out blow was so widespread by the 1930s that it was, as 
Holman has noted, accepted and promoted by pacifists and militarists alike.14 Indeed, the 
influence of such theorists is evident in the work of military strategists of the period such as 
Basil Liddell Hart, J.F.C. Fuller, and Charlton.15 The ‘culture of anticipation’ explored in 
Roxanne Panchasi’s study of interwar France, then, was similarly a part of interwar Britain 
 
11 AL, AL Minute Book, Annual General Meeting, 1 June 1922, p. 1; AL, AL Minute Book, Meeting of the 
Executive Committee, 28 April 1922, p. 3. Groves did, however, offer the Air League any profits from the 
reprinted form of his articles, Our Future in the Air: A Survey of the Vital Question of British Air Power, which 
also included a condensed version of the League’s aims. AL, AL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive 
Committee, 27 July 1922, p. 2; P.R.C. Groves, Our Future in the Air: A Survey of the Vital Question of British 
Air Power (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1922), p. [6]. Sales of the publication were disappointing, however, 
with Groves subsequently informing the Air League he had no sum to contribute. AL, AL Minute Book, 
Meeting of the Executive Committee, 31 October 1923, p. 3.   
12 Most notably, his War from the Air (1935), War Over England (1936), and The Menace of the Clouds (1937) 
all depicted the potential death and destruction that the next war might bring. Charlton, War from the Air; 
L.E.O. Charlton, War Over England (London: Longmans Green, 1936); and L.E.O. Charlton, The Menace of 
the Clouds (London: William Hodge, 1937). 
13 AL, AL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 9 July 1929, p. 2.  
14 Holman, The Next War in the Air, p. 23. Not all were convinced by such predictions. For example, Neon’s 
The Great Delusion was highly sceptical of the importance of air power and criticised the unparalleled ‘volume 
of feverish propaganda to which this country has been subjected’ regarding air power. Neon, The Great 
Delusion: A Study of Aircraft in Peace and War (London: Ernest Benn, 1927), p. xxxv. Neon’s findings met 
with considerable criticism, principally in Seuter’s Airmen or Noahs, and certainly did little to halt the influence 
of theorists such as Montagu and Groves. Neon is usually identified as being Mary Whiteford Acworth, but 
seems more likely to have been Bernard Acworth. Holman, The Next War in the Air, p. 75. 
15 B.H. Liddell Hart, Paris: Or the Future of War (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd., 1925), 
p. 43; p. 47; J.F.C. Fuller, The Reformation of War (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1923), p. 150; Charlton, War 
from the Air, pp. 153–154; Charlton, The Menace of the Clouds, p. 54. 
123 
 
with Air League members making a notable, albeit sometimes alarmist, contribution to such 
a culture.16 Indeed, in shaping fears of a knock-out blow, the Air League aided the Air 
Ministry by ‘emphasizing the decisive role that an air force would play in future war’.17  
 
 
II. ‘Remember the Power of the Newest Bombs’: The Air League and 
Political Pressure   
Although the Air League did not want it to be thought that its ‘sole concern was with war 
and with military aviation’, it exerted considerable effort in attempting to shape popular and 
parliamentary attitudes to the military potential of the aeroplane through the political 
promotion of airmindedness – and in lobbying for British rearmament more broadly.18 This 
is important to highlight because, as Uri Bialer has noted, broadly speaking, public opinion 
is often seen to have had a malign influence upon the ‘process of rearmament when not 
obstructing it altogether’.19 The Air League was responsible for considerable activity in the 
press and in parliament at crucial moments in the history of the Air Ministry and the RAF. 
One such occasion was its support for the maintenance of the RAF as a separate service, 
with an independent Air Ministry in the early 1920s. Since the end of 1919, Winston 
Churchill had held the position of Secretary of State for War in tandem with the position of 
Secretary of State for Air. This was viewed by many as the subordination of the Air Ministry 
to the War Office, even leading to the resignation of Seely as Under-Secretary of State for 
Air.20 The Air League objected to Churchill’s position and worked closely with Seely 
following his resignation. Indeed, Seely felt that the League was ‘rendering invaluable 
 
16 Roxanne Panchasi, Future Tense: The Culture of Anticipation in France Between the Wars (Ithaca, N.Y.; 
London: Cornell University Press, 2009), p. 6.  
17 Haapamaki, The Coming of the Aerial War, p. 44.  
18 AL, AL Minute Book, Annual General Meeting, 10 July 1934, p. 2.  
19 Bialer, ‘Elite Opinion’, p. 32.  
20 See Richard Overy, The Birth of the RAF, 1918: The World’s First Air Force (London: Allen Lane, 2018), 
Chapter 4.  
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service’ to aviation through its work and shortly became the organisation’s president after 
his departure from the Air Ministry.21  
To promote an independent Air Ministry, the League sent a ‘very large’ number of 
telegrams to David Lloyd George, then Prime Minister, prior to the air estimates in 1920, 
yet it also carried out propaganda in more public spheres.22 It held a public – and well 
publicised – meeting at the Mansion House in June 1920, outlining its aims and stressing the 
importance of developing civil and military aviation for the preservation of Britain’s island 
status.23 The League considered the issue of an independent Air Ministry as the ‘most 
important question that could exist with regard to aviation’, later declaring that it was 
‘absolutely essential if we are not to be beaten in the race for air power’.24  
The League sent letters to MPs at all three general elections between 1922 and 1924, 
asking voters and MPs alike to remember that the question of the air was ‘one that vitally 
concerns the safety of the Empire, and that a large and efficient Air Force based on a 
prosperous and highly organized system of civil aviation and a flourishing aircraft industry 
are indispensable’.25 The League urged its members to lobby politicians on a local level, 
reminding them to ‘see that your candidate promises to press for aerial development’ and to 
‘remember the power of the newest bombs’.26 The League likewise asked its members to 
promote the importance of aviation in the 1929 general election and to pressure local 
candidates ‘to demand an enquiry into the whole air situation’.27 
 
21 AL, AL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 22 January 1920, p. 2.  
22 Ibid., p. 2.  
23 ‘Our Waning Air Supremacy’, The Times, 9 June 1920, p. 11. The Daily Herald bemoaned the meeting, 
writing that ‘We have had militarism and navalism. Airism comes next.’ ‘Airum Scarum’, The Daily Herald, 
9 June 1920, p. 3. 
24 ‘To the Editor of The Times’, The Times, 31 January 1921, p. 11.  
25 ‘Electors and Air Power’, The Times, 3 November 1922, p. 19; AL, AL Minute Book, Meeting of the 
Executive Committee, 22 November 1923, p. 2; AL, AL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 
22 October 1924, p. 4. 
26 Air League of the British Empire, ‘Remember the Power of the Newest Bombs’, 1922, p. 1. 
27 ‘The Air League and the General Election’, Air, May 1929, pp. 228–229. 
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Following Groves’s appointment, the Air League became even more vocal in its 
opposition to the perceived inadequacy of Britain’s aerial position. For instance, in the first 
issue of Air, Groves wrote that the public had been ‘misled by the optimistic oratory of the 
past nine years, to believe that Britain is at least holding her own in the sphere of aviation’. 
‘Nothing’, Groves continued, ‘could be further from the truth’.28 Groves published on 
subjects such as air power and its application in modern warfare, air power in relation to sea 
power, air debates in parliament, the progress of civil aviation, and on a number of other 
topics.29 As the editor of Air, Groves frequently used the journal as a vehicle through which 
to bemoan Britain’s aerial position and as a ‘spearhead of attack upon apathy, inertia and 
official ineptitude’.30 Upon his appointment, Groves had warned the Air League’s Executive 
Committee that he may have to take steps which would be considered ‘inimical to the Air 
Ministry’ and so it proved.31  
Despite such pressure, the League appears to have been fairly inactive in 
parliamentary circles for much of the late 1920s and early 1930s. As noted in Chapter 1, this 
was a period in which the League underwent major structural and institutional changes. It 
had limited funds and no effective secretary general in between Groves and Chamier, with 
Thwaites only serving as acting secretary general (largely without the confidence of 
members of the Executive Committee).32 More importantly, as noted in Chapter 2, this 
period saw a dramatic shift in Air League policy. As has been highlighted, however, the 
appointment of Chamier undoubtedly galvanised the League and meant it once again became 
 
28 ‘The Air Situation’, Air, December 1927, p. 7. 
29 ‘Air Power and its Application’, Air, January 1928, pp. 7–10; p. 26; ‘Air Power and Sea Power’, Air, 
February 1928, pp. 7–10; p. 26; ‘The Coming Air Debate’, Air, March 1928, pp. 7–11; ‘The Progress of Civil 
Aviation’, Air, July 1928, pp. 7–11. 
30 ‘Something Accomplished’, Air, December 1929, p. 543. 
31 Indeed, it was not long until Groves attracted the Air Ministry’s ire, with the latter contacting Sutherland 
directly to complain about former’s writing. AL, AL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 10 
June 1927, p. 3; AL, AL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 20 October 1927, p. 1.  
32 AL, AL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 9 July 1929, p. 2; AL, AL Minute Book, 
Meeting of the Executive Committee, 12 May 1931, p. 2.  
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more influential in parliamentary spheres. Indeed, as Chamier revealed to the League’s 
Executive Committee shortly after his appointment, he had been able to ‘establish personal 
contacts with many of the friends of aviation in the House of Commons’.33  
In attempting to keep the issue of aviation at the forefront of parliamentary 
discussions, Air League members (or figures with close ties to the League) initiated two of 
the three parliamentary debates on air power between November 1933 and July 1934. 
Significantly, these debates were opened only a month after the German withdrawal from 
the Disarmament Conference, were prior to the formal acknowledgment of German 
rearmament, and were at a time when calls for the internationalisation of civil aviation and 
the creation of an international air police force were widespread. The League provided 
important parliamentary opposition to disarmament at the time of Geneva, instead lobbying 
for an increase in the RAF. As Bialer writes, the Air League and was able to construct a 
‘highly effective propaganda machine’ and ‘mobilized virtually everybody connected with 
civil and military aviation in Britain’.34 
 Taking place in November 1933, two debates on Britain’s strength in the air were 
opened: one, in the House of Lords by Sutherland (supported by Lord Lloyd), and the second 
in the House of Commons by Sueter. In the House of Lords, Sutherland expressed anxiety 
regarding the strength of the RAF in relation to European powers and argued that Britain’s 
frontiers had changed because of the development of air power. Echoing Lord Montagu’s 
‘nerve centre’ speech of 1909 – and Groves’s writing in 1922 – Sutherland declared that ‘if 
London were destroyed, England would be destroyed. The heart and brain of the country 
would be destroyed.’ He was careful to emphasise that he did not initiate the debate ‘in any 
 
33 Allowing him, among other things, to inspire counter-motions against calls for the government to relinquish 
its use of police bombing. AL, AL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 14 June 1933, p. 2. 
34 Bialer, ‘Elite Opinion’, pp. 38–39. Contemporary observers such as The Tatler similarly described the 
League as a ‘genuine political force’. ‘The Air League’, The Tatler, 29 August 1934, p. 418. 
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martial spirit’, nor did he suggest Britain should ‘rattle the sabre by advertising to the world 
our intention of increasing our forces in the air’, yet opposition from Lord Arthur Ponsonby, 
a founding member of the UDC, and Lord Cecil suggests that Sutherland’s fears of appearing 
militaristic were seemingly well-founded. Nevertheless, Sutherland argued that a powerful 
air force, making Britain as impregnable as possible, would be one of the strongest 
arguments Britain could use in the ‘peace councils of Europe’. He concluded that ‘we should 
all work, hope, and pray that there would never be another war . . . but we should all see, if 
it did come, in spite of every human effort to the contrary, that we were not found hopelessly 
supine and apathetic’.35  
 In the House of Commons, Sueter put forward a similar motion that ‘this House 
views with grave disquiet the present inadequacy of the provision made for the air defence 
of these islands, the Empire overseas, and our Imperial communications’, welcoming ‘the 
need for a one-power standard in the air’.36 Supported by the Air League stalwarts Moore-
Brabazon and Guest, the motion was seconded by Balfour.37 Baldwin drew the debate to a 
close, stating that Britain’s inferiority in the air was due to a sincerity to secure disarmament 
and that the country was striving for disarmament as peace was a ‘matter of will and not of 
armament’. Baldwin accepted the resolution, but asked for the tone of it to be altered. He 
felt that if it were passed it would create the ‘worst possible atmosphere’ in Germany by 
suggesting Britain wanted to rearm as quickly as possible.38 These simultaneous motions 
received widespread coverage and support from newspapers and aviation journals such as 
the Daily Mail, The Times, and Flight, and meant that, not only were liberal internationalist 
 
35 ‘Air Defence’, The Times, 30 November 1933, p. 7.  
36 Commons Sitting, Air Defence, HC Deb 29 November 1933 vol 283 cc958-1022.  
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. Alongside the debates in late 1933, Air League members were also prominent in debates on air power 
in mid-1934, helping to make the divergence of views between those who campaigned for disarmament and 
those who pressed for rearmament ‘more acute . . . than it had ever been before’. Commons Sitting, Air 
Estimates, HC Deb 08 March 1934 vol 286 cc2027-89; Commons Sitting, Armaments, HC Deb 30 July 1934 
vol 292 cc2325-447. 
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policies on aviation challenged, but the importance of air power and rearmament was kept 
before both state and society.39 
In attempting to influence parliamentary debates and cultivate political allies, the Air 
League had a number of representatives on the Parliamentary Air Committee (PAC). Sueter, 
considered an ‘old friend of the Air League’ by Sutherland, was chairman of the PAC, while 
numerous Air League figures – or individuals who had strong links with the League – sat on 
the Committee.40 The PAC was an effective pressure group within Parliament, numbering 
around 80 MPs (predominantly Conservative and ex-servicemen) by 1934.  In many 
respects, the PAC often pursued similar aims to the Air League. It lobbied the government 
on the necessity of maintaining an independent air force, and thereafter a strong RAF, 
criticised plans for disarmament in the early 1930s, supported the retention of air bombing 
for police purposes, and arranged tours for MPs to visit the factories of aircraft 
manufacturers.41 It also, like the Air League, was concerned with civil aviation, sending a 
deputation to see Ramsay MacDonald with suggestions for improvements in the organisation 
of civil flying in late 1934.42 While the PAC was not necessarily an auxiliary of the Air 
 
39 ‘The Air Terror’, Daily Mail, 29 November 1933, p. 10; ‘Air Defence’, The Times, 30 November 1933, p. 
7; ‘Editorial Comment’, Flight, 14 December 1933, pp. 1251–1252. For Bialer, the activities of such air 
lobbyists ‘do something to redeem the honour of Parliament as a whole during the inter-war period’. Bialer, 
‘Elite Opinion’, p. 46. Sutherland was certainly satisfied with the Air League’s increased parliamentary activity 
that year, noting that the debates had ‘proved of very considerable value in directing the attention of the public 
to the unsatisfactory state of British air power in comparison with England’s neighbours’. AL, AL Minute 
Book, Annual General Meeting, 10 July 1934, p. 1. 
40 Including Guest, Joyson-Hicks, Seely, Moore-Brabazon, Everard, Lord Clydesdale, Sempill, Balfour (the 
Committee’s vice chairman), and O’Gorman. Sueter insisted the PAC be known as the ‘Parliamentary Air 
Committee of the Conservative Party’, ‘Parliamentary Committees’, The Times, 21 January 1938, p. 8; AL, 
AL Minute Book, Annual General Meeting, 10 July 1934, p. 1. While members of the Air League served on 
the PAC, the Committee also often invited the most senior Air League members to its annual dinner. AL, AL 
Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 10 April 1934, p. 2; 19 November 1935, p. 3. 
41 ‘British Air Power’, The Times, 10 July 1922, p. 10; ‘Disarmament and Aircraft’, Flight, 10 November 1932, 
p. 1043; ‘The Parliamentary Air Committee’, Flight, 6 July 1933, p. 665; ‘M.P.s’ Air Journey’, The Times, 23 
July 1934, p. 9.  
42 ‘Civil Aviation Development’, Flight, 6 December 1934, p. 1313.  
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League, there were evidently close ties between the two, helping to foster a largely symbiotic 
relationship.43 Clearly, the Air League’s political lobbying work must not be underestimated.  
While the League never formally renounced its ‘non-party’ status, clashes with 
liberal internationalists, figures in the Labour Party, the ILP, and others on the political left, 
particularly over calls for the internationalisation of aviation and the creation of an 
international air police force did little to endear it to such groups and suggest its claim to be 
above party was something of a fig leaf. Yet, it was able to have a degree of success in 
parliamentary spheres, precisely because it did not attempt to cultivate cross-party support. 
Indeed, as Pugh has observed, ‘Conservatives generally favoured national rearmament to 
militarised internationalism’ and this was undoubtedly beneficial to the Air League.44  
 
 
III. The Navy League, Air Protagonists, and a ‘More Virile Type of 
Patriotism’   
While Air League members were some of the key contributors to the knock-out blow theory, 
there was a reluctance within the Navy League to engage with issues deemed to be of a 
technical nature, despite the fact that its membership comprised many naval authorities, 
former naval officers, and senior members of the Admiralty. As Lloyd informed the 
League’s Executive Committee in December 1936, it had ‘always been an unwritten rule of 
the Navy League that no part should be taken in controversial matters of technical detail 
connected with the ships of the Fleet’.45 For Lloyd, this formed an important part of the 
League’s relationship with the Admiralty more broadly. As he underlined in 1938: 
our relations with the Admiralty have never been better . . . that is because we have steadily 
refused to take upon ourselves duties which are not within our competence to perform. It is 
 
43 Furthermore, such links were long-standing; the Air League was closely connected with the pre-war 
Parliamentary Aerial Defence Committee, the forerunner to the PAC, which was established shortly following 
Montagu’s ‘nerve centre’ speech in 1909. The Parliamentary Aerial Defence Committee seemingly changed 
its title to the PAC in 1916. ‘New Air Committee’, Daily Mail, 10 August 1916, p. 3. 
44 Pugh, Liberal Internationalism, p. 88.  
45 NLSCC, NL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 2 December 1936, p. 3.  
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not our duty to criticise the Admiralty on technical matters . . . Our job is to preach the sea 
services up and down the country.46 
He felt that while it was ‘always the business of the Navy League to press for a strong Navy’, 
it was ‘seldom its duty to interfere in matters of detail’.47 Although Lloyd had previously 
stressed that it was ‘necessary to avoid any tendency for the Navy League to become a mere 
appendage of the Admiralty’, such pronouncements clearly highlight a desire within the 
League to avoid commenting upon subjects seemingly beyond its remit.48  
If there was a reluctance within the Navy League to comment upon issues of a 
technical nature, then it was far more willing to discuss the importance of the Royal Navy in 
relation to air power. At the League’s Grand Council Meeting in 1935, for instance, Lord 
Lymington ‘deprecated the extraordinary propaganda for air power and the neglect of the 
sea service’.49 Executive Committee meetings in early 1936 similarly reveal a deep-seated 
concern about calls for aerial supremacy from certain sections of the press. For instance, 
Admiral Stephenson called for increased propaganda to counteract the ‘grossly misleading 
and dangerous propaganda in favour of a supreme Air Force’ which he felt was attempting 
to ‘drive a wedge between the two services’.50 Admiral Thursfield likewise criticised the 
‘extreme propaganda at present indulged in by some of the air protagonists’ which he felt 
‘was a menace and was seriously misleading the Public’. In combating such sentiments, 
however, Thursfield urged caution ‘lest the impression be given that the Navy League was 
old fashioned and not alive to modern developments’.51 Local Navy League branches also 
expressed apprehension at the primacy given to air power. For example, the League’s Bexhill 
 
46 ‘The Navy League Grand Council Meeting’, The Navy, August 1938, p. 1.  
47 MSCC, NL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 15 June 1938, p. 2.  
48 MSCC, NL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 18 November 1937, p. 4.  
49 ‘Grand Council Meeting’, The Navy, June 1935, p. 181. 
50 MSSC, NL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 4 March 1936, p. 2. 
51 MSSC, NL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 26 March 1936, p. 2. Marsden also expressed 
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newspaper was running articles advocating the construction of a strong air force at the expense of the navy. 
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Branch resolved that in view ‘of the overwhelming importance our Sea Communications, 
any increase in our Air Force should be considered as an accessory to, not as a substitute for, 
Sea Power’.52  
Fears that the air force was being built at the expense of the navy were a feature of 
the League’s Grand Council Meeting that year. Echoing the Bexhill Branch, the League’s 
Chelsea Branch similarly resolved that no increase in Britain’s air forces could be considered 
as a substitute for a modernised fleet, yet Thursfield urged that there should be no antagonism 
between the two services and argued that they both had a common object: ‘the security of 
the Country and of the Empire’.53 Such fears display a desire to avoid inter-service rivalry, 
but also highlight an understanding that aviation – and the shadow of the bomber – perhaps 
had more hold upon public and parliamentary consciousness than naval threats. They 
underline the modernity and technological innovation of aviation in comparison with the 
tradition and heritage of the naval service. They are also interesting because, for the most 
part, the Navy League argued in favour of balanced armaments and was certainly alive to 
the importance of aviation for national defence. Indeed, as Lloyd stated to the League’s 
Glasgow Branch, ‘we in the Navy League, as the oldest and best known organisation 
concerned with the needs of National defence, are the first to recognise the absolutely vital 
needs of air supremacy’.54  
Alongside forming an important part at the Navy League’s Grand Council Meeting, 
air power was a central theme at its annual Nelson Day dinners. Expressing his satisfaction 
that Sir Cyril Newall, Chief of Air Staff from 1937 to 1940, was one of the principal speakers 
in 1937, Lloyd again urged that the Navy League stood for balanced armaments and that 
 
52 NLSCC, NL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 10 June 1936, p. 3.  
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54 CHUR, The Papers of Lord Lloyd of Dolobran (hereafter Lloyd Papers), GLLD, 22/16, Lloyd Lecture to the 
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‘co-operation [was] a source of security’.55 Churchill, another key figure at the dinner, spoke 
with ‘particular pleasure about the British Navy’ and about the Navy League itself ‘which 
has played so great a part in maintaining its strength and not only maintaining its strength 
when these matters are common property and everyone’s sentiments, but in the years when 
so often defences are neglected’.56 However, despite his praise, Churchill did stress that the 
‘Air Force are in the front line now’ and that no ‘advocate of the Navy, no champion of the 
Navy League would go so far as to say Naval Defence would be able to defend us alone’.57 
Newall’s speech similarly underlined the importance of cooperation between the service 
departments. He argued that it was ‘only by co-operation that we can fulfil our duties’ and 
he hoped that the spirit of co-operation between the three services would increase.58  
The Navy League’s fears were shared at a more official level. A committee appointed 
by Baldwin in 1935, which focused on the ways in which air power had influenced the nature 
of warfare (particularly in relation to the long-standing demands of the navy regarding 
national defence) highlights this. The Committee explored inter-service rivalry and the 
pressure from figures in the aviation community lobbying for increased spending on 
Britain’s air force. As Chatfield, First Sea Lord of the Admiralty from 1933 to 1938, 
bemoaned, the navy had been ‘suffering from the most virulent attacks for a long time’ 
largely from ‘air protagonists [and] protagonists of air firms who want to rise to power on 
the ruins of the Navy’.59  
Attempting to limit inter-service rivalry, the Navy League suggested to the Air 
League in 1938 that it might combine into one organisation. This was rejected by the Air 
League’s Executive Committee on the grounds that it had sufficient strength to retain its 
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56 Ibid., p. 334.  
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133 
 
independence, although a letter did appear in The Times calling for closer co-operation 
between the two bodies to make ‘the widest possible appeal’.60 However, while there seems 
to have been no opposition from within the Admiralty, figures from within the Air Ministry 
were less enthusiastic about such proposals. For instance, Newall warned Chamier about 
associating with the Navy League, writing ‘the Air League should not do anything which 
would, by any conceivable means, tie its hands when propaganda for the Air Ministry and 
the Royal Air Force was required’.61 Lord Trenchard ‘strongly deprecated’ the proposal, 
while similar ‘unofficial views’ had also reportedly been expressed by members of the Air 
Council.62 Newall’s opposition is particularly interesting, given his calls for closer 
cooperation at the Navy League’s Nelson Day dinner the year before. More broadly, such 
statements highlight the Air League’s propagandistic importance, which will be further 
explored in Chapters 5 and 7, for the Air Ministry.  
Following the second London Naval Conference, the Navy League limited its 
propaganda for a time. In late 1936, its Propaganda Sub-Committee felt that ‘the need for 
extensive and intensive lecturing had for the time being ceased and that the propaganda 
activities of the Navy League should be devoted to other channels, particularly in regard to 
the Merchant Navy, and an extension of the Sea Cadet Corps’.63 At its Grand Council 
Meeting the following year, Lloyd noted that ‘after ten or fifteen years of persistent 
preaching, it has come home to the people of this country and to their leaders how manifest 
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61 AL, AL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 20 July 1938, p. 1.  
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is the impossibility of achieving any success in foreign policy . . . without adequate force 
behind it’. He felt that the Navy League had done its duty and that it could feel gratified and 
pleased at its role in bringing about rearmament. Yet, the extent to which the League directly 
influenced the policy of the Cabinet in relation to rearmament was made clear by Lloyd 
himself: 
Our main task has been to provide public opinion throughout the country and although we can 
claim some measure of success in this connection, we cannot claim to have influenced the 
counsels of the Cabinet; no voluntary organisation can expect to do that, but it may help to 
influence them.  
He felt that the League created a public opinion which the Cabinet could rely upon for 
support in pursuing rearmament and that the League’s ‘persistent propaganda against apathy 
and emotional pacifism has been largely instrumental in giving to the Government that 
united support for armaments which it has got now’.64 However, while Lloyd observed that 
the League could no longer directly influence the form which rearmament would take, he 
stressed that there were other contributions which it could make to the military preparedness 
of the nation. The first was to lobby for improvements in the condition of the Merchant 
Navy, the second was the promotion of the SCC. Referencing the expansion of the SCC, he 
spoke of the ‘futility of providing armaments if you do not provide the personnel behind 
them to wield them’.65 This will be explored in Chapter 4, yet it is clear that the Navy League 
had a number of ways in which it felt it could contribute to rearmament. Speaking in support 
of Lloyd, Freemantle reminded those gathered that the Navy League had to carry out its 
propaganda at a time when ‘a certain Organisation [the LNU]’ had been particularly active. 
He stressed that the effect of the LNU’s propaganda had been ‘very serious indeed on public 
opinion, including the contemptuous ignoring of our armed forces’.66 Thanks to a ‘more 
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virile type of patriotism’, however, Freemantle declared that the Navy League had 
contributed to the government’s decision adopt rearmament on a large scale and had 
achieved its main object, ‘the maintenance of a strong Navy’.67 
 
 
IV. The Many Air Leagues  
In an associational sense, there were seemingly few organisations (aside from the Navy 
League) which were concerned with the political promotion of British naval power in the 
interwar years. Conversely, organisations such as the LNU, the NCS, and the Next Five 
Years Group all saw the potential of the aeroplane for achieving collective security through 
the internationalisation of aviation, through the creation of an international air police force, 
or through a combination of the two. While this may have represented a form of ‘militarised 
internationalism’, it was undoubtedly less militaristic than the policies pursued by a number 
of organisations on the political right who were also interested in aviation. Chapter 1 detailed 
the links of personnel and funding between the Air League and a number of groups on the 
far right, yet there were also a number of organisations which cut across the Air League’s 
work. One such organisation was the National League of Airmen (NLA). Founded in January 
1935 by Lord Rothermere, owner of the Daily Mail, the NLA’s principal aim was to ‘make 
Britain air-minded and to make the rulers of Britain responsive to that air-mindedness’.68 
The League, which sought funding from Lady Houston, wanted ‘the condition of our aerial 
situation and development a matter of discussion and knowledge in every home in the 
country’.69 With Captain Norman Macmillan, the flying ace and test pilot, as the 
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organisation’s president, the NLA was conceived as being ‘entirely directed by airmen. It 
must not be a hotch-potch of civilians with a few airmen who are unable to make their 
influence felt.’70 As Flight pointed out, however, the work of the NLA was bound to overlap 
with the Air League and suggested ‘a wastage of effort will arise’.71 The League itself also 
objected to the NLA.   
The Air League initially considered approaching Rothermere to remove any 
misunderstanding between the two organisations, but Guest felt the former to be ‘an 
extremely difficult man with whom to discuss a matter of this kind’.72 Despite this, the 
League wrote an open letter to Rothermere, to newspapers, and to its members, which stated 
that the aspirations of the NLA to create an airminded nation was welcomed by the League, 
but that it had a number of objections. It resented the NLA’s reference to itself as ‘“The Air 
League” as though the Air League of the British Empire did not exist’, that ‘by the use of 
“hotch-potch” of civilians” you [the NLA] should have disparaged the constitution and 
efforts of other organisations than your own who are engaged in like work’, and finally that 
the NLA gave the impression that it had ‘a monopoly of anxiety for the safety and progress 
of our nation in air matters’.73 Despite criticism, by early 1938 Rothermere considered the 
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NLA to have achieved its aims, noting: ‘In awakening the country to its danger and the need 
for rearmament in the air, and in making politicians conscious of the rising tide of public 
opinion in these matters, the League did a wonderful work’.74  
Alongside the Air League and NLA, there were other pressure groups on the political 
right which were concerned with aviation. As Edgerton and others have noted, aviators 
formed a disproportionate element in the BUF’s membership.75 Mosley himself was a 
member of the RFC in the First World War – although only for several months after a crash 
(whilst showing off to his mother) brought his flying career to a premature end.76 Despite 
his limited flying experience, Mosley attempted to cultivate a myth surrounding the airman, 
which incorporated idealised visions of war and youth.77 Flying was undoubtedly of long-
standing interest to Mosley – his parliamentary maiden speech in 1919 was, notably, on the 
Aerial Navigation Bill.78 Mosley later called for ‘the creation of a British Air Force second 
to none in the world’ which perhaps goes some way to explaining the popularity of the BUF 
in wider flying circles and the support the BUF received from figures such as Rothermere 
and from journals such as The Aeroplane.79 The BUF, in calling for the formation of a model 
airplane section of the British Union Youth Movement, stressed it could allow youths to 
make ‘themselves of real use to their country’ as well as ‘fitting themselves for a place in 
the aircraft industry of Britain’.80 The BUF formed flying clubs in 1934, its journal The 
Blackshirt often published on the importance of maintaining a strong air force, it supported 
the NLA, and frequently argued that peace could only be maintained from a position of 
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power.81 Of course, while the majority of Air League members kept their political affinities 
private, it is clear that the BUF and the Air League shared a number of objectives.   
A final organisation on the political right, the Hands Off Britain Air Defence League, 
is worthy of mention. Inaugurated in June 1934 by Oliver Locker Lampson, the right-wing 
MP, the organisation had ‘its purpose as an independent ginger group’. The first meeting 
was well attended, with speeches from Locker Lampson, the Duchess of Atholl, Sueuter, 
and Hannon. In a fiery address, Locker Lampson called for a ‘winged arm of long-range 
bombers, which would make the voice of England paramount again. Our prestige had sunk 
to zero. Once the British whisper reverberated around the world. To-day we might bellow in 
vain. For we lacked mastery in the air.’ He stated it was ‘unfair that because a politician was 
interested in the security of his country, he should be called a war-monger’.82 While Hannon 
and Sueuter had previously been Air League members, and while Locker-Lampson served 
on the PAC alongside Air League members, there were seemingly no further connections 
between the two organisations.83 The most notable propaganda carried out by the Hands Off 
Britain Air Defence League was the distribution of a pamphlet titled ‘England Awake’. The 
pamphlet warned that ‘London can be bombed, battered and broken within a few hours’.84 
Nevertheless, the League appears to have ceased operations in 1934 – and its influence 
appears to have been fairly marginal.85 Significantly, however, it meant the Air League was 
not operating in a political vacuum. The place of the NLA, the BUF, and the Hands Off 
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Britain Air Defence League ensured that the Air League was not alone in its opposition to 
liberal internationalist ideas on aviation, or in calling for increased armaments.  
 
 
V. The ‘Merchants of Death’ and ‘Sinister Organization[s]’: The Air 
League, the Navy League, and the Private Manufacture of Armaments  
The private armament manufacturer (otherwise known as ‘The Merchant of Death’) was a 
long-standing feature of the British warfare state.86 However, following the First World War, 
the private manufacture of armaments became even more contentious.87 For Hugh Dalton, 
writing in 1928, armament manufacturers were ‘among the strongest and most unscrupulous 
opponents both of disarmament and peace. Until their power has been broken, the world will 
have no security against war.’88 Beverley Nichols’s Cry Havoc! likewise detailed the 
presence of the private manufacturer of armaments, lamenting that ‘in our midst were these 
vast corporations, trading in death, profiting by death, owing their very existence to death’.89 
Fenner Brockway, the left-wing politician and anti-war campaigner, urged that ‘[m]ankind 
must either destroy the Bloody Traffic [the armament industry] or be destroyed by it’, while 
the UDC declared that if ‘Governments wish us to believe in their sincerity when they preach 
peace and discuss disarmament, they must begin by abandoning their unholy alliance with 
the vested interest in arms’.90  
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The League of Nations shared such sentiments, with Article 8 of its Covenant stating 
that ‘the manufacture by private enterprise of munitions and implements of war is open to 
grave objections’.91 The Labour Party was also a notable opponent of the private 
manufacture of armaments.92 The previous chapter has detailed the numerous campaigns 
waged by the peace movement in favour of disarmament, arms limitations, and collective 
security. A further area in which it lobbied against was, like the League of Nations, the 
private arms industry and the international arms trade.93 This political and popular pressure 
forced the British government to establish the Royal Commission on the Private 
Manufacture of and Trading in Arms.94  
The Royal Commission was an official inquiry into the armaments industry which 
sat for twenty-two public sessions between 1935 and 1936. A vast quantity of evidence on 
the arms industry was generated by the Commission and this was supplemented by Noel-
Baker’s publication of The Private Manufacture of Armaments, which used evidence he had 
provided at the Commission, in late 1936. Yet, as Edgerton highlights, ‘campaigners did not 
produce an adequate overall description of the interwar British military-industrial 
complex’.95 While the Commission may have suggested that the ‘tide of popular feeling was 
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[now] running fiercely against private manufacture’ of arms, it nevertheless failed to 
advocate any concrete action against such manufacturers.96 However, the Commission, and 
later Noel-Baker, highlighted that armament firms used ‘patriotic’ societies, such as the Air 
and Navy Leagues, to lobby for increased spending on armaments as well as advertising on 
a considerable scale in aeronautical and naval journals.97 This section does not attempt to 
explore the Royal Commission in any depth. Rather, it seeks to explore the charges brought 
against the Air and Navy Leagues concerning their relationship with the private 
manufacturers of armaments and how this influenced the character and policies of each 
League. 
As noted in Chapter 1, Frederick Handley Page’s offer to the Air League in 1926 of 
an annual sum of £5,000 for two years on the condition that Groves was appointed as 
secretary general with a free hand was highly controversial. Handley Page, founder of the 
aircraft manufacturing company Handley Page Limited, stressed that the offer was made 
‘entirely without condition as to the future policy of the Air League’ and that the League 
‘would be free to settle its own affairs in its own way without dictation from any political 
body, trade interest or otherwise’.98 Some within the League understandably feared such 
connections and were concerned that associations with aircraft manufacturers might hamper 
its independence. Despite this, the League’s Executive Committee accepted Handley Page’s 
offer. It was undoubtedly Sir Edmund Bartley-Denniss, the sole dissident regarding the offer 
and a figure who had previously considered the League’s links with manufacturers as 
potentially ‘disastrous, not only to the League but to the country’, who leaked the story to 
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The Times, which published proceedings of the meeting the following day.99 This led to the 
withdrawal of the offer, with Handley Page noting that the ‘worst possible effect was being 
created by the suggestion that General Groves was the nominee of some body outside the 
Air League, and that the offer was made on behalf of those interested in production’.100  
Almost as remarkable as Handley Page’s offer, was the Air League’s invitation to 
Sir Basil Zaharoff, the arms dealer and archetypal ‘merchant of death’, to join it on public 
platforms and to become an honorary vice president.101 The Air League’s invitation was 
natural enough, given Zaharoff’s interest in aviation, yet his image and status would have 
made any association more difficult for the Air League to justify in the mid-1930s, when the 
‘genuine [public] sentiment of revulsion’ against the profit in arms had reached its apogee.102  
 It has already been observed that one of the League’s publicly stated aims was ‘the 
establishment of a thriving aircraft industry’ and this link was touched upon by other figures 
on the left. For example, it was noted by Clement Attlee in the House of Commons in 1926 
(much to the annoyance of the League): ‘The suggestion conveyed in Major Attlee’s remarks 
that the Air League is a sinister organization, created to develop markets for some of our 
armament firms is wholly incorrect’. The League argued that ‘the names of well-known men, 
some of whom may be possibly interested directly or indirectly in aviation, from a 
manufacturing point of view, appear in the list of personnel of the League is only natural’.103 
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Also natural, perhaps, was that manufacturers were among the friends of many Air League 
figures.104  
As well as being among the personnel of the League, manufacturers were also present 
on its public platforms. For example, in January 1926, in response to Hoare’s announcement 
that the Air Ministry intended to slow down the rate of RAF production, the Air League held 
a luncheon to protest the decision. One of the key speakers was C.R. Fairey, founder of the 
Fairey Aviation Company and chairman of the SBAC, who, perhaps unsurprisingly, 
lamented Hoare’s decision.105 He was conscious of speaking from a position of vested 
interest, noting that ‘when an aircraft manufacturer expresses any opinion on the subject of 
aerial defence, he lays himself open to the charge that the aircraft industry are very interested 
parties’.106  
This was not the end of the Air League’s links with aircraft manufacturers.107 Aircraft 
manufacturers (such A.V. Roe and Co. Ltd.) paid annual membership subscriptions to the 
League and were also considered when planning for increased propaganda activities.108 A 
number of manufacturers (Fairey, Rolls-Royce, Saunders-Roe, and Armstrong-Whitworth) 
also supported the Air League by allowing visitors to attend their factories on Empire Air 
Day in 1934, with the Gloucester Aircraft Company allowing visitors to attend its factory in 
1935, while contributors to Empire Air Day programmes included eminent manufacturers 
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such as Geoffrey de Havilland and A.V. Roe.109 Programmes on Empire Air Day were also 
replete with adverts for aircraft manufacturers.110 
The League planned to arrange tours of the factories of aeroplane manufacturers for 
members of the Boy Scouts, and manufacturers were also considered in forming the ADCC, 
with Sutherland informing the League’s Executive Committee that he would contact figures 
in the aviation and motor-car industry for assistance.111 The ADCC did, in fact, receive 
financial backing from such companies, with Vickers donating to the Corps.112 Adverts for 
aircraft manufacturers frequently appeared in Air Review and, as Noel-Baker suggested, the 
aeronautical press could not live without the advertisement contracts from armament 
firms.113 Alongside promoting manufacturers on Empire Air Day, the League received direct 
financial support from manufacturers such as Vickers-Armstrong and Imperial Chemical 
Industries (as well as unofficially approaching Fairey when struggling for funds in the early 
1930s).114 The League also organised a trip for 30 MPs to Filton to visit the Bristol Aeroplane 
Company in 1934, only weeks before the announcement of plans for RAF expansion, to tour 
its factory.115  
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As well as financial contributions, there were occasions where private manufacturers 
seemingly directed Air League policy (as in the case of Groves’s appointment) or at least 
heavily influenced it. For instance, Sir John Siddeley, director of Armstrong Siddeley, 
approached Lindsay Everard during the Geneva Disarmament Conference ‘with the 
suggestion that the Air League might take action to safeguard British air interests’.116 The 
action taken was the appointment (with a contribution from Siddeley towards his salary) of 
Chamier as secretary general.117 It is also worth noting that Chamier was a director of 
Vickers Aviation and Supermarine before his appointment at the Air League.118 Likewise, 
Sir Henry White-Smith, the League’s honorary treasurer in the late 1920s, also had strong 
ties to the aircraft industry.119 Chamier and White-Smith were not the only figures with links 
to the aircraft industry to sit on the League’s Executive Committee, although the presence 
of such figures was not without opposition. Included in the Air League’s restructuring in 
1932, therefore, was the principle that no one actively associated with any aircraft 
manufacturer should have a seat on the Executive Committee.120 
Such links were mentioned in the Report of the Royal Commission and in Noel-
Baker’s subsequent book, which raised concerns that organisations such as the Air League 
were being ‘used by the armament firms as a means of exerting indirect influence in favour 
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of increased national armaments’.121 Noel-Baker particularly focused on Handley Page’s 
offer: ‘In plain English, £10,000 was offered to the League to help it to create opinion in 
favour of increased armaments in the air’.122 In his evidence to the Royal Commission, Noel-
Baker similarly stated that the Air League should publicise its membership, subscribers, lists 
of donors, and ‘ought not to have any connection with the industry by which . . . armed 
forces are to be produced’.123 
Financial links between the Air League and manufacturers were also touched upon 
by other figures. For example, Brockway and the journalist Frederic Mullally later suggested 
that such links explained why the Air League so ‘assiduously pursued the “aim”’ of 
establishing a ‘thriving aircraft industry’.124 However, given the often parlous financial 
condition of both the Air and Navy Leagues in the interwar years and the fact that both, on 
occasion, declined subscriptions from armament manufacturers, one should be careful of 
overemphasising the importance of such financial links.125 While it may not be the case that 
either organisation was solely ‘moved by patriotism freed from politics’, neither League 
simply acted as a mouthpiece for armament firms.126  
Like the Air League, the Navy League was conscious of both financial and political 
associations with the armament industry.127 For instance, when approached by R.T. Lang of 
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Sell’s Ltd., with a scheme to acquire funds from shipbuilding, steel, and armament firms for 
the Navy League to use in the education of the British public on the necessity of the navy, 
the League’s Executive Committee was strongly opposed.128 Similarly, in his report to the 
Royal Commission, Sir Charles Craven, chairman and managing director of Vickers, 
revealed that Vickers-Armstrong also offered subscriptions to the Navy League (as well as 
to the Air League) but that they were refused.129 This was explained by Lloyd, who urged 
that it ‘was imperative that no accusation that the League was supported by Armament firms 
could be made with any justification’, and by G.O. Stephenson, general secretary of the 
League at the time, in the following terms: ‘The League consider that, if they accepted 
subscriptions from armament firms, they would not feel themselves entirely free to form 
whatever opinion they might wish. They might be accused of having their policy dictated to 
them.’130 However, in a later Executive Committee meeting, Lloyd discovered that the 
League had in fact been receiving funds from Vickers.131 Unaware of this, Lloyd was furious 
and lamented that ‘in the full course of his career, he had never before been so badly let 
down as he had been in this instance’.132 In the same meeting, the League resolved to return 
a cheque for £100.00 to the Imperial Chemical Industries, due to the company’s production 
of armaments.133  
While the Navy League clearly wanted to avoid the controversy that surrounded 
Handley Page’s financial offer to the Air League, this did not stop it accepting financial 
contributions from Vickers to the SCC (or from approaching firms in the shipping industry 
for financial support for the Corps) yet there appears to have been curiously little hostility 
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towards these contributions.134 Similarly, there was little opposition to Vickers’s offer to the 
Navy League of lantern slides illustrating the construction of a battleship for lecturing 
purposes or the fact that, in 1930, the League was receiving £154 per annum from aeroplane 
manufacturers and others within the aviation industry.135 Alongside financial links, Lord 
Sydenham had spent a period on the board of Armstrong Whitworth, Patrick Hannon became 
a director of the Birmingham Small Arms company following his time with the Navy League 
in 1925, while Leo Amery became a director of the naval manufacturers Cammell Laird & 
Company in 1933.136 Despite such links, however, the involvement of armament 
manufacturers in the organisational and institutional elements of the League appear to have 
been far less extensive than with the Air League. While the private manufacturers of arms 
may not have been able to dictate the policy of the Air and Navy Leagues, they certainly saw 
the propagandistic value of each League. Links of personnel, funding, and objectives – 
especially in the Air League’s case – were numerous and undoubtedly significant. 
Associations with the ‘Merchants of Death’ also did little to help each organisation 
disassociate itself from accusations of militarism.  
 
 
VI. The Air League, Rearmament, and Defence from the Air 
Although Sutherland was satisfied with the Air League’s increased parliamentary activity in 
late 1933, this did little to assuage his growing anxiety regarding Britain’s aerial position. 
At the League’s Annual General Meeting in 1934, he stressed that Britain’s air force was 
currently ‘pitiably below strength’ and argued that:  
no reasonable person could really look forward with pleasure to our entry on a race in air 
armaments with other countries but no sane citizen could look with equanimity on our present 
 
134 MSSC, NL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 18 March 1937, p. 3. 
135 MSSC, NL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 18 December 1923, p. 6; MSSC, NL Minute 
Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 6 November 1930, p. 4.  
136 Davenport-Hines, ‘The British Armaments Industry’, p. 183; Haxey, Tory M.P., pp. 62–65.  
149 
 
position. There must be a speeding up immediately of the defences forces of this country . . . 
we had to get, by agreement or otherwise, an Air Force second to none in the world.137 
Speaking at a Navy League meeting in June 1934, Chamier likewise regretted that ‘[a]s 
matters stand, the world laughs at British peace plans: we hawk them round Europe, and no 
one cares and no one listens, because we have no weight behind our views. The British lion 
is old, his claws are cut, his teeth decayed, and his spirit gone.’138 While the Air League may 
have been successful in awakening politicians and the public to the potential threat of the 
aeroplane, it was clear that it remained unsatisfied with Britain’s aerial position. The League 
expressed ‘bitter disappointment’ over the air estimates in 1934, particularly Lord 
Londonderry’s memorandum accompanying the estimates which described a ‘widening gap 
between the present strengths of the Royal Air Force and of the Air services of the other 
great powers’.139 
Following the introduction of the first RAF expansion scheme, Scheme A – the first 
major expansion of the RAF since 1923 – and Baldwin’s comment that ‘since the day of the 
air, the old frontiers are gone. When you think of the defence of England, you no longer 
think of the White Cliffs of Dover; you think of the Rhine’, the Air League was far less 
critical of both the state and the Air Ministry.140 After the formal acknowledgement that 
Britain was pursuing parity with anyone within striking distance of its shores, Air Review 
wrote that ‘it is a good start and a courageous one. A Government still hoping for some 
agreement on the limitation of armaments, and beset by the apostles of internationalism, can 
do no more.’141 The statement was not simply an attempt to lay the blame for Britain’s 
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perceived aerial deficiencies on its liberal internationalist rivals, but instead seemed to 
genuinely reflect the Air League’s stance on rearmament plans.  
The formal announcement of German rearmament did little to alter the League’s 
policy, rather it was merely confirmation of what it had been preaching for most of the 1930s. 
‘The great lesson to be drawn from Germany’s rearmament’, Air Review stated, ‘is that any 
nation, though bound by Treaty and under constant surveillance by suspicious neighbours, 
can arm secretly if it intends to. The abolition of national military air forces would lead 
directly to this danger; the internationalisation of military or civil aviation can do nothing to 
remove it.’142 The Air League’s opposition to the internationalisation of aviation and the 
creation of an international air police force was seemingly vindicated. According to the 
League, Britain had ‘listened too long to theorists and internationalists’ and the lessons were 
clear: ‘We must have an Air Force for the defence of this country equal at least to that of any 
other power within reach of our shores, and we must have it quickly’.143 
The Air League did not call for an unrestrained armament programme, but instead 
suggested that an ‘ordered progress – a steady strengthening of foundations to carry a solid 
structure – is preferable to spectacular spending that might only erect a flimsy façade’. It 
also noted that the RAF was suffering from ‘sixteen years of neglect. The effects of sixteen 
years of neglect cannot be remedied in one year’s Estimates.’144 Sutherland did, however, 
stress that it was ‘accepted that we must increase the Royal Air Force – and increase it rapidly 
– if we are to get out of a most dangerous situation’. He felt that it was, to some extent, due 
to the Air League’s ‘constant propaganda that we have obtained real public recognition of 
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the position, so that our sober and peace-loving peoples realise that we can no longer take 
the risk of inferiority in the air’.145 
As well as commenting on the need for rearmament, the Air League also often 
reflected on the best measures Britain could employ to defend against the threat from the air. 
The League questioned the apparent wisdom of Baldwin’s the ‘bomber will always get 
through’ speech, suggesting that ‘we can confidently assert that the bombing of women and 
children, or bombing in reprisal of attacks on women and children, is the most foolish form 
of utilising air power which it is possible to conceive’. The League objected to the way in 
which the term ‘reprisals’ was used in reference to air power and criticised suggestions that 
it was not possible to defend against aerial bombardment. It suggested that a more likely (or 
more efficient) scenario than the bombing of women and children would be that 
bombardment would be directed against a nation’s Achilles heel, stressing ‘only in the case 
of the most feeble-minded people would direct attack on the morale of the civil population 
come under this heading’. The best form of defence, so the League argued, was to attack the 
‘air establishments of the enemy [which] will serve to diminish very greatly the scale of 
attack which can be brought to bear on us’.146  
Similarly, following the formal announcement of German rearmament, the League 
reflected on the form of any potential conflict. An article in Air Review asked its readers: 
‘Which strategy is likely to triumph? – one that uses air power to choke docks with sunken 
ships, stop the production of munitions, and to attack the enemy air establishments? Or the 
one that attacks women and children and civilians in their homes?’ The journal declared: 
‘Let us stop this constant cry of havoc . . . The sooner our possible enemies realise that we 
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are not to be scared into surrender by the bombing of civilians the less likely are we to suffer 
from such attacks’.147  
However, following the announcement of German rearmament, the Air League did 
call for the country to ‘put our backs into defence as much as into counter attack’, with 
members such as Chamier warning that, in a future conflict, mustard gas could be ‘dropped 
like rain from the skies’.148 Sutherland likewise urged in July 1935, the same month as the 
first Air Raid Precautions (ARP) circular was issued by the Home Office, that a ‘big drive 
should be made for air defence’. He felt that the question of defence had not been properly 
tackled and was of the opinion that ‘the country could be given a great measure of security 
against air attack’.149 He also emphasised that ‘too much stress should not be given to the 
counter attack which was a poor consolation to the individual citizen’ and that the anti-
aircraft gunnery, searchlight and sound locater operations, and other forms of defence should 
be promoted.150 Air defence, although not as prominent as the counter offensive, was also 
part of Air League pronouncements surrounding the threat of the bomber in light of growing 
international tension beyond Europe. For instance, writing on the Italian invasion of 
Abyssinia, the League stressed that it did not believe that:  
anything like sufficient attention has been given to this problem of defence – a defence which 
must involve every art which science can bring to our aid: aeroplanes, guns, searchlights, 
balloon aprons, aerial mine fields, camouflage, air defence training for civil population. 
Everything which can lessen casualties and prevent panic must have our urgent and earnest 
attention.151 
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While the League hoped that events would not develop into a ‘European catastrophe’, it felt 
that Abyssinia underscored the importance of strengthening Britain’s air force, while also 
emphasising the vulnerability of civilians to aerial warfare.152 
Despite the Air League’s relative inactivity in matters of aerial defence, it was 
nevertheless approached with a number of schemes which revolved around precisely this. 
For instance, Chamier revealed to the League’s Executive Committee in June 1937 that he 
had received ‘highly confidential proposals’ for the Air League to organise a ‘National Air 
Defence Exhibition’ at Olympia.153 The Exhibition seemingly did not take place, yet 
proposals for an exhibition on air defence, only months after the German bombing of 
Guernica, suggest that civil defence and the preparation for conflict were understandably 
becoming more pressing issues for the Air League in the late 1930s.154 Similarly, the Air 
League was approached in March 1938 with a scheme for the evacuation of schoolchildren 
from large towns to specially-built schools in the country in the event of war.155  
Of course, events on the international stage made matters of defence more pressing 
and the threat of aerial bombardment more tangible. We have seen the Air League’s response 
to the Abyssinian Crisis and it was similarly vocal on the Munich Conference. Indeed, for 
the Air League, the lessons of the Conference were clear: ‘whether we are fighting to achieve 
peace with honour or struggling to maintain the peace secured to us by statesmanship, our 
efforts in our own defence must be intensified’. The League argued that ‘We must pay no 
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heed to those who, drawing false lessons from the Spanish or Japanese wars, say that 
aeroplanes are inconclusive’ and warned that ‘[w]hen aeroplanes are skilfully used on a large 
scale they can destroy the sinews of war by striking ammunition works, factories and 
communications. Weakness in our air defence organisation might lead to our defeat.’156 
In response to the Munich Agreement, the League called for more active, and radical, 
defence measures. The League noted that most existing ARP schemes aimed at getting the 
majority of the population in underground air raid shelters, with the defence of the country 
being left in the hands of those in the services. Yet, the League suggested there was room 
for more active civilian participation. One suggestion was that civilians could lay smoke 
screens in the event of an air raid, yet it also felt it would be feasible to arm ‘civilian 
“soldiers”’ with light machine guns to combat low flying aeroplanes, asking: ‘Is it so hard 
to train a man to fire with some accuracy against low flying aircraft? Would not the volume 
of fire make up to some extent for any inaccuracy?’157 The militarisation of civil society was 
a theme of a further article in Air Review in February 1939. The article stressed that if Britons 
were to be forced underground, ‘into holes like rabbits’, and industry, commerce, and 
communications were disrupted, then ‘utter chaos’ would be caused and any war would be 
lost. It stated that it ‘is on active defence that we must concentrate. If we can shoot down the 
enemy, or ward off his attack, the losses which will be inflicted upon our people will 
diminish.’158 It was clear that the League felt civilians had an active role to play in conflict.  
 
 
VII. The Navy League, the Merchant Navy, and the Preparation for War 
If the Navy League felt that it had influenced the government’s decision to pursue naval 
rearmament, albeit somewhat indirectly, it was less content about the condition of the 
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Merchant Navy in the late 1930s.159 After expressing satisfaction in late 1936 that the 
League’s lecturing and press campaigns for rearmament had reached millions – with the 
introduction of the government’s White Paper its ‘great reward’ – Lloyd also declared that 
the League had ‘every confidence in Sir Samuel Hoare’s influence at the Admiralty’. He 
then stressed that the League would turn its activities to ‘making the people of this country 
understand the terrible and dire effect which a depleted Mercantile Marine must have on the 
whole of the Empire’.160 In doing so, the League frequently drew upon the importance of the 
Merchant Navy in the First World War and emphasised that in any future conflict the role of 
the Merchant Navy would be even greater. As Lord Beatty stressed in 1938, ‘the great lesson 
of history was that there was no security for an Empire such as ours without sea power’. He 
hoped ‘that the lesson that sea power was necessary meant also that the mercantile marine 
was not forgotten.’161 In attempting to disseminate its message, the League engaged in an 
extensive programme of political lobbying which included lecture tours, letters to the press, 
public meetings, letters to the prime minister, and pronouncements in the House of 
Commons and House of Lords.  
At the Navy League’s Grand Council Meeting in 1937, Lloyd was satisfied that the 
League had been active in both the House of Commons and House of Lords in relation to 
the Merchant Navy, but stressed that more could be done.162 Navy League branches on a 
local level also lobbied for improvements in Britain’s Merchant Navy. For example, at the 
League’s Edinburgh Branch it was argued that one of Britain’s most ‘urgent naval needs to-
day was the provision of an adequate Reserve, properly trained and fully equipped in the 
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strategy of defensive warfare . . . A shortage of seamen and ships in our Merchant Navy 
might prove disastrous in war.’163 
For the Navy League, naval supremacy rested not only upon a powerful Royal Navy, 
but also on a vibrant shipping industry and a large Merchant Navy with the capability to 
carry out trade, supply Britain’s food, and provide a reserve of manpower. A powerful 
Merchant Navy was important to trade, commerce, and communications with its empire, but 
it was also important for British prestige. Indeed, in early 1938 the League objected to the 
‘scandal’ resulting from the ease with which registration to the Merchant Navy and 
consequent protection of the British flag could be obtained by foreign vessels. Lloyd had 
contacted Neville Chamberlain, then Prime Minister, directly, receiving a response noting 
that no further temporary registration would be granted by British Consuls without reference 
to the Board of Trade and that a number provisionally registered British ships had reverted 
to their foreign registration.164 The League also considered the advisability of pressing for 
the appointment of a Minister of Marine at this point, although felt it could not be pursued 
owing to the political pressure it would involve. However, this did not prevent further 
propaganda on behalf of the Merchant Navy.165 In attempting to increase its influence in this 
sphere, the League appointed Captain B. Shillitoe to serve, as a representative of the 
Merchant Navy, on its Executive Committee.166 Lloyd also stated that just as every Admiral 
of the Fleet was a Navy League vice president and supporter, ‘so we desire that the Chairman 
 
163 ‘Our Merchant Navy’, The Scotsman, 3 March 1937, p. 19. At a Navy League meeting in Birmingham, 
Lloyd similarly argued that ‘To-day we cannot man our Merchant Navy and we are beginning to have difficult 
in manning our Royal Navy’. In order to combat this, Lloyd called upon those gathered to support the SCC. 
‘No Reserves for Navy’, Birmingham Daily Gazette, 19 July 1937, p. 5. 
164 MSSC, NL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 3 March 1938, pp. 1–2. 
165 Ibid., p. 2.  
166 MSSC, NL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 7 April 1938, p. 3.  
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and Directors of every Shipping Company and Shipbuilding Company shall join our 
ranks’.167  
Lloyd was active in lobbying for the Merchant Navy in the House of Lords on a 
number of occasions. He drew attention to the decline of British shipping in the Pacific in 
June 1936, impressing upon his audience that if the Merchant Navy – ‘its men as well as its 
ships’ – was ‘ineffective or enfeebled’, it could herald Britain’s ‘downfall as surely as naval 
defeat’. He stressed that no other country ‘is in so precarious a state as regards its food 
supplies as our own’ and that if Britain’s ports were closed or its ships sank then the people 
of the country would starve.168 He again brought the matter of the Merchant Navy before the 
House of Lords several weeks later. He warned that Britain could not rely upon neutral 
tonnage to assist its Merchant Navy in a future war as it had done during the First World 
War, nor could it rely upon the fact that its cargo carrying tonnage had increased. He stated 
that it was not the tonnage that counts, but the number of ships and that a ‘torpedo or bomb 
does not sink a percentage of tonnage; it sinks a ship’.169 Lloyd was part of a number of other 
debates as the decade progressed. In lobbying for the Merchant Navy, Lloyd felt ‘amazed at 
the complacency of Parliament, amazed that at the most critical period probably in the whole 
of our history we should not be more interested in or more concerned at the depletion in our 
shipping’.170 Commander Marsden also lobbied in the House of Commons for improvements 
to the Merchant Navy, although seemingly met with little success.171  
At the League’s Grand Council Meeting in 1938, the decline of the Merchant Navy 
was once again the central topic of discussion. Lloyd felt that as the Royal Navy was rapidly 
rearming, the decline of the Merchant Navy was the issue which ‘all our energies and [the] 
 
167 CHUR, Lloyd Papers, GLLD, 22/16, Lloyd Lecture, 1 April 1936, p. 5.  
168 Lords Sitting, British Shipping in the Pacific, HL Deb 23 June 1936 vol 101 cc142-80. 
169 Lords Sitting, Shipping, HL Deb 30 July 1936 vol 102 cc411-49. 
170 Lords Sitting, British Shipping (Continuance of Subsidy) Bill, HL Deb 09 March 1937 vol 104 cc562-80. 
171 Commons Sitting, Mercantile Marine, HC Deb 06 April 1938 vol 334 cc348-9. 
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country’s attention must be directed because the position is extremely grave’.172 He felt that 
there was little indication that either the government or the public appreciated the gravity of 
the situation. Reflecting on his own work, Lloyd stated that he had spoken in Parliament, 
had addressed important meetings throughout the country, and was in constant 
communication with the Shipping Federation, founded in 1890 to promote the interests of 
shipowners, and almost every important shipowner in the country. He nevertheless referred 
to the decline of British shipping in the Pacific, in the Baltic, and criticised the lack of 
protection to Britain’s coastal trade.173 Others spoke in more stark terms, declaring that the 
‘public must be roused from their comfortable coma to acute awareness of the disagreeable 
fact that the Red Ensign is being gradually ousted off the seas by the foreigner, and that the 
trident is being snatched from the hand of Britannia’.174   
Lecturing activities, public meetings, and letters to the press continued throughout 
1938, yet the League remained unsatisfied. In October that year, Lloyd regretted that no 
scheme of rearmament would ‘avail anything unless the Government can make up its mind 
to give immediate protection to the greatest of all its industries, namely, the Merchant Navy 
and the men who man the Merchant Navy’.175 By 1939 Lloyd felt that the ‘Merchant Navy 
was more than a great industry; it was an essential national and Imperial service, whose 
prosperity should be the concern of every man, since its services were necessary to our very 
life as individuals and as a nation and Empire’.176 The League’s endeavours in relation to 
the Merchant Navy received wide press coverage both locally and nationally and was 
supported by a number of figures, or former figures from the Admiralty, including Admiral 
Sir Roger Backhouse, First Sea Lord of the Admiralty from 1938 to 1939, Sir Roger Keyes, 
 
172 ‘The Navy League Grand Council Meeting’, The Navy, August 1938, p. 1.  
173 Ibid., p. 2.  
174 Ibid., p. 7.  
175 ‘Navy League Dinner’, The Navy, November 1938, p. 336.  
176 ‘Dangerous Decline of the Merchant Navy’, The Times, 14 February 1939, p. 9. 
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Admiral of the Fleet, and Duff Cooper, First Lord of the Admiralty from 1937 to 1938.177 
Lloyd also received the backing of Sir Samuel Hoare, First Lord of the Admiralty from 1936 
to 1937. At the League’s Nelson Day dinner in 1936, Hoare paid tribute to the ‘sincerity of 
purpose, to the resolute courage and to the unshaken patriotism that Lord Lloyd has always 
shown to the country and to the Empire during the many years of his distinguished career’. 
Hoare also noted that while the Admiralty and Navy League had a ‘particularly independent 
line of action and they do not always agree, both of us are engaged in the same task’.178  
By 1939, the League was calling for the appointment of a Minister of Shipping with 
Cabinet status to be responsible for the administration of the Merchant Navy.179 While Lloyd 
argued there was still work to be done in relation to the Merchant Navy, he felt that the 
League could claim ‘quite definitively that during the last two or three years we have done 
more than any other body to compel the Government to make proposals for subsidies for the 
Merchant Service’.180 The League expressed satisfaction that the government had passed the 
Merchant Shipping Assistance Act in early 1939, granting large financial aid to the shipping 
industry, and felt this success was due to its long campaign on behalf of the Merchant 
Navy.181 It felt that the Act constituted an important contribution to the ‘security of our 
country and merit[ed] the gratitude of both Government and people’.182 Such sentiments 
were shared by Duff Cooper, who remarked that ‘the splendid state of the Navy owed much 
to the vigilance and energy of the Navy League’.183  
 
177 ‘Navy League Dinner’, The Navy, November 1938, p. 336; ‘Grand Council Meeting’, The Navy, June 1937, 
p. 192; ‘Our Danger at Sea’, Liverpool Daily Post, 7 March 1939, p. 9. 
178 ‘Navy League Dinner’, The Navy, November 1936, p. 310.  
179 Despite criticism, a Minister of Shipping was not appointed until after the outbreak of the Second World 
War. 
180 ‘The Navy League Grand Council Meeting’, The Navy, July 1939, p. 237.  
181 MSSC, Navy League Pamphlets, NLAR 1939, p. 3.  
182 Ibid., p. 3.  
183 ‘Our Danger at Sea’, Liverpool Daily Post, 7 March 1939, p. 9. 
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While the Navy League’s propaganda surrounding the Merchant Navy can hardly be 
described as militaristic, this did not mark the abandonment of navalism or attempts to 
contribute to the military preparedness of the nation. In the late 1930s the League was not 
reluctant to criticise the state or the public concerning its attitude towards the Merchant 
Navy, but it was less willing to publicly criticise the Admiralty. As Chapter 4 will examine, 
the League was dependent upon the financial, moral, and political support of the Admiralty 
for the SCC and for the promotion of navalism through British youth. By 1936, the League 
was satisfied that it had achieved its aim to awaken the government and the public to the 
importance of the Royal Navy for the maintenance of the nation and empire. Efforts, 
therefore, shifted to the militarisation of youth and the promotion of Nelsonian principles of 
duty, discipline, and sacrifice through Trafalgar Day.  
 
 
VIII. Conclusion 
By the late 1930s, Britain’s rearmament programme was concentrated on two key 
‘technological arms’ – the RAF and the Royal Navy – both of which ‘were among the very 
strongest in the world’.184 As Edgerton has highlighted, ‘in absolute terms Britain spent at 
least as much as any other country on warfare, and about the same as it had spent in the 
Edwardian years’.185 As Edgerton makes clear, the Royal Navy ‘out-built all other navies in 
nearly all periods of the interwar years and in nearly all classes of warship’.186 The RAF was 
accorded strategic priority in the 1930s and subsequently overtook the army, in 1937, and 
 
184 Edgerton, Warfare State, p. 58. 
185 Ibid., p. 58. G.C. Peden, building on the work of Edgerton, has also recently explored how British defence 
policy was based on technological innovation. He argues that British grand strategy was, in fact, far more 
ambitious than is commonly assumed. G. C. Peden, Arms, Economics and British Strategy: From 
Dreadnoughts to Hydrogen Bombs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 1. In his earlier work, 
Peden highlighted the ways in which the Treasury, rather than hindering rearmament, helped direct it towards 
the development of the air force and navy. G.C. Peden, British Rearmament and the Treasury, 1932–1939 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1979).         
186 Edgerton, Warfare State, p. 32.  
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the Royal Navy, in 1938, in terms of total expenditure.187 In 1940, Britain was the leading 
aircraft manufacturer in the world, producing 50 per cent more airframes and engines than 
Germany.188 The Air and Navy Leagues were among the chief protagonists in supporting the 
development of Britain as a warfare state.  Although the Air and Navy Leagues may not have 
influenced the shape of rearmament, both Leagues exerted considerable effort to keep issues 
of military strength within public and parliamentary consciousness. This did not entail a 
large-scale campaign for rearmament, but a more reasoned programme which still pointed 
to areas of deficiency when necessary. This did not mean that the Air and Navy Leagues no 
longer attempted to contribute to the military preparedness of the state – or to promote 
military prowess – as the next section of the thesis will demonstrate. 
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Chapter 4: ‘Tak[ing] the Place of Those Who Had Gone Before’: The Navy 
League Sea Cadet Corps, Navalism, and the Command of the Sea 
On 9 March 1937 a national appeal for funds was launched at Mansion House, London, to 
expand the activities and organisation of the SCC.1 At the meeting, it was announced that 
Lord Nuffield promised to donate £50,000 to the Corps – on the proviso it could raise 
£100,000.2 Presided over by Sir George Broadbridge, the Lord Mayor of London, a number 
of speeches were made by influential figures, including Sir Thomas Inskip, the Minister for 
Co-ordination of Defence, Sir Alan Anderson, the Conservative MP, the Earl of Cork and 
Orrery, Admiral of the Fleet, and Lord Lloyd.  
Opening the meeting, Broadbridge lamented that the City of London itself did not 
have a Corps, but felt that the SCC provided a reserve of manpower ‘disciplined and imbued 
with love of country’ and that such a movement was to the advantage ‘both of the youth of 
the nation and of the country itself’. Broadbridge spoke at length on the value of the SCC to 
both the nation and empire, themes which were important in the ethos and practice of the 
Corps itself, declaring: 
We must command the seas or perish as an Empire. It was vital that a constant supply of sea-
minded young men should be coming forward generation by generation to take the place of 
those who had gone before. It was only by the Nelson tradition of patriotism, service, and self-
sacrifice that the Empire could be maintained. The Navy League, through its cadet corps, 
would take a great part in ensuring that that tradition would be preserved.3 
Inskip was similarly enthusiastic, remarking that ‘I cannot imagine any more British 
institution than the Sea Cadet Corps . . . in spirit we are all sailors; we all love the sea; we 
 
1 Although the appeal was indeed national, the Navy League was not above ‘private begging’ for funds for the 
SCC, especially prior to the appeal. MSSC, FGP Minute Book, Meeting of the Sub-Committee, 10 February 
1937, p. 2.  
2 £1,000 each was also donated from Vickers, Morgan Grenfells, Lord Wakefield, and the Maharaja of Patiala. 
MSSC, NL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 18 March 1937, p. 3. While the Navy League 
contacted prominent firms in the shipping, steel and shipbuilding industries in an attempt to accrue funds for 
the Corps, it was unable to raise this amount, although Nuffield donated the sum regardless. MSSC, FGP 
Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 2 July 1937, p. 2; ‘Navy League Dinner’, The Navy, 
November 1937, p. 332. 
3 ‘Lord Nuffield’s Gift to Navy League’, The Times, 20 October 1937, p. 8. 
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all think of the sea as the element on which the Englishmen lives and flourishes.’4 In 
elevating the sea and the navy into a distinct political symbol – based around the preservation 
of empire and nation – both speakers implicitly signalled that it was something that, for 
members of the SCC, was worth fighting for. By evoking a long-standing institutional 
symbol – the Royal Navy – the Corps was frequently linked to a largely uncontested emblem 
of Britishness and national prestige.  
The Mansion House meeting marked part of a concerted effort by the Navy League 
to recruit boys aged between 12 and 18 and train them in the habits of discipline, duty, self-
sacrifice, seamanship, and to ‘instill into them a love of the Empire and a love of the Navy, 
on which that Empire absolutely depends for its existence’.5 While the SCC had a long 
history, the political, moral, and financial support at the Mansion House meeting proved to 
be a catalyst for the expansion and organisation of the Corps. Previous chapters have looked 
at the Navy League’s promotion of navalism in the form of public, political, and 
parliamentary pressure; this chapter will instead explore the resonance of navalism for 
British youth and the extent to which the Navy League attempted to imbue a sense of 
navalism among its Cadets. 
While much has been written on youth organisations in the interwar years, and on 
youth culture more broadly, militaristic Corps such as the SCC and ADCC rarely feature in 
such accounts. Studies of organisations such as the Lads’ Drill Association, the Church Lads’ 
Brigade, the Jewish Lads’ Brigade, and the Boys’ Brigade focus largely on the Edwardian 
era, with the post-war period being framed as inhospitable to military, and militaristic, youth 
organisations. The current and following chapter will argue that such organisations were 
able to occupy an important place in the youth culture of the interwar years. While scholars 
 
4 ‘The Navy League Sea Cadet Corps’ [hereafter ‘NLSCC’], The Navy, April 1937, p. 103. 
5 ‘Sea Cadet Corps News’ [hereafter ‘SCCN’], The Navy, January 1936, p. 25.  
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have examined Navy League activities, it is surprising that little of this work has extended 
to explore the League’s attempts to imbue a sense of navalism, and an often-atavistic ‘naval 
patriotism’, within Cadets.6 This is especially surprising as so much Navy League work 
revolved around youth. As W. Mark Hamilton has noted, ‘an area of continual League effort 
was the awakening and influencing of British youth’.7  
In part, this neglect no doubt results from the reluctance within naval and maritime 
history to embrace the cultural turn in historical scholarship until relatively recently. 
However, as Glen O’Hara has argued, British naval and maritime history has lately 
undergone ‘something of a renaissance’.8 Certainly, works by Jan Rüger, Timothy Jenks, 
Mary Conley and, more recently, by Daniel Owen Spence, Duncan Redford, James Davey, 
and Quintin Colville suggest this is the case.9 The lack of historical attention may, then, be 
due to the popularity of rural and peaceable youth movements in the interwar period, and the 
ways in which groups like the Boy Scouts became associated with internationalism, 
alongside imperialism and militarism – characteristics of the movement’s pre-war years.10  
As the SCC was not a mass-membership organisation until the Second World War, 
and as interest in the SCC waxed and waned, one may question why a Corps that emphasised 
 
6 On ‘naval patriotism’, see Timothy Jenks, Naval Engagements: Patriotism, Cultural Politics, and the Royal 
Navy 1793–1815 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).  
7 Hamilton, The Nation and the Navy, p. 147. On the Navy League and navalism in children’s literature, see 
Hazel Sheeky Bird, ‘Naval History and Heroes: The Influence of U.S. and British Navalism on Children’s 
Writing, 1895–1914’, The International Journal of Naval History, vol. 11, no. 1 (2014). 
http://www.ijnhonline.org/2014/07/01/influence-us-british-navalism-childrens-writing/ (accessed 23 
September 2019). 
8 Glen O’Hara, ‘‘The Sea is Swinging Into View’: Modern British Maritime History in a Globalised World’, 
The English Historical Review, vol. CXXIV, no. 510 (2009), p. 1109.  
9 Rüger, The Great Naval Game; Jenks, Naval Engagements; Mary A. Conley, From Jack Tar to Union Jack: 
Representing Naval Manhood in the British Empire, 1870–1918 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
2009); Daniel Owen Spence, Colonial Naval Culture and British Imperialism, 1922–67 (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2015); Duncan Redford (ed.), Maritime History and Identity; James Davey and 
Quintin Colville (eds), A New Naval History (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2019). 
10 On the relationship between Scouts, imperialism and internationalism, see Scott Johnston, ‘Courting Public 
Favour: The Boy Scout Movement and the Accident of Internationalism, 1907–29’, Historical Research, vol. 
88, no. 241 (2015), pp. 508–529. On youth culture more broadly, see David Fowler, Youth Culture in Modern 
Britain, c.1920–c.1970 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).  
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discipline, duty, physical culture, a martial, naval masculinity, and had distinctly militaristic 
overtones warrants specific attention. Yet, its lack of historical scrutiny is surprising for a 
number of reasons. The SCC, which occupied an uneasy position between civil and military 
spheres of society, played an important part in the cultivation of civic, local, and regional 
pride, as well as forming an important part of national ceremony, pageantry, civic and 
military ritual, and commemoration. The Corps also provides an insight into the relationship 
between the Navy League and the Admiralty and the extent to which the Admiralty valued 
the work of the SCC. The Corps made a direct military contribution to both the First and 
Second World Wars and provides a lens through which to examine the changing nature of 
navalism and Navy League policy more broadly. Finally, an exploration of the SCC provides 
an insight into the place of physical culture – and the associated anxieties relating to fears of 
a perceived decline in national efficiency – masculinity, citizenship, discipline, and 
patriotism in interwar Britain and the ways in which British youth engaged with military 
culture, especially in the prelude to the Second World War.   
In exploring these themes, this chapter argues that the SCC represented a form of 
popular navalism, with the Corps being designed to make a direct contribution to the military 
preparedness of the nation. Moreover, owing to the voluntary nature of the Corps, youth 
participation in the SCC suggests that there was still an enthusiasm for the navy and military 
culture among British youth in the interwar years. By stressing the educational and character-
building nature of the Corps, the leadership of the SCC was largely able to avoid accusations 
of militarism that were levelled at similar organisations, such as the ADCC. In examining 
these areas, this chapter will first briefly outline the history of the SCC from its inception in 
the mid-nineteenth century, up until the end of the First World War. It will then look at the 
emphasis the League placed on the education of youth in the aftermath of the conflict before 
examining the SCC’s training and the organisation of the Corps. The chapter will then trace 
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the relationship between the Navy League and the Admiralty surrounding the SCC, before 
looking at a number of areas in relation to the Corps, such as: naval heritage and tradition, 
the Corps in military and civic events, annual camps, uniform, masculinity, and militarism. 
It will then outline the SCC’s expansion following the Mansion House meeting and will 
briefly chart the activities of the Corps upon the outbreak of the Second World War. 
 
 
I. Origins, Organisation, and the Admiralty  
The emergence of the SCC – or a youth culture centered around the sea – was not an interwar 
development.11 While an influx of uniformed youth organisations were created in response 
to concerns over national efficiency caused by the Boer War, the origins of the SCC can, in 
fact, be traced to the Crimean War. Sailors returning from Crimea, concerned by the apparent 
idleness and delinquency of youths, formed a Naval Lads’ Brigade at Whitstable in 1856. A 
handful of other Lads’ Naval Brigades were formed throughout the nineteenth century yet, 
as L.J. Collins notes, the work of naval veterans of Crimea in relation to naval brigades, and 
the activities of such brigades more broadly, are not well documented.12 The Navy League 
itself described the origins of the SCC as ‘little more than Boys Social Clubs with a salt 
atmosphere, some emphasis on sea interests, and later a uniform of “naval” character’.13 It 
was not until the League’s involvement that such brigades had any discernible organisation 
or significance. 
Formed from a collection of disparate naval brigades and naval organisations in late 
1910, the Boys’ Naval Brigade (BNB) was founded by the Navy League with a view ‘to the 
establishment of a Central Organisation to deal with the various Companies of Boys’ Naval 
 
11 On youth culture in the period more broadly, see David Fowler, The First Teenagers: The Lifestyle of Young 
Wage-Earners in Interwar Britain (London: Woburn Press, 1995). 
12 L. J. Collins, Cadets: The Impact of War on the Cadet Movement (Oldham: Jade Publishing Limited, 2001), 
p. 9.  
13 CHUR, Lloyd Papers, GLLD 17/59, Report on Sea Cadet Corps, 1940, p. 2. 
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Brigades’ and had two principal aims. The first was ‘to secure uniformity in the management 
of existing Brigades, or those about to be formed in the future’ and the second was ‘to co-
ordinate such volunteer effort as may be available for the promotion of Brigades, and to 
control and direct the training necessary for their efficiency’. The role of the BNB’s Sub-
Committee was to arrange competitions between brigades to ‘induce a healthy rivalry’, hold 
mass meetings of the brigades, organise excursions to naval ports ‘in order to teach 
something about the Royal Navy and its work’, publish a paper for the use of boys which 
would give news of the brigades, particularly the ‘meritorious deeds on the part of the boys 
concerned’, and to give advice generally on obtaining of uniforms, rifles, boats, and 
instructional equipment.14 Drill and quasi-military activities formed part of the BNB’s early 
training and the outward appearance of the brigades was of a military nature. Indeed, even 
shortly after its formation, the BNB was conscious about its militaristic appearance, 
expressing concern over the War Office’s objection to ‘“armed parties” marching the 
streets’.15  
Lack of funding, equipment, uniform, and organisation characterised the early years 
of the BNB, although there was a steady growth from its inception up until the outbreak of 
the First World War. While other organisations, such as the Boys’ Brigade, were reluctant 
to become officially associated with the army, the Navy League quickly attempted to 
formalise links with the Admiralty and, in May 1913, the Navy League applied to the latter 
for recognition of its brigades. In attempting to justify official recognition, the League 
stressed that the BNB ensured that ‘a constant stream of eligible boys pass[ed] into the Navy 
. . . no better means can be devised for the preparation of a better class of boys for sea service 
 
14 MSSC, Central Boys’ Naval Brigades Committee Minute Book, 1910–1915 (hereafter BNB Minute Book), 
The Navy League, Boys’ Naval Brigades, undated, pp. [1–2]. 
15 MSSC, BNB Minute Book, Meeting of the BNB Sub-Committee, 12 March 1911, p. 2.  
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than that which is now afforded’ through the BNB.16 Such proposals were eventually 
rejected, although this was largely due to the outbreak of war and many Admiralty members 
spoke enthusiastically about the scheme.17  
The BNB played an active role in the First World War, with units engaged in a 
number of activities, for instance acting as messengers, signal boys, coastal watchers, and a 
range of other duties.18 Of course, as well as serving in civil defence, many boys applied for 
active service in the Royal Navy. By the end of the conflict, the BNB had contributed 164 
officers and instructors and 3,099 boys to the fighting forces, with most serving in the Royal 
Navy or Mercantile Marine.19 While such figures are not particularly striking, the League 
took pride in its contribution, with The Navy asserting: ‘When the demand for “British boys 
for British ships” is remembered, it is obvious that the movement is one which deserves 
official recognition and public support as a practical national asset’.20 The BNB was, in fact, 
finally recognised by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty as a Central Association in 
January 1919, formally becoming the SCC.21  
Official recognition to SCC Units meant financial support and the loaning of 
equipment such as boats, rifles, and field guns. Officers and instructors were granted Royal 
Naval Volunteer Reserve (RNVR) honorary commissions and were allowed to wear the 
RNVR uniform. However, recognition would only be granted by the Admiralty on a number 
of conditions. Units had to be financially self-supporting; had to comply with any rules, 
regulations, or orders issued from the Admiralty; had to have a minimum of 30 boys 
 
16 TNA ADM 1/8384/187, Volunteer Cadet Corps and Sea Scout Associations. Request for official recognition 
of Boys Naval Brigades, Letter from P. J. Hannon to the Admiralty, 21 May 1913, p. 1; MSSC, BNB Minute 
Book, Meeting of the BNB Sub-Committee, 9 June 1913, p. 3. 
17 See TNA ADM 1/8384/187, Volunteer Cadet Corps. 
18 For example, see ‘Stornoway Naval Corps and Stornoway Boys’ Naval Brigade’, The Navy, March 1916, p. 
94. 
19 Hamilton, Nation and Navy, p. 151.  
20 ‘Boys’ Naval Brigade: Admiralty Recognition’, The Navy, October 1918, p. 98. 
21 MSSC, BNB Minute Book, 1916–1921, Meeting of the BNB Sub-Committee, 3 February 1919, p. 1. 
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registered; and instructors had to be capable of ‘imparting elementary technical instruction 
to its members in an efficient manner’. Units then had to pass an Admiralty inspection and 
thereafter pass at least one inspection annually.22 The Admiralty saw the purpose of the SCC 
as providing ‘moral, social, and physical training’, which would improve the ‘welfare of 
boys’, who would receive ‘instruction of a nautical character’.23 However, while the SCC 
had the support of the Admiralty, the Corps was not supported by all naval organisations.24 
The BNB was not a priority for the Navy League in the Edwardian era – or even 
throughout the First World War. However, following the conflict, there was a distinct shift 
in the League’s policy, and a far greater emphasis placed on education and youth.25 
Addressing the guests of the League’s first Nelson Day dinner since the Armistice, the Duke 
of Somerset noted that ‘perhaps the strangest of all England’s peculiarities is the ignorance 
of English people generally on the subject of its Sea Services and their vital importance to 
the nation, their history, and their everyday work’. In an attempt to remedy this, Somerset 
stressed that the League would create ‘an educational campaign amongst the children of this 
country’ that the organisation ‘hoped to make one of its principal works in the future’.26  
At the Grand Council Meeting in 1920, it was similarly stated that ‘the main duty of 
the Navy League would be to see that the youth of this country, those who guided the studies 
of the youth of this country, that those who were in a position of authority at universities and 
 
22 TNA ADM 120/214, Memorandum Relating to the Official Recognition by the Admiralty of the Sea Cadet 
Corps, 3 October 1918, p. 2. 
23 TNA ADM 1/8545/310, Regulations Governing the Formation, Organisation and Administration of Units of 
the Sea Cadet Corps in the British Isles, 1918, p. 3. 
24 For example, the RNVR Committee objected to SCC officers wearing the RNVR uniform and having RNVR 
ranks as many had received ‘no naval training’, were ‘in no way under discipline’ and could not ‘be considered 
part of any fighting force’. TNA ADM 1/8645/186, Officers of Recognised Sea Cadet Corps. Designation and 
Uniform, RNVR Committee, 14 July 1922, p. 1. 
25 Although the Navy League did attempt to establish branches in secondary schools prior to the First World 
War. See TNA ED 24/1653, Formation of branches of The Navy League in Secondary schools, 1912.  
26 ‘Nelson Day Dinner’, The Navy, December 1919, p. 164.  
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secondary schools, should all appreciate properly the value of the sea to this country’.27 The 
inculcation of navalist principles through schools and in the SCC was not without 
opposition.28 For example, L.B. Perkin in Public Schools complained that ‘the Navy League 
in particular is still spreading political notions of quite remarkable narrowness among 
preparatory schoolboys’.29 While the League considered such remarks ‘vitriolic’, it was 
nevertheless satisfied ‘as they showed our lectures were having some effect’.30 
Alongside its work in schools, the Navy League was present at the Schoolboys’ 
Exhibition in 1929 (which had an attendance of 80,000), with the Daily Mail noting ‘for the 
boy with a love of blue water in his veins . . . there is the Navy League exhibit’.31 The Navy 
League’s presence at the exhibition did, however, meet with some criticism. Commenting 
on a film shown by the League, titled ‘Keep Watch’, the Daily Herald wrote that it would 
be ‘unquestionably dangerous in [its] effects on the impressionable minds of the youngsters’ 
and that it should be removed from the exhibition.32 It criticised the film for only showing 
the positive elements of life in the Navy and argued that the film should also show the bleaker 
elements such as ‘a picture of a crowd of the disfigured and mutilated to follow those wherein 
the boys are shown [as] fine strapping youths, the acme of fitness, drilling and exercising’.33  
 
27 ‘Grand Council Meeting’, The Navy, April 1920, p. 46. The League had already started to offer prizes for 
essays on naval history by this point, see TNA ADM 1/8530/193, Offers of Prizes for Naval History by the 
Navy League, 1918.  
28 MSSC, NL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 2 June 1927, p. 4; 7 July 1927, p. 1.  
29 L.B. Perkin, Public Schools: Their Failure and Their Reform (London: Hogarth Press, 1932), p. 101.  
30 MSSC, NL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 3 March 1932, p. 2.  
31 ‘Thrills for Schoolboys at To-day’s Great Exhibition’, Daily Mail, 31 December 1929, p. 7. The Navy League 
agreed to take part in the same exhibition in 1930. The Daily Mail again waxed lyrical about the League’s 
display, promising it would ensure that boys would be ‘thrilled with the might and majesty of British sea 
power’. ‘Thrills for Schoolboys’, Daily Mail, 16 December 1930, p. 4. 
32 ‘Arms & the Boy’, Daily Herald, 4 January 1929, p. 4. 
33 “Catching ‘Em Young”, Daily Herald, 4 January 1929, p. 5. Despite the Daily Herald’s opposition, the 
League was satisfied that a large number of maps, calendars, postcards, and pictures of Nelson had been sold, 
and that “Keep Watch” – which had been shown twice daily for a week – had attracted an average audience of 
180 people per screening. MSSC, NL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 9 January 1930, p. 
3. Propaganda for the SCC did, in fact, show the realities of life in the navy. For instance, one poster showed 
a British warship, in stormy conditions, firing on an enemy vessel and called for contributions to the Nelson 
Day Fund. IWM, Art IWM PST 7942, The Navy League, Nelson Day Fund, 1926.  
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Closely connected with the education of schoolchildren, was the development of 
SCC. The SCC was supported financially by the Nelson Day Fund (which was kept going 
from Flag Day contributions held on Trafalgar Day), as well as by private and public 
donations, membership subscriptions to the Navy League, and capitation grants from the 
Admiralty. The Corps also received donations from more controversial figures. One such 
figure was Lady Houston, who donated £5,000 to the SCC in 1933, although seemingly 
without much opposition.34  
The object of the SCC was ‘to continue the training of boys just before and after 
school leaving age, in habits of discipline, duty and self-respect’, ‘to educate them to love 
the British Empire and its splendid sea traditions’, and to help boys ‘desirous of joining the 
Royal Navy and Mercantile Marine to attain their ambition’.35 The League hoped that 
members of the Corps would become ‘of practical use not only in time of peace but in time 
of war, and that they may be educated to believe in the British Empire and the British 
Navy’.36 The League’s Committee considered the work of the SCC as ‘one of the most 
valuable methods of obtaining publicity for the League’, yet the Corps, and the Navy League 
itself, also had the private and public support of the Admiralty.37 As early as 1924, Beatty 
felt that the League had succeeded in ‘instilling into the young generation the sea sense upon 
which the foundations of the Empire were built, and its work in that direction was a great 
national asset’.38 Inspecting the Cowes Unit of the SCC in 1927, Lord Jellicoe, First Sea 
Lord of the Admiralty from 1916 to 1918, similarly argued that the Navy League ‘was never 
more needed than to-day’.39  
 
34 ‘Grand Council Meeting’, The Navy, June 1933, p. 172.  
35 MSSC, Navy League Pamphlets, ‘Navy League’, 1936, p. 2.  
36 Navy League, Pocket Manual for the Navy League Naval Units and Sea Cadet Corps (London, 1939), p. 
[49]. 
37 MSCC, Navy League Pamphlets, NLAR 1920, p. 17.  
38 ‘Navy League Fair’, The Times, 23 May 1924, p. 12.  
39 ‘Lord Jellicoe’s Inspection of Sea Cadets’, The Times, 17 January 1927, p. 7.     
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Upon recognition of the SCC in 1919, the Admiralty provided a capitation grant of 
2s. (later 6s.) per Cadet which the Navy League considered to be of ‘immense help’ in 
maintaining the Corps.40 Despite the League’s reliance on this grant, it received a letter from 
the Admiralty in early 1924, informing it that the capitation grant would be terminated.41 
This was met with profound regret by the Navy League. Citing the importance of 
encouraging a sea-spirit through the SCC both within the nation and the empire, the League 
urged the Admiralty to reconsider, however the decision ultimately lay with the Treasury. 
The decision to stop the grant does seem to have been made with reluctance from the 
Admiralty, as many considered the Corps to be of ‘great national importance’ and ‘that the 
Sea Cadet Corps training does much to strengthen the morals of those young lads, instils 
habits of obedience and discipline . . . and in many cases gives them a taste for a sea career’.42 
The Admiralty also felt that enthusiasm for the Corps would be lost if ‘divested of its naval 
or military character’.43 As the capitation grant was restored in 1927, albeit reduced to 3s. 
6d. per Cadet, this suggests that the Admiralty did indeed see the value of the SCC in such 
terms.44  
The Navy League’s Executive Committee was responsible for the SCC’s affairs and 
organisation generally, although the scheme was decentralised and local branches often 
handled the affairs of units in their areas. The administration of the SCC continued in this 
manner until mid-1935 when the SCC Sub-Committee was formed, undoubtedly improving 
the efficiency of the Corps’ organisation.45 To facilitate training, the League produced a 
 
40 ‘The Sea Spirit and Good Citizenship’, The Navy, July 1927, p. 189.  
41 MSSC, NL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 6 March 1924, p. 2. 
42 TNA T 161/1212, Fighting Services. Navy: Sea Cadet Corps. Volunteer Cadet Corps Attached to Royal 
Navy Establishments; Assistance to be given to Recognised Units, 1920–1925, Letter from the Secretary of 
the Admiralty, 10 November 1923, p. 2; TNA ADM 1/8633/179, Sea Cadet Corps. Recognition of New Units, 
Minute Sheet, 1 August 1922, p. 1. 
43 TNA T 161/1212, Letter from the Secretary of the Admiralty, 5 May 1920, p. 1.  
44 MSSC, NL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 7 April 1927, p. 3. 
45 MSCC, NL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 6 June 1935, p. 2. See Appendix IV. 
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pocket manual for the SCC which contained information on the discipline expected to be 
maintained by members of the Corps, seamanship, signalling, drill, rifle exercises, physical 
drill and exercise, model making, first aid, and various other topics. The manual also 
included the ‘Sea Cadet’s “Promise”’, which members of the Corps were required to sign. 
This was essentially a code of practice which the Cadet would live by while serving as a 
member of the Corps. The Cadet was required to declare loyalty to the King, to officers and 
instructors, and to his fellow Cadets. The final ‘promise’ required the Cadet to ‘try and 
follow the glorious example of Nelson and DO MY DUTY’.46 The League emphasised that 
while the SCC did not seek to ‘force boys into a Maritime career’, the manual would provide 
an ‘excellent grounding’ for those who wished to join the services.47 Although the Corps had 
the support of Admiralty in the interwar years, members of the SCC also attempted to gain 
recognition and legitimacy within public consciousness – on a local and national scale – by 
taking part in a number of popular civic events, rituals, and ceremonies. 
 
 
II. The SCC and Popular Civic Ritual 
In taking part in civic and military ritual, the SCC both participated in, and indeed promoted, 
military culture and put navalism on a public stage. The performative aspects of the SCC 
constituted a significant element in the promotion of sea-mindedness among boys and it was 
important to the leadership of the Corps that boys took part in a navalist ‘patriotic public 
sphere’.48 Spectacle and imagery were important in the navalist ‘patriotic public sphere’, yet 
such imagery had a long and distinguished pedigree in British civic life.49 Military theatre, 
 
46 Navy League, Pocket Manual for the Sea Cadet Corps, p. 42.  
47 Ibid., p. [49]; p. [2]. Emphasis in original.  
48 Jenks, Naval Engagements, p. 11.  
49 Scott Hughes Myerly has shown the ways in which military imagery and martial spectacle was a crucial 
component of military management in the nineteenth century. He argues that martial spectacle helped to instil 
values such as: bravery, duty, discipline, order, efficiency, self-sacrifice, and loyalty to those in command – all 
of which were ‘embedded in the military model’ and were highly idealised military virtues. Scott Hughes 
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pageantry, ritual, and drill all contributed in steering members of the Corps towards serving 
the state in times of war.  
Units of the SCC were present on important state occasions, such as the Silver Jubilee 
in 1935 and the Coronation of King George VI in 1937.50 The Corps also had units present 
on important naval occasions, such as the Royal Naval Review at Spithead to celebrate the 
Silver Jubilee.51 In taking part in such ritualised performances of military culture, the SCC 
contributed to a range of overtly militaristic events, such as the Hendon Air Pageant, Empire 
Air Day, the Aldershot Tattoo, and navy weeks, which aimed to keep the military at the 
forefront of public consciousness in the interwar years.  
The SCC also took part in commemorations of war. The Corps was often present on 
Armistice Day and commemorated the Battle of Jutland, the death of Jack Cornwell, and, of 
course, Trafalgar Day.52 However, the Corps’ veneration of fallen military figures was not 
limited to the navy. The SCC also commemorated figures of empire, taking part in 
remembrance parades for ‘that hero of the last century’, General Gordon, who died at 
Khartoum.53 The Corps also took part in the British Legion’s Festival of Empire.54 Of course, 
while Trafalgar Day was the most important annual commemoration for the Corps, the SCC 
clearly deemed it important to champion emblems of empire and Britishness more broadly.  
While each unit had to reach a standard of efficiency as laid out by the Admiralty, 
the activities of units varied based on locations, funds, the size of the unit, and the experience 
 
Myerly, British Military Spectacle: From the Napoleonic Wars through the Crimea (Cambridge, Mass.; 
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50 ‘SCCN’, The Navy, May 1935, p. 164; MSSC, Sea Cadet Corps Sub-Committee Minute Book, 1935–1943 
(hereafter NLSCC Minute Book), Meeting of the Executive Committee, 18 March 1937, p. 1.  
51 ‘SCCN’, The Navy, July 1935, p. 256.  
52 MSSC, NL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 24 November 1932, p. 3.  
53 ‘SCCN’, The Navy, March 1935, p. 97. On ‘heroic imperialists’ and the promotion of these heroes in Britain 
and France, see Berny Sèbe, Heroic Imperialists in Africa: The Promotion of British and French Colonial 
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54 ‘SCCN’, The Navy, January 1939, p. 32.  
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of local organisers. Drill, marching, seamanship, rifle training, field gun training, and 
physical fitness were part of most unit’s activities. That martial and quasi-military training 
was central to the SCC, even after the First World War, suggests that the leadership of the 
Corps were intent on shaping boys into naval citizens of the nation. Such training was also 
reflected in – and an important part of – the SCC’s public presence. For example, members 
of the Corps frequently participated in Empire Day parades and had the support of Sir 
William Wayland, chairman of the Empire Day Movement.55 The visibility of the SCC in 
public arenas on Empire Day was a reflection of the SCC’s growth and increasing ambition 
and was an important vector for publicly linking the Corps to the empire. 
 The Corps also took part in a number of other major civic events such as the Lord 
Mayor’s procession in London. In one procession, Cadets followed a ‘decorated motor-lorry, 
bearing a 12-pdr quick-firing naval field gun and section of gun’s crew’. Upon the lorry was 
a white banner with the “Navy League Sea Cadet Corps,” printed and below, the motto of 
the Corps, “Keep Watch”. On either side of the lorry similar banners were displayed, 
emblazoned with “British Boys for British Ships’’.56 Parades and marches not only gave an 
opportunity for members of the SCC to be present on important civic occasions, but also 
provided the ‘thrill which comes with military movement’.57 Reflecting on the presence of 
the Corps at a battleship launch in 1939, The Navy observed that ‘[e]xperiences such as this 
encourage and fortify the whole movement. Like the great parade in Trafalgar Square, they 
give these boys a vision of duty and a sense of usefulness to the state.’58 While such 
occasions may not have necessarily elicited notions of duty or a sense of usefulness towards 
the state in all boys, members of the Corps did not passively take part in such events and 
 
55 ‘N.L. Navy League Units and Sea Cadet Corps’, The Navy, July 1924, p. 201; ‘NLSCC’, The Navy, July 
1932, p. 226. 
56 ‘NLSCC’, The Navy, December 1927, p. 381.  
57 ‘SCCN’, The Navy, November 1936, p. 326.  
58 ‘They Do Count’, The Navy, March 1939, p. 66. 
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likely understood the militaristic nature of them. However, if boys did not appreciate the 
military nature of civic processions and naval commemorations, then they could hardly miss 
the more overt forms of militarism which was a feature of military tattoos and military fêtes. 
The SCC’s role in British Legion fêtes and military tattoos included parading, 
marching, rifle drills, signalling displays, physical training, the use of naval field guns, and 
even the storming of mock naval ports.59 In its tattoos, the SCC provided displays of earlier 
conflicts, as well as of modern warfare. Such was the efficiency of SCC units in military 
tattoos that The Navy described them as being ‘reminiscent of the Searchlight Tattoo at 
Aldershot’.60 While this may have been something of an overstatement, military parades and 
tattoos provided an important opportunity for Cadets to publicly exhibit their physical and 
military efficiency and such visibility was undoubtedly important for the movement as a 
whole. As H.T. Bishop, general secretary of the SCC, noted: 
the part they have played not only in the Northern Command Tattoo at Leeds, but on many 
purely military and naval occasions, have shown their substance in Lord Lloyd’s claim that 
these boys are Britain’s answer and the boys’ own answer to the Hitler Youth Movement and 
the Italian Balilla.61 
Although such occasions were unlikely to have acted as any particular deterrent, the Corps’ 
leadership clearly saw the SCC as important instruments of propaganda. Vice Admiral J.E.T. 
Harper was similarly conscious of how the SCC – and the Royal Navy – might appear to 
aggressor countries and urged members of the Corps to ‘uphold the prestige of the flag, and 
so to show the foreigner that the British lion had not become a British rabbit’.62  
While the SCC took part in a number of civic events in urban centres and port towns, 
the Corps had a presence in a range of public arenas and was also prominent in rural areas, 
 
59 ‘SCCN’, The Navy, August 1936, p. 234. On the SCC in military tattoos, see ‘Leeds Sailor-Boys in Tattoo’, 
Yorkshire Evening Post, 22 June 1938, p. 7 and ‘Torchlight Tattoo’, Surrey Mirror, 3 June 1938, p. 9.  
60 ‘NLSCC’, The Navy, June 1932, p. 190.  
61 ‘Youth at the Helm’, Hull Daily Mail, 27 May 1939, p. 4.  
62 ‘NLSCC’, The Navy, July 1932, p. 226.  
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particularly summer camps. Despite shifting leisure patterns in interwar Britain, camps 
remained an important part of popular recreation for youth. As Sian Edwards notes, the 
countryside was central in the formation of citizenship for youth.63 The growth of woodcraft 
groups that emerged as part of a broad anti-militarist sentiment and challenge to pre-war 
notions of masculinity – as well as the perceived militarism of Scouting – certainly highlights 
the importance of the rural in youth and associational culture in the interwar years. The 
Kindred of the Kibbo Kift, the Woodcraft Folk Movement, and the Order of Woodcraft 
Chivalry, although none were mass-membership organisations, were peaceable and rural 
movements which emphasised the importance of nature and the countryside for citizenship 
and character-building.64 John Springhall has similarly traced the importance of camp for 
Scouts and members of the Boys’ Brigade, noting that, while for leaders camp was an 
opportunity to instil discipline, for many boys it simply provided an opportunity for 
excitement, adventure, and relief from the ‘noise and dirt of urban existence’.65 However, 
Springhall also highlights the blurring of leisure activities and entertainment alongside 
military-style training which often took place at annual camps.  
Activities at SCC camps varied, but they were often martial and militaristic in nature. 
For example, at the annual camp of the Sussex SCC in 1922, activities included a mock raid 
of a camp suspected of the stealing the Corps’ boat, with the Corps ‘[a]rmed with rifles, 
bayonets and (blank) ammunition’ taking part in ‘a mimic attack upon an enemy position, in 
which field and machine guns were brought into use, followed up by an attack by riflemen 
and a final bayonet charge’. The remainder of the week was reportedly spent ‘in a wise 
 
63 Sian Edwards, Youth Movements, Citizenship and the English Countryside: Creating Good Citizens, 1930–
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combination of drill and liberty’.66 Mock combat featured in many SCC camps, which 
Cadets often took seriously. One report noted that ‘it was a good thing the rifles were not 
loaded’. The sight of Cadets being ‘mown down when they came into the arena of imaginary 
machine gun nests’ and Cadets ‘sho[oting] themselves to pieces’ was no doubt enjoyed by 
the boys, but the warlike nature of such training did little to help the SCC in claims that they 
were not training boys for service.67  
The rural was, as the activities of the SCC suggest, a site to engender a martial and 
militaristic spirit among boys, in contrast to the peaceable and pacifist ethos of woodcraft 
movements. Of course, as Kenny Cupers observes, youth camps were ‘consciously shaped 
social practice[s]’ and built environments ‘with a particular internal logic and 
organization’.68 Camps were designed to ‘leave an imprint of specific values’ and, for boys, 
provided ‘a step towards manhood’.69 While the place of camps as instruments of social 
control, where leaders of the SCC could instil a set of naval principles within Cadets, could 
be exaggerated, camps were undoubtedly part of an attempt by the Navy League to foster an 
interest in both navy and nation. 
Drill, discipline, parades, and route marches were all part of camping life, with 
character-building, training, and citizenship part of the ethos and purpose of camps. In his 
study of the Boys’ Brigade, Chris Spackman has noted that historians have overstated the 
appeal of camp for youth and that the ‘historiographical consensus purports that camp was 
the key attraction for Boys wanting to join youth movements, with drill and militaristic 
elements deemed to be concessions to authority that were endured in order to spend a week 
 
66 ‘The 1st Sussex (Eastbourne) Company, N.L. Sea Cadet Corps’, The Navy, August 1922, p. 231. 
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69 Cupers, ‘Governing Through Nature’, p. 181.  
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away under canvas’.70 However, as Spackman points out, camps were ‘underpinned by 
drilling and military discipline that were in place to instil order and create efficiency’ and 
were an extension of normal activities.71 Physical, mental, and moral training at camp had a 
grounding in weekly training. Drill and discipline were an unescapable element of camp life 
for the Boys’ Brigade – indeed, camp provided a platform for these activities – and the same 
can be said for the SCC.  
The smartness and good behaviour of Cadets while at camp was often commented 
upon by locals, although the SCC’s Executive Committee was clearly conscious that boys 
might get into trouble, with Seasalter, Whitstable being considered ‘not at all suitable for 
camps for cadets owing to the proximity of Public Houses’.72 A wartime handbook, titled 
Hints on Sea Cadet Camps, similarly complained of ‘drinking, smoking and girl-meeting 
expeditions which so often mar the Camp morale and tone’.73 
Despite control and strictness at camp, there was certainly the freedom for boys to 
get into trouble: games of football and cricket against Cadets from nearby camps, 
sunbathing, swimming, hiking, and cinema trips were all part of camp as, undoubtedly, was 
drinking, smoking, and ‘girl-meeting expeditions’. Martial and militaristic training was 
unquestionably part of camp life, but it did not reflect the totality of activities at camp. Camp 
provided boys with excitement and adventure and a chance to escape normal routine.74 
Grants were provided towards Cadets’ annual camp, particularly those from distressed areas, 
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with the SCC’s Executive Committee stating that ‘no financial handicap should be allowed 
to prevent cadets attending’ summer camps and resolved to contribute where it could.75  
While the countryside was part of camp life for members of the SCC, so too of 
course, was the sea. Cadets often spent a fortnight on ships such as the HMS Impregnable 
and HMS Implacable, where ‘[s]o far as practicable service routine was followed’ in order 
to ‘emulate the work of the real Navy’.76 The Implacable, like HMS Victory, had taken part 
in the Battle of Trafalgar, although originally on the French side before being captured by 
the British. In using the ship, the Navy League hoped it would ensure that boys ‘realised 
their heritage’.77 Six units spent two weeks onboard Implacable instead of camp in 1933. 
The Navy attempted to impress upon Cadets that they would not be subjected ‘to hard fare’ 
and ‘stern discipline’, but to “holiday training”, although the journal noted that instruction, 
practical seamanship, and an insight into the work of the Royal Navy was all part of the 
‘holiday’ element and Cadets were still expected to take part in physical exercise, drill, as 
well as being subject to inspections by members of the Admiralty.78 Cadets also spent time 
on the Navy League’s sea training brig Lord Nelson while at camp and on the training ship 
HMS Ganges.79 While there is little trace of boys recording their experience of camp, one 
cannot assume that boys saw camp simply as a means to be trained in the service of state. 
Yet, at the very least, such statements give an insight into the intentions of the SCC’s leaders.  
The draw of the Royal Navy for members of the SCC was also no doubt in part due 
to the popularity of the Royal Navy’s annual ‘navy weeks’. Navy weeks were held at home 
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ports between 1927 and 1938 – originally with the aim of raising funds for naval charities, 
although the propagandistic value was quickly realised. Spectators had access to the 
dockyards, museums, and a number of modern battleships.80 Navy weeks were particularly 
popular and were ‘the most overtly propagandistic of the navy’s activities between the 
wars’.81 The Navy League was undoubtedly keen for the SCC to take part in navy week and 
arranged for units to visit dockyards, to be given tours of battleships and submarines, to be 
shown naval films, to hear performances from the band of the Royal Marines, and to visit 
HMS Victory and HMS Hood.82 SCC units frequently attended navy week events whilst at 
annual camp and the inclusion of tours onboard Victory and Implacable, in particular, were 
intended to remind Corps of the long-standing importance and tradition of the Royal Navy.  
As well taking part in a number of public and popular civic rituals, in both urban and 
rural settings, members of the SCC also engaged in naval pageantry.83 Pageantry – and the 
performance of war through pageantry – was a means through which many sections of the 
British public made sense of, and commemorated, the events of the First World War. 
Historical pageants provided a way to engage with the past prior to the First World War, yet 
pageantry in the aftermath of conflict could ‘affirm and propagandize political ideas about 
wars and the nations that fought them’, ‘showcase patriotism and imperialism’, and could 
convey ‘understandings of the nature of loss and sacrifice’.84 Of course, historical pageantry 
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was utilised by a range of different groups to convey contrasting messages, with the LNU 
and a collection of women’s organisations also taking part in public pageantry.85  
Themes of patriotism, empire, loss, sacrifice, and nation undoubtedly ran through 
SCC pageantry, although SCC pageantry was not merely confined to the First World War, 
with re-enactments of the Peninsular War also taking place.86 SCC pageantry also had 
imperial overtones, with one unit staging a ‘comic opera’ (titled “Out East”) which presented 
a story ‘deeply tinged with the activities of Arabs’, while another pageant was merely titled 
“Hong Kong”.87 Other plays, such as the “Sons of the Sea on Board Ship”, focused more on 
the training involved on board naval ships, including demonstrations of gymnastics, physical 
exercise, alongside band and drill displays.88 Music was an important element of SCC 
training – with drum, fife, and bugle bands being part of drill and displays – but music also 
formed an important part of SCC pageantry, with concerts of a nautical nature a common 
feature throughout the interwar years, often finishing with a rendition of the national anthem 
or ‘Land of Hope and Glory’.89 A number of these performances were fairly light-hearted; 
particularly popular among units was the singing of sea shanties in full naval costume.90 
 One, more conventional, play by the Hove and Brighton Unit of the SCC, titled “A 
Life on the Ocean Wave”, was ‘typical of the two phases of life in the Navy in peace and 
war’. In the play, which was set on board a mock British destroyer, the first act involved the 
crew going out to sea, enjoying themselves with ‘a carouse with a sing-song and jollity’, a 
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‘false alarm of “fire” on the boat’ which ‘resulted in a merry comedy scene’ with the 
concluding item being a rendition of ‘God bless the Prince of Wales’. In the second act, ‘an 
enemy battleship is sighted’. The destroyer ‘prepares for action; guns are manned and 
loaded, and a thrilling naval battle is enacted. Several of the guns’ crew “fall” in action, and 
the ambulance section administer first-aid to the wounded.’ Then, at the ceasefire, ‘the shade 
of Nelson appears, and the undaunted spirit of the Navy is typified by the brave death of Boy 
Jack Cornwell’.91 Such martial scenes – a hyper-realistic portrayal of conflict mixed with 
symbolism and allegory – were commonplace in SCC and wider public pageantry.92  
The SCC’s use of historical pageantry and recurring emphasis on duty, discipline, 
sacrifice, chivalry, hero-worship, war, and patriotism – particularly symbolised by the 
inclusion of Nelson and Cornwell – was an important means of conveying its message and 
contributing to the military culture of the interwar years.93 Figures like Nelson and Cornwell 
represented important moral paradigms for the Corps, while pageants ‘told aspects of the 
national story’ enabling the SCC to construct a visual depiction of nation, naval heritage, 
and tradition.94 Not only did the rhetoric of senior leaders of the SCC revolve around 
tradition, but the Corps’ activities – particularly pageants and its participation in Trafalgar 
Day – were firmly rooted in the past and an important site for the expression of navalism.  
The leadership of the SCC had a long naval history – representing high points of 
British national identity – from which to draw upon and appropriate in an attempt to shape 
the ideas and values of members of the Corps. Indeed, as Mark Freeman has pointed out, 
historical pageants needed to include ‘some sense of a “usable” past, one which could be 
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brought into the service of present day’.95 SCC pageantry undoubtedly attempted to 
underline the importance of the Royal Navy to the nation, with Nelson, in particular, 
representing a ‘usable past’. More broadly, the Navy League certainly saw the 
propagandistic value of pageantry and theatre.96 Military pageantry was, for the SCC, a 
highly politicised site, which could be utilised to transmit navalist principles and clearly the 
League saw theatre and pageantry as a means to counter sentiments of disarmament, 
collective security, and pacifism. However, it was not necessarily the most effective or 
popular format through which the SCC transmitted its message.  
Perhaps the greatest public platform for the SCC was its role in Trafalgar Day. On 
Trafalgar Day, the Corps would march to Nelson’s Column from the Navy League’s head 
office in London and, as part of its ‘patriotic endeavour’, lay a wreath.97 This was often 
followed by an inspection of the SCC units and boys would also attend church services on 
the day.98 While the SCC was present annually at Trafalgar Day commemorations, it was 
not until the late 1930s that they featured prominently. Following Lord Nuffield’s donation 
and the subsequent expansion of the SCC, over 2,000 Cadets, ‘the greatest assembly . . . that 
has yet been organised’, attended Trafalgar Day celebrations in 1938, with most units 
throughout the country being represented.99  
Addressing the assembled Cadets, Admiral Sir Edward Evans said the movement 
was one that should appeal to every boy in Britain. He told the Cadets that ‘it must never be 
forgotten that our Empire was founded on the sea, and that it still depended on its Navy and 
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its glorious Mercantile Marine’.100 Lloyd also linked the BBC’s coverage of Trafalgar Day 
in 1939 to the dictatorship countries, noting that it ‘let some people know they have not the 
monopoly of Youth Movements!’101 Such rhetoric did little to help the SCC disassociate 
itself from militarism. We have seen the ways in which the training and leadership of the 
Corps was undoubtedly militaristic, yet the Corps’ uniform and notions of masculinity also 
connected the Corps to the Royal Navy and nation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
100 ‘2,000 Cadets on Parade’, The Times, 24 October 1938, p. 11.  
101 ‘The Navy League Grand Council Meeting’, The Navy, July 1939, p. 238. 
Figure 3: ‘Admiral Sir Edward Evans Addressing the Parade of Navy League 
Sea Cadets in Trafalgar Square’, The Navy, December 1938, p. 380. 
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III. Uniform, Masculinity, and Militarism   
Uniform 
Introduced in 1748, the regulated uniform of the Royal Navy represented masculine – and 
highly idealised – virtues such as duty and sacrifice, highlighted rank and status, although 
could also construct an esprit de corps among its wearers, as well as signifying Britishness 
when worn abroad. It impacted upon public perceptions of the navy, with officers in 
particular being viewed as ‘guardians of the nation’ and of ‘national honour’.102 It was upon 
such themes that the leaders of the SCC relied on when stressing the symbolic significance 
of uniform to members of the Corps. Although, as Melanie Tebbutt has suggested, the First 
World War compromised expectations of ‘being a boy’, especially ‘in relation to militarism 
and the jingoistic expectations of youthful masculinity’, the leadership of the SCC still 
clearly attempted to inculcate values such as discipline, patriotism, and duty – themes that 
were commonplace in Edwardian youth movements.103  
While it is difficult to trace how members of the SCC felt about their uniform, which 
resembled that of the Royal Navy, the leadership of the SCC, and senior members of the 
Admiralty, constantly attempted to impress upon boys its symbolic value. Speaking to the 
Slough Unit of the SCC in March 1939, Sir Roger Keyes, Admiral of the Fleet, told boys  
they were really part of the Royal Navy: The uniforms you are wearing are those of the Service. 
That is indeed something that should be a source of pride to you all . . .  you are learning the 
meaning of good comradeship, the meaning of the service, the tradition of the sea, and that 
should greatly influence your lives.104 
 
102 Of course, as Amy Miller has highlighted, such uniform was often reappropriated according to fashion 
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Chatfield, inspecting the London Divisions of the SCC, similarly remarked that ‘by wearing 
the treasured uniform of the Royal Navy, you have formed a definite connection with that 
great Service’. He continued: ‘No uniform occupies a higher place or commands a greater 
respect and affection among your countrymen, and I know you are proud of wearing it’.105 
Uniform could convey, and attempt to entrench, a particular set of values and beliefs among 
the boys, as well as moral, behavioural, and social codes, as evidenced by both Chatfield’s 
and Keyes’s speeches.  
The leadership of the SCC attempted to imbue a sense of obligation within members 
that, when wearing the uniform of the Royal Navy, they were part of an important tradition 
and should act with dignity. Sir Sydney Freemantle, speaking in rather stern terms to the 
Wimbledon Unit of the SCC, declared:  
I want you to understand what the uniform means and what it stands for . . . it is not just rather 
a joke or a fancy dress, but an indication that you belong to a community. It is the uniform of 
sailors of the King. If you disgrace yourselves then you disgrace the whole of the British Navy. 
Everything you do reflects to the credit or discredit of the Navy.106  
One inspector of a SCC unit in Jersey even went as far as to tell boys that ‘anyone who 
brought discredit on the uniform was not fit to live’.107 As members of the SCC had 
propagandistic value for the Royal Navy, their conduct was clearly of the upmost 
importance.   
Of course, aside from the military associations with donning uniform, there was the 
potential for the SCC – as other youth organisations did – to attract criticism for wearing 
uniform, particularly in working class areas.108 Yet, boys were able to gain a sense of pride 
and dignity through wearing the uniform of the Royal Navy and this was understood by the 
 
105 ‘Naval Units and Sea Cadet Corps (London Division)’, The Navy, August 1921, p. 258. 
106 ‘NLSCC’, The Navy, May 1931, p. 154. 
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League’s Executive Committee.109 There was certainly a desire among working class boys 
to be part of the SCC and to wear the uniform of the Royal Navy. This is evident in many 
applications by units to the SCC committee for uniform grants, particularly from distressed 
areas.110 While Quintin Colville has argued that the expense of the Cadet Officer’s uniform 
was a deliberate attempt to ‘exclude the sons of the poorest sections of society’, the SCC 
provided provisions for Cadet uniforms, even if they did have reservations about certain 
types of boys.111 Indeed, the Navy League alluded, both publicly and privately, to wanting a 
particular type of boy to join the Corps. In a meeting of the SCC’s Executive Committee, 
T.G. Bedwell, Committee member, made it clear that: ‘it was very harmful that the Navy 
League should give the impression that the type of boy they wanted for the Sea Cadet Corps 
was one off the street . . . only the very best type of boy is wanted’.112  
While there was clearly a reluctance from the leadership of the SCC to recruit boys 
‘off the street’, once put in uniform, discipline and manliness was seen to follow. The Sphere 
described this process in the following terms: ‘In the course of a few months the average Sea 
Cadet is transformed from the raw material of unkempt urchin into a smart, alert vigorous 
young seaman’.113 While such transformations may have been somewhat exaggerated, life 
in the Corps clearly attempted to cultivate a change in attitude and behaviour among boys, 
with uniform playing an important part in this. As Commander J. Irving, who carried out 
 
109 Indeed, in considering whether it might change the SCC’s uniform to something simpler, the League’s 
Committee rejected the proposal unanimously, noting that ‘boys were intensely proud’ of being able to wear 
‘the correct naval uniform’. MSSC, NL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 4 December 1935, 
p. 7.  
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much work on behalf of the Corps, remarked ‘we dress the boy in the uniform of one of his 
Majesty’s seamen, which immediately makes the boy want to play the part of the man’.114  
 
 
Masculinity  
Recent work has shown the ways in which gender operated within a maritime context and 
uniform was undoubtedly important in the construction of masculinity.115 Demonstrating the 
importance of material culture in shaping naval, social, and national identity, across rank 
and class, Colville has argued that naval uniform was used to ‘articulate, propagate and 
defend the hegemony of a specific male identity’ and to construct ‘military masculinity’.116 
The leadership of the SCC similarly attempted to cultivate a ‘military masculinity’ amongst 
the Corps, with uniform being an important element in this.117 The Navy League wanted 
‘real men of real value’ and argued that the Corps was ‘the best means by which they may 
pave their way to manliness’.118 Senior members of the Admiralty, such as Admiral Sir 
William James, similarly thought the SCC represented ‘the young manhood of this 
country’.119 Of course, as the SCC recruited boys aged 12 to 18, masculinity and calls for 
‘real men of real value’ would have meant different things to boys depending on their age. 
Unfortunately, little trace of records relating to the age of Cadets exists. However, it is clear 
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based on photographs, newsreels, newspaper articles, and reports in The Navy that the age 
of Cadets varied; the Corps was a mixture of both boys and young men.120  
Discussion of the Corps in relation to masculinity, for both boys and young men, was 
often framed in reference to physical culture. Speaking at a Navy League dinner in 1937, 
Lloyd emphasised that ‘[a]ll through these years we maintained a standard of discipline for 
our boys, in the belief that you cannot build a man that is worth calling a man unless you 
train his will as well as his body’ also noting that ‘it is now being recognised that both 
training and discipline are essential to the making of what used to be called in Elizabethan 
days a “proper man”’.121 Such themes were evident in The Navy’s report of an incident in 
early December 1938, where two officers of the SCC were rescued by members of the Corps 
on the River Severn. The journal described the boys as ‘proper men’ and claimed the incident 
illustrated ‘the nerve and courage which are ideals of a Navy League Sea Cadet’.122 In 
attempting to make an example of such bravery, which other members of the SCC were 
expected to follow, Lloyd felt the League should institute a medal for gallantry.123  
Bravery and heroism were undoubtedly important in shaping masculinity among 
members of the Corps. As Graham Dawson has demonstrated, highly idealised narratives of 
soldier-heroes have been central in the construction of masculinity and the nation.124 He 
argues that the ‘soldier hero has proved to be one of the most durable and powerful forms of 
idealized masculinity within Western cultural traditions’, with military virtues such as 
‘aggression, strength, courage and endurance’ representing the most ‘natural and inherent 
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qualities of manhood, whose apogee is attainable only in battle’.125 The leadership of the 
SCC, as we have seen, attempted to use such hero models in the construction of naval identity 
– the League’s pronouncements replete with images of Nelson.126 Yet, if the soldier-hero 
was an important element in the Corps’ masculinity, how else can it be characterised?  
While Alison Light has portrayed a highly feminised and domesticated masculinity 
in response to the First World War in Britain, George Mosse has emphasised continuity, 
particularly in relation masculinity and militarism.127 Rather than a feminised or 
domesticated masculinity, the masculinity of the SCC perhaps resembled more closely 
Sonya Rose’s notion of ‘temperate masculinity’.128 The leadership of the SCC attempted to 
engender a masculinity which displayed fairly martial characteristics such as bravery and 
heroism, although such masculinity also had to avoid the hyper-masculinity of fascist youth 
organisations. For example, in his speech at the Mansion House meeting in 1937, Lloyd 
reflected on the efficiency of Germany and Italy in the training of youth, remarking: ‘When 
I go to those countries and see what marvellous things are being done for every boy and girl 
under dictatorship, I envy at least that fruit – if no other – of the dictatorships of Europe’. 
Lloyd spoke at length about the voluntary system for recruitment in Britain, but did 
not believe that we are going to exist as a people very long unless we can train and do for our 
boys and girls what other countries have done for theirs . . . if they are properly trained, I 
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promise you that you shall see growing up – without the “million bayonets” of Mussolini – as 
fine a body of young men as will make proud the people of this country.129  
 
Comparisons were often made with youth organisations in dictatorship countries. 
Indeed, The Navy noted that both Germany and Italy trained ‘all their youth from the very 
earliest years in the use of arms, in the perfection of bodily vigour, and in the pursuit of 
patriotic and exceedingly national ideals. We must do something of the same or go down to 
defeat in the event of war.’ The journal also insisted that the SCC ‘was not at all militaristic, 
in the sense particularly opposed by the pacifists’ although admitted ‘they do fit boys for the 
service of sea in peace or war’.130 By emphasising the voluntary nature of the Corps, the 
SCC attempted to avoid associations with continental and German forms of militarism – 
particularly conscription, national service, political repression, and state authoritarianism – 
something disliked by both liberals and many of those on the political right.131 Indeed, as 
Edgerton has noted, ‘military service was not seen as a civic duty but an unjust impost on 
youth, and a danger to freedom’.132 While conscription was seen as being antithetical to the 
British way in warfare, and to Britain as a liberal democracy, militarism and military service 
was certainly never far away from Navy League rhetoric surrounding the SCC and the 
organisation played an important role in the military – and indeed militaristic – culture of 
the interwar years.133 
 
 
Militarism  
The nature of the Corps’ training, the emphasis on discipline, drill, and marching, the 
military nature of the Corps’ leadership, the wearing of military uniform, and the strong links 
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with the Admiralty suggest that militarism was undoubtedly a feature of the SCC. However, 
Navy League pronouncements were careful to distinguish between militarism and navalism. 
For instance, as Arnold White declared in 1919, ‘[n]ever again should educated politicians 
and statesmen be allowed with impunity to confuse the public mind by telling them that Sea 
Power and Militarism are the same thing; or that British “Navalism” is a form of Prussian 
Militarism’.134 As Prussian militarism was invariably linked with a regimented and 
militarised civilian population – as well as the preponderance of the military class – the 
League attempted to distance itself from such a policy by framing it as a ‘foreign’ problem, 
an invariable feature of Victorian and Edwardian popular conceptions of Prussian 
militarism.135  
As the SCC had a rather modest public profile until the mid-1930s, it attracted little 
criticism, although some within the Treasury held the view that the SCC were part of a 
number of ‘vile bodies which inculcated militarism in the young’ and that ‘navalism is as 
reprehensible as militarism’.136 Letters to local newspapers also reveal opposition towards 
the Corps’ militaristic nature, with one letter considering the ‘Navy League boys blaring 
forth martial airs’ as constituting a ‘menace to peace’.137 The Corps’ leadership certainly 
always remained conscious of accusations of militarism. For example, the Navy League 
temporarily cancelled field gun competitions in 1930 as it felt it was ‘inadvisable to flaunt 
the militarism of the Sea Cadet Corps in the faces of the moderate pacifists’.138  
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The SCC aimed to inculcate in its members moral and physical strength, alongside 
notions of citizenship which revolved around service, duty, and naval patriotism. Providing 
education, ritualised and regimented physical training, and, most importantly, discipline, the 
Corps also attempted to combat juvenile delinquency and moral concerns over the youth of 
the nation.139 Of course, despite invariable, and public, protestations to the contrary, military 
service and militarism more broadly were constant features of debates surrounding the true 
purpose of the SCC. While the leadership stressed that the Corps was ‘not a military corps 
 
139 On juvenile delinquency in the period, see Stephen Humphries, Hooligans or Rebels? An Oral History of 
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Figure 4: ‘Kingston (T.S. “Steadfast”) S.C.C.’, The 
Navy, December 1928, p. 356.  
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at all; it is merely to teach good fellowship, good comradeship, and discipline’, such 
assertions did not reflect the true nature and organisation of the SCC.140  
The training of the SCC focused on physical and military efficiency and on preparing 
boys to contribute to national defence, even if the statements of the Corps’ leadership 
preferred to emphasise the character-building nature of such training. Indeed, the emphasis 
on the quality of the boys points to the importance of military efficiency and training for 
specific military purposes, with units often being rejected for low standards of fitness and 
training.141 Of course, the mere fact that units had to be inspected by the Admiralty before 
they were able to be formed suggests that military efficiency was an important element of 
the SCC.  
Ina Zweiniger-Bargielowska has demonstrated the importance of physical culture in 
linking ‘manliness, physical fitness, and patriotism in interwar Britain’, areas which are more 
commonly associated with the dictatorship countries, yet a similar emphasis on physical 
culture can be traced through the SCC.142 Debates surrounding the physical culture of the 
Corps were often imbued with military terminology. For example, speaking at the East 
Cowes Unit, Jellicoe told his audience that ‘if all boys in the country had the same 
opportunities for improving their physique, that C3 business would vanish and everyone 
would in time be A1’.143  
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The leadership of the SCC framed debates on the purpose of the Corps around 
national efficiency and combatting juvenile delinquency. In linking the Corps to increasing 
anxieties surrounding the physical condition of the nation, the Corps stressed that physical 
health and physical training could also improve the moral health of British youth. Reflecting 
on a 1937 War Office statement that two out of every three men were rejected for service 
because they were not physically fit, Lord Lloyd noted the corresponding increase in crime 
rates among boy offenders. While Lloyd attributed this to a lack of physical training among 
British youth, he also noted that ‘there has been a lack of training of wills . . .  a lack of 
discipline, and that alone justifies the Navy League Sea Cadet Corps in having made, almost 
alone among the youth organisations of this country, a main point of discipline as well as of 
physical training’.144 There was undoubtedly genuine concern among the leadership of the 
SCC to improve both the moral and physical health of members of the nation’s youth and 
such statements reflect a widespread concern about the state of youth in comparison to 
dictatorship countries.  
Of course, the official line of the leadership of the SCC was that the Corps was not 
training boys for war but in citizenship, yet concerns about the physical and moral fitness of 
the nation was frequently employed in the rhetoric of senior Navy League figures and 
Admiralty. We have already seen the way that the SCC was linked to the Royal Navy on 
Trafalgar Day in both pronouncement and practice, but such statements were widespread in 
the discourse of the Corps. Speaking at Brighton Unit of the SCC, Earl Howe, deputy-
president of the Navy League, remarked that many people thought that by forming the SCC 
the ‘Navy League was doing all it could to encourage militarism. But surely everybody in 
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this country must feel it a duty to try and fit himself to play a useful part if ever the need 
should arise. That was the finest ambition that as an Englishman one could have.’145  
 
 
IV. The Mobilisation of the SCC 
As international tension increased in the late 1930s, particularly following the Munich 
Conference, the SCC’s Executive Committee accordingly turned its focus to the role of the 
Corps in the event of war. Shortly after the Conference, Bishop reported that various units 
of the SCC had been in touch with him enquiring how their services could be best utilised in 
the event of war. Bishop subsequently visited the Naval Recruiting Officer and agreed with 
the Assistant Director of Naval Recruiting that a roster of Cadets of 17 and over would be 
‘made available to the Admiralty who would be glad to accept such cadets for the Sea 
Service’.146 Lord Lloyd also arranged for Cadets the right to do their compulsory service in 
the Royal Navy. Addressing the League’s Grand Council Meeting in 1939, Lloyd felt that 
there had been ‘anxiety amongst our Cadets, lest, after having patriotically given up their 
time in years previous to the compulsory service, they should suddenly be used for other 
military purposes’. On the Admiralty’s agreement with the Navy League, Lloyd noted that 
‘[t]hus, the Sea Cadet Corps besides supplying a regular stream of recruits for the Sea 
Services, provides, for the service of the Crown, a body of partially trained young men, 
available in any emergency’.147  
There was undoubtedly enthusiasm amongst members of the SCC to serve the 
country during periods of emergency. For example, following Munich, Lloyd described ‘a 
stampede of all our boys who wanted to go and serve the country anywhere during the 
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crisis’.148 The Navy also outlined the work of the Corps throughout the Munich Crisis, noting 
that a large proportion of older members of the SCC ‘at once volunteered for active service’. 
Many local units volunteered their service for ARP activities and members of the Corps were 
given jobs as messengers under the guidance of ARP wardens. It certainly seems to be the 
case that, as Rosie Kennedy has argued, while uniformed youth organisations ‘did not always 
interpret their role in quite the same way as their leadership intended’, they often wanted to 
play more of an active role in war, taking on even more responsibility than they had.149  
The expansion and development of the SCC were also principal themes in the Navy 
League’s commemoration of Trafalgar Day in the prelude to the Second World War, 
particularly following Munich. Duty, loyalty, and service were key themes in both public 
and private speeches, giving little doubt that the SCC would be expected to contribute to the 
defence of the nation if required. An advert published in The Times on Trafalgar Day in 1938 
stressed that the ‘recent [Munich] crisis has made clear the gaps in our defences. These must 
be filled . . . it is the purpose of the Navy League Sea Cadet Corps to equip boys for these 
vital Services; to train them to uphold the age-old traditions of loyalty and duty.’ ‘The Sea 
Cadet Corps’, the article continued, ‘is moulding Britain’s sons to be Britain’s strength and 
safety’.150 On Trafalgar Day in 1939, Lord Lloyd sent a letter to The Times, writing that 
‘each single member of the Sea Cadet Corps is fully aware of the responsibility which rests 
now upon him as an individual and upon the corps as a unit for proving that the traditions of 
the British Navy stand as firm to-day as when Nelson won his great victories’.151  
Following the Mansion House meeting in 1937 – and in particular Nuffield’s 
donation – the Corps increased both its scope and scale. Indeed, in 1938, units more than 
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doubled from 30 to 70, with units spread throughout the country. While over half of the SCC 
units in 1931 were based in London, these units represented only a quarter of total units by 
mid-1938 with that ‘proportion diminishing as the movement grows’.152 By June 1939, this 
figure had reached 100 units. In fact, the rate of expansion was so high that the Navy League 
decided to limit expansion of the Corps from June onwards in order to alleviate some of the 
administrative and organisational pressure.153 Such expansion gained high praise from 
members of the Admiralty, with Admiral Sir Roger Backhouse assuring the Navy League 
‘that the Admiralty view its activity with the greatest sympathy and will do everything they 
can to help it’ and that the SCC ‘is worthy of the support of the whole country’.154 Reflecting 
on the expansion of the Corps in 1938, The Navy suggested that while this gave the country 
‘young citizens physically and spiritually fit in times of peace’, it also provided ‘partly 
trained man power in war’.155 Yet, while the Corps was undoubtedly important in recruiting 
cadets for the Royal Navy, it had a number of other, more unofficial, recruiters.  
Interest in the SCC and the Royal Navy more broadly was also fueled by popular 
juvenile fiction, pulp fiction, magazines, and films. Despite the prominence of aviation and 
the aviator in interwar fiction, the Royal Navy still occupied an important place in the 
‘pleasure culture’ surrounding war.156 Fictional depictions of the navy were important in 
shaping, and indeed reflecting, the way that people thought about and understood the Royal 
Navy. As Michael Paris has argued, popular culture promotes a ‘martial spirit, elevates the 
warrior to heroic status and romanticizes war’.157 The existence of such a pleasure culture of 
war, in Paris’s view, created an image of Britain as an ‘aggressively militant warrior 
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nation’.158 While literature may not have been the sole – or even most effective – vector of 
creating an enthusiasm for the Royal Navy during the interwar years, there was still an 
interest surrounding fictional depictions of life in the navy. Particularly popular were C.S. 
Forester’s novels centered around the character Horatio Hornblower. While the novels were 
set during the Napoleonic Wars, they were able to evoke ‘feelings of pride in the sailors of 
the twentieth century’.159 
Hazel Sheeky Bird has similarly highlighted the ways in which the Royal Navy 
remained an important part of writing for children throughout the interwar years. She 
demonstrates how popular novels such as Percy Westerman’s The Keepers of the Narrow 
Seas (1931) – originally published as The Fritz Straffers in 1918 – utilised the Nelson 
tradition to ‘encourage boys to take up service’ and emphasised the importance of Nelsonian 
qualities.160 Bird has also highlighted how the Nelson tradition was able to permeate naval 
cadet stories such as John Irving’s ‘Dick Valliant’ novels.161 Such literature was undoubtedly 
important in shaping young naval minds, yet so too was cinema.  
Cinema, Victoria Carolan argues, was able to construct, transmit, and represent the 
sea as a ‘symbol of national identity and marker of national characteristics’ in the interwar 
years, although this relationship had to be continually reinforced.162 Such films often, much 
like literature, evoked Nelsonian traditions and other hero models such as Drake, with more 
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films that focused on either Nelson or Drake produced between 1912 and 1935 than at any 
other time previously.163 The ‘cult of the navy’, as Carolan shows, undoubtedly manifested 
itself in the broad proliferation of naval and maritime films in the Edwardian and interwar 
periods. There were also specific films created for the SCC, such as Youth at the Helm (1939) 
which depicted the life and training of the Sea Cadet and the Ministry of Information film 
Sea Cadets or Nursery of the Navy (1941).164 SCC activities also featured in newsreels in 
the interwar years, particularly its celebration of Trafalgar Day.165  
Upon the outbreak of Second World War, the SCC had 9,000 Cadets in over 100 
units, ‘in training for the service of their country on the high seas’.166 However, considerable 
difficulty was faced bringing the SCC onto a ‘war basis’. Large numbers of officers and 
instructors were called into service, drill halls were ‘commandeered’ by military authorities, 
while evacuations and blackouts caused units difficulty. While several units closed, most 
carried on and continued to hold meetings and training exercises. Upon the outbreak of war, 
‘many thousands’ of ex-Cadets were already serving in the Royal Navy or Merchant Service, 
while many who were of age within the Corps volunteered. SCC units in Canada, Australia, 
New Zealand, South Africa, and Rhodesia were also serving in the Imperial and in the 
Dominion Naval and Mercantile Marine Services.167 The SCC was also providing ‘intensive 
training’ in visual signalling to 1,000 Cadets, to ready them to enter the Royal Navy as 
trained signalmen, while the younger Cadets were giving ‘splendid voluntary service’ as 
messengers and telephone operators at Naval bases on coasts. Cadets were also manning 
signal stations, acting as messengers to the fire service, filling sandbags, barricading 
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windows, acting as ARP messengers, digging trenches, guarding bridges and store depots, 
and ‘doing all kinds of useful work in support of Civil Defence Services’.168 Such work was 
deemed to be of national importance, with the League receiving a letter from Winston 
Churchill stating: ‘We (The Admiralty) are deeply sensible of the work undertaken by the 
Navy League. It is our hope that this work can continue.’169 In 1942, the Admiralty, 
recognising the value of the Corps, took responsibility for the organisation. King George VI 
became the Admiral of the organisation and the Admiralty assumed responsibility for its 
training, although the Navy League continued its administration. By the time the Admiralty 
had taken over the Corps, its membership had expanded to 400 units and 50,000 Cadets.170    
 
 
V. Conclusion  
Writing in 1940, George Orwell reflected that  
Most of the English middle class are trained for war from the cradle onwards, not technically 
but morally. The earliest political slogan I can remember is ‘We want eight (eight 
dreadnoughts) and we won’t wait’. At seven years old I was a member of the Navy League 
and wore a sailor suit with ‘H.M.S. Invincible’ on my cap . . . On and off, I have been toting a 
rifle ever since I was ten, in preparation not only for war, but for a particular kind of war.171 
 
By the outbreak of the Second World War, the SCC embodied a form of navalism which 
went beyond the promotion of high naval armaments, but instead represented, for the Navy 
League at least, an expression of national might and prestige. Trained both morally and 
technically, the SCC formed an important part of the ‘patriotic public sphere’ in the interwar 
years and of military and martial spectacle, particularly in national ceremonies, civic and 
military ritual, and commemoration. The Corps employed pageantry and theatre to 
disseminate its message and enjoyed popularity in urban and rural areas. While the efficiency 
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of units varied, most had a good level of physical and military efficiency and a measure of 
training in seamanship. The Corps represented the Navy League’s most direct contribution 
to the military preparedness of the state and to the militarisation of society; boys were, as 
Orwell reflected, being prepared not only for war, but for a ‘particular kind of war’. The 
leadership of the Corps was keen to emphasise the defensive and passive elements of the 
SCC and the centrality of citizenship to the movement, yet it was undoubtedly militaristic. 
Naval heritage and tradition were important to the Corps and while the SCC was not able to 
draw on the modernity of movements like the ADCC, the movement still had a broad appeal, 
appearing to transcend class. The SCC occupied a more important place in the youth culture 
of the interwar years than has hitherto been realised and, as this chapter has shown, offers 
an important insight into debates about physical culture, masculinity, militarism, and leisure 
in the interwar years. While the SCC may not have achieved a truly constant supply of sea-
minded young men, imbued with a Nelsonian tradition of patriotism, service, and self-
sacrifice, clearly many young boys wanted to contribute to the command of the seas, to take 
the place of those who had gone before.  
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Chapter 5: ‘The Future Defenders of Our Country’s Heritage’: The Air 
League, the Air Defence Cadet Corps, and the Militarisation of British 
Youth  
In a letter to the ADCC’s Executive Committee in October 1942, Lord Beaverbrook, the 
press baron who held various positions in Winston Churchill’s government during the 
Second World War, enthused that ‘the members of your cadet corps are the future defenders 
of our country’s heritage’. He continued: ‘they give the most splendid demonstration of the 
spirit of the youth of this country today. A spirit of willing and eager self-sacrifice deep 
rooted in the love of their country.’1 Formed in a period of high international tension, the 
ADCC represented a vehicle through which the Air League was able to train the airminded 
youth of Britain to be ready, able, and willing to defend the nation. The Corps was used to 
extoll the virtues of airpower to both state and civil society alike and to legitimate the 
League’s aims and objectives. In many ways, the ADCC shared similarities with the aims, 
function, and activities of the SCC. Yet, while the SCC was linked to naval heritage and 
tradition, the ADCC was associated with modernity, technology, and the promise of flight.  
The Corps was an ‘association of all those who have the welfare of their country in 
the air at heart’ and – by the outbreak of the Second World War – consisted of 17,000 
uniformed, disciplined, patriotic, and knowledgeable boys aged 14 to 18.2 The ADCC’s 
ethos – much of which revolved around service, discipline, patriotism, and duty – linked 
airmindedness, citizenship, and a militarised masculinity among boys. While the Air League 
emphasised the defensive and passive element of the Corps from its inception, there is little 
doubt that the League hoped members of the Corps would, like the SCC, make a direct 
military contribution to the nation. If, as John Springhall remarks, youth organisations 
‘functioned as extremely sensitive barometers of shifts in public and governmental attitudes 
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towards the military in British society’, then the ADCC’s activities – and indeed the SCC’s 
– suggest that public opinion was at least reasonably favourable to a Corps designed to 
protect the nation.3 Fear of future conflict was clearly conducive for militaristic organisations 
such as the ADCC, the SCC, and militarism more broadly. However, despite Beaverbrook’s 
praise and, despite the active role many ADCC members played in the Second World War, 
the Corps has received little scholarly attention.  
Largely neglected by historians of youth and air forces alike, this chapter will 
examine the ADCC, particularly in relation to militarism and mobilisation. It is concerned 
with the creation, organisation, nature, ideas, and values of the Corps. Moving beyond more 
conventional paradigms of operational, strategic, and institutional histories of air forces, this 
chapter will explore the cultural, symbolic, visual, material, and performative aspects of 
aviation, through the lens of the ADCC. Like the SCC, the ADCC not only represented, but 
indeed promoted, popular forms of militarism and military culture that had resonance 
throughout large sections of British society. For all the Air League’s various attempts to 
create a non-militarised airmindedness among Britain’s youth, it was the ADCC that 
represented the League’s most successful endeavour to interest young males in all things 
associated with aviation. This chapter will also explore the lived experience of ADCC 
members – drawing on written accounts and oral testimonies – the experience of life in the 
Corps, the interaction with aeroplanes, aerodromes, and military equipment and how boys 
perceived the RAF and the approach of war.  
This chapter will outline the ADCC’s origins, organisation, and objectives. It will 
then highlight how the Corps was financed and how a mutually beneficial relationship 
existed between the Air League and Air Ministry surrounding the Corps. The chapter will 
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then move on to the question of the ADCC and militarism, before looking at the ways in 
which the Corps was involved in recruitment for the Air Ministry and the function of the 
Corps at the outbreak of the Second World War. First, however, an account of the Air 
League’s broader activities surrounding youth will be provided as a necessary precursor to 
an examination of the ADCC. 
 
 
I. ‘Air Thrills’ for Schoolboys: The Air League, Aviation, and the 
Education of British Youth  
The creation of Boys’ and Girls’ Aerial League (later the Young Aerial League (YAL)), 
under the auspices of the WAL in 1909, represented one of the first organisations with the 
sole purpose of fostering an interest in aviation among British youth.4 While the WAL or 
Air League do not seem to have provided an extensive programme of activities for the YAL, 
lectures were part of the organisation’s events, with speakers stressing ‘the need for patriotic 
effort in urging the Government to spend more money on aeroplanes’.5  
YAL activities were closely connected with the Boy Scouts. For instance, the Air 
League invited Scouts to flying meets, races, and persuaded the Association to include 
articles on aviators and their exploits in its publications.6 Scouts were clearly interested in 
aviation from an early stage, with a Boy Scout Balloon Club being formed in 1910 (after the 
sanction and approval of Robert Baden-Powell, founder of the Boy Scouts, and Massy).7 
The YAL also arranged aeronautical courses for the Scouts, with those who passed receiving 
a certificate.8 Scouts were involved in Air League experiments, running and signalling in 
 
4 ‘Young Aerial League of the British Empire’, The Aerial Observer, 1 October 1910, p. 7. 
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connection with balloons and aeroplanes (for which they received a medal) and were also 
permitted to attend YAL lectures free of charge.9 The organisation’s journal, The Scout, also 
featured stories on the ‘trials and adventures’ of young aviators and included columns 
providing Scouts with technical information on aeroplanes.10 In seeking to formalise links 
further, the WAL placed a scheme before the Boy Scouts which involved the formation of a 
special branch of the YAL to be called the Boy Scouts’ Division. This would provide Scouts 
with basic aeronautical training, enabling boys to ‘identify machines, estimate their height, 
speed, direction of flight . . . thus enabling them to be of immediate service to their country 
in case of invasion’.11  
While the YAL represented an important contribution to the shaping of young aerial 
minds in an associational sphere, the League attempted to consolidate these links by 
initiating educational schemes in schools and universities, particularly following the First 
World War. The Air League contacted headmasters at many public schools proposing to 
deliver lectures on aeronautical subjects. The scheme involved sending an aeroplane, along 
with a ‘pilot-lecturer’, on a tour of public schools.12 Among the schools contacted were Eton, 
Harrow, Westminster, Haileybury, Winchester, Rugby, Wellington, Cheltenham, and 
Marlborough, with most schools accepting.13 Although the scheme had the support of many 
within the aviation community, it was unable to secure the backing of the Air Ministry and 
Air Council. While the Air Council welcomed the proposal and was ‘in entire sympathy’ 
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with the scheme, from both the point of view of recruitment and for ‘developing a knowledge 
of the air among the younger generation’, it was unwilling to publicly support it, citing the 
aversion of headmasters to ‘providing the facilities’ which the Air League’s lectures 
required.14  
Despite its endeavours, the League struggled to gain the widespread support of 
education authorities. When the LCC chose not to adopt Facts about Flying and the Civil 
Uses of Aviation, which was circulated widely in schools and popular among Scouts (with 
over 4,000 copies being ordered in 1925 alone), the League thought this rang of a ‘distorted 
mind . . . obsessed by the principles of pacifism’.15 In outlining the importance of Facts 
about Flying, the Air League wrote that the ‘plastic and receptive mind of the younger 
generation . . . is a fertile and virgin soil, in which the germs of the great principles which 
dominate aeronautics should be planted forthwith’.16  
Clearly, the publication was not devoid of ideological content, with one section 
highlighting the importance of the development of aircraft as ‘an imperial necessity’, 
declaring that only through the air could Britain ‘retain its supremacy’.17 Such descriptions 
meant that the LCC was not the only source of opposition to the publication. For example, 
the Daily Herald wrote that although ‘it may be unfair to regard the Air League as already 
the successor of the Navy League, which used to preach the virtues of steel and gunpowder 
to young Britain’, the ‘real essence of militarism’ was ‘latent’ within the pamphlet.18 
 
14 AL, AL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 18 March 1926, pp. 2–3.  
15 AL, AL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 23 April 1925, p. 3; ‘London County Council 
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However, the publication did have some support, with The Times stressing that it was 
‘essential that a steady interest in and realization of the importance of flying should be 
maintained and developed in the nation’, noting that the book went some way to preparing 
the ‘ground for future years’.19  
In attempting to increase its influence in educational spheres, the League approached 
the two University Air Squadrons – Oxford and Cambridge (both formed in 1925) – in an 
attempt to interest them in the League, receiving letters from Oxford undergraduates 
supporting its policy. Encouraged by the letters, the League endeavoured to contact the 
University’s colleges for support, although this appears to have met with little success.20 The 
University Air Squadrons provided flying training, however, as John James has stressed, 
these Squadrons were not purely recruitment agencies for the RAF. Instead, they also 
attempted to instil within future members of the establishment an understanding of the RAF 
and it seems likely the Air League understood the importance of University Air Squadrons 
in these terms.21  
Unperturbed by wavering support from both schools and universities, the League 
even considered establishing a public school for aviation, along the lines of Wellington 
College for the army, which would have ‘an aviation bias, the same way that Wellington had 
a military bias’.22 Unofficially, Chamier had the support of the Air Council who initially 
‘thought it excellent’. However, at a later Air League meeting, Chamier revealed that the Air 
Ministry was not, after all, ‘favourably inclined to the idea’ and so it was abandoned.23  
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Like the SCC and the Navy League, the Air League’s activities in schools clearly 
met with some opposition. The Air League therefore attempted to improve links with other 
youth organisations, particularly, as we have seen, the Boy Scouts. Many within the Boy 
Scouts certainly saw the value of such cooperation with the Air League. For example, Lt. 
Colonel Drage, chief organiser for the Boy Scouts in Wales, was anxious that Scouts within 
his district should receive elementary education with regard to the air and requested a model 
aeroplane from the Air League. Drage also requested that the Air League might make 
arrangements for an aviator to fly to a Scout camp and provide lectures.24  
 Alongside attempts to interest the Scout movement in aviation, the League took part 
in a number of public exhibitions. The League was present at the Boys’ Own Exhibition, 
which took place in London in 1926, and was also present at the Aero Exhibition at Olympia 
in 1929, setting an essay prize for children (the winning entry was published in Air, titled 
‘The Importance of Aircraft in Imperial Communications’).25 The League, like the Navy 
League, was also present at the Schoolboys’ Exhibition from 1929 to 1930.26 It attended the 
same exhibition in 1934, with its section reportedly ‘arous[ing] the most interest’ of all those 
present.27 However, despite such activities, Air Review still bemoaned that ‘younger folk are 
ill-served’ to gain experience of flight. The article continued, ‘[b]urning with an enthusiasm 
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foreign to his elders, the boy who has outgrown his aeroplane toys asks nothing but to be 
allowed to fly’.28 To combat this, the Air League established the Young Pilots’ Fund in 1935.   
The idea for a Young Pilots’ Fund arose out of a meeting in October 1934. The 
scheme was designed to subsidise half the costs for those who wanted to take their ‘A’ 
license at a flying club and gain flying experience.29 In attempting to acquire money for the 
Fund, the League released an appeal in December that year which stressed that Britain’s 
‘safety and progress demand that the rising generation should fly. They want to fly but cannot 
afford the cost . . . Other Governments are helping the new generation into the air; our young 
men must be helped too.’30 Air Review stressed that it was not a ‘militaristic scheme’, 
although admitted ‘no one can deny that the ability to fly will be an asset to the country if 
war should be forced upon us’. Chamier also framed the scheme in terms of nation and 
empire, emphasising it could ‘set another young Englishman to start his path of mastery of 
the air, which means so much to us as a nation and an Empire’.31  
The scheme had the support of a number of notable figures, including the Prince of 
Wales, Lord Londonderry, Lord Wakefield, and Sir Philip Sassoon, Under-Secretary of State 
for Air from 1924 to 1929 and again from 1931 to 1937, all of whom donated to the Fund.32 
The response was high, with the League receiving hundreds of applications to the scheme 
by January 1935, leading Flight to declare that ‘aviation has captured the imagination of 
youth’.33 The League evidently saw the country’s security as being linked to the creation of 
an airminded youth, aiming to put ‘a pilot into every village and every street’.34 In a letter to 
 
28 ‘Youth and Aviation’, Air Review, May 1934, p. 36.  
29 From May 1919, the Air Ministry began granting ‘A’ licenses to private flyers and ‘B’ licences to commercial 
pilots.  
30 AL, AL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 4 December 1934, p. 1. 
31 ‘What of 1935’, Air Review, January 1935, p. 12; ‘The Air League to its Members’, Air Review, January 
1935, p. 17.  
32 AL, AL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 26 March 1935, p. 2.  
33 AL, AL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 25 January 1935, p. 1; ‘Youth’s Opportunity’, 
Flight, 10 January 1935, p. 29. 
34 AL, AL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 4 December 1934, p. 1.  
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Moore-Brabazon, then president of the RAeS, the League requested his support, noting that 
‘each of these young pilots will form a focus of enthusiasm among his relatives and friends 
so that we shall get that support for aviation and recognition of its possibilities which is as 
essential for our prosperity as for our safety’.35 
In attempting to make flying more accessible, the Air League also endeavoured to 
popularise the Pou-du-Ciel (‘Flying Flea’), a French home-made light aircraft designed by 
the French radio engineer, Henri Mignet.36 The League translated and published Mignet’s 
book, The Flying Flea: How to Build and Fly It, a guide for building and flying the aircraft. 
6,000 copies were sold within months and the League eventually formed a ‘Pou Club’ based 
on this enthusiasm.37 Reflecting on the significance of Mignet’s work, Chamier wrote that 
he ‘has captivated a youthful generation; he has fired them with his own enthusiasm, and he 
has proved that the romance and the spirit which inspired the early pioneers of flight are still 
with us’.38 Sutherland similarly hoped that the Flea could ensure that young people could 
‘follow in the footsteps of the pioneers of aviation’.39 
Alongside the ‘Pou Movement’ and the Young Pilots’ Fund, the Air League also had 
its own junior section, with a membership of 4,000 by mid-1936, however little of the 
League’s work was directly tailored towards its junior section until the ADCC’s creation.40 
Indeed, even Chamier admitted that members got ‘little or nothing’ in return for their 
membership subscription.41 The League was far more active in its involvement in modelling 
 
35 RAF Museum, Lord Brabazon of Tara Papers, AC 71/3, Letter from J.A. Chamier to Moore-Brabazon, 2 
January 1935, p. 1.  
36 After building its own Flea, the League arranged for Mignet to tour England, funded by the Daily Express, 
and fly its own Flea. The League’s Flea was subsequently displayed at Selfridges on Oxford Street, London, 
for a number of weeks. ‘The Air League to its Members’, Air Review, September 1935, pp. 14–15. 
37 Henry Mignet, The Flying Flea: How to Build and Fly It (London: Sampson Low, Martson & Co., Ltd, 
1935); AL, AL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 26 March 1935, p. 2.  
38 Mignet, Flying Flea, p. vi.  
39 AL, AL Minute Book, Annual General Meeting, 10 July 1935, p. 2.   
40 AL, AL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 7 April 1936, p. 3.  
41 ‘Air League Junior Leaguer’s Scheme’, Air Review, November 1934, p. 23.  
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clubs, involving the Skybird League (created to oversee the growth of modelling clubs) in 
its junior section from October 1935 as well as publishing news and information on the 
Skybird League from December 1937 in Air Review.42 By February 1935, over 300 Skybird 
clubs had been formed around the country in an attempt to encourage airmindedness.43 The 
League published its own journal, The Skybird, which later became Aero Modeller and, 
although the Skybird League was far less militaristic than the ADCC, its journal often 
featured articles on the RAF and on aviation as a career.44 The Air League certainly valued 
the propagandistic elements of modelling, viewing it as a ‘highly educative means of 
interesting the people of this country’ and to be of ‘national importance, insomuch as it helps 
to spread an “air sense” . . .  and is very often the means, especially in the younger generation, 
of producing the potential airman of the future’.45 However, it was not until the ADCC that 
the Air League was able to appeal to British youth on truly a nationwide scale.  
 
 
II. The Origins, Organisation, and Objectives of the ADCC 
Chamier initially broached the idea of an Air Cadet Corps with Sir Donald Banks, Permanent 
Secretary of the Air Ministry, in November 1937. Chamier wrote that  
For some time past we have been anxious to do some more for the youngsters and our ideas 
have gradually hardened into an Air Cadet Corps on the lines of the Sea Cadets or Sea Scouts. 
Based, in the first instance, at all towns where there are aerodromes, we feel that a Corps of 
this kind would be immensely popular.46 
 
42 ‘The Editor Talks’, The Skybird, October 1935, p. 1; ‘The Skybird League’, Air Review, December 1937, p. 
52.   
43 ‘The Editor Talks’, The Skybird, February 1935, p. 1.  
44 See, for example, ‘Aviation as a Career’, The Skybird, Summer 1934, pp. 52–53; ‘Vacancies in the Royal 
Air Force’, The Skybird, Autumn 1934, p. 52. 
45 ‘Model Flying’, Air League Bulletin, July 1926, p. 16.  
46 TNA AIR 2/2716, Proposed Formation of Air Cadets Corps and Boy Scouts Air Patrols, Letter from J.A. 
Chamier to Sir Donald Banks, 19 November 1937, p. 1.   
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The idea was ‘to give the boys a uniform and discipline’ and ‘to instruct them in air matters’. 
Chamier felt that ‘volunteer cadets of this kind . . . would be an immense value to the 
country’.47  
In order to gain support for the Corps, the Duke of Sutherland arranged a luncheon 
party in December 1937. Guests welcomed the idea of an Air Cadet Corps, but felt that ‘the 
scale and scope of the scheme placed before them [was] too small’. The League consequently 
changed the name of the Corps to the ADCC and widened its scope.48 Following this 
meeting, Chamier wrote to Banks again to outline the new scheme: ‘we could really aim for 
numbers of youngsters definitely trained to take an active part should war break out as well 
as to have a leaning towards the R.A.F. when they grew beyond the cadet stage’.49 Chamier 
felt the Air League must ‘launch out largely while people are scared and while the future is 
obscured’.50 Chamier received no official response initially, although he had been assured 
that the scheme met with the Air Ministry’s approval.51 Indeed, Sir Cyril Newall’s letter to 
Chamier in December 1937, which stressed that ‘the Air Cadets scheme has our whole-
hearted approval’, was clearly enough for the Air League to proceed.52  
In January 1938, Chamier set out the ADCC’s aims and objectives to the Air Ministry 
in far clearer terms: ‘The main object of this organisation is to bring large numbers of young 
men between the ages of fourteen and eighteen who would otherwise be deprived of the 
opportunity into direct contact with aviation’. In doing so, these young men would ‘become 
to a great extent a reservoir of man-power for both Service and Civil aviation’. The ADCC 
was also envisioned as being important in civil defence measures and ARP services: ‘it is 
 
47 Ibid. 
48 AL, AL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 3 February 1938, p. 1.  
49 TNA AIR 2/2716, Chamier to Banks, 21 December 1937, p. 1. 
50 Ibid., p. 2.  
51 AL, AL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 13 December 1937, p. 1.  
52 TNA AIR 2/2716, Letter from Newall to Chamier, 20 December 1937, p. 1. 
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held that large bodies of Cadets of this kind will be a channel of communication of air raid 
precautions to the populace and will prove, in the event of war, of value not only to R.A.F. 
Stations . . . but to the officials of the Air Raids Precautions organisation’. More generally, 
the ADCC would be trained in ‘discipline and patriotism’.53 The proposal was to form two 
hundred units, of one hundred Cadets each, making 20,000 Cadets in total, which Chamier 
stressed would make ‘a definite contribution to the security of the country’.54  
Following Chamier’s letter in January, the ADCC gained the backing of many senior 
members of the Air Ministry and military theorists. Lord Swinton, Secretary of State for Air 
from 1935 to 1938, argued that the Corps: ‘in helping to bring considerable numbers of 
young men into touch with aviation and stimulating interest in aeronautical and allied 
subjects, will fill a real need’.55 Chamier, who felt the scheme was ‘five years overdue’, even 
suggested to the League’s Executive Committee that it had the ‘full support of the Air 
Ministry’ and that ‘certain officials . . . were anxious to see an extension of its scope in order 
that practical flying might be included in the training syllabus’.56 Earl Winterton, Chancellor 
of the Duchy of Lancaster and Deputy Secretary of State for Air from March 1938, publicly 
stated that ‘the Air Ministry is in full sympathy with the project and had undertaken to give 
the corps all practicable assistance’.57  
The Corps likewise had the support of L.E.O. Charlton. Writing in the Army 
League’s journal, Rising Strength, Charlton thought the Corps was ‘destined to sweep the 
country in an access of belief that no boy or youth can do better in the sense of service than 
clamour for inclusion in the Air Defence Cadet Corps’.58 Londonderry also attempted to 
 
53 TNA AIR 2/2716, Letter from Chamier to the Air Ministry, 7 January 1938, p. 1.  
54 Ibid., p. 3.  
55 AL, ADCC Minute Book, Report of a Meeting to Consider a Proposed Scheme for an Air Defence Cadet 
Corps on a National Basis, 7 April 1938, p. 1.  
56 Ibid., pp. 1–2.   
57 Commons Sitting, Air Cadet Corps, HC Deb 13 April 1938 vol 334 cc1124-5. 
58 ‘Towards Airmindedness’, Rising Strength, May 1938, p. 168. 
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accrue support for the Corps, requesting the assistance and patronage of the Association of 
Lord-Lieutenants of Counties, of which he was a member, at its Annual General Meeting in 
1939. He urged that the Association assist the Corps ‘by persuading local subscribers that 
this Cadet movement is worth their fullest support both from a patriotic and from a charitable 
point of view’. While Londonderry noted that the Cadets could go into civil aviation, he also 
stressed that ‘when they grow to the military age, they can take up Service life’.59 The 
scheme also had the backing of Lindsay Everard, despite his resignation from the Air League 
at the beginning of March 1938.60 
The ADCC also had the backing of Kingsley Wood, Secretary of State for Air from 
1938 to 1940. In a letter to Sir John Salmond, retired Marshal of the RAF and ADCC 
chairman, Wood wrote that while the Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve and the CAG 
existed, neither lessened the need for the ADCC. He felt that the Corps would ‘perform a 
most important service to civil aviation in this country by familiarising young men with all 
aspects of aviation, making them air minded in the best sense of the term’, and would ‘work 
for both the prosperity and the safety of this country in the air’.61 Wood made this support 
public in his address to the Corps’ Mansion House meeting in October 1938, at which 
Viscount Trenchard presided, by proclaiming: ‘I hope we shall be able to make some of the 
present generation knights of the air as their forefathers were conquerors of the sea’.62 The 
language and tone of Wood’s pronouncement is worth noting. It recalls David Lloyd 
George’s description of aviators in the First World War as ‘the Cavalry of the clouds’ and 
 
59 Parliamentary Archives, Papers of the Association of Lord-Lieutenants of Counties, ALC/1/17, Annual 
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little reason to doubt this. AL, AL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 3 March 1938, p. 1; 
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as ‘the knighthood of the war, without fear and without reproach’.63 It also echoes the image 
of Scouts as ‘young knights’.64 The chivalric image of the aviator, and the promise of 
excitement which flying could provide, were an important draw for young members of the 
ADCC. 
The Air Ministry’s support of the ADCC is, perhaps, unsurprising. The ethos of the 
Corps was closely tied to increasing anxieties about the nation and the prospect of war. As 
Peter Adey suggests, ‘young people were the susceptible clay from which a new kind of 
aerial being could be moulded, and the seedbed for a new form of aerial and political 
community’.65 Adey sees the training of youth groups involved in aviation as a process 
involving ‘the inculcation of the air – an aerial life born through sets of associated practices 
of the mobile body which had their own benefits in the training of character and, importantly, 
the ‘capacities’ desirable for their militaristic use’.66 Such idealised (male) bodies would be 
shaped through a combination of training and character building. Moreover, aerial bodies, 
and aviators in the First World War, were not associated with the dismemberment and 
disfigurement that many soldiers on the front-line faced.67 Accordingly, there was little 
opposition to the creation of young aerial bodies or the construction of military and 
masculine identities in an aerial sense. Adey’s description of young people as ‘susceptible 
clay’ which could be ‘moulded’ is more problematic as it portrays young people as passive, 
takes away their agency, and neglects the voluntary nature of groups like the ADCC. 
However, his focus on mobile practices, character, and the bodily actions of young aerial 
lives are far more applicable to the activities of the Corps. The Air Ministry valued the Corps 
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as it was able to turn boys into useful, airminded, citizens of the nation. Indeed, the British 
state – and in particular the Air Ministry’s involvement in the ADCC – in many ways, 
represented an acquiescence in, and indeed promotion of, the militarisation of British youth.  
The ADCC was a nationwide scheme, with squadrons ranging from Inverness to 
Land’s End.68 There were two forms of squadrons: School Squadrons, which drew from 
pupils and ‘old boys’ and Open Squadrons, which recruited from the local community.69 
Decentralisation was a key component in the establishment of squadrons; for this purpose, 
the ADCC Committee divided the country into the following areas: Scotland, North West, 
Western, Eastern, South West, South East, London, and the North East (from December 
1938) with each being headed by an area organiser.70 These organisers were responsible for 
visiting the main towns within their areas, making contact with mayors, corporations, rotary 
clubs, chambers of commerce, and local gentry to encourage them to establish squadrons.71 
The formation, training, discipline, accommodation, management, and financial 
maintenance of cadet units was placed in the hands of local organisers. Training was 
provided by ex-officers and men of the Royal Flying Corps, Royal Naval Air Service, 
Comrades of the Royal Air Forces Association, the British Legion, Civil Aviation Clubs, the 
RAF, and Auxiliary Air Force, many of whom often ‘enthralled the cadets with stories of 
their fighting days’.72  
The ADCC council, much like the Air League itself, contained many notable 
political, social, and military figures, ex-servicemen, members of the press, and aviation 
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pioneers. The leadership of the Corps had a strong military background: two thirds of the 
Committee had some military experience, all of the area organisers were ex-servicemen, 
while slightly under half of the ADCC council had some form of military background.73 The 
military nature of the Corps’ leadership and organisation – on a national and regional level 
– is important to note because, although Chamier claimed that the Corps had ‘a distinctively 
civilian organisation for administration’, this was certainly not the case.74 While, as Martin 
Dedman notes, there ‘is a widespread tacit assumption that all military or ex-military men 
are likely to be ‘militarist’ in their views and inclinations’, the military nature of the Corps’ 
leadership certainly did little to help it distance itself from accusations of militarism.75 
However, if the 1920s were characterised by ‘waves of virulent pacifism and anti-militarism 
mov[ing] public opinion against the idea of ex-soldiers training the young’ then, by the late 
1930s, such opposition was relatively small-scale, and did little to affect the activities or 
success of the Corps.76  
The ADCC’s activities were reported on in Air Review. However, such was the 
popularity of the Corps that the Air League created an official organ, Air Defence Cadet 
Corps Gazette, which published news and information of general interest to the Corps, as 
well as reports from squadrons, rules and regulations, routine orders, and lists of 
appointments and promotions. A further indication of the ADCC’s value to the Air League 
can be seen in the League’s decision to suspend the publication of Air Review during the 
Second World War, while Air Defence Cadet Corps Gazette continued to be published. The 
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League also produced a pocketbook for ADCC members which included information on the 
Auxiliary Air Force, the Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve, the Royal Air Force Reserve 
of Pilots, how ADCC members could join the RAF, and the Air Ministry’s policy on Cadets 
joining the RAF. The book included practical information for Cadets on a range of subjects 
from aircraft registration markings, to Morse code, and care of aeroplanes.77 Alongside this, 
the League produced the Air Defence Cadet Corps Training Manual, based largely on the 
Officers’ Training Corps’ Training Manual, which set out the rules and regulations of the 
Corps and sold for 3.s 6.d. The manual emphasised to Cadets that they would not be accepted 
‘unless they show themselves to be in possession of those physical and moral qualities which 
make them a credit to their country in aviation’.78 Much like the SCC’s manual, clear themes 
of citizenship, masculinity, and service are evident in much of the rhetoric throughout the 
ADCC manual as, of course, was an emphasis on the character of the boys – Cadets, it was 
made clear, had to be physically and morally ready to serve the nation. For the ADCC, 
citizenship was clearly closely linked with duty, discipline, patriotism, and national defence 
– it became a form of militarised aerial citizenship.79 
Cadets were intended ‘to form part of the civic life of the towns’. They were taught 
the elementary principles of aircraft engineering and maintenance, the handling of workshop 
tools and instruments, the general theory of flight, the identification of aeroplanes, Morse 
code, message carrying, meteorology, fire action, and model aeroplane making and flying. 
Cadets were also trained in ARP, given an insight into the working of the Observer Corps, 
the Balloon Barrage companies, anti-aircraft gunnery, searchlight and sound locator 
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operations, and other forms of ‘passive’ defence.80 Each squadron was attached to an RAF 
or Auxiliary Air Force unit and was given instruction in drill, discipline, and physical 
exercise. The ADCC’s leadership wanted the Corps to provide youths with social, physical, 
and mental development.81  
The Corps’ uniform consisted of a blue forage cap, blue tunic (similar to that of the 
RAF), trousers, a black belt, and chromium badges with the Air League’s logo 
superimposed. In attempting to give the Corps a cross-class appeal, the ADCC Committee 
provided grants, confined to squadrons in the Special Areas, of 8.s 6.d per Cadet which 
covered uniform and acted as a capitation grant.82 While the class composition of the Corps 
is difficult to measure, the fact that the ADCC Committee received many requests for funds 
to buy uniforms suggests that the Corps had a significant working-class appeal.83 As we have 
seen, the SCC Committee similarly received requests from distressed areas for uniform 
grants. Although some considered uniform a ‘deterrent’ in peacetime, this does not seem to 
have been the case for the SCC or ADCC.84  
While it may not be the case that uniform was able to ‘dupe unruly youths into 
submission’, the symbolic nature of the Corps’ uniform is certainly important to consider.85 
Indeed, as Martin Francis notes, the distinctive blue RAF uniform provided a ‘beguiling 
emblem of the flyer’s allure’, associated with bravery, heroism, glamour, and even sexual 
magnetism. The appeal of the RAF’s uniform was even greater when contrasted with the 
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prohibitively expensive. One former cadet complained that the uniform was the equivalent of two weeks wages 
and, of course, not all would have been willing to pay this. IWM, Sound Archive, Acc. No. 10199, Reel 1, Paul 
Vincent Bartley Longthorp. 
84 Morgan, Young Citizen, p. 117. 
85 Humphries, Hooligans or Rebels?, p. 134.  
223 
 
‘drab brown uniform of the army’.86 While the image and materiality of khaki gave it a place 
‘in the distinctive visual culture that characterized First World War Britain’, the flyer’s 
uniform was one of the most striking visual and material characteristics of the Second World 
War.87  
Although military uniform may have constituted ‘soft forms of militarism’, it was 
also undoubtedly an emblem of ‘patriotic militarism’; the wearing of military uniforms by 
members of both the ADCC and SCC visually signalled the preparation of young bodies for 
military service.88 The effect of military uniform on youth was something that had attracted 
the attention of figures such as Beverley Nichols, although he was far less positive than the 
leadership of either the ADCC or SCC. Considering toy soldiers, military pageants, and war 
memorials as constituting the ‘Microbes of Mars’ – which inculcated a martial and violent 
spirit within young boys – Nichols warned parents that if ‘war memorials are fever-spots, 
disseminating the germs of Mars, uniforms are even more dangerous as the carriers of the 
fever. It is essential that you should realize the tremendous importance of the uniform as a 
war force.’89  
 The ADCC certainly highlighted the blurring of civil and military spheres of society 
in the late 1930s. Indeed, upon the outbreak of the Second World War, the Air Ministry sent 
a letter to the Air League stating:  
the wearing of uniforms by Cadets and Cadet officers should be immediately discontinued in 
the event of the commencement of hostilities on land in the United Kingdom, inasmuch as the 
Corps is not part of the armed forces of the Crown, and the wearing of a uniform similar to the 
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uniform of the Royal Air Force might expose the wearers to the danger of attack as 
combatants.90  
This apparently created ‘intense disappointment to all associated with the Corps, as it seems 
to minimise the responsible character of the work of the Corps’, although it did little to affect 
the ADCC’s war-time activities as the chapter will later discuss.91 
The ADCC’s uniform was able to foster a sense of belonging and identity among its 
members and associate its wearers with the modernity of the RAF. It was part of the 
‘spectacle of military display’ of the pre-war years and, in many respects, a part of the 
‘paradigm of how the military body is envisaged within modern warfare’.92 As Adey notes, 
‘emphasis was placed on the uniform’s symbolic value’ which was associated with ‘prestige 
and bravery’, owing to its likeness to the RAF’s uniform.93 Jennifer Craik argues that there 
is often a ‘disjuncture between the ostensible meaning of uniforms . . . unity, regulation, 
hierarchy, status, roles’ and ‘the experience of uniforms’ yet, for many ADCC members, the 
wearing of uniform did seem to represent the supposedly ostensible meaning of uniform: 
unity, status, roles etc, alongside the promise of prestige and glamour.94  
As Adey stresses, there is ‘no doubt that the aesthetic form and connotations of the 
ADCC and ATC uniforms provided one of the biggest attractions to boys at this time’.95 
Uniform, however, was equally important for squadron leaders and instructors. Several 
contacted the Air League to request permission to wear their own RAF uniforms and badges. 
For example, a letter to the Air League from the governors of one school stressed that the 
headmaster felt unable to command the local ADCC squadron unless allowed to wear Royal 
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Observer Corps wings.96 The Corps’ uniform was clearly ‘both a sign and a conduit for 
command and authority’.97 Of course, the ADCC uniform did not have this symbolic value 
for all members, yet there was an element of prestige in the displaying of rank through 
badges – uniform could provide authority and ‘dignity’ to squadron leaders.98  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
96 TNA AIR 2/4027, Air Defence Cadet Corps: Uniform, Letter from the Air League to the Air Ministry, 11 
April 1939, p. 1. 
97 Adey, Aerial Life, p. 34.  
98 TNA AIR 2/4027, Letter from Mr J. W. H. Ratcliffe to the Air Ministry, 26 June 1939, p. 1.  
 
Figure 5: ‘Air 
Commodore 
Chamier 
Inspecting the 
New Cadet 
Corps 
Uniform’, Air 
Review, 
August 1938, 
p. 20. 
 
226 
 
Although the outward and visible signs of the Corps was related to the military – 
drill, discipline, uniform, the organisation into squadrons and parades (see Figure 6) – this 
did little to dissuade boys from joining the ADCC. Cadets would attend squadrons one night 
in the week (although this often became more frequent with the approach of war) and on 
Saturdays. That Cadets devoted their leisure time to the Corps is important to note and 
suggests that militaristic corps still had a place within the youth culture of the late interwar 
years and that boys welcomed the quasi-military culture of the Corps. Young men, of course, 
had agency and, for some, this meant exercising it by voluntarily joining the ADCC. It was, 
perhaps unsurprisingly, in flying that many members of the Corps seemed most interested 
in.  
In a letter to the Air League’s junior section in June 1938, Chamier wrote that ‘I 
believe that many of you have got the idea that these Air Defence Cadets will all be pilots. I 
do not want to disappoint you, but it is not possible at this stage to make any definite 
promises like that.’99 However, Chamier did hope that around 10,000 Cadets would 
eventually have the opportunity to fly. To facilitate this, the Corps was given some gliding 
experience after the British Gliding Association (founded in 1929 to popularise the sport of 
gliding) allowed 700 ADCC members to fly in the summer of 1939.100 The ADCC leadership 
and Air League clearly understood the importance of flying for boys, ‘because the interest 
of the Cadets would be likely to sag if they were fed entirely on books and lectures, and were 
denied opportunities of practical flying’. Camps also brought members of the ADCC 
together for the first time, giving them the opportunity of developing the ‘esprit de corps so 
necessary for a movement of this nature’.101  
 
99 ‘Air Commodore Chamier’s Letter to Leaguers’, Air Review, June 1938, p. 44. 
100 Commons Sitting, Gliding Clubs (Air Defence Cadet Corps Training), HC Deb 01 March 1939 vol 344 
cc1242-3. For a sense of the Cadet’s experience of gliding, see RAF Museum, Charles Edward Brown 
Collection, Air Defence Cadet Corps.  
101 ‘The Cadet Gliding Camps’, Air Review, October 1939, p. 23.  
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III. The ADCC Beyond London      
Although the majority of ADCC squadrons were based in the south of England, with 33 
squadrons in London alone, the Corps was also popular in many other regions and regional 
variations should not be overlooked. Urban and rural squadrons would have undoubtedly 
had a different experience from one another (this is especially so since some squadrons were 
over 60 miles away from the nearest RAF aerodrome) and, while it is beyond the purview 
 
Figure 6: 
‘Marshall of 
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of this chapter to explore fully, a brief overview of the ADCC in the North East will be 
provided.102 The rapid growth of the Corps in the North East was not exceptional – but 
instead fairly representative of the Corps’ popularity – and by using the North East as a case 
study, in particular the minute books of local units and regional newspapers, this section 
intends to demonstrate the appeal of the Corps beyond the south of England.  
The first squadron in the North East was set up in Sunderland in early 1939, with a 
second squadron being considered by May after over 400 boys attended a local ADCC 
meeting.103 A squadron was affiliated to the RAF station at Addington in August 1939, with 
recruits coming from Blyth and Seaton Delaval, while Durham also created a squadron by 
August that year.104 The Mayor of Durham, echoing the public pronouncements of the 
ADCC’s Committee, declared that ‘the primary function of the Corps is not for war, but to 
make youths air-minded’.105 The establishment of the Tyneside Squadron of the ADCC, 
formed in May 1939, gives a further sense of the airmindedness of youth on a local and 
regional level. Eighty local boys had expressed their interest by May and, by December 
1939, a second squadron had been proposed.106 Indeed, by 1940, over five squadrons had 
been formed in Newcastle alone. School Squadrons were particularly popular in the region, 
with Dame Allen’s School and the Royal Grammar School both proposing squadrons.107 The 
first commanding officer of the Tyneside squadron was Arthur George, the aviation pioneer, 
and the squadron was attached to the No. 43 Elementary and Reserve Flying Training School 
 
102 ‘News from the Squadrons’, Air Defence Cadet Corps Gazette, June 1939, p. 7. 
103 ‘400 Boys Apply to Air Cadet Corps’, Sunderland Daily Echo and Shipping Gazette, 27 May 1939, p. 4.  
104 ‘Air Cadets’, Alnwick Mercury, 18 August 1939, p. 2.  
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106 T&W, AF/ATC1/1, No. 131 (Tyneside Squadron) Air Defence Cadet Corps, Minute Book, 1939–1947, 
Meeting of the Executive Committee, 31 May 1939, p. 1; Meeting of the Executive Committee, 8 December 
1939, p. 1.  
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at Newcastle Airport, Woolsington.108 Like many local squadrons, as well as the ADCC 
Committee itself, the Tyneside Squadron faced difficulty upon the outbreak of the Second 
World War. Over half of the Corps was evacuated, with many officers and members of the 
Executive Committee being called into military service.109   
While the above picture of Cadets in the North East is fairly unremarkable, it gives 
an idea of the airmindedness of youth on a local scale, highlights how quickly squadrons 
were formed, and how enthusiastically the ADCC scheme was embraced throughout Britain. 
Indeed, as the first ADCC squadron was only formed in July 1938, the fact that 172 
squadrons, comprising 17,000 boys, had been formed by the outbreak of the Second World 
War is remarkable.110 However, given the Air League’s often parlous financial situation, as 
noted in Chapter 1, how was the ADCC Committee and the Air League able to fund such an 
ambitious scheme?  
 
 
IV. Finance and the Interrelationship between the ADCC and Air Ministry 
There were three principal sources of income that squadrons relied upon: £200 per squadron 
had to be raised by the local city or town before being registered with the ADCC; a central 
fund of £25,000 raised by the Air League over three years; and contributions from the Air 
Ministry of 3.s 6.d annually per Cadet, providing squadrons passed inspection. Cadets were 
also required to pay a weekly sum of 3.d for the maintenance of their kit.111 At the Mansion 
House appeal to the public for contributions to the central fund in 1938, Salmond declared 
 
108 T&W, AF/ATC1/1, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 3 July 1939, p. 1; See T&W, AF/ATC1/2/1, 
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that he wanted the ADCC to become ‘a living, national movement’ although argued ‘this 
object cannot be achieved without money’. The importance of this, as Salmond continued, 
was ‘not only to direct the enthusiasm of our youth in all things pertaining to aviation but 
also to provide a useful reservoir of air-minded, air-trained youth on which the nation can 
draw at the appropriate time’.112 In response to this appeal, and the Mansion House meeting 
in October, Lord Nuffield promised the ADCC £10,000 if the fund reached £15,000.113 
Although his contribution was less than his respective grant to the SCC, Nuffield 
nevertheless received praise from various figures. For instance, Newall wrote that, although 
he was not directly linked with the Air League or the ADCC, he was delighted to read of 
Nuffield’s gift, which he felt would ‘be of the greatest value to the Royal Air Force and to 
aviation in this country’.114 Wood also sent a letter to Nuffield, writing that his contribution 
was ‘very highly appreciated by all who are interested in the air’.115 However, despite 
Nuffield’s donation, it was not long until the ADCC Committee was pressuring the Air 
Ministry for greater funds. 
While the Committee was initially content with the Air Ministry’s contribution of 3.s 
6.d per Cadet, by late 1938 it viewed this contribution as ‘miserable’ and urged that the grant 
should be reconsidered.116 Such sentiments were echoed by many of the squadrons. In July 
1939, Salmond met with the first 100 squadrons of the Corps, most of whom demanded 
greater government support for squadrons on a local level.117 The Committee asked the Air 
Ministry for £2 per Cadet which would enable to rest of the money to be found from private 
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sources ‘which at the present are not convinced that the Government, in view of its small 
contribution, are seriously interested in this movement’. The Committee concluded that the 
Corps could not only become a ‘most potent agent to buttress the voluntary system of the 
Royal Air Force’ but could encourage ‘the whole principle of National Service’.118 Chamier 
stressed this in more vehement terms in a letter to Sir Edward Campbell, Private 
Parliamentary Secretary to Kingsley Wood:  
I would think that it one of the stupidest crimes a democracy could perpetrate if something 
like this which can spread like a fire through the country is stifled by the want of a small 
amount of Government support. It is not like a Territorial Cadet Corps: they have to search the 
by-ways for the boys: we are flooded with applications. 
 
He concluded that the Corps would be ‘of incalculable value to the whole foundations of 
aviation and to the whole idea of patriotic service to the State’.119 There was certainly little 
objection to the principle of national service from within the Air League’s Executive 
Committee. When Salmond urged the League to publicly support a scheme of national 
service, the Committee agreed in principle, although plans appear to have got little further 
than this.120  
In response to concerns raised over matters of funding, Wood and Harold Balfour, at 
this point Under-Secretary of State for Air, met with Salmond, Elibank, and Chamier in May 
1939. Wood and Balfour made clear that they were in sympathy with the ADCC’s proposals, 
and assured the Committee that they would do all they could do secure a larger grant for the 
Corps; however, the proposal received far less sympathy from others in the Air Ministry. As 
a note on the Air League’s proposals emphasised, ‘no reason is given for this change of grant 
and beyond a vague statement that some units are in financial difficulties, there is no 
 
118 TNA AIR 2/2716, The Support of the Air Defence Cadet Corps, 22 May 1939, pp. 1–4. Such pressure also 
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120 AL, AL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 6 October 1938, p. 2.  
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information as to how far the movement really needs further financial support’ and so the 
contribution remained at 3.s 6.d.121  
The Air League’s criticism of the Air Ministry was somewhat unjust. Alongside 
financial contributions, declarations of moral, practical, and political support by senior 
members (as well as Salmond serving as the Corps’ chairman, the council also included Lord 
Weir), the Air Ministry also provided the Corps with technical equipment and training films 
to squadrons, as well as letting squadrons use RAF aerodromes. The Air Ministry had denied 
Chamier’s request for closer cooperation between the ADCC and the CAG on several 
occasions yet, for the most part, the Air Ministry was clearly supportive of the Corps.122 The 
Air Council agreed to grant the ADCC Committee the privilege of nominating authority for 
the purpose of the entry of Cadets into the RAF as aircraft apprentices or boy entrants.123 
The Air Ministry also provided a grant of £4,900 for the technical training of 700 Cadets in 
gliding.124 Links of funding, personnel, as well as shared objectives in terms of the purpose 
of the Corps, demonstrates how valuable the Air League’s work had become to the Air 
Ministry by the late 1930s. 
 
 
V. The ADCC and Militarism  
While the ADCC was able to gain the support of the Air Ministry, it was subject to 
accusations of militarism from elsewhere. The Corps met with criticism from some 
parliamentarians, who accused the Air League of being little more than a ‘private 
propaganda organisation’.125 The ADCC Committee was certainly conscious of accusations 
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of militarism and felt that ‘care should be taken not to antagonise parents by stressing the 
military aspect of the scheme . . . The Corps was a measure of passive defence against a 
common danger, and should be presented as such.’126 This was further elaborated on in a 
speech by Salmond in October 1938:  
When the question of aviation cropped up it was generally the parents who stood in the way. 
They were nervous for fear their sons would go into a dangerous career . . . It must not be 
thought that because these boys were trained in a Cadet Corps they were any more liable to 
military service than boys who had not joined such a corps.127  
A history of the Air Training Corps (ATC) also felt that the inclusion of the word ‘defence’ 
in the title of the ADCC was useful in attempting to ‘disarm possible criticism that it was a 
militant or aggressive body’ and, while one of the declared aims of the League was to 
‘interest these boys [in aviation], not to militarise them’, the Corps struggled to distance 
itself from associations with militarism.128 The ADCC certainly constituted a ‘paramilitary 
group’, as defined by Michael Blanch: the Corps was closely connected to the military, wore 
military uniforms, practiced drill, and were trained by ex-servicemen.129  
Naturally, the aims, objectives, and values of the Corps was strongly shaped by the 
Air League’s wider goals and so, from its inception, the ADCC had a distinctly militaristic 
character, despite the largely unconvincing attempts of its organisers to suggest otherwise. 
In debates about militarism in relation to the Scout movement, Springhall argues that ‘when 
Baden-Powell organized his Scout movement he did so with one primary motive – to prepare 
the next generation of British soldiers for war and the defence of the Empire’.130 Similarly, 
Michael Rosenthal notes that Baden-Powell made ‘usefulness in times of war’ a focal point 
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of scouting and suggests that ‘the notion of the Scout as a serviceable citizen trained to follow 
orders in wartime is at the heart of Scouting’.131 Both the ADCC and SCC certainly had 
similar ambitions; the rhetoric, aims, ideology, and practices of the two organisations closely 
revolved around both militarism and nationalism from their inception until, and indeed 
throughout, the Second World War. Of course, individual units differed and did not 
necessarily reflect the Air or Navy League’s official aims. Importantly, while the lived 
experiences of members of the Corps were not homogenous, many can still be characterised 
as militaristic. 
The creation of the ADCC by the Air League certainly did little to assuage fears that 
the League was attempting to inculcate principles of discipline and militarism within 
schools. In response to the scheme, the Education Committee of the LCC refused to give 
permission to the Air League to form an ADCC squadron within one of its secondary 
schools.132 This was based on a resolution passed in 1935 by the LCC’s Education 
Committee that cadet corps would not be permitted in secondary schools. The Committee 
felt that cadet training provided ‘very little educational advantage’ and that it went against 
the ‘desire of the Council to encourage schools to inculcate the spirit of peace and 
international good-will’.133 However, by 1939, there was opposition from within the 
Education Committee towards the LCC’s attitude concerning cadet corps and, in particular, 
the ADCC. John Hare, an alderman of the LCC, suggested that ‘recent changes in the 
international situation make it most undesirable that this Committee should hamper our air 
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defences’.134 Hare went further by remarking that ‘such views as those which the Socialist 
majority held in 1935 – that Cadet Corps in schools would make youths militaristic – were 
held only now by “eccentric old women and cranks”’.135 The Daily Telegraph criticised the 
LCC for its ‘priggish’ attitude, while the Daily Mail described it as ‘right out of touch’.136  
The latter wrote that 
Their refusal is based on a decision of 1935. These were the days when the Peace Ballot was 
fobbed off on a public not so well informed on affairs as they are today. It was the time when 
the League of Nations Union had reached the heights of inglorious pacifism. Times have 
changed – and opinion with them. Resolutions – like treaties – are not eternal. The London 
County Council should rescind this one, which never brought them anything but odium.137 
The LCC did not rescind the decision, however the opposition to the resolution clearly 
reflected a growing concern about the nation’s security. 
Somewhat surprisingly, Chamier did not feel that the LCC were unfriendly to the 
ADCC and noted that the Council had agreed to allow posters and other publicity matters 
relating to the Corps to be displayed in secondary schools and in technical and evening 
institutes.138 The Higher Education Sub-Committee of the LCC also approved, in principle, 
to the ‘provision of classes of instruction for Cadets in subjects relating to their training in 
technical and evening institutes under the Council’s control’.139 However, while the Council 
did not disagree with the objects or need for the ADCC, they felt that their job was to 
‘educate the children, and not turn them into soldiers’.140  
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Of the 172 ADCC squadrons established by the beginning of the Second World War, 
45 were School Squadrons. Clearly, as over a quarter of squadrons were school squadrons 
there was some degree of military influence in state-sponsored schools, despite the LCC’s 
opposition. The success of the Corps evidently depended on the cooperation of education 
authorities, schools, and parents.141 Given the military background of those who trained the 
Corps, the support of the Air Ministry, alongside the military uniform of the Corps, as well 
as training in drill and discipline, accusations of militarism were somewhat understandable. 
Yet, the Corps was not created in a social or political vacuum and the lack of widespread 
opposition to the ADCC reflected the growing concern within British society about the threat 
of the aeroplane in any future conflict.  
 
 
VI. The ADCC, Recruitment, and the Outbreak of the Second World War 
The ADCC Committee and Air League understandably wanted to avoid associations with 
militarism, yet, as a leaflet issued by the Corps outlined:  
In its eighteen months of existence the Corps has taken about 20,000 youths, inspired them 
with the ideals of the great flying pioneers, with the spirit of patriotism, of service, and of 
mental endeavour that is vital to the continuance of our nation . . . The Air Defence Cadet 
Corps is the visible expression of Britain’s determination to continue its greatness, and of the 
realisation of the fact that its greatness depends on the mastery of the air by the whole of its 
young manhood.142 
Such rhetoric was commonplace in Air League language when discussing the ADCC and 
the Air League clearly viewed the Corps as being integral to British aviation, and to the 
preservation of Britain itself. In opening squadrons number two and three at Watford, 
Salmond outlined his views on the ADCC’s importance, remarking that  
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The totalitarian countries had the advantage of only having to press a button and the whole 
nation sprang to arms, organised and equipped to the last degree. In countries like our own, 
where freedom of the individual has been so precious to us, the transition from peace to war 
is a much slower and more hesitating movement . . . The Air Defence Cadet Corps will train 
you while you are still young to make good this time-lag and to be ready and equipped at a 
moment’s call. We Britons must be ready in the air, and you young men are going to show the 
way in the years to come.143 
Increasing international tension clearly brought anxieties about the physical condition of 
Britain’s youth to the fore and, in many respects, were similar to questions of national 
efficiency prior to the First World War. Sutherland addressed such themes in a letter to The 
Times in December 1939, declaring that the Corps was ‘making a great contribution to the 
mental and physical fitness of the nation’s youth’.144 Fitness, manliness, and the health of 
Britain’s young men were evidently important in light of youth movements in fascist 
countries as Salmond and Sutherland highlighted. This link was also explicitly made by 
sections of the Air Ministry: ‘the phenomenal success of the Air Defence Cadet Corps shows 
. . .  that there is a real demand for a popular youth movement which would emulate the good 
side of the Hitler Youth and young Fascists’, although the note was also careful to stress that 
the Corps should avoid ‘the pernicious ideology of those totalitarian bodies’.145 As the 
international situation worsened, the need for the Corps became even more apparent. 
Following the Munich Conference, Air Review urged its readers that ‘[w]e can no 
longer put any faith in princes, proletariats, pacts or pacifists. We must have more 
aeroplanes, more men to make them and more men to man them.’ The appeal cited the RAF, 
the CAG, and, of course, the ADCC and concluded that ‘[w]e cannot get peace by wishing 
for it, or even by praying for it. We must be prepared, and well prepared, to fight for it.’146 
In many respects, this reflected the rhetoric surrounding the SCC following the Conference. 
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There was little doubt that the Air League similarly intended the Corps to make a direct 
military contribution to the nation. This is evident in the frequency of themes such as duty, 
service, and patriotism in discussions surrounding the Corps. For example, at the League’s 
Annual General Meeting in 1938, Mottistone spoke of how he looked forward to ‘twenty 
thousand Air Defence Cadets ready to serve their country’.147 One newsreel similarly 
described the Corps as ‘the defenders of Britain’.148  
One of the Air Ministry’s primary concerns with the Corps was, of course, 
recruitment, as was made clear in a meeting to consider Air Ministry cooperation: ‘it has to 
be borne in mind that our main interest in the Corps, although it has other virtues, is the 
recruiting aspect’.149 Indeed, one of the main arguments which persuaded Treasury support 
was that ‘the Corps would instil air-mindedness into the youth of the country, and so 
stimulate a flow of recruits into the R.A.F.’.150 On the possibilities of RAF recruitment, the 
Air League wrote that it was ‘clear that the Corps will afford a very fruitful recruiting ground 
for the Royal Air Force’.151 Yet, while the ambitions of the Air League and Air Ministry in 
the creation of the ADCC were clear, why did young men want to join such an organisation? 
Did members of the Corps see themselves as making a ‘definite contribution to the security 
of the country’? Did they see themselves as part of a ‘reservoir of air-minded, air-trained 
youth’ on which the nation could draw upon at the appropriate time? Of course, it is 
important to explore ‘[aerial] youth as agent not as object’ and it is to this question that the 
chapter now turns.152  
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A series of letters to Air Review gives some indication as to why boys joined the 
Corps. One boy wrote that his reason for joining was that ‘last September [1938] we were 
threatened with war. At once I realised that I knew nothing, could do nothing to defend other 
people or myself. Here came a chance to learn how to defend other people, myself, to serve 
my King and country, by simply offering to learn.’153 Another wrote that he wanted to 
become ‘a useful and worthy member of the Royal Air Force’, while another – whose letter 
revealed that his parents stopped him joining when he was 14 – was confident that ‘when we 
are all trained as pilots we’ll challenge any air force in the world’.154 Another boy proclaimed 
that  
Should war again come, let us hope that we may all do our allotted task with a good heart, and 
although it may not fall to any of us who have lately joined to take a noticeable part we can by 
obeying orders, do our bit and enable the qualified men to sweep the skies and shores of 
England of the enemy.155  
Striking here are notions of duty, patriotism, and sacrifice. Other letters expressed an interest 
in model making, drill, and engineering, although the desire to fly was a common theme. 
Even though the letters were published in Air Review, and so were unlikely to be critical of 
the Corps, they give an important insight into the attitudes of the boys themselves. 
Further insight into motivations for joining the ADCC are provided in a series of 
interviews conducted by the Imperial War Museum in the late 1990s and early 2000s with 
men who had previously been part of the ADCC. These interviews provide an idea as to why 
the men joined and also outline some of the training undertaken as members of the Corps. 
One interviewee, Laurie Godfrey, joined the Corps in 1939 when he was 16 and speaks of 
his training which included rifle drill and sports, but said the Corps had ‘nothing to do with 
aircraft at that time’ and that it ‘was just like the Boy Scouts’. Godfrey does, however, 
 
153 ‘England Awakes’, Air Review, April 1939, p. 37.  
154 ‘The Spirit of Youth’, Air Review, May 1938, p. 23. 
155 ‘England Awakes’, Air Review, April 1939, pp. 37–38.  
240 
 
remember time spent at Hornchurch aerodrome loading ammunition belts.156 Others go into 
more detail about why they joined. Alan Davis, part of a School Squadron, talks about drill, 
parading, and the type of training he had with the Corps. He discusses how members of his 
squadron would go to the local aerodrome to try and get free flights and that ‘that was what 
it was all about’.157 Francis May, who joined when he was 14 after an announcement by his 
headteacher at school, recalls that he was ‘always interested in flying’ and this provided his 
motivation for joining the Corps. When asked what he learned, he remembers aircraft 
recognition, the workings of an internal combustion engine, the theory of flight, and Morse 
code. He felt that Morse code and aircraft recognition provided the most use to him during 
his service in the Second World War.158  
Douglas Fry recalls how he, and many others, joined the ADCC not solely as a result 
of interest in aviation, but also due to increasing international tension. He talks of how, after 
the German occupation of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, that it ‘was obvious that things 
were going to get tougher . . . all the youth of the country started to join things. Since I was 
interested in aeroplanes, I joined the Air Defence Cadet Corps.’ Again, Fry recalls parading, 
lectures, and in particular, drill, saying that he had no issue with drill and that he understood 
the purpose of it.159 Another interviewee, Paul Longthorp, recalls how his mother was 
reluctant for him to join the Corps, owing to its ‘military background’. However, when asked 
about the interview when he joined the Corps, Longthorp felt that they were not looking for 
young men with ‘war-like intentions’ but for ‘young men to join the Royal Air Force’. Much 
like May and Fry, when asked about his motivation for joining the Corps he remarked that 
‘aircraft were the beginning and end of everything for me’.160 However, not all remember 
 
156 IWM, Sound Archive, Acc. No. 27799, Reel 1, Laurie Godfrey.  
157 IWM, Sound Archive, Acc. No. 30639, Reel 2, Alan Davis.  
158 IWM, Sound Archive, Acc. No. 17822, Reel 1, Francis John Cretchley May.  
159 IWM, Sound Archive, Acc. No. 27255, Reel 1, Douglas Robert Fry.  
160 IWM, Sound Archive, Acc. No. 10199, Reel 1, Paul Vincent Bartley Longthorp.  
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their time with the ADCC so clearly, or indeed, so fondly. Ernie Lummis, for example, 
struggled to remember when he joined the Corps and suggested that the Corps had very little 
training which he found to be of use, due to a lack of equipment.161 While it is not difficult 
to define the ADCC’s aims and objectives as an organisation, it is much more challenging 
to tease out how those who joined felt about the organisation. Yet, taken together, these 
testimonies and letters provide an invaluable insight. If there were concerns that the ADCC 
represented a militarisation of the country’s youth, then clearly many boys themselves did 
not object to the more militaristic aspects of the Corps. 
As in the case of the SCC and popular culture surrounding the sea, the prominence 
of aviation and the aviator in a range of juvenile fiction, novels, magazines, and films in the 
interwar years also goes some way to explaining the willingness of boys to be a part of the 
ADCC and, in particular, their desire to fly. Popular American films such as Wings (1927), 
Hell’s Angels, and The Dawn Patrol (both 1930) – all of which focused on the romance and 
nobility of aviation – as well as pulp magazines such as War Ace, Sky Fighters, War Birds, 
and G2 Battle Aces – were all part of the pleasure culture of the war in the air in Britain 
throughout the interwar years.162 The proliferation of martial and militaristic sentiment was 
also evident in W.E. Johns’s creation of Biggles – one of the most popular fictional 
characters of the interwar period.163 Rieger has suggested that, in the aftermath of protracted 
battles of attrition that had marked the First World War, ‘eulogies of individual bravery 
sounded unconvincing to the ears of many contemporaries’.164 Adult fiction often portrayed 
the devastating impact that aerial war would bring – particularly books such as H.G. Wells’s 
 
161 IWM, Sound Archive, Acc. No. 27800, Reel 1, Ernie Lummis.  
162 Paris, Warrior Nation, p. 160. 
163 Dennis Butts, ‘Biggles – Hero of the Air’, in Tony Watkins and Dudley Jones (eds), A Necessary Fantasy? 
The Heroic Figure in Children’s Popular Culture (New York: Garland Publishing Inc., 2000), p. 140. As well 
as previously authoring Popular Flying, by August 1940 Johns had become a regular contributor to Air Defence 
Cadet Corps Gazette. Johns also became a volunteer lecturer for the ADCC. Collins, Cadets, p. 75.  
164 Rieger, Technology and the Culture of Modernity, p. 268.  
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The Shape of Things to Come (1933) and Nevil Shute’s What Happened to the Corbett’s 
(1939). However, in ‘their juvenile counterparts’, as Michael Paris observes, ‘the raids were 
usually foiled at the last moment by heroic young Britons, or destroyed en route by the 
RAF’.165 As Paris continues, that ‘young men could still view war as exciting and glamorous 
was due to the heroic and romantic images of war and violence which had been so much a 
part of juvenile fiction throughout the inter-war period’.166 Those who joined the ADCC did 
not have to wait long to experience war.  
The purpose of the Corps in wartime was set out in a letter from the ADCC to officers 
commanding all squadrons of the Corps in August 1939: ‘In view of the tension existing at 
the present time, we would remind Squadron Commanders of the desirability of placing the 
services of such Cadets as are available and willing at the disposal of the country’. The letter 
continued, ‘It is left entirely at the descretion [sic] of Commanding Officers how best the 
Corps may be employed, but we have now over 17,000 organised and disciplined boys and 
it would seem obvious that some use should be made of them in time of need’.167 The Air 
League also stressed that ‘[s]hould the Air Ministry have in mind any specific use for Air 
Defence Cadets in time of emergency, every endeavour will be made by the Air League to 
supply them’.168 Upon the outbreak of war, the ADCC comprised 172 squadrons and many 
Cadets were employed at RAF aerodromes, unpaid and largely without authority, and were 
engaged in a number of tasks.169 These tasks included filling sandbags, message carrying, 
ambulance work, filling machine-gun belts, and taking part in ARP activities. Cadets also 
helped children at local train stations who were being evacuated.170  
 
165 Paris, Warrior Nation, p. 184. 
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Such activities were widely reported and the work of the Corps in war received much 
praise. However, the presence of the Corps at aerodromes was not unproblematic. As the Air 
Ministry thought that one of primary objects of German attack would be RAF aerodromes, 
they felt they would be unable to defend the death of members of the Corps to Parliament or 
the public.171 While the Air Ministry did not object to ADCC activities upon the outbreak of 
war, it did not feel justified in allowing such employment to continue when there was ‘any 
serious danger of exposing boys to undue risk from aerial bombardment’.172 While the 
military preparedness of the Corps may have varied, the character of the boys was less 
doubtful and boys often did expose themselves to danger and risk. For example, there were 
many cases of Cadets rescuing people from burning buildings, smothering incendiary 
bombs, and controlling fires and many of these boys received the ADCC Gallantry Medal 
for their actions.173  
By October 1939, with concern growing over the possibility that war could destroy 
the ADCC headquarters in London, the number of ADCC areas was reduced to four: 
Scotland, Northern, South Western, and South Eastern.174 Many members of the Corps’ 
leadership – as was the case for those in the SCC – were called to service, although the Corps 
survived. Indeed, such was the ADCC’s value to the Air Ministry that it subsequently took 
over the Corps in February 1941, renaming it the ATC. King George VI – who issued a 
Royal Warrant setting out the Corps’ aims – served as Air Commodore-in-Chief, while 
Chamier was appointed as Commandant.175 The ADCC’s Committee ‘welcomed and 
 
171 TNA AIR 2/3168, The Position of the Air Defence Cadet Corps in War Time, 17 September 1939, p. 6. 
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accept[ed] the proposals made by the Air Ministry’ and this is significant to note.176 While 
the Scouts avoided being too closely associated with the War Office in the First World War, 
the ADCC Committee was very quickly taken over by the Air Ministry. 
By the time the Air Ministry took over the Corps, it had over 20,000 members. Many 
letters of appreciation were received by the ADCC Committee for its work, including letters 
from Balfour and Archibald Sinclair, Secretary of State for Air from 1940.177 While the 
military efficiency of members of the Corps may have varied – owing to the somewhat ad 
hoc nature of training – many Cadets were already trained in drill, discipline, the correct way 
to wear a uniform, how to behave on aerodromes, and in a vast array of aviation matters, and 
so they naturally played a key role in the RAF. By the end of the Second World War, 
approximately 500,000 young men had passed through the ATC and, of course, many went 
on and joined the fighting Services.178 The Air Ministry estimated that 98,500 Cadets had 
entered the RAF; 9,200 had entered the Fleet Air Arm; 17,662 had joined the other branches 
of the Navy and the Merchant Service, and 27,519 had gone into the Army. In total, it 
estimated that over 150,000 Cadets joined the Services.179 The Corps, then, was clearly an 
important component in the military apparatus of the British state in the Second World War. 
 
 
VII. Conclusion 
Reflecting on the growth of the Corps, an article in Air Review in June 1939 enthused that 
‘[n]one of the Air League’s activities has had a greater success and none could have been 
more valuable to the country’.180 Militarism was a central feature of the ADCC – in the 
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organisation’s rhetoric and aims, to the practices and policies of the Corps. It was 
downplayed by senior figures, with the defensive nature of the Corps being emphasised, 
alongside the educational aspects of the organisation, yet associations with militarism were 
unescapable. The ADCC was closely linked with a number of key political and military elites 
and its leadership had a strongly military complexion.  
Taken together, a lack of organised opposition to both the SCC and the ADCC 
suggests that, if sections of society were not enthusiastic, they were at least resigned to the 
need for Britain’s youth to be trained in all things related to the sea and air. Both 
organisations occupied important positions in the youth culture of the late 1930s and, as has 
been noted, offer important insights into issues such as masculinity, physical culture, leisure, 
and militarism. Indeed, both the SCC and ADCC represented a militarisation of sections of 
British youth which continued, and indeed only intensified, when taken over by the 
Admiralty and Air Ministry respectively.  
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Chapter 6: ‘England Expects That Every Man Will Do His Duty’: 
Trafalgar Day, Naval Commemoration, and National Identity, c.1895–
c.1939  
Trafalgar Day remains a resonant date in the calendar, commemorated in many places in the 
Anglophone world. The continuing significance of this day, remembered annually in so many 
places for almost two hundred years, is ample evidence of the mythic status of the action it 
commemorates and the most famous actor at the centre of that victory. Indeed, the legendary 
status of Horatio Nelson is probably the greatest of all the heroic myths created by the British 
to explain the essence and uniqueness of their history.1 
 
Despite John MacKenzie’s assessment, the legacy of both Trafalgar and Nelson – seemingly 
uncontested emblems of Britishness and national prestige – is not without opposition. 
Indeed, in the aftermath of clashes in Charlottesville in August 2017 between white 
supremacist protestors and antifascist demonstrators, over plans to remove the statue of 
Robert E. Lee, the Confederate general, Afua Hirsch wrote an article for The Guardian in 
which she labelled Nelson a ‘white supremacist’ and argued that Nelson’s Column should 
also be removed.2 
At the heart of Hirsch’s article is the contention that many within modern British 
society either fail to confront, or have a particularly selective interpretation of, the past. More 
broadly, her comments force us to question the place of statues, works of art, and other forms 
of material and visual culture that are laden with ideologies that are no longer, or at least 
should not be, our own. She pointed to the fact that the Cecil Rhodes statue at Oxford 
University still stands, while a monument to Edward Colston, a slave trader, remains in 
Bristol.  
Much of the response to Hirsch’s article was vitriolic, often consisting of little more 
than personal attacks on Hirsch herself. However, alongside this, there were some more 
 
1 John MacKenzie, ‘Nelson Goes Global: The Nelson Myth in Britain and Beyond’, in David Cannadine (ed.), 
Admiral Lord Nelson: Context and Legacy (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 144.  
2 Afua Hirsch, ‘Toppling Statues? Here’s Why Nelson’s Column Should be Next’, 22 August 2017, 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/aug/22/toppling-statues-nelsons-column-should-be-next-
slavery [accessed 15 November 2018]. 
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perceptive and reflective themes which characterised responses to Hirsch’s piece. In 
particular, debates about nation and national identity, the importance of the past in 
contemporary society, and the highly politicised nature of national commemoration all 
represented some of the more cogent issues raised by those who objected to Hirsch’s article. 
For instance, Andrew Lambert warned that pulling down Nelson’s Column ‘would rip the 
heart out of British identity, and begin a bonfire on our history that would not end until 
everything that is different, unique and important had been consumed, leaving nothing but 
universal platitudes. Changing the past is far more dangerous than understanding it.’3 
      Patriotism, nation, and national identity were also evident in reports of the 
bicentenary of the Battle of Trafalgar in 2005.4 For instance, in stark contrast to the 
arguments advanced by Hirsch, The Sun felt that such commemorations ‘reminded us of 
what made this country great’, declaring ‘we must never be afraid or ashamed to salute our 
national heroes’. It also objected to the marginalisation of Trafalgar in the son et lumière re-
enactment in favour of a ‘red’ versus ‘blue’ naval battle. The Daily Mail’s protests took place 
along similar lines, with the newspaper reminding the ‘panjandrums of political correctness 
that at Trafalgar the Reds did not fight the Blues – the British beat the French, resulting in 
the creation of the greatest navy and arguably the most beneficial empire in history’. The 
Guardian, on the other hand, suggested that celebrating the ‘carnage of Trafalgar is 
obscene’.5  
The legacy of Trafalgar and Nelson is evidently an enduring, yet contested and 
conflicting one. However, despite recent interest, the Navy League’s celebration of Trafalgar 
 
3 Tom Rogan, ‘Britain’s Foremost Naval Historian: Nelson’s Column Must Stand in Place’, 24 August 2017, 
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in Holger Hoock (ed.), History, Commemoration, and National Preoccupation: Trafalgar 1805–2005 
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Day has received curiously little attention from historians of modern Britain.6 Where 
Trafalgar Day has been examined, little of this interest has extended beyond the Edwardian 
period.7 The imperial dimensions of Trafalgar Day have been explored in studies by Daniel 
Owen Spence and John Griffiths, although, again, only in passing.8 This chapter seeks to 
build on these works. It will argue that the presence and continuation of Trafalgar Day in 
interwar commemorative practices challenges untested assertions, such as those of Anne 
Summers, who argues that ‘the manufactured ritual’ of Trafalgar Day ‘struck few chords’.9  
This chapter is concerned with the ways in which Trafalgar Day – and by extension 
navalism – was reconstituted after the 1914–1918 conflict. The commemoration of Trafalgar 
Day provided a platform for the Navy League to construct naval and national identity and to 
impress upon both state and society the importance of sea power. In short, Trafalgar Day 
was about keeping Britain’s rich naval heritage – and status as an island nation – relevant to 
society in the twentieth century. The Navy League’s construction and use of the past was 
highly politicised and, at times, strongly contested.  
 
6 Recent edited collections by David Cannadine and Holger Hoock provide excellent discussions on the legacy 
of Trafalgar and Nelson, yet only one contribution, Marianne Czisnik’s ‘Commemorating Trafalgar: Public 
Celebration and National Identity’ in Cannadine’s Trafalgar in History, offers an extended discussion of the 
Navy League and Trafalgar Day. See David Cannadine (ed.), Trafalgar in History: A Battle and its Afterlife 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Cannadine (ed.), Admiral Lord Nelson; and Hoock, History, 
Commemoration, and National Preoccupation.  
7 Coetzee, For Party or Country; pp. 25–27, Hamilton, The Nation and the Navy, Chapter IV; Andrew S. 
Thompson, Imperial Britain: The Empire in British Politics, c. 1880–1932 (Harlow: Longman, 2000), p. 46.  
8 Chapter 7 of Spence, Colonial Naval Culture and John Griffiths, Imperial Culture in Antipodean Cities, 
1880–1939 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), especially Chapter 6. 
9 Summers, ‘Militarism’, p. 118. Manifestations of public navalism, and attempts by the Navy League to place 
the navy at the centre of public imagination, certainly appear to be at odds with wider forms of commemoration 
in the interwar period. Adrian Gregory, for example, has explored the way in which peace societies attempted 
to make Armistice Day an anti-militarist display. See Chapter 5 of Adrian Gregory, The Silence of Memory: 
Armistice Day 1919–1946 (Oxford: Berg, 1994). See also Dan Todman, The Great War: Myth and Memory 
(London: Hambledon Continuum, 2005), pp. 49–59; Alex King, Memorials of the Great War in Britain: The 
Symbolism of Politics and Remembrance (Oxford: Berg, 1998); and Bob Bushaway ‘Name Upon Name: The 
Great War and Remembrance’, in Roy Porter (ed.), Myths of the English (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), pp. 
136–167. For commemorations and the politics of memory and national identity see John R. Gillis (ed.), 
Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). 
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The historiographical neglect of Trafalgar Day is surprising given the recent interest 
in the cultural and symbolic aspects of the Royal Navy.10 It is also surprising when one 
considers the vast historiography exploring the changing nature of memorials, monuments, 
and commemorative practices surrounding war in the interwar years, as well as the complex 
and contested relationship between national identity and the construction of ‘invented 
traditions’.11 As Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger famously defined them, ‘invented 
traditions’ are practices ‘normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a 
ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by 
repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past’.12 As McCarthy notes, 
under this conceptual framework ‘historians of modern Britain have analysed everything 
from civic centenaries and acts of remembrance to imperial pageantry and military tattoos’.13 
In his study of patriotic rituals in First World War propaganda, David Monger similarly 
observes that ‘historians of modern Britain have taken regular interest in rituals, particularly 
those concerned with public and popular politics’.14 
What such accounts highlight is that public ritual is crucial in the construction of 
identity.15 As Paul Connerton argues, rituals ‘have the capacity to give value and meaning 
 
10 See Rüger, The Great Naval Game. See also Don Leggett, ‘Restoring Victory: Naval Heritage, Identity and 
Memory in Interwar Britain’, Twentieth Century British History, vol. 28, no. 1 (2017), pp. 57–82; Ralph 
Harrington, ‘‘The Mighty Hood’: Empire, War at Sea and the British National Imagination, 1920–60’, Journal 
of Contemporary History, vol. 38, no. 2 (2003), pp. 171–185; Jenks, Naval Engagements; Redford (ed.), 
Maritime History, and Conley, From Jack Tar.  
11 The literature is vast, but see James M. Mayo, ‘War Memorials as Political Memory’, Geographical Review, 
vol. 78, no. 1 (1988), pp. 62–75; Reinhart Koselleck, The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History, 
Spacing Concepts (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), pp. 285–327; Jay Winter, Sites of Memory, Sites 
of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); 
K.S. Inglis, ‘War Memorials: Ten Questions for Historians’, Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains, no. 
167 (1992), pp. 5–21; Alan Borg, War Memorials: From Antiquity to the Present (London: Leo Cooper, 1991); 
Bill Niven, ‘War Memorials at the Intersection of Politics, Culture and Memory’, Journal of Culture Studies, 
vol. 1, no. 1 (2008), pp. 39–45. 
12 Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds), The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1983), p. 1. 
13 McCarthy, ‘The League of Nations’, p. 110.  
14 David Monger, ‘Familiarity Breeds Consent? Patriotic Rituals in British First World War Propaganda’, 
Twentieth Century British History, vol. 26, no. 4 (2015), p. 505.  
15 McCarthy, ‘The League of Nations’, p. 110.  
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to the life of those who perform them’.16 Indeed, ritualisation can create a feeling of 
connection with the past and encode objects with a cultural status.17 Ritual, as an analytical 
and explanatory term, has been the subject of serious scholarly debate among historians.18 
However, in attempting to understand the importance of Trafalgar Day as public and political 
ritual in British society, rituals will be understood as a ‘rule-governed activity of a symbolic 
character which draws the attention of its participants to objects of thought and feeling which 
they hold to be of special significance’.19 
This chapter explores a number of areas relating to the Navy League’s celebration of 
Trafalgar Day. It will first outline the structure and content of Trafalgar Day celebrations 
and will provide an examination of the day until the end of the First World War. It will then 
explore how Trafalgar Day was celebrated beyond Nelson’s Column. In attempting to 
understand the extent to which Trafalgar Day resonated within contemporary society, and 
was able to embed itself in popular civic ritual, the chapter examines the response of the 
popular – and regional – press to the commemorations. In looking at the shifting meaning of 
Trafalgar Day throughout the interwar years, the chapter then examines the Navy League’s 
‘Nelson Day’ messages. Although the form of ceremony on Trafalgar Day essentially 
remained the same throughout the period, the meaning of the day constantly changed, with 
the concept of navalism undergoing constant revision for the Navy League. Trafalgar Day 
was about ritual and commemoration, yet it was also about education, naval and national 
 
16 Paul Connerton, How Societies Remember (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 45. 
17 See Jan Assmann, ‘Communicative and Cultural Memory’, in Astrid Erll and Ansgar Nünning (eds) in 
collaboration with Sara B. Young, Cultural Memory Studies: An International and Interdisciplinary Handbook 
(Berlin; New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2008), pp. 109–119.  
18 Particularly since the publication of Emile Durkheim’s, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (London: 
Allen & Unwin, 1976). See also, debates in David I. Kertzer, Ritual, Politics, and Power (New Haven, Yale 
University Press: 1988) and Catherine Bell, Ritual: Perspectives and Dimensions (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1997).  
19 Steven Lukes, ‘Political Ritual and Social Integration’, Sociology, vol. 9, no. 2 (1975), p. 291. For a further 
discussion of some of the issues surrounding the study of rituals, see Edward Muir, Ritual in Early Modern 
Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 1–11. 
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identity, and propaganda. This chapter will demonstrate the importance of Trafalgar Day in 
the creation of sea-mindedness and an ‘imagined’ naval community, in the construction of 
national and imperial identity, and for extolling the virtues of seapower by the Navy 
League.20  
 
 
I. The Invention of Trafalgar Day 
At the suggestion of Arnold White, Trafalgar Day was first held by the Navy League on 21 
October 1895 to commemorate the ninetieth anniversary of the Battle of Trafalgar.21 While 
Nelson’s Column was constructed in 1843 there appears, as Marianne Czisnik observes, 
‘never to have been any regular habit of celebrating Trafalgar Day outside the Royal Navy’ 
until the Navy League’s celebration of Trafalgar Day in 1895. ‘This’, as Czisnik remarks, 
‘was the beginning of a tradition’.22 While the first Trafalgar Day was relatively small, this 
did indeed mark the beginning of a tradition which remained important to the Navy League.  
Celebrations the following year were on a much larger and grander scale. The Times 
recorded that celebrations were noticeable due to ‘an extraordinary manifestation of public 
interest and of patriotism’. The newspaper noted that its creation was ‘in large measure due 
to the Navy League’, but that the celebrations more broadly represented ‘widely-spread 
enthusiasm for a great hero of the past’.23 The Spectator estimated that over half a million 
people must have seen the decorations on Nelson’s Column.24 As the League itself 
 
20 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: 
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21 For the commemoration of Nelson throughout the nineteenth century see Marianne Czisnik, 
‘Commemorating Trafalgar: Public Celebration and National Identity’, in Cannadine (ed.), Trafalgar in 
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22 Ibid., p. 143.  
23 ‘Trafalgar Day’, The Times, 22 October 1896, p. 4.  
24 ‘News of the Week’, The Spectator, 24 October 1896, p. 2.  
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explained, ‘in initiating Trafalgar Day the object sought for by the Navy League was, not 
triumph over former foes, but recognition of the principles of duty and courage personified 
in the life and death of Nelson – a legacy of example for the present and future generations 
of the English-speaking people’.25  
      Following the first celebration of Trafalgar Day, The Navy League Journal 
triumphantly declared:  
It was as if the people had arisen to answer those who say: “They do not care; they have 
forgotten their dead . . .” the hundreds of thousands who for six days from morning till night 
defiled before the column have shown the unsuspected strength of feeling latent in British 
hearts. They have shown that Britons do care, that they have not forgotten, that they are still 
capable of devotion and self-sacrifice. Trafalgar – the very name, with its stirring associations, 
is a trumpet-call to the nation to do its duty . . . the great mass of people in the square were 
pilgrims, rather than spectators. And those who were mere spectators must have learnt from 
their gazings. They would realise that the British Navy still regards Nelson as its chosen hero.26  
Trafalgar Day was often reported on in a similar manner. For instance, The Observer felt 
there ‘was no anniversary in the history of any country’ which had ‘a better right to be 
celebrated’.27 However, the extent to which the Navy League was invested in the 
commemoration of Trafalgar Day has been the subject of some debate. For instance, Barbara 
Tomlinson writes that, following the first Trafalgar Day, it ‘subsequently became popular 
nationwide but the League regarded this involvement with heritage as a distraction from its 
contemporary political objectives’.28 This is not the case. The League used Trafalgar Day 
not to only expound its own political objectives, but also to create – and shape – sea-
mindedness in Britain. The League’s use of the past, and of Britain’s naval heritage, was 
crucial for the construction of naval identity as we shall see. The early responses to the Navy 
League’s celebration of Trafalgar Day, and the particular attention to Nelson’s Column, also 
 
25 ‘The Navy League and Naval Celebrations’, The Times, 7 June 1898, p. 12.  
26 ‘Trafalgar Day’, The Navy League Journal, November 1896, p. 131. 
27 ‘Trafalgar Day’, The Observer, 22 October 1911, p. 13. 
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challenge Robert Musil’s infamous claim that ‘there is nothing so invisible as a 
monument’.29 
By 1898, The Pall Mall Gazette argued that ‘public opinion, educated by journalists 
and the Navy League, has insisted upon the steady development of our naval resources. The 
days in which official lethargy had to be prodded into action by a series of scares have 
departed, we trust for ever.’ The Referee likewise felt ‘there cannot be a greater incentive to 
young Englishmen to join the navy than the celebration of Nelson’s Day at Trafalgar 
Square’, while The Standard declared that ‘the anniversary of Lord Nelson’s greatest victory 
was commemorated yesterday with unabated enthusiasm. The celebration is due to the Navy 
League, and it is to that association that the honour belongs of reviving the national interest 
in the greatest seaman of the century.’30 There was, however, some opposition to the display. 
The author Arthur Conan Doyle felt that it would be ‘unchivalrous to exult over a beaten 
foe’, suggesting the Navy League instead name Nelson’s birthday ‘Nelson Day’.31 The 
playwright George Bernard Shaw similarly argued that rather than decorating Nelson’s 
Column, the League might be best advised to pull it down.32 Given Conan Doyle’s 
imperialist sentiments, and Shaw’s ties with the Fabian Society, this suggests that Trafalgar 
Day was viewed as contentious by figures across the political spectrum.  
Such criticism seemingly had little impact on Navy League policy, with Trafalgar 
Day celebrations only increasing in size. However, the League did feel the need to respond 
to such criticism. The Navy League Journal wrote that ‘one or two unsympathetic letters in 
 
29 Cited in Siobhan Kattago, ‘Written in Stone: Monuments and Representation’, in Siobhan Kattago (ed.), The 
Ashgate Research Companion to Memory Studies (Surrey: Ashgate, 2015), p. 179.  
30 ‘British Opinion on Trafalgar Day Celebration’, The Navy, November 1898, pp. 164–165.   
31 ‘Nelson Day’, The Times, 20 October 1897, p. 12. 
32 Hamilton, The Nation and the Navy, p. 146.  
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the Press’ had been published surrounding Trafalgar Day celebrations. ‘To the writers of 
them’, the journal remarked, 
to those who would forget Trafalgar and erase its lesson from the nation’s heart, we can say 
nothing. They are beyond reminders and reproofs. They had better emigrate to some distant 
island of the Southern Seas, where, safe from war’s alarms and the exhilarating call of national 
duty, they can live the life of a tame rabbit in its hutch.33 
Despite such criticism, Trafalgar Day remained popular and there was certainly 
something of the ‘cult of the centenary’ surrounding the Navy League’s centenary 
celebrations in 1905.34 The Navy League Journal estimated that 20,000 people were in 
Trafalgar Square with queues for Nelson’s Column reaching nearly three miles in length.35 
The Daily Telegraph likewise reported ‘immense throngs’ of visitors to Trafalgar Square 
and that ‘the manifold Nelson gatherings, concerts, and banquets seem to have been marked 
by an outpouring of patriotic fervour’.36 Yet, following the entente cordiale agreement in 
1904, the patriotic elements of the display were somewhat muted in order not to offend 
Britain’s new ally, France.37 Indeed, as Roland Quinault notes, the centenary celebrations 
were striking in the way they sought to commemorate French and Spanish dead.38 The 
centenary celebrations were also marked by the religious symbolism surrounding the 
display. As Czisnik notes, ‘the whole event was hugely indebted to Christian symbolism of 
the saviour . . . including the notion of death and ‘resurrection’’.39  
 
33 ‘Trafalgar Day’, The Navy League Journal, November 1896, p. 131. See also Arnold White’s response to 
Conan Doyle, ‘The Commemoration of Trafalgar’, The Navy League Journal, November 1897, p. 276. For the 
League’s response to Shaw, see ‘Trafalgar Day’, The Navy League Journal, November 1898, p. 158.  
34 Roland Quinault, ‘The Cult of the Centenary, c.1784–1914’, Historical Research, vol. 71, no. 176 (1998), 
pp. 303–323.  
35 ‘Nelson Centenary Celebration’, The Navy League Journal, November 1905, p. 273. 
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37 MacKenzie, ‘Nelson Goes Global’, in Cannadine (ed.), Admiral Lord Nelson, p. 157. Cf. Andrew Lambert, 
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While Trafalgar Day had clearly quickly assumed significance on a national level, it 
was also crucial to the survival of the League itself. As one Navy League pamphlet reflected: 
When the Navy League had been under way for about six months, it was evident that 
something must be done to attract public support to the principle of Sea Power, if the League 
was not to die of inanition. Popular support . . . may generally be secured by linking a great 
idea to a great personality . . . So Nelson’s life and death, it was foreseen, might be utilised to 
personify British Sea Power to the children, if not to the veterans, of British democracy 
throughout the world . . . Everything that emphasises the fact that England lives on a 
foundation of Sea Power exerts a healthy influence on national life and character.40  
 
This highly idealised moment in British history was able to invest Navy League practices 
with ‘the authority and weight of tradition’.41 Navalism and the promotion of naval 
armaments was palatable in the form of naval commemoration, especially when centred 
around Nelson. Trafalgar Day and Nelson provided the Navy League with a usable past, 
one which could reinforce its contemporary propaganda on a wide range of issues.  
 
 
II. The Form of Trafalgar Day 
In commemoration of the Battle of Trafalgar, and in memory of Nelson, wreaths were 
annually placed at the foot of Nelson’s Column in Trafalgar Square. Displayed centrally was 
the Navy League’s wreath bearing its motto, ‘Keep Watch’.42 Initially the column, base, and 
plinth were decorated. The column would be ‘encircled by a gilded naval crown . . . bearing 
nautical devices, while from this point downwards four festoons of laurel were entwined, 
extending from a point near the base as far as the Landseer lions, round the heads of which 
they were looped’.43 However, from 1901, decorations were confined to the base and 
plinth.44  
 
40 MSCC, Navy League Pamphlets, ‘Nelson Day’, Navy League Pamphlet, 1936, pp. 1–2.  
41 T.G. Otte, ‘Centenaries, Self-Historicization and the Mobilization of the Masses’, in Otte, The Age of 
Anniversaries, pp. 26–27.  
42 Tritton changed this motto to ‘Sacrifice and Service’. Following Tritton’s resignation in 1922, however, the 
League reverted back to ‘Keep Watch’. ‘Grand Council Meeting’, The Navy, July 1922, pp. 188–189.  
43 ‘Trafalgar Day’, The Navy League Journal, November 1897, p. 274. 
44 ‘Trafalgar Day Celebration’, The Navy League Journal, November 1901, p. 201.  
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Nelson’s Column was undoubtedly a site of remembrance and commemoration, yet 
it was also a site of political mobilisation.45 The symbolic value of Nelson’s Column is 
important to highlight; as Andrew Lambert remarks, ‘Nelson on an Augustan column 
provided the ultimate expression of global maritime power . . . The impact of the column 
was, and remains, immense.’46 Nelson’s Column undoubtedly provided the focal point of 
Navy League ritual and commemoration. Nelson’s Column, as well as the Battle of Trafalgar 
itself, acted as the League’s lieu de mémoire.47 However, Navy League commemoration 
went beyond the column.  
As well as the wreaths on Nelson’s Column, a wreath would also be placed at the 
foot of Nelson’s tomb in St. Paul’s Cathedral. Flown at Trafalgar Square and on Nelson’s 
flagship, the HMS Victory, was Nelson’s famous signal ‘England expects that every man 
will do his duty’. Interestingly, commemorations on the Victory took place long before the 
Navy League’s annual celebration at Trafalgar Square. As Colin White notes, by the 1840s, 
the custom of dressing the ship overall on Trafalgar Day had begun, alongside ‘hoisting 
laurel wreaths between her masts as a sign of mourning for Nelson’.48 In 1846, the custom 
of toasting to ‘the immortal memory of Nelson and those who fell with him’ was established. 
Around the same time, ‘the custom of dressing the Victory overall on Trafalgar Day was 
replaced with the tradition of hoisting the flags of ‘Nelson’s ‘England Expects’ signal’.49  
 
45 For Trafalgar Square as a site for political demonstration in general, see Rodney Mace, Trafalgar Square: 
Emblem of Empire (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1976). 
46 Andrew Lambert, ‘Nelson, Trafalgar and the Meaning of Victory’, History Today, vol. 54, no. 11 (2004), p. 
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Divisions (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. xvii. 
48 Colin White, ‘Nelson Apotheosised: The Creation of the Nelson Legend’, in Cannadine (ed.), Admiral 
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Accompanying Trafalgar Day, a religious service was also held each year, initially 
at St Martin-in-the-Fields and then at St Paul’s Cathedral. The sermons would almost always 
address Britain’s naval position and evoke the spirit and legacy of Nelson and Trafalgar. 
William Inge, the Dean of St. Paul’s Cathedral, in a fairly typical sermon in 1919 addressed 
his audience thus:  
There was no reason in the nature of things why a nation should grow old and decay. Nor was 
there any proof, in spite of disquieting symptoms, that we were a decadent nation. But we 
needed to unite and organise all the best elements in the nation, for we had a hard struggle 
before us. The Navy League stood for duty and discipline, the two things which we needed 
the most.50  
 
50 ‘Nelson Day Celebrations’, The Navy, December 1919, p. 163.  
Figure 7: ‘Nelson’s Monument in Trafalgar Square’, The 
Navy League Journal, November 1902, p. 237. 
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The speech is made more interesting when one considers that the service was conducted by 
H.R.L. Sheppard, who later founded the PPU.  
An annual Nelson Day dinner would also be held, which was attended by Dominion 
statesman, ambassadors, prominent British politicians, members of the royal family, 
members of the Admiralty, members of the British and Dominion Navy Leagues, and finally 
by members of the press. Each year a toast was made to ‘the glorious and immortal memory 
of Nelson and his comrades’. The dinner was a high point in the League’s social calendar 
and a further way in which the League attempted to disseminate its message. As Christopher 
Bell argues, the dinner highlights an example of the ‘Admiralty provid[ing] the Navy League 
with a clear vote of confidence and measure of moral support’.51 Such moral support was 
also provided by the royal family, with Edward VIII, Prince of Wales, stating in 1932 that 
he ‘agree[d] with all the purposes of the Navy League’.52 As the occasions boasted key public 
figures, and speeches on naval issues, press coverage was also fairly extensive.  
While it is difficult to gauge attendance levels throughout the interwar years, 
thousands were regularly reported to have been present at Nelson’s Column. Alongside the 
aforementioned features of Trafalgar Day, the day would often include a host of other events 
in an attempt to remain in the public eye such as military parades, pageants, public lectures, 
essay competitions, dances, concerts, and film screenings. Trafalgar Day in wartime, 
however, was even more closely tied to the nation and national identity.  
 
 
III. Trafalgar Day in the First World War 
With the outbreak of hostilities in 1914, the Navy League’s celebration of Trafalgar Day 
took on new meaning. As The Manchester Guardian reported: ‘[Nelson’s] Column is now 
 
51 Bell, The Royal Navy, p. 167.  
52 ‘Nelson Day Dinner’, The Navy, December 1932, p. 363.  
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not only the symbol of a grand tradition but of a nation’s spirit . . . No crowd could have 
gathered such as to-day’s crowd except when nations were stirred to a deep sense of pride 
and determination.’53 The Times similarly observed that ‘it is doubtful whether such large 
crowds have ever been seen on any previous anniversary’.54 The first Trafalgar Day in 
wartime was also modified in content, as well as meaning. Public dinners, decorations of 
monuments and public buildings, and the public meetings which had been held in ‘support 
of a vigorous naval policy’ were cancelled. The Navy League instead urged 
that the occasion should be utilised for the especial object of concentrating public thought 
upon the incalculable blessings which have been conferred upon this nation and upon the 
British Empire as a whole through our supremacy at sea; to stimulate interest in the minds of 
the masses of the people in the welfare of officers and men of the Fleet, and to encourage solid 
and abiding confidence in the capacity of our sea power to secure the continuance of our 
liberties.55  
In 1915, Trafalgar Day was commemorated only nine days after the British nurse, 
Edith Cavell, was executed by a German firing squad in German-occupied Belgium. The 
event caused widespread condemnation and was addressed in the Trafalgar Day service that 
year.56 At the service, the Bishop of London wondered ‘what Nelson would have said if he 
had been told that an English girl had been shot in cold blood’. He felt he ‘would have made 
more than the diplomatic inquiries which have been made by a great neutral into this crime 
. . . he would have made his inquiries by the thunder of the guns of the British Fleet.’ He 
then suggested there was no need for a recruitment campaign, feeling that the execution of 
Edith Cavell was enough.57 The description of Cavell’s execution was neither novel nor 
exceptional, yet the appropriation of her death to invoke Nelson is significant. By linking 
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the contemporary conflict to the morality of Nelson, the Navy League could, yet again, 
transform the meaning of Trafalgar Day commemorations.  
Trafalgar Day celebrations in 1915 were also marked by Navy League efforts to 
impress the legacy of Nelson upon schoolchildren. The Navy League contacted the chairmen 
of educational authorities throughout Britain to ‘make arrangements that a short discourse 
on the work of the Navy during the present War may be given at a convenient hour during 
the day in every primary school’.58 In 236 districts, totalling approximately 27,000 primary 
schools, such a lecture was delivered.59 In connection with the 1915 celebrations, the Navy 
League also published a message from Winston Churchill, then ex-First Lord of the 
Admiralty, who wrote that ‘the spirit of Nelson and the memory of Trafalgar stirring to-day 
in all hearts should rouse us now to sustain un-wearingly the darkening conflict, and by 
proceeding to all necessary extremes and laying aside every impediment, rescue Britain from 
dishonour and Europe from ruin’.60 Reports of the 1915 Trafalgar Day certainly suggest that 
the spirit of Nelson remained strong. The Daily Telegraph wrote that ‘London celebrated 
Trafalgar Day in a spirit of patriotic fervour’ with hundreds of thousands of people present 
in Trafalgar Square.61 The Manchester Guardian suggested that the day was ‘mainly a 
recruiting rally . . . The crowds that poured round Nelson’s Column in the mist and rain this 
afternoon were not allowed to admire in peace the giant lions with wreaths in their mouths . 
. . there were recruiters on every plinth shouting a summons to duty.’62 
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The 1916 Trafalgar Day celebrations were closely linked with the Battle of Jutland. 
Trafalgar Day commemorations that year provided a further example of the way in which 
the League utilised the conflict to keep the legacy of Nelson alive. The day was devoted to  
an expression of the profound gratitude of the British Empire to the officers and men of the 
gallant fleet for their brilliant achievement in the victory of Jutland on the 31st May last, and 
for the incalculable services which our Sea Power has rendered to civilisation and liberty since 
the beginning of the conflict.63  
That Trafalgar Day became closely associated with the remembrance of those who lost their 
lives at sea in the First World War is significant and goes some way to explaining the 
continuing relevance of the day in the interwar years. Most of the wreaths on Nelson’s 
Column in 1916 were in memory of those who lost their lives at Jutland, with The Navy 
describing Nelson’s Column as a ‘great war shrine’.64 The Navy League also decided in 
1916 upon changing the name of Trafalgar Day to Nelson Day ‘in order to express in a 
permanent form the warmest friendship with France and to increase the interest of the British 
people in the sea power of the Empire which is associated with the name of Nelson’.65 In the 
interwar period, however, both Nelson Day and Trafalgar Day were used by the Navy 
League and the press.  
The commemoration of ordinary sailors on Trafalgar Day in wartime reflected the 
shifting nature of commemorative practices more broadly and was part of a wider 
‘democratisation of death’.66 As Reinhart Koselleck has noted, ‘the nation, which had 
previously shored up its identity by way of victory monuments, now remembered all the 
dead individually’.67 Bill Niven has similarly observed that ‘monuments to triumph appeared 
to give way, in part at least, to memorials of human loss’.68 By remembering those who lost 
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their lives in the war at sea, Trafalgar Day was able to enjoy resonance well into the interwar 
years, even if the focus remained on Nelson and Nelsonian qualities. 
Throughout the First World War, Trafalgar Day was supported by many 
distinguished politicians and military figures including Field Marshall Sir Douglas Haig, 
Amery, Churchill, as well as many members of the Admiralty, including Beatty and Jellicoe. 
The final celebration of Trafalgar Day in war met with much support from these key military 
figures. For instance, Beatty sent the Navy League greetings and ‘assurances of sympathy 
with its objects and appreciation of its excellent work’. Haig wrote that ‘on the anniversary 
of Nelson Day, the heart of every one in the British Army goes out with mine to all officers 
of the Royal Navy and the mercantile marine . . . I wish that this great national anniversary 
may in every way prove most successful’. Jellicoe thought that the day ‘emphasised to an 
exceptional degree the supreme value of sea power’ and that ‘it is fitting that on ‘Nelson 
Day’ the Empire should remember with profound gratitude all that it owes to its seamen, and 
should renew its determination to see that both the Navy and the Mercantile Marine retain 
that position which is essential to its safety and welfare’.69 As Bell has noted, ‘Naval 
decision-makers valued the Navy League because it could and did appeal directly to the 
public, something the navy felt itself unable to do’.70 While there was less pomp and 
ceremony surrounding Trafalgar Day celebrations throughout the First World War, the day 
remained an important occasion for the Navy League and for many throughout Britain.  
 
 
IV. Trafalgar Day Beyond Nelson’s Column 
Jay Winter has urged historians to ‘shrink the framework of discussions of commemorative 
forms in the twentieth century . . . shifting the scale of vision from the national and grandiose 
 
69 ‘Nelson Commemoration’, The Navy, October 1918, p. 83.  
70 Bell, The Royal Navy, p. 167.  
263 
 
to the particular and mundane may help transform our understanding of war monuments, 
and of the forms of remembrance which occur surrounding them.’ Winter argues that ‘great 
national sites of remembrance are exceptional, and their histories provide a misleading 
impression of thousands of others’.71 While this chapter has been careful to suggest that 
Trafalgar Day celebrations were heterogenous in scope and nature, it is undoubtedly 
important to assess the place on Trafalgar Day commemorations beyond Nelson’s Column. 
By the end of the First World War, the commemoration of Trafalgar Day throughout Britain 
was a well-established practice. While Nelson’s Column naturally provided a focal point, 
the day was celebrated throughout many towns and cities in Britain – particularly in port 
towns.  
In Portsmouth, ‘as the premier naval port of the Empire’, Trafalgar Day held special 
significance.72 The Portsmouth Evening News viewed Trafalgar Day as ‘one of our great 
national days of remembrance’.73 Nelson’s flagship, the Victory, was festooned with laurels 
on each Trafalgar Day, with a wreath being placed on the spot where Nelson fell.74 A wreath 
was also placed on the Nelson Monument on Portsdown Hill in Portsmouth. Alongside the 
decoration of the Victory, Portsmouth would also hold a naval pageant procession on behalf 
of the Trafalgar Day Orphan Fund.75 Nelson’s cabin on the Victory even played host to a 
dinner on Trafalgar Day in 1930, held by Sir Roger Keyes.76  
On Trafalgar Day in 1922, Admiral Frederick Charles Doveton Sturdee, president of 
the Society for Nautical Research (SNR), launched a public appeal to raise funds for the 
restoration of the Victory, arguing that ‘the value of the Victory is no transitory thing’, while 
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Archibald Hurd, the journalist and Navy League member, contended that ‘the Victory would 
. . . be a lasting monument to an era in the history of our sea-power which is linked up 
intimately with the story of the great expansion of England’.77 That Sturdee chose Trafalgar 
Day to launch his campaign is, of course, significant. As Don Leggett notes, the ‘campaign 
sought to preserve the physical remnants of Nelson’s ship and memorialize a moment in 
British history when sea power was at its height and the British Empire was securely 
guarded’.78 The SNR also requested financial support from the Navy League, although due 
to the parlous conditions of the League’s finances at the time, it felt unable to help.79  
The restoration of the Victory was not the only campaign linked with Trafalgar Day 
in the interwar years. A similar scheme was launched on the eve of Trafalgar Day in 1925 
to save the HMS Implacable by Lord Beatty. Beatty viewed the ship as a ‘national relic’ and 
later described the scheme to save the Implacable in the following terms: ‘The work that the 
Implacable was intended for was to build up that sea service and to inculcate it into the minds 
of many, so that they should follow in the footsteps of the great seamen of the past and 
maintain the heritage that had been passed down to us’.80 These restoration campaigns 
provide further evidence of the myriad ways in which Britain’s rich naval heritage, and 
relevance of Trafalgar for contemporary generations, was kept alive. 
Trafalgar Day also had a particular resonance in the North East of England. As 
Admiral Lord Collingwood was born in Newcastle upon Tyne, the strength of sentiment 
surrounding Trafalgar Day celebrations at Collingwood’s Monument in Tynemouth was, 
 
77 ‘Save the Victory’, Portsmouth Evening News, 20 October 1922, p. 5; Leggett, ‘Restoring Victory’, p. 61.  
78 Leggett, ‘Restoring Victory’, p. 61. 
79 The Navy League did, however, publish appeals for the Victory fund in The Navy. NMM, SNR 7/2, Society 
for Nautical Research Papers (SNR), Victory Correspondence, ‘Save the “Victory” Fund’. The Hawke’s Bay 
branch of the Navy League in New Zealand also provided a donation of £53.01 to the SNR, noting that such 
contributions represented a ‘general spirit of deep loyalty and patriotism’. NMM, SNR 7/2, SNR, Victory 
Correspondence, Letter from the Hawke’s Bay branch of the Navy League to the SNR, 8 August 1923, p. 1.  
80 ‘Ship that Fought the Victory’, The Times, 20 October 1925, p. 11; ‘The Implacable’, The Times, 21 October 
1930, p. 17.  
265 
 
perhaps, unsurprising. Beginning in 1923, Tynemouth’s commemoration of Trafalgar Day 
took a similar form to the one at Nelson’s Column. A public procession would take place 
before a wreath would be placed at the foot of the Collingwood Monument. This was initially 
done by the Mayor of Tynemouth and then by the Duke of Northumberland, as president of 
the Northumberland County and City of Newcastle Navy League Branch. This was often 
followed by a service by the Vicar of Tynemouth. In performing the ceremony, the Duke of 
Northumberland thought the purpose of doing so was threefold:  
It is to pay tribute to the memory of a great Englishman and a great Northumbrian Seaman: 
(2) in order to show our sense of the deep gratitude we owed to the British navy; and (3) to 
express our determination to maintain that navy . . . to protect the interests of the British 
Empire in the future as it had in the past.81  
The form of commemoration resembled the Navy League’s main celebrations at Trafalgar 
Square, although the strength of regional celebrations is important to note. Trafalgar Day 
was also important for cultivating civic pride on a local level. This is evident in the Mayor 
of Tynemouth’s suggestion that the day was ‘one of the greatest events in English history’ 
and that ‘there was no more suitable place [than Tynemouth] for the ceremony’.82  
In Bristol, the local Navy League branch was particularly active in Trafalgar Day 
celebrations. The branch would show naval films to around 2,000 schoolchildren each year 
‘with a view to bringing home to the coming generation the essential meaning of Nelson’s 
victory and its influence on the Empire’.83 By 1922, the Western Daily Press declared that 
‘Trafalgar Day has become an institution’.84 Trafalgar Day was also celebrated in Glasgow, 
Edinburgh, Manchester, Birmingham, Liverpool, Norwich, Southampton, and in many other 
towns and cities throughout Britain. Urban centres and port towns, or places with particular 
links to the Battle of Trafalgar, saw the most popular celebrations of Trafalgar Day. 
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However, smaller, regional celebrations of Trafalgar Day commemorations were often well 
attended and were widely reported on in the local press. As the Yorkshire Evening Post 
commented, Trafalgar Day represented ‘the greatest sea anniversary’ in Britain.85 Although 
the local Navy League branches were often responsible for such commemoration, many local 
councils commemorated the day without Navy League pressure. These local forms of 
commemoration certainly suggest that Trafalgar Day had resonance beyond London.  
 
 
V. Trafalgar Day and the Shifting Nature of Navalism: 1919–1939 
In his study of Empire Day in Britain, Jim English notes that in the aftermath of the First 
World War ‘the survival of and (in some places) extension of Empire Day celebrations 
appears curious, given that its attendant militaristic rituals and jingoistic legacy appeared 
anachronistic after the catastrophe of the war’.86 English’s conclusion provides a useful 
starting point and model for exploring the Navy League’s celebration of Trafalgar Day in 
the interwar years.87 Indeed, as early as 1919, The Daily Telegraph noted that ‘Trafalgar Day 
begins to assume something of the same spirit as that of Empire Day, in that it emphasises 
the imperial significance of the anniversary in relation to the Royal Navy’.88 Representing 
similar ‘militaristic rituals’ as Empire Day, Trafalgar Day focused on naval heritage, 
tradition, commemoration, and naval nostalgia. However, the display was in many respects 
Janus-natured. While Trafalgar Day attempted to evoke the legacy of Nelson and instil 
feelings of patriotism, self-sacrifice, and duty, it was also a crucial platform for the Navy 
League to narrate the Navy’s place in post-war Britain. Trafalgar Day represented a 
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renegotiation of navalism – and of Britain’s status as a maritime nation – in the aftermath of 
the First World War. 
With ‘naval treaties, economic slumps and the rise of airpower’ posing problems for 
the Royal Navy, together with the ‘ambiguous outcome of the Battle of Jutland’, Trafalgar 
Day marked an important point of continuity for the Navy League.89 Indeed, as one Nelson 
Day message made clear, ‘In spite of all the contributions which the engineer and the 
scientist have made to human progress, we remain islanders’.90 If ‘Empire Day was 
representative of the prevailing sentiment of imperialism that characterized the Edwardian 
era’, then could Trafalgar Day be seen as a continuation of the prevailing sentiment of 
militaristic rituals, which similarly formed an important part of the political and cultural 
landscape of Edwardian Britain?91 There was certainly little opposition to Trafalgar Day in 
the interwar years, despite the highly politicised and, at times, militaristic nature of the 
display.  
In the immediate post-war period, the Navy League’s willingness to embrace 
international ideals of collective security, and the preservation of peace through agreement, 
while potentially sacrificing British naval supremacy, was seen by many members of the 
League as an abandonment of navalism as we have seen.92 Yet, this conflict within the 
League did little to influence the success of Trafalgar Day celebrations. Reporting on 
Trafalgar Day in 1921, The Times remarked that as ‘the years advance, and as the events, so 
fresh in the memory, of the greatest of all wars tend to recede into historical retrospect, 
Trafalgar Day assumes an ever larger and wider meaning’.93 The Daily Telegraph similarly 
noted that ‘not for many years’ had ‘Nelson’s Day been celebrated with such fervour . . . all 
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day long crowds gathered in Trafalgar Square and reverently circled the monument . . . it 
was not until late in the afternoon that there was any appreciable decline in the votaries at 
our national naval shrine.’94  
 
 
Alongside Trafalgar Day, the Navy League wanted the ‘institution of a Navy Day 
throughout the British Empire’. However, the League received a letter from the Admiralty 
informing them that ‘it was impossible to co-operate as suggested’.95 The Admiralty’s 
rejection of this proposal is perhaps surprising, especially given its support of annual navy 
weeks. While the Navy League did not have sole custodianship of Nelson’s Column, it did 
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often object to its use by other societies. For example, the League’s Islington branch 
protested against the ‘desecration of Nelson’s Column by the Communist and Socialist 
meetings held from this national monument, such demonstrations being an insult to the 
memory of the gallant Admiral in whose honour it was erected’.96  
Nelson’s Column clearly provided a visual and symbolic reminder of Britain’s naval 
past, yet how did the Navy League go about disseminating its message more broadly? There 
were, of course, competing narratives of what Trafalgar and Nelson meant for Britain and 
so each year the Navy League published, in the popular press and its own journal, a ‘Nelson 
Day’ message which outlined the League’s views on the legacy of Nelson, his relevance for 
contemporary society, and a critique of the naval situation at the time. Through Nelson Day 
messages, the League would attempt to nurture feelings of patriotism, duty, and naval 
identity. As the League declared in 1936: 
In Nelson’s day . . .  the Navy needed no advertisement, and British Sea Power wanted no 
advocate . . . Nowadays, the people require instruction in sea sense and sea knowledge, 
advertisement is necessary, and an advocate for the Silent Navy must be found; and it is the 
Navy League which supplies these requirements of the age.97  
The Nelson Day messages essentially provided the Navy League with a platform to lobby 
the government on naval issues, and to shape the attitude of British society on the centrality 
of the sea to the nation. However, while Empire Air Day was used by the Air League to 
promote rearmament and the importance of aviation to the nation and empire through 
spectacular visual displays, Trafalgar Day utilised naval tradition and heritage to promote its 
message. Several distinct themes can be seen in Nelson Day messages throughout the 
interwar years – empire, a hostility towards collective security, disarmament, pacifism, 
internationalism, and finally calls for naval supremacy.  
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Empire 
While it is beyond the purview of this chapter to provide any extensive exploration of the 
ways in which Trafalgar Day was celebrated in an imperial context, a few brief comparisons 
will be made. John Griffiths notes that the commemoration of Trafalgar Day in Antipodean 
cities, much like Empire Day, was rather underwhelming and failed to secure any 
prominence in a public setting.98 Daniel Owen Spence observes that Trafalgar Day went 
some way to fortifying imperial unity in Hong Kong, although suggests that navy week had 
more cultural purchase.99 However, if the day was not particularly popular in the Dominions 
or in the empire, Dominion Navy League branches were certainly active in their support of 
Trafalgar Day celebrations in Britain. Members of the Dominion Navy Leagues would often 
attend Nelson Day dinners, with wreaths sent yearly from the Dominions and from all across 
the globe. India, Hong Kong, Ceylon, South Africa, Malta, Newfoundland, Tasmania as well 
as many other countries would send wreaths and messages of support to the Navy League. 
Navy League branches throughout the world would also send messages to the Navy League 
in support of Trafalgar Day celebrations which were read out at Nelson Day dinners. The 
League also certainly valued its relationship with its Dominion branches. As one Nelson Day 
message made clear, ‘it [the Navy League] has formed branches in every part of the Empire, 
and this world-wide organization has become an invaluable link between Great Britain and 
her people beyond the seas’.100  
Although Trafalgar Day may not have had the same resonance in the Dominions and 
parts of the empire as it did in Britain, the rhetoric and discourse surrounding the display 
often focused on the importance of the sea for Britain’s empire. The Navy League also used 
the messages to criticise the government. We have seen the ways in which the League 
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protested against the closure of the Singapore Naval Base by MacDonald in 1924 and this 
was a feature of its Nelson Day the same year.101 The Nelson Day message in 1927 likewise 
spoke of Britain ‘facing dangers of which Nelson could not have dreamed’. The League 
urged that ‘Trafalgar Day should bring home to all loyal British citizens the “national policy” 
on which the Empire depends. Nelson, above all men, by precept and by demonstration, has 
taught us to “hold the sea.” That is the great lesson that the Navy League exists to 
proclaim.’102  However, rather than simply focusing on the defence of the empire, Nelson 
Day messages also emphasised the importance of commerce, trade, communication, and 
imperial unity. As the 1930 Nelson Day message stressed, the ‘navy is more than ever the 
“Sure Shield” of Britain, her Dominions and her Colonies, of the supplies which are the life-
blood of the homeland, and of the sea communications which hold our family of nations 
together’.103 However, towards the end of the 1920s, the content of Nelson Day – and the 
rhetoric surrounding the League’s commemorations – shifted once again.  
 
 
Collective Security, Disarmament, and Pacifism  
Reflecting the Navy League’s wider policy, the content and tone of Nelson Day messages 
from 1927 to 1934 was largely based around a hostility towards pacifism, disarmament, 
and collective security. The League used Nelson Day messages to lobby against the 
Geneva Naval Conference, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the London Naval Conference, and 
the Geneva Disarmament Conference. For instance, the Nelson Day message of 1929 was 
particularly hostile in tone: 
To Nelson the pacifism that is fashionable to-day would have been as inconceivable as the 
pathetic trust in treaties unsupported by force . . . it is the aim of the Navy League, in days 
when the strength of the national navy has become a subject of political bargaining, to strive 
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to keep alive the spirit which created and held our vast Empire – the spirit that Nelson 
embodied.104  
The Navy League’s Nelson Day messages at the time of the Geneva Conference were 
similar in tone to its wider pronouncements, although also employed Nelsonian rhetoric and 
propounded highly idealised Nelsonian traits in relation to disarmament and national 
defence. For example, the 1932 Nelson Day message warned its readers to  
be careful lest the spirit of patriotism and self-sacrifice . . . be undermined by uninformed 
clamour, and lest we come to rely too far upon the security provided by paper pacts, which 
have often proved an illusion in the past and have even been the cause of war itself . . .  Now, 
more than ever, the peace of the world can be maintained by the existence of an efficient 
British Fleet.105  
Importantly, at the height of the Geneva Conference, the League utilised Nelson as an 
emblem of Britishness, as a synonym for naval might, and as an example of how the country 
should conduct itself on the global stage. As Lloyd declared at the Nelson Day Dinner in 
1933: ‘Now for ten or fifteen years the leaders of every party have preached pacifism. They 
forgot that, when Nelson said that England expected every man to do his duty, he was not 
suggesting that every man was to do his duty by Geneva or the League of Nations.’106 For 
the Navy League, peace, stability, and security rested not upon treaties or pacts, but upon 
force. The League’s hostility towards disarmament on moral as well as practical grounds, 
alongside its use of Nelson in its rhetoric, led to much criticism – particularly from figures 
such as Noel Baker. He felt that the League were ‘still living, like Lord Lloyd, in the days 
of Nelson; they still believe that nations can grow great and can be safe by the methods 
which their heroes of the eighteenth century applied’.107 The Daily Herald also bemoaned 
that Trafalgar Day was being ‘exploited to work up panic and rush Parliament into spending 
millions more money on preparations for war’.108 
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Alongside issuing public pronouncements relating to Geneva on Trafalgar Day, the 
League also lobbied politicians more directly. In 1931, it sent out a letter to every candidate 
prior to the general election, outlining its stance on naval treaties and, again, evoked 
Nelsonian traits of duty and service. The League argued that British disarmament had only 
caused other nations to rearm and reminded candidates: ‘The General Election takes place 
within a week of Trafalgar Day, on which we celebrate the Immortal Memory of Nelson; 
may we hope that the example of duty and service of our National Hero will be in your mind 
when the “sea affair” is under consideration’.109  
 
 
National Defence and Rearmament, 1934–1938 
The Navy League’s understanding of national defence and rearmament was conceived on an 
ideological and moral basis, as well as a strategic and military one. The content and tone of 
Navy League pronouncements, of course, reflect Navy League policy at that time. Yet, 
Nelson Day messages and the public pronouncements surrounding the League’s 
commemoration of Trafalgar Day towards the end of the decade were far less militaristic 
and patriotic in tone than one might expect. This resulted in part, as we have seen, from the 
focus on the development of the SCC and the Merchant Navy, but the tone of Nelson Day 
messages are surprising nonetheless. They revolved around naval strength and military duty, 
but they were by no means a call to arms.  
The Nelson Day message in 1934 warned that the ‘future security of the Empire 
hangs precariously in the balance, for we are no longer supreme by sea, land or air, and our 
security depends on whether the peoples of the Empire are prepared and determined to 
maintain their strength at sea’.110 The League was sensitive to the importance of air power, 
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as we have seen, although still placed primacy on the Navy for protecting trade and shipping 
routes. The 1935 Nelson Day message was somewhat more ominous in tone: ‘crisis and the 
creeping mists of war have reawakened the sense of reality and exposed the perils of a 
weakened Fleet’.111 The Nelson Day dinner that year boasted a particularly impressive guest 
list, including Jellicoe, Sir Roger Keyes, Churchill, Lord Derby, and Lord Runciman. Lord 
Lloyd described how the League had throughout ‘this long and dark decade of opportunism 
and naval neglect’ attempted to make clear the need for a ‘strong, sufficient and a supreme 
Navy’. The League’s sentiments clearly had the sympathy of the principal speaker Jellicoe, 
who declared ‘the voice of a powerful nation carries weight: that of a weak one does not’.112 
The Nelson Day message of 1936 appears to be the last formal one before the 
outbreak of the Second World War, although the League continued Trafalgar Day 
commemorations and Nelson Day dinners. The 1936 Nelson Day message spoke of the 
‘country going to work in earnest to make good the dangerous gaps in her defences and 
to build her fleets again’. Reflecting on the League’s work, the message spoke of how 
‘the Navy League through many years, in all the alternating gusts of apathy and 
enthusiasm, has laboured diligently, unceasingly and successfully to see that the great 
lesson taught at Trafalgar is not forgotten or ignored’. ‘We are’, the message continued, 
‘entering a new phase of national and Imperial endeavour . . . The Navy League has 
greater responsibilities and new opportunities . . . the Navy League means to shoulder 
these responsibilities and seize these opportunities.’113  
One feature of Trafalgar Day in 1936 was the publication of a poem by Alfred 
Noyes. Speaking at the Nelson Day dinner that year, Noyes declared that ‘we shall never 
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get peace in Europe again until we discover some sure process for the safeguarding of the 
principal of right and wrong, and in the meantime the British Navy is the most salutary 
factor in the world to-day’.114 At the Nelson Day dinner, Sir Samuel Hoare, as First Lord 
of the Admiralty, was the principal speaker. This was the first time that an active first lord 
had attended a Navy League dinner, highlighting the symbiotic relationship that existed 
between League and Admiralty towards the Second World War.  
Speaking at the Nelson Day dinner in 1938, Lord Lloyd, welcomed his guests by 
describing the mobilisation of the Royal Navy during the Munich Crisis as ‘the only 
effective argument in the conversations that took place on the other side of the channel’. 
Reflecting on the Navy League’s work, Lloyd continued 
in the days of toil and sacrifice that await us in the near future, the Navy League has a great 
part to play. Throughout the last 10 years of pacifism and disarmament, the Navy League has 
never ceased for one day in the year, with its speakers up and down the country, to warn this 
country of the dangers of Lord Baldwin’s policy of disarmament; the Navy League has an 
even greater part to play in the future.115 
This was Lloyd’s last Trafalgar Day address before the war. Underlying this message 
were themes of duty, sacrifice, and patriotism – features of much Navy League rhetoric 
throughout the interwar years.  
 
 
VI. Conclusion  
The Navy League’s commemoration of Trafalgar Day on 21 October 1939, over a month 
after the outbreak of the Second World War, was marked, as The Times reported, by a 
‘quickened interest and depth of feeling that are natural at a time when the best-loved of 
British sailors lives again in the thoughts of his people as he has always lived in the 
thoughts of the Royal Navy’.116 The annual inspection of the SCC was cancelled and 
 
114 ‘Navy League Dinner’, The Navy, November 1936, pp. 309–310.  
115 ‘Navy League Dinner’, The Navy, November 1938, p. 336.  
116 ‘Trafalgar Day’, The Times, 23 October 1939, p. 5.  
276 
 
Nelson’s Column lacked the usual resplendent decorations. There had been a plan to 
unveil memorial fountains to Jellicoe and Beatty, although this was also cancelled due to 
the outbreak of war. The League’s Nelson Day dinner was also cancelled and no Nelson 
Day message was published. However, Admiral Sir Sydney Freemantle placed a wreath 
on Nelson’s Column on the Navy League’s behalf, which read ‘In memory of those who 
fought at sea in the past for Britain’s freedom, and in gratitude to the seamen of Britain 
and France, fighting side by side to-day’.117 On the Navy League’s celebrations that year, 
The Navy wrote that: ‘thus, in a new spirit, the Navy League paid its tribute to the defences 
of freedom. In doing so, the Navy League, strong in its own faith, made testimony of its 
confidence that sea power still rules the events of man and that sea power will determine 
this dreadful and abhorrent conflict.’118 
      Although the reception of the day is somewhat difficult to gauge, the manner in 
which Trafalgar Day was celebrated throughout Britain suggests that the day still had 
resonance for many. Thousands were yearly reported to have been present at Trafalgar 
Square although, as we have seen, commemorations went far beyond central London. 
Trafalgar Day was widely reported on and was supported by a number of key political 
figures, across the political spectrum. Trafalgar Day was also supported by many members 
of the Admiralty. Trafalgar Day was just one of the ways in which the navy remained an 
important cultural symbol in the interwar years.  
This chapter has charted the evolving, adapting, and shifting meaning of Trafalgar 
Day from its ‘invention’ in 1895 to the outbreak of the Second World War. The study of 
Trafalgar Day provides a lens to view the changing nature of navalism and of the scope, 
scale, and significance of the Navy League itself. Nelson Day messages reflect the changing 
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nature of the Navy League’s politics and views on a wide array of subjects from 
internationalism, collective security, and pacifism, to empire, conceptions of national 
identity, and naval supremacy. The Navy League’s message, of course, also changed over 
time. Far from becoming irrelevant at the outbreak of the First World War, the League 
attempted to impress upon the British public the importance of the Nelsonian spirit of 
patriotism, duty, and self-sacrifice. The lesson of Trafalgar and Nelson was consistently 
altered by the Navy League according to circumstance. Nelson could be used in League 
discourse which rallied against pacifism and disarmament, yet he could also be used to 
represent ideas of national identity. Upon the outbreak of the Second World War, the Navy 
League once again called upon the spirit of Nelson, issuing his famous clarion call: ‘England 
expects that every man will do his duty’. 
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Chapter 7: ‘Millions of Eyes Were Turned Skywards’: The Air League, 
Empire Air Day, and the Promotion of Airmindedness, c.1934–1939 
On Saturday 20 May 1939, over one million people throughout Britain were present at 78 
civil and military aerodromes. Marking the ‘coming-of-age’ of the RAF as a separate service, 
visitors witnessed a range of activities that day: formation flying, dive bombing, aerobatics, 
parachuting, balloon bursting, and even ‘crazy’ flying.1 Spectators saw over 5,000 
aeroplanes – including the latest types of fighters and bombers such as Spitfires, Blenheims, 
and Hurricanes – ‘[h]urtling through the air, their engines roaring’, representing ‘the world’s 
finest aircraft’ and demonstrating the ‘winged might’ of Britain.2 These performances 
formed part of Empire Air Day – an annual event that the Air League had launched in 1934. 
Reviewing the activities of 1939, the League was clearly satisfied with the progress that had 
been made, confidently proclaiming: ‘we have become an air-minded nation’.3 The 
Aeroplane responded with similar enthusiasm, referring to ‘one of the greatest aviation 
demonstrations in our history’ which had ‘demonstrated how air-minded our country has 
become and the secure and abiding place the Royal Air Force occupied in the hearts of our 
people’.4  
A substantial literature exists on the military, political, and diplomatic aspects of 
aviation, giving credence to Allan English’s observation that little research has been carried 
out into the military culture of air forces.5 However, while the cultural, symbolic, visual, 
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material, and performative aspects of aviation have been the subject of more recent scholarly 
enquiry, the celebration of Empire Air Day has received curiously little attention.6 
This chapter redresses this imbalance by examining the Air League’s creation of 
Empire Air Day, the social, cultural, and political responses to the display, and the League’s 
promotion of airmindedness in the late 1930s. It argues that Empire Air Day – an important 
and largely militarised part of popular civic ritual – enabled the Air League to place before 
the British public a form of ‘popular’ militarism that was not only accepted, but widely 
celebrated. In doing so, it contributes to the growing literature on the cultural history of 
aviation and military spectacle in several ways. It advances our understanding of how ‘aerial 
theatre’ linked the aeroplane to the nation prior to the Second World War – as a symbol of 
modernity and technological prowess, but also as an instrument of deterrence.7 It also 
examines how Empire Air Day was linked to empire, in both rhetoric and practice. 
Moreover, the chapter highlights the interrelationship between the Air League and the Air 
Ministry, demonstrating how the Air Ministry valued aerial theatre as a vehicle for 
recruitment, propaganda, and as a way to project an image of military strength. More 
broadly, the study of Empire Air Day offers a fresh perspective on the ways in which British 
society interacted with – and ascribed meaning to – technology, technological change, 
modernity, and the visual and material culture of conflict in a period of high international 
tension.  
The previous chapter detailed the importance of naval civic ritual for the Navy 
League and in the promotion of navalism more broadly. It showed the ways in which 
Trafalgar Day was used as a vehicle to construct national and naval identity and to champion 
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military power. Both Trafalgar Day and Empire Air Day were linked by common themes 
such as empire and nation. Each was important to the Navy and Air League respectively for 
the promotion of specific messages and ideas, yet the use of civic and military ritual by each 
League was different in various ways. As we have seen, Trafalgar Day was largely 
characterised by tradition, heritage, and naval nostalgia, commemorating a high point in 
British naval supremacy. Of course, its meaning shifted and the legacy of Nelson was re-
appropriated according to circumstance. Yet, tradition was undoubtedly at the heart of Navy 
League ritual and commemoration. Conversely, the Air League’s contribution to civic ritual 
– in the form of Empire Air Day – was less concerned with heritage and tradition, but with 
modernity, technological innovation, and military theatre.  
This chapter’s line of enquiry draws on Holman’s recent work on the militarisation 
of aerial theatre in Britain and Australia in the interwar years. The most successful format to 
promote airmindedness within society in the interwar years was, according to Holman, 
through what he labels ‘aerial theatre’: a ‘spectacular display of aviation’.8 Aerial theatre, 
Holman argues, ‘offers a new way to approach popular understandings of technology and 
modernity, nation and empire, war and peace. It was a spectacular and persuasive form of 
popular culture.’9 The focus on the visual, symbolic, and performative aspects of flight as a 
lens through which to explore wider themes of empire, nation, and, in particular, militarism, 
will be similarly employed in examining the cultural and political significance of Empire 
Air Day.  
If one accepts the interpretation advanced by Jon Lawrence that, following the First 
World War, Britain became a ‘peaceable kingdom’ one would expect overt expressions of 
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militarism to enjoy little resonance.10 However, the case of Empire Air Day shows that 
institutional, cultural, and popular forms of militarism were able to continue despite the fear 
of post-war brutalisation, anti-war sentiment, the growth of internationalism, the popularity 
of interwar peace movements, pacifism, and the support for disarmament and collective 
security.11  
As the introduction to this thesis outlined, one major problem confronting the scholar 
of militarism is its elusive nature. As has been noted, militarism is traditionally understood 
as militancy, or aggressive foreign policy on the part of the state, a preponderance of the 
military in the state and finally, and most commonly, the problem of civil-military relations. 
This chapter employs a broader understanding of militarism which embraces popular and 
cultural forms. Aerial theatre was a politically and culturally acceptable way of promoting 
rearmament, popular militarism, and the military capabilities of the British state in the 
prelude to the Second World War. 
 As a whole, this chapter aims to demonstrate that Empire Air Day occupied an 
important part of popular civic ritual in the prelude to the Second World War. To do so, it 
will first examine the creation, content, and nature of Empire Air Day. It will then focus on 
aspects that were central to the day and on the tropes that the rhetoric of aerial theatre largely 
revolved around – namely airmindedness, youth, empire, and nation. Finally, it will look at 
how Empire Air Day was received by both state and society. Before examining Empire Air 
Day itself, however, it is necessary to outline the place of airmindedness in interwar Britain.  
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I. Aerial Theatre and the Promotion of Airmindedness before Empire Air 
Day  
As noted in the introduction to this thesis, the Air League’s promotion of airmindedness was 
not simply concerned with national defence, but was centred around national might and 
prestige. However, the creation of airmindedness in Britain resulted not just from aerial 
pageants of military might, but also from the celebrity status enjoyed by the aviator. 
According to Bernhard Rieger, aviators ‘became the subject of curiosity verging on the 
obsessive’ following the First World War.12 Aviation and the aviator were prominent in a 
range of juvenile fiction, novels, magazines, and films, while huge crowds were reported to 
have welcomed back aviators like Alan Cobham and Amy Johnson from their respective 
flights to Australia in 1926 and 1930.13  
Flying also played an important part in sporting events during the interwar years. The 
King’s Cup, celebrated from 1922, was Britain’s principal annual air race. The Schneider 
Trophy, the most famous international air race in the period, was held in Britain in 1919, 
1923, 1929, and 1931 and afforded the chance ‘to prove that Britain led the world in aircraft 
design and engine manufacture’.14 The race played an important part in the creation of 
national prestige and was described ‘as an abiding memorial of British supremacy in the 
air’.15 When the Labour Government confirmed at the start of 1931 that it would no longer 
finance the race, it met with widespread opposition.16 The Air League was one of the 
principal opponents to the decision, immediately contacting Sir William Mackenzie (1st 
Baron Amulree), Secretary of State for Air from 1930 to 1931, to protest.17 The League also 
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issued a strongly worded letter to the press, declaring that ‘never before has [any]one 
interested in the Nation’s prestige in the air world been so shocked as by the unutterable 
stupidity of the Government’s decision not to contribute to towards the expense of the 
contest this year’. It continued, stating that the winning of the Trophy was more than an 
advertisement of British aircraft and pilots but was the embodiment of the country’s brains 
and numerous industries and a ‘symbol of national skill’. The letter concluded by warning 
that to ‘permit a stupid, fuzzy-brained Cabinet to throw away a national asset of this order 
simply must not be tolerated. By such deeds shall we be brought to disaster.’18 Such pressure 
no doubt contributed to MacDonald’s announcement that RAF personnel and machines 
could be used, provided that the RAC could raise £100,000 to cover the costs. It was Lady 
Houston who donated the £100,000 necessary to fund the British team, declaring that she 
was ‘utterly weary of the lie-down-and-kick-me attitude of the socialist Government . . . I 
live for England and want to see England always on top’.19   
     The distinctly militaristic tradition of aerial theatre had a long and distinguished 
pedigree in British civic life. Empire Air Day was preceded by the Hendon Air Displays of 
1920 to 1937 which, as David Omissi notes, ‘turned the progress of British military aviation 
into a yearly ritual, and drew attention to one of the main justifications of an independent air 
force’.20 As a form of aerial and imperial theatre, it was highly politicised, distinctly 
militaristic, and even ‘war-like’.21 Spectators saw ‘formation flying . . . air races, parachute 
descents, bombing demonstrations, mock battles between fighters and bombers, parades of 
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19 Jack Williams, ‘The Upper Class and Aeroplane Sport between the Wars’, Sport in History, vol. 28, no. 3 
(2008), pp. 460–461. A further example of airmindedness in Britain, liked to patriotism, nation, and empire, 
can be seen in the response the Mount Everest Expedition in 1933. See Patrick Zander, ‘(Right) Wings over 
Everest: High Adventure, High Technology and High Nationalism on the Roof of the World, 1932–1934’, 
Twentieth Century British History, vol. 21, no. 3 (2010), pp. 300–329. 
20 David E. Omissi, ‘The Hendon Air Pageant, 1920–1937’, in John M. Mackenzie (ed.), Popular Imperialism 
and the Military (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992), p. 206.  
21 ‘The Set Piece’, Flight, 1 July 1932, p. 598.  
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the latest weaponry’, and aeroplanes ‘swooping down upon hordes of many-coloured “Wot 
Knotts” . . . blowing everything up with terrific bangs’.22 These set-piece bombings drew 
attention to the RAF’s imperial role in the 1920s and nearly always featured aeroplanes 
‘swooping down upon vicious but comically bewildered “natives”.23 The set-piece bombings 
were used to emphasise the importance of the RAF in terms of empire, yet the inclusion of 
industrial and more distinctly European scenarios in the late 1920s also points to the ways 
in which Hendon was linked to the preservation of Britain.24 
Britain’s imperial aerial policing was, in part, used to affirm the belief in European 
racial superiority; as Omissi observes, and as the previous descriptions suggest, ‘perhaps the 
most striking feature of the imperial set piece was its racism’.25 The highly militaristic nature 
of Hendon was also not lost on some observers. Geoffrey Dorman, the sub-editor of The 
Aeroplane, felt that the audience at Hendon understood, and approved of, the militaristic and 
patriotic symbolism of the event: ‘Judging by the vast crowds gathered to see a purely 
warlike display without any civil interest in it whatsoever . . . there is still some difficulty in 
believing that we are a Pacifist . . . Nation’.26 Another journalist, in the same paper, described 
the display in a similar manner: ‘In spite of the soothing influence of Communist 
schoolteachers, children still love to see things blown up and burn’.27 It was feared that 
Hendon elicited militaristic and ‘martial impulses’ in children, with the ILP worrying that 
Hendon was an ‘attempt to create a war-minded people’.28 
 
22 Pugh, ‘We Danced All Night’, p. 310; ‘The Set Piece’, Flight, 1 July 1932, p. 598.  
23 Omissi, ‘Hendon’, p. 204. 
24 Holman, ‘The Militarisation of Aerial Theatre’, p. 489. 
25 Omissi, ‘Hendon’, p. 204.  
26 ‘On the R.A.F. Pageant’, The Aeroplane, 4 July 1928, p. 1.  
27 Cited in Omissi, ‘Hendon’, p. 213.   
28 Robert Graves and Alan Hodge, The Long Weekend: A Social History of Great Britain, 1918–1939 (London: 
Faber and Faber, 1940), p. 269; LSE, ILP Papers, ILP/10/10/41, Report of Committee on Hendon Campaign, 
1935, p. 2.  
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The more militaristic elements of Hendon, especially the threat of the bomber, were 
also the focus of other contemporary observers. In War Over England, L.E.O. Charlton 
imagined the next war opening with a surprise attack by German bombers at the Hendon Air 
Display. The imagined bombing, dubbed the ‘Hendon holocaust’ by Charlton, had a 
‘paralysing effect’, resulting in the ‘ruthless slaughter’ of those gathered.29 Moreover, 
because the event was attended by MPs, cabinet ministers, dignitaries, and high-ranking 
military officials, the bombing was particularly significant. For the Air Force, because it was 
essentially present ‘en bloc’, the blow was ‘almost mortal’.30 Charlton’s account gives a 
sense, albeit in fairly sensationalist terms, of the fear of the bomber, the vulnerability of 
civilians to aerial bombardment, and of the significance of air displays in terms of the nation 
and national defence. Furthermore, because of the accidents at Empire Air Day in 1937 
(which will be examined later), such depictions were not too far removed from reality, even 
if they occurred on a much smaller scale than Charlton envisioned. 
Hendon was well attended. Spectator numbers exceeded 100,000 in 1928 and by 
1937 attendances reached 179,000.31 However, following the success of the first Empire Air 
Day in 1934, the Air Ministry recommended that the day ‘be accepted as an annual institution 
and that it should be developed with a view to ultimately replacing the Hendon Display’. 
The Air Ministry thought that the greatest advantage of this was that ‘it enables the public 
from a wide area to come and see the Air Force instead of confining the occasion practically 
to the south-east of England’ and that ‘Empire Air Day also provides an opportunity of a 
more intimate and more informal inspection of Royal Air Force activities’.32 Such was the 
 
29 Charlton, War Over England, p. 158; p. 161; p. 164. 
30 Ibid., p. 163. 
31 Williams, ‘Aeroplane Sport between the Wars’, p. 458.  
32 TNA AIR 2/4421, Empire Air Day, 1934, Report on opening of Royal Air Force Aerodromes and Stations 
to the Public, 29 October 1934, p. 2.  
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success of the first Empire Air Day that the Air Ministry considered extending it to an 
‘Empire Air Week’, although no agreement was reached on the matter.33  
Empire Air Day was not, however, the Air League’s only, or even first, initiative 
which involved aerial theatre. While Chapter 1 discussed the League’s failure to secure 
support for an air day at the British Empire Exhibition in 1924, proposals for some form of 
aerial theatre intensified in the early 1930s. In October 1931, the League was considering, 
alongside a number of other organisations, creating an ‘International Civil Air Week’.34 The 
chief objectives of the scheme were increased membership and publicity for the League. In 
attempting to achieve this, the week was provisionally arranged to coincide with Hendon 
and the King’s Cup.35 The emphasis on the civil side of aviation in the League’s scheme is 
important to note, especially given the misgivings of Groves, Thwaites, Balfour, and others 
over the perceived pacifism of the League. While Empire Air Day attempted to showcase 
both the civil and military sides of aviation, with the event becoming increasingly militarised 
by later displays, the emphasis on the civil side of aviation would no doubt have been to the 
disappointment of certain members of the League. However, while the Air League was able 
to gain the support of the Air Ministry for an international civil air week in principle, it was 
unable to secure any financial support for the scheme and so the matter rested in abeyance.36  
Alongside proposals for an international civil air week, the Air League was also in 
discussions with Sir Alan Cobham who approached the organisation with a scheme for a 
National Aviation Day Tour. Cobham had previously approached the League to request 
funding for his flight to Australia in 1926 and also suggested the League might considerer 
 
33 TNA AIR 2/4449, Empire Air Day Arrangements, Agenda for a Meeting to Consider Empire Air Day 
Arrangements, 15 June 1935, p. 1.  
34 AL, AL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 13 October 1931, p. 3.  
35 AL, AL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 10 November 1931, p. 3.  
36 AL, AL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 12 January 1932, p. 3.  
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supporting his earlier tour of Britain by holding it under its auspices.37 Writing to the League 
for support of the National Aviation Day Tour, Cobham stated that he ‘particularly wished 
to have the Air League associated with the undertaking’ as it would give the League ‘an 
opportunity of getting in touch with the people’ and aid the League in ‘general propaganda 
work’.38 The tour, which ran from 1932 to 1935, initially under the auspices of the League, 
began in April 1932 and included flying demonstrations, aerobatics, parachute displays, and 
offered spectators the opportunity to fly. In outlining the scheme, Cobham declared that ‘the 
importance of flying . . . the development of flying cannot be exaggerated. It is so essential 
that the public of Britain should become airminded.’39 Yet, the League appeared to offer 
little in the way of practical support.40 The Air League was, however, represented at 
Cobham’s tour and at the British Hospitals’ Air Pageants Tour, which similarly gave flying 
displays in towns and cities throughout Britain, as ‘an experimental measure’.41 The 
propagandistic value of aerial pageants and theatre was evident to the League from the early 
1930s, yet it was not until the creation of Empire Air Day that the League was able to place 
the aeroplane, empire, and nation on a public stage.  
 
 
II. The Creation, Content, and Nature of Empire Air Day  
Empire Air Day was based on a proposal in October 1933 by Chamier to Sir Edward 
Ellington, the then Chief of Air Staff. Such an initiative, Chamier argued, could help to ‘get 
the public inside aviation’ and ‘give the public an ‘insight into the everyday life of the Royal 
 
37 AL, AL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 27 May 1926, pp. 4–5; AL Minute Book, 
Meeting of the Executive Committee, 24 May 1928, p. 1.  
38 AL, AL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 8 December 1931, p. 3.  
39 ‘National Aviation Day’ (London: British Pathé, 1932–1935). See also ‘The Air Circus’ (London: British 
Pathé, 1932).  
40 For example, it was unable to provide Cobham’s tour with exhibitions of model aeroplanes as requested, 
although it did give the tour its ‘moral support’. AL, AL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 
6 April 1933, p. 2.  
41 AL, AL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 14 June 1933, p. 2.  
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Air Force’.42 The idea was ‘not to keep the public behind fences but to let them roam about 
like they do on aboard the battleships’.43 The Air Ministry felt that ‘the object of R.A.F. 
participation in Empire Air Day is to afford some opportunity to the public of seeing the 
normal life and working conditions at R.A.F. stations’.44  
The displays were supposed to be ‘at home’ days, with The Times warning audiences 
that they ‘must not expect flying displays or any spectacular variation of the normal duties’. 
However, in fact, aerodromes hosted a variety of activities on Empire Air Day: dive 
bombing, formation flying, blind flying, aerobatics, artillery observation, defence tactics, air 
combats between bombers and fighters, attacks on towed targets, and machine-gun attacks 
on ground targets.45 While such activities were considered to come under the ‘normal 
programme of training’, they were often visually spectacular. There was certainly confusion 
within many aerodromes about what exactly the form of the displays should take.46 In 1937, 
an Air Ministry memorandum stressed that the displays were supposed to fall ‘within the 
scope of training’ whereas ‘[e]xhibitions of “crazy” flying are not to be given’.47 However, 
as a separate Air Ministry memorandum conceded two years earlier, ‘the term “normal 
training” . . . is elastic’.48  
While Empire Air Day was designed to provide an insight into both civil and military 
aspects of British aviation, it was the military side of flying that people were seemingly most 
attracted by. Interestingly, given the ADCC’s militaristic nature, Chamier expressed 
 
42 TNA AIR 2/4421, Proposals for an Air Day by the Air League of the British Empire, Letter from Secretary-
General of the Air League Air Commodore J.A. Chamier to Air Chief Marshal Sir Edward L. Ellington, 25 
October 1933, p. 1.  
43 TNA AIR 2/4421, Chamier to Ellington, p. 1. 
44 TNA AIR 2/4421, Empire Air Day, 1935. Memorandum, Object of R.A.F. Participation, April 1935, p. 1.  
45 ‘Empire Air Day’, The Times, 11 April 1934, p. 11. For a fairly typical programme of Empire Air Day events, 
see TNA AIR 2/4445, Royal Air Force Official Programme, Empire Air Day, 1937.  
46 Commons Sitting, Royal Air Force (Air Day), HC Deb 09 April 1935 vol 300 c966; TNA AIR 2/4422, 
Empire Air Day – Flying Regulations, 6 August 1937, p. 1. 
47 TNA AIR 2/4442, Empire Air Day Arrangements 1937, Memorandum No. 1, 12 March 1937, p. 4.  
48 TNA AIR 2/4449, Agenda for Conference on Empire Air Day Arrangements, 19 June 1935, p. 1.  
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misgivings in 1939 about the form that Empire Air Day had taken. Chamier felt that ‘the 
idea of an “At Home” [day] had rather been lost and the day was in danger of becoming a 
series of miniature “Hendons”’.49 Chamier also expressed these views publicly, writing in 
Popular Flying that he ‘regret[ted] more than anything else the complete militarisation of an 
event designed to embrace all aviation’ and desired ‘less pageantry’ from Empire Air Day.50 
However, as Peter Adey remarks, ‘although the displays were themed on the idea of being 
‘at home’ and opening up local RAF stations to their communities, their ambitions composed 
a far more extensive sphere of influence . . . the airshows aimed to stimulate interest in 
British aviation and its capabilities as a strategic and global force.’51 Contemporaries also 
felt that the day’s importance lay in stressing the military significance of aviation. For 
example, a writer in the BUF’s, The Fascist Week, suggested that ‘whilst it must be admitted 
that the public interest in civil aviation needs stimulating, the fact that military aviation is 
being shamefully neglected, must not be forgotten’. The lesson of Empire Air Day, declared 
the article’s sub-heading, was that ‘Britain’s National Security is at Stake’.52 
The civil aspects of Empire Air Day certainly appeared to have been overwhelmed 
in the later displays. In 1934, civil aerodromes comprised over a third of the aerodromes 
open on Empire Air Day.53 However, by 1939, of the 78 aerodromes taking part, only 4 were 
‘purely civil aerodromes’.54 Many of the events at civil aerodromes also merely reflected 
those at RAF aerodromes – mock battles, formation flying, bombing set pieces, and 
 
49 AL, AL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 13 April 1939, pp. 1–2. This exact criticism 
was levelled at the Air League in a letter to Flight, although Chamier denied that the Air League had any 
intensions of creating ‘miniature Hendons’. ‘Empire Air Day Criticisms’, Flight, 22 June 1939, p. 642. 
50 ‘The Significance of E.A.D.’, Popular Flying, June 1939, p. 101.  
51 Adey, Aerial Life, p. 61.  
52 ‘Necessity for Air Strength Parity’, The Fascist Week, 18–24 May 1934, p. 3.  
53 ‘“Exhibits” Publicly Inspected on Empire Air Day’, The Illustrated London News, 26 May 1934, pp. 810– 
811.  
54 ‘Empire Air Day’, The Times, 1 April 1939, p. 12.  
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aerobatics etc.55 Chamier lamented that ‘[m]ost of the civil aerodromes seem to have been 
overawed by the magnitude and magnificence of the military air pageants and to have felt 
themselves unable to participate in the scheme – no doubt fearing that their own small shows 
would bring them into contempt’.56 This suggests that, although Empire Air Day represented 
a form of militarism that was not only acceptable, but widely popular, the Air League was 
not entirely content with the character of the display by the late 1930s.  
   Empire Air Day was propaganda in symbolic, visual, and ritual form, and the Air 
League made extensive use of public ritual and aerial theatre to legitimate its aims and 
objectives, to disseminate its message to the widest possible audience, and to put the air force 
and the nation on a public stage.57 Figures such as Noel-Baker certainly understood Empire 
Air Day as propaganda, arguing the purpose of which was ‘to influence public opinion, in 
order to determine the actions of the Government’. He noted that the nature of such 
propaganda could be ‘summed up in two words: “great armaments”’.58 While Noel-Baker’s 
criticism may have been somewhat polemical, aerial theatre was clearly not devoid of 
ideological content. As Kenworthy noted in 1927, the RAF display at Hendon helped to 
‘inure the popular mind to the prospect of further wars and to familiarise it with the spectacle 
of death thrown from the heavens’.59 In particular, Kenworthy protested the effect of such 
displays on children, writing that Hendon constituted a ‘deliberate attempt’ to ‘familiarise 
the minds of school-children with the idea of war’.60 
 
55 See, for example, ‘Empire Air Day’, Reading Mercury, 27 May 1939, p. 8; ‘Empire Air Day’, The Leighton 
Buzzard Observer, 23 May 1939, p. 5; and ‘Empire Air Day’, Coventry Herald, 29 April 1939, p. 1.   
56 ‘The Story Behind Empire Air Day’, Flying, 27 May 1939, p. 7. 
57 Much like naval theatre prior to the First World War: see Rüger, The Great Naval Game, p. 1. For military 
spectacle more generally, see Myerly, British Military Spectacle. 
58 Noel-Baker, The Private Manufacture of Armaments, p. 293. 
59 Cited in Holman, ‘The Militarisation of Aerial Theatre’, p. 499.  
60 Kenworthy, Will Civilisation Crash?, p. 187. However, his opposition to such displays was seemingly short-
lived. By mid-1931, as has been noted, Kenworthy agreed to join the Air League’s Executive Committee, later 
becoming a vice president, and was even part of the League’s sub-committee considering proposals for an 
international air week in December 1931. AL, AL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 16 June 
1931, p. 1; AL, AL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 8 December 1931, p. 3.    
291 
 
The Air Ministry certainly saw the propagandistic value of the displays. As Empire 
Air Day coincided with RAF expansion from 1934, the display provided a platform for the 
Air Ministry to project its increasing strength and modernity.61 Empire Air Day illustrates 
the often symbiotic relationship that existed between the Air League and the Air Ministry. 
The Air League required Air Ministry permission to use RAF aerodromes and had J.M. 
Spaight, Principal Assistant Secretary of the Air Ministry, dealing with Lloyds of London 
over the risks and necessary insurance behind the displays.62 Prominent figures from the Air 
Ministry contributed to programmes, attended displays and, as we shall see, provided ringing 
endorsements of Empire Air Day. Although the Air League suffered from a lack of funding, 
proceeds from Empire Air Day were donated to the RAF Benevolent Fund.63 After only two 
Empire Air Days, Air Review claimed that the proceeds generated towards the RAF 
Benevolent Fund equalled two thirds of the proceeds by all of the Hendon air shows over a 
17 year period.64 By 1939, the figure raised by Empire Air Day was over £36,000.65  
Empire Air Day proved to be a useful recruitment tool for the RAF and many were 
reported to have joined the RAF as a result of the display.66 Two days prior Empire Air Day 
in 1935, the Air Ministry announced a large-scale recruitment scheme with Londonderry 
appealing ‘to the youth of the nation to join the Royal Air Force’.67 Recruitment efforts 
featured heavily in press coverage of the display that year. As one Daily Mirror article 
suggested, young men 
wanted to see what service life really was like, to examine the machine and apparatus and 
surroundings among which they would live before entering on a new career in the air. Empire 
 
61 On RAF Expansion Schemes A–M, see Gibbs, Grand Strategy, pp. 559–589. 
62 TNA AIR 2/4421, Letter from J. M. Spaight to Captain A. G. Lamplugh, 1934, p. 1.  
63 This fund was established by Lord Trenchard in 1919 to provide assistance to RAF personnel and their 
dependents.  
64 ‘The Air League to its Members’, Air Review, May 1936, p. 10.  
65 AL, AL Minute Book, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 6 June 1939, p. 1. 
66 For Airshows and recruitment more generally, see Matthew F. Rech, ‘A Critical Geopolitics of RAF 
Recruitment’ (unpub. PhD thesis, Newcastle University, 2012), especially part two.  
67 ‘R.A.F. Calls for 22,500 Men’, The Morning Post, 24 May 1935, p. 13. 
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Air Day gave them that opportunity, and for many of them the decision was made on the 
aerodromes there and then.68  
The Manchester Guardian similarly described ‘a long queue of young men . . . asking for 
particulars of entry into the Air Force’ and a ‘rush of would-be recruits for the Royal Air 
Force’.69 Of course, Empire Air Day programmes also attempted to aid recruitment. The 
1938 programme featured articles on a day in the life of an airman and on the RAF as a 
career, while Kingsley Wood’s contribution to the 1939 programme focused almost entirely 
on recruitment.70 
 
 
III. Empire Air Day, Airmindedness, and the Militarisation of British 
Youth 
Attendance figures on Empire Air Day testify to the popularity of the display and certainly 
appear to be indicative of the airmindedness of many within British society. This especially 
seems to be the case when one takes into account that many aerodromes were difficult to get 
to, and three of the six displays were reported to have had particularly bad weather.71 This 
is important to note, as poor weather meant that flying programmes could be curtailed or, in 
some cases, completely abandoned.72 Attendance (as measured by ticket sales) in 1934 was 
around 137,000; in 1935 it was 200,000; in 1936 it was 214,500; in 1937 it was 353,000; by 
1938 figures had reached 500,000, although Air Review claimed that the figure was closer 
to 750,000, and, by 1939, over one million people across Britain attended Empire Air Day.73  
 
68 ‘Empire Air Day Thrills Helped Scores of Youths to Make up Their Minds’, The Daily Mirror, 27 May 
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70 TNA AIR 29/568, Royal Air Force Official Programme: Empire Air Day 1938, ‘Call it a Day!’, pp. 45–47; 
‘The Royal Air Force as a Career’, pp. 49–53; NAL, Royal Air Force Official Programme: Empire Air Day 
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71 ‘Empire Air Day’, The Aeroplane, 29 May 1935, p. 616; ‘Empire Air Day’, The Aeroplane, 27 May 1936, 
p. 654; ‘Empire Air Day’, Air Review, July 1938, p. 7.  
72 See, for example, ‘R.A.F. Mass Flight Over Yorks.’, Yorkshire Post and Leeds Intelligencer, 24 May 1938, 
p. 5. 
73 ‘Empire Air Day’, Air Review, March 1939, p. 7.  
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Even if spectators went more than once, this figure of nearly 2.5 million across six 
displays is remarkable, especially if one considers that non-paying spectators are not factored 
in. Clearly, as McCarthy argues, ‘the popular culture of militarism . . . remained an important 
presence in Britain despite the ravages of war . . . the new peace-mindedness of the interwar 
decades did not attenuate the public thirst for military spectacle.’74 Tickets for Empire Air 
 
74 McCarthy, The British People, p. 137. 
Figure 9: ‘Air-Minded Britain’, The Illustrated London News, 27 May 
1939, p. 921. 
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Day cost substantially less than for Hendon: one shilling for adults and sixpence (reduced to 
threepence in 1935) for children, whereas prices at Hendon ranged from two shillings to 
seven pounds.75 In an attempting to achieve the highest possible attendance on Empire Air 
Day, cheap fares on trains were arranged in connection with the day, with London Transport 
producing a poster advertising Empire Air Day which told spectators which station to go to 
in order to get to certain aerodromes in London.76 Of course, attendance figures were 
undoubtedly helped by low admission charges. 
Michael John Law notes that Hendon ‘catered for a wide range of visitors, ranging 
from the society elite, through the wealthy and motorised middle classes to the ordinary 
Londoner’.77 Conversely, Empire Air Day was less concerned with the social elite, but rather 
with attracting the ‘man in the street’. When the Air Ministry suggested that ‘there should 
be various prices of admission, the holders of higher priced tickets to receive extra amenities 
such as seats or special enclosures’ on Empire Air Day, Chamier strongly protested. He 
pointed out that ‘one of the attractions of E.A.D. was the friendly atmosphere created by the 
mixing of all classes of people’.78 In announcing its plans for Empire Air Day, the League 
expressed the view that Britain could not ‘take its proper place in aviation “unless there is a 
proper public appreciation of air matters”. Empire Air Day is intended to interest the “man 
in the street.”’79  
Airmindedness was also a recurring trope within newspaper reports – on a local as 
well as national scale – surrounding Empire Air Day. Describing the first Empire Air Day 
as ‘an emphatic success’, The Daily Mirror deemed it ‘abundantly evident from the large 
 
75 Michael John Law, The Experience of Suburban Modernity: How Private Transport Changed Interwar 
London (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2014), p. 67. 
76 ‘News in Brief’, The Times, 9 May 1939, p. 11; London Transport Museum, Posters, 1983/4/5030, Poster; 
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77 Law, The Experience of Suburban Modernity, p. 67. 
78 TNA AIR 2/4435, Minutes of a Meeting held at the Air Ministry, 31 January 1938, p. 5. 
79 ‘Empire Air Day’, The Times, 11 April 1934, p. 11.    
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contingents of visitors to these aerodromes that this country is becoming enthusiastically 
airminded’.80 The Daily Mail similarly declared that ‘all Britain must be air-minded . . . the 
first Empire Air Day marks a new epoch in the development of British flying’.81 However, 
one would perhaps expect increasing international tension in the 1930s to limit enthusiasm 
for Empire Air Day. In fact, the creation of the Luftwaffe, the use of chemical weapons by 
aeroplanes in the Italian invasion of Abyssinia, the intensive aerial bombardment of Madrid, 
Guernica, and other areas in the Spanish Civil War, and the increasing likelihood of another 
war following the Munich Conference in 1938, did little to deter visitors from Empire Air 
Day.82 
Edgerton has observed that ‘aeroplanes were associated with England, rather than 
Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland’ and that ‘the heart of the association [with aeroplanes] 
lay in the Home Counties, with the sort of ‘Englishness’ that foreigners usually 
understand’.83 Given that roughly half of the aerodromes open on Empire Air Day were 
located in the Home Counties, and aerodromes in Home Counties often recorded the highest 
attendances, the same can arguably be said of Empire Air Day.84 However, although 
aeroplanes may be associated with England, particularly following the Battle of Britain and 
the Blitz, attendance figures outside London were often high, and Empire Air Day was 
covered in local, as well as national, newspapers.85 Spectators across Britain were drawn to 
Empire Air Day by pageantry, entertainment, and technology. 
 
80 ‘81,000 See Air Day Pageants’, The Daily Mirror, 25 May 1934, p. 6. 
81 ‘Make Britain Air-Minded’, Daily Mail, 24 May 1934, p. 9.  
82 See Holman, The Next War in the Air, pp. 55–80.  
83 Edgerton, England and the Aeroplane, p. xxxvii. 
84 ‘Wings over England’, The Times, 23 May 1938, p. 11.  
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‘Empire Air Day’, Northern Whig, 22 May 1939, p. 11; ‘15,000 see Cardiff Air Display’, Western Mail, 22 
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‘four nations’ history, see Naomi Lloyd-Jones and Margaret M. Scull (eds), Four Nations Approaches to 
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Spectacle was clearly important in drawing crowds yet, so too, was the materiality 
of Empire Air Day. As one Flight article reported, ‘[o]nce cajoled to an aerodrome, young 
and old alike become consumed by a raging curiosity to see, touch, sniff and scramble upon 
aeroplanes at close quarters – especially military aeroplanes’.86 As demonstrated in Figure 
10, this sensorial and material engagement with aeroplanes particularly appealed to British 
youth. As The Times noted, the display provided an opportunity for ‘hundreds of small boys’ 
to climb into cockpits and work bomb release gears for the first time’.87 The same newspaper 
reflected on ‘the delight of the average boy at being able to handle a machine-gun and an 
empty bomb, at being able to sit in the pilot’s cockpit’.88  
 
86 ‘Empire Air Day’, Flight, 2 June 1938, p. 539. 
87 ‘The Air Force at Home’, The Times, 30 May 1938, p. 8.  
88 ‘Empire Air Day’, The Times, 25 May 1936, p. 9.   
Figure 10: ‘The Royal Air Force on View’, The Illustrated London News, 27 
May 1939, p. 920. 
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The draw of the more militaristic aspects on display was also noted by The Aeroplane, who 
remarked that ‘youth is more warlike . . . at all stations the youngsters crowded round the 
machine-guns and bombs and weapons of offence’ and described ‘[y]oung England’ as being 
attracted ‘by the most warlike display.’89 Clearly, as a Dundee Courier headline declared in 
1935, boys were ‘Happy Among the Bombs’.90  
As well as engaging with offensive weapons of war, boys were also encouraged to 
learn about, and interact with, items of civil defence – particularly the gas mask. 
Understandably, this met with conflicting reactions. For example, one journalist wrote that 
‘[t]he scene of schoolboys wearing gas masks was a reminder that the next generation may 
be obliged to wear these grim instruments of protection if gas attacks are launched by air in 
another war’.91 While The Aeroplane stressed that youngsters ‘inspected with relish [the] 
gruesome drawings of gas blisters’ and got ‘a great thrill by being fitted with gas masks and 
being allowed to run about in them and get a whiff of tear gas’, it admitted that this was ‘to 
the horror of their parents’.92 Perhaps unsurprisingly, ADCC members were engaged in a 
number of activities on Empire Air Day, including selling programmes, drilling, parading, 
acting as runners and as stewards to car parks, as well as patrolling boundaries.93 The way 
that children engaged with the material and sensory world of conflict in the form of gas and 
gas masks points to the further militarisation of the civil home front, and of British youth in 
particular, which occurred on Empire Air Day. 
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Much like the SCC on Trafalgar Day, youth were clearly an important part of Empire 
Air Day. Yet, while Trafalgar Day emphasised to boys the long-standing importance of the 
sea to nation and empire, Empire Air Day offered a much more interactive experience with 
the visual and material culture of conflict. While Trafalgar Day was undoubtedly military 
pageantry, it was less overtly militaristic than Empire Air Day and the presence of children 
at the latter display accordingly received much wider criticism as a result.  
On Empire Air Day, school children in parties of 12 or over were offered cheaper 
tickets, while children under 5 were given free admission. The Boy Scouts and uniformed 
youth organisations were also permitted free entry to rehearsals.94 The Ploughshare, the 
organ of the Teachers Anti-War Movement, hinted at its uneasiness by including a picture 
of schoolchildren at an Empire Air Day display alongside a discussion on fears of aerial 
bombardment.95 Similarly, when the Air League displayed Empire Air Day posters in 
schools, the Wood Green Education Committee reacted with hostility. Some members of the 
Committee felt that ‘these sort of things look like war’ and that Empire Air Day was little 
more than ‘disguised militaristic propaganda’. While they acknowledged the educational 
value of the display, members clearly feared that Empire Air Day would engender a martial 
and militaristic spirit among children, feeling that: ‘we have got to keep education apart from 
what may be purely militaristic policies’.96 Such sentiments were not popular, however, 
leading to the Committee being labelled as ‘disloyal’ and a ‘disgrace to the borough’ (as well 
as ‘pretentious pedants’ and ‘attitudinising pedagogues’).97 As Empire Air Day was an 
important recruiting ground for the RAF, children were undoubtedly among the intended 
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audience of the displays and their vast numbers at aerodromes suggest that militarism, in the 
form of aerial theatre, proved attractive for British youth. 
 
 
IV. Empire and Nation 
‘The imperial leitmotif’, as Rieger argues, has ‘figured as an important, long-standard theme 
in British discussions about technology’.98 Empire Air Day was no exception in this respect. 
The date chosen for Empire Air Day – namely Empire Day – reflected, of course, a conscious 
decision.99 As Air Review made clear, it drew attention ‘to the lesson that the safety and 
prosperity of the Empire is connected with our place in the air’.100 The connection of Empire 
and air power was a key trope in much of the discourse and rhetoric surrounding the display. 
Lord Londonderry certainly approved of the choice of Empire Day, writing to the Air League 
that ‘I am very glad that Air Day is being celebrated upon Empire Day, for this happy 
association shows clearly the great importance which aviation has for the Empire’.101 Such 
was the importance of Empire Day for the display that the Air League even raised objections 
to the army’s consideration for an ‘at home’ day falling on Empire Day.102 
The Air League’s appropriation of Empire Day clearly indicated the importance it 
accorded to aviation’s imperial dimensions. At the organisation’s Annual General Meeting 
in 1934, the Duke of Sutherland stressed his desire for the event to become ‘an annual 
institution’ which would ‘spread beyond the borders of this country to the Empire beyond 
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the seas’.103 The published programmes for Empire Air Day would often comment on the 
importance of aviation for the preservation and defence of empire.104  
Links between empire and Empire Air Day were certainly commonplace in the public 
pronouncements of many senior Air League members, the Air Ministry, and politicians. 
However, the display also had resonance beyond Britain. Both Australia and South Africa 
celebrated Empire Air Day for the first time in 1935. The observance of Empire Air Day 
also spread to New Zealand and India, with the idea ‘taking root’ in Canada by 1937.105 
Empire Air Day was even observed in Bermuda by 1939.106 Empire Air Day emphasised the 
importance of aviation for imperial unity, communication, and security, as opposed to 
merely the aeroplane’s role in imperial policing. As we have seen, the Hendon displays were 
markedly imperial in terms and highlighted the importance of aerial bombing for policing 
the empire. Although there were some bombing set pieces on Empire Air Day, they were far 
less imperially-themed than the set pieces at the end of Hendon. By the time that the Air 
League had launched Empire Air Day, the RAF no longer lacked a strategic or ideological 
purpose with the threat of the bomber helping to preserve the ‘RAF’s institutional 
autonomy’.107  
Alongside its imperial role, Empire Air Day revolved around the nation. 
Domestically, Empire Air Day sought to instil a sense of pride among national audiences by 
displaying the aerial might of Britain, yet it also attempted to impress upon audiences the 
importance of the aeroplane for the preservation of Britain itself. Clearly, while the aeroplane 
has been linked to notions of Britishness after 1940, there was a strong relationship between 
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the aeroplane, aerial theatre, and the nation even prior to the Second World War. Indeed, as 
Peter Fritzche observes, ‘images of aviation’ could ‘validate claims of national prowess and 
technological mastery’.108  
Empire Air Day was an arena of deterrence, projecting an image of British aerial 
superiority to other nations. Speaking on Britain’s defensive forces in March 1938, Neville 
Chamberlain declared that ‘[t]he sight of this enormous, this almost terrifying power which 
Britain is building up has a sobering effect, a steadying effect, on the opinion of the world’.109 
While such pronouncements may have overestimated the strength of the German air force, 
were not necessarily shared by all within the Air Ministry, and may not have reflected the 
realities of either Fighter or Bomber Commands in mid-1938, Empire Air Day was 
undoubtedly intended as a performance of power visible to both domestic and foreign 
audiences.110  
Empire Air Day exhibited to spectators the national importance of aviation, with 
debates about technology and the nation employing both defensive and offensive motifs.111 
For example, while one report of Empire Air Day in 1939 opened rather solemnly, stating: 
‘Look up to the skies and see how Britain is preparing to defend herself against her enemies 
in the air’, Chamier underlined the more offensive potential of Empire Air Day, writing that 
‘the Air Ministry . . . are using Empire Air Day to show the country – and the world – the 
power of Britain’s reborn Air Arm’.112 Another reporter observed that crowds ‘were left in 
little doubt’ of the RAF’s efficiency after Empire Air Day, while The Aeroplane proclaimed: 
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‘service pageantry is an opportunity to reveal to friends and enemies in other lands the type 
of men and equipment we can put into the field, onto the high seas or in the air when the 
time comes’.113 While early descriptions of Empire Air Day centred on the promotion of 
airmindedness, by the late 1930s the tone of coverage was far more defensive in nature and 
linked Empire Air Day to the military preparedness of the nation. The Air League, the Air 
Ministry, and many prominent politicians, as well as both the aviation and popular press, all 
saw the strategic and military value of Empire Air Day, to show that Britain’s air force did 
indeed lead the world.  
Of course, at this point the state and the Air Ministry’s aim was deterrence. In 1936, 
Chamberlain spoke of his ‘enthusiasm’ for an air force which, fully developed, would 
possess ‘terrific striking power,’ which would be ‘the most formidable deterrent to war that 
could be devised’.114 By 1938, Kingsley Wood wanted ‘[a]n air force . . . built up to a 
strength sufficient to protect this country and to act as a deterrent to possible enemies, so 
that whatever the strength of the German air force, Germany itself would risk destruction if 
they attacked us’.115 The presence of modern aeroplanes such as Hurricanes, Spitfires, 
Blenheims, Hampdens, Wellingtons, and Whitleys, and the increasing number of 
monoplanes, which were largely replacing biplanes by 1938, certainly provided an indication 
of the increasing modernisation of the RAF. The Air League, the Air Ministry and many 
prominent politicians, as well as both the aviation and popular press, all saw the strategic 
and military value of Empire Air Day.  
While both the Air League and the Air Ministry recognised the potential of aerial 
theatre for putting the air force and the nation on a public stage, one telling incident of an air 
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attaché of the German embassy being questioned at an aerodrome on Empire Air Day after 
making notes of certain types of aeroplanes suggests that the Air Ministry was conscious of 
just how much the displays revealed.116 Similarly, aircraft on the ‘secret’ list were not 
exhibited to the public and, in late Empire Air Days, the Air Ministry did not want the public 
examining the cockpits or being given information about the equipment of its modern 
aeroplanes. Performance figures of aircraft were also prohibited from being included in the 
programmes.117  
The striking visual elements of Empire Air Day lent themselves to film. British Pathé, 
Gaumont British, and British Movietone all covered Empire Air Day, often in a ‘nationalistic 
and militaristic manner’.118 Newsreel coverage invariably focused on the spectacular visual 
elements of the display, particularly formation flying, dive bombing, and aerobatics, pointing 
to the technological sophistication of the aeroplanes on display. Discussion of Empire Air 
Day in a war-like manner was commonplace in much newsreel footage: Hurricanes in 
formation flight were described in one newsreel as keeping ‘their formation like a line of 
infantry’, and the number of bullets a Spitfire could fire in a minute was also noted. Another 
newsreel shows a demonstration of fighters ‘repelling the invader’ highlighting the 
‘efficiency of British pilots and British machines’.119 By 1939, newsreels assured their 
audiences that ‘the wealth, skill and determination of this little island has built up a 
stupendous fleet to take its place among the leaders . . . These pictures tell the world: the 
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skies are safe for Britain.’120 This shift in tone reflected the changing nature of newspaper 
coverage but also of Empire Air Day itself.  
Empire Air Day provided an opportunity to impress upon the British public the more 
threatening aspects of aviation domestically. Many aerodromes invited members of the 
public to wear gas masks and walk into a sealed gas chamber, where a ‘quite harmless’ gas 
would be released simulating a gas attack. They could then walk through a mild 
concentration of gas without a mask, to see the effect of the gas and function and efficiency 
of the gas mask. This blurring of civil and military spheres of society was another way of 
physically reminding ‘post-war inhabitants of the legacy of war waged against civilians at 
home’.121 This militarisation of Empire Air Day increased when John Anderson, who served 
in Chamberlain’s government as Lord Privy Seal and who was tasked with the co-ordination 
of defence measures, contacted the Air Council in 1939 about the inclusion of ARP exhibits 
and demonstrations on Empire Air Day. The Air Council subsequently contacted local 
authorities ‘with a view to the provision, where practicable, of air raid precautions 
exhibits’.122 The Air Ministry clearly felt that more could be done to include ARP displays 
after only four stations included exhibits of this kind in 1937.123 Although Empire Air Day 
initially promoted both civil and military aviation, the inclusion of civil defence measures, 
the shift of tone in newspaper coverage, and the increasing militarisation of the display, 
reflected the broader preparation of the state for future conflict.  
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V. The Reception of Empire Air Day 
The discussion thus far has stressed the scope and scale of Empire Air Day while also 
exploring themes of airmindedness, empire, and nation. An assessment of how Empire Air 
Day was received is more challenging. This is especially so since there is, unfortunately, 
little trace of audiences recording their reactions to Empire Air Day. Attendance levels are, 
of course, one important indication of approval. As we have seen, millions attended the 
event. Millions more would have read about the event in the both national and regional 
newspapers, the popular aviation press, and seen the display in newsreels.  
Empire Air Day – in particular the technological innovation and modernity on 
display – elicited complex and often contradictory emotional states: fascination, enthusiasm, 
and excitement coexisted alongside fear, anxiety, and even horror. Rieger has argued that 
the British experience of modernity, and British responses to modernity, were characterised 
by ‘ambivalence about the modern that resulted from perceptions of change as both creative 
and destructive’.124 This understanding of technological innovation – and of the emotional 
response to the aeroplane – can similarly be traced through Empire Air Day. The event 
occupied an intermediate position between aerial enthusiasm and aerial fear. While crowds 
could marvel at the speed and sleekness of modern machines, with the Spitfire being lauded 
as ‘an object of wonder’ by one reporter, the mass flights of fighters and bombers overhead 
– heralded by ‘the thunder of their engines’ – provided a reminder of the threat posed by the 
aeroplane.125 Indeed, while one Empire Air Day report declared that ‘the giant all metal 
bombers’ inspired confidence in the spectators that ‘England is prepared for emergencies 
and does possess some marvellous war weapons’, another reporter noted that ‘spectators saw 
with mixed feelings the uncanny accuracy with which bombs can be dropped from attacking 
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planes’.126 Newsreels similarly spoke of aeroplanes both as ‘machines of war’ and ‘as things 
of beauty too’.127 While there may have been a ‘culture of anticipation’ in Britain 
surrounding the aeroplane, clearly it is wrong, as Edgerton has noted, to simply conclude 
that ‘the English were afraid of the aeroplane and that they saw it as a hideous foreign 
invention’.128 
Empire Air Day stands in stark contrast to the ‘splendid anachronism’ of Britain’s 
wider public pageantry in the 1930s.129 David Cannadine suggests that pageantry in England 
was the antithesis of the ‘technologically sophisticated forms of ritual’ found in Italy, Russia 
and, in particular, Germany whose use of aeroplanes in rituals ‘implied a commitment to 
technology and an impatience with anachronism’.130 However, as a prominent feature of 
civic life, Empire Air Day clearly points to a commitment to modernity and ‘technologically 
sophisticated forms of ritual’. 
There was clearly an appetite within British society for military and martial spectacle 
in the form of aerial theatre, despite fears of a future war. While some may not have reflected 
on the more militaristic aspects of Empire Air Day, and attendance alone did not necessarily 
constitute an endorsement of militarism, spectators did not passively consume aerial theatre 
and would have been at least somewhat aware of the militaristic nature of Empire Air Day. 
Of course, this was not the only draw for spectators.  
As The Times noted, the high attendance levels might also have been attributable to 
‘the growth of the class of people who have relations in the expanded Air Force, or by the 
increased interest of those who have been roused by recurrent threats from overseas, or 
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simply by the desire for a fine afternoon’s entertainment’.131 As Empire Air Day coincided 
with RAF expansion from 1934, the growth in attendance may also be explained by the 
increasing scale and modernity of each Empire Air Day, especially as the emphasis at most 
aerodromes was on the military, rather than civil, aspects of aviation. Higher attendance 
figures in 1938 and 1939 are also likely to have resulted somewhat from the ending of the 
Hendon displays in 1937. There were clearly many factors that account for the high 
attendance figures: the ‘air menace’ and concerns about Britain’s vulnerability to aerial 
bombardment were clearly important, although it may, of course, simply have been the draw 
of a fine afternoon’s entertainment. 
In comparison to popular reactions, the response of the aviation community, the 
popular press, and public figures is much easier to trace. Empire Air Day was endorsed not 
only by the Air Ministry, but also by many other leading aviation organisations and 
societies.132 Empire Air Day was publicly supported by an array of influential politicians, 
military figures, and even members of the royal family. During their respective premierships, 
both Ramsay MacDonald and Stanley Baldwin commended the Air League for its 
organisation of the event.133 MacDonald’s support is particularly interesting, given his 
previous assertion that ‘so long as militarism in any shape or form exists it is a menace to 
peace’.134 Clearly, militarism in the form of aerial theatre was somewhat palatable. On his 
visit to Bircham Newton aerodrome, King George V was reported to have been ‘greatly 
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impressed with the remarkable efficiency of those who took part in the air display’.135 
Empire Air Day was also supported by the Prince of Wales, Edward VIII. In 1935, he argued 
that ‘it is impossible to exaggerate the importance for the country of the development of air-
mindedness, not only among enthusiasts but among the whole population’.136 Likewise, 
King George VI backed the organisation of Empire Air Day. In 1937, the Air League 
received a message from the King in which he affirmed his conviction that the event would 
‘afford striking proof of the progress which is being made in aviation’.137 Successive 
Secretaries of State for Air, perhaps unsurprisingly, lent their support to, and attended, 
Empire Air Day events. Lord Londonderry thought that the day advanced ‘both the security 
of the Empire and the cause of peace’.138 Lord Swinton ‘did not think there could be anything 
better for recruiting for the R.A.F.’, and Kingsley Wood, whose first flight as Swinton’s 
successor was on Empire Air Day in 1938, thought the day provided ‘a convincing 
demonstration of the power and efficiency of the R.A.F.’.139  
However, Empire Air Day did not attract universal acclaim. A leaflet issued by the 
left-leaning UDC outside aerodromes in 1934 criticised the Air League for its opposition to 
the abolition of civil and military aircraft and for its organisation of Empire Air Day: 
You can easily see but for propaganda in the press and displays like the one you have just 
enjoyed, there would be a fearful danger of the abolition of bombing . . . Thank you for your 
support. You have not only helped in a small measure the R.A.F. Benevolent Fund, you have 
done more . . . You have dropped another British bomb to explode disarmament and peace.140 
While The Aeroplane dismissed the leaflet as the work of ‘half-witted pacifists’, ‘anti-British 
Communists’, and ‘anti-Air Force agitators’, it is clear that in some quarters, there was strong 
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opposition to the display.141 Indeed, the pacifists of the PPU also criticised Empire Air Day. 
Forty PPU members distributed posters and 5,000 ‘Burn the Babies!’ leaflets outside Castle 
Bromwich aerodrome in 1937.142 The leaflet declared that: 
There are some things no one would do – not even in the name of Patriotism. For instance, no 
one, however loyal, would put his neighbour’s baby on fire at the suggestion of the Secretary 
of State for War . . . Babies, we feel, are neutral . . . But modern warfare means war from the 
air. War from the air means bombing babies.143  
Despite the vivid imagery, the pamphlet’s influence is difficult to discern. It certainly did 
little to deter visitors from aerodromes. The PPU also demonstrated outside Kenley 
aerodrome in 1938. Posters were displayed, leaflets were distributed, and a small parade took 
place outside the aerodrome, although such activities were not widely reported.144 Reflecting 
on military displays such as Hendon, the Aldershot Tattoo, and spectacles like Empire Air 
Day, Dick Sheppard, founder of the PPU, had similar objections. Rather than military 
displays, Sheppard instead called for a ‘great Peace Circus’ to tour Britain which could help 
‘shatter the solemn conventions of militarism’.145   
The CPGB’s Daily Worker also attacked Empire Air Day, declaring: ‘[t]he “glories” 
of both the Empire and of the R.A.F., which the Government wants you to celebrate to-day, 
can only be exposed for what they are – mass murder, poverty, disease and grinding 
exploitation’.146 The paper reported a number of protests outside aerodromes. At Bristol, 
members of the ‘Youth Anti-War Committee went to Filton Air Display with leaflets and 
posters, exposing its meaning’. This group was also reported to have dropped leaflets from 
an aeroplane at Romford. In Sheffield and at Hucknall aerodrome, large slogans were painted 
on the approaches to aerodromes reading “Displays To-day, Bombs To-morrow” and ‘AIR 
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PAGEANT TO-DAY, GAS BOMBS TOMORROW’.147 Demonstrations against a bombing 
range at Pwllheli also took place on Empire Air Day, although protests were reportedly 
drowned out by patriotic crowds singing ‘God Save the King’.148  
The fragmented and seemingly sporadic nature of Empire Air Day opposition meant 
that it ultimately did little to affect the popularity of the display. There was little moderate 
or popular opposition, with demonstrations largely being carried out by those on the far left, 
signalling that Empire Air Day, and the promotion of rearmament and popular militarism 
through aerial theatre, was acceptable to large sections of British society. As Holman has 
argued, while 9.6 million people voted in favour of the international reduction of aircraft in 
the Peace Ballot, such sentiment did not prevent huge numbers from attending air displays 
in the late 1930s. Many spectators ‘were seemingly comfortable with the destructive power 
of the bomber that was soon to be unleashed on their behalf and, in some cases, actually 
upon them’.149 
The other principal objection to Empire Air Day focused on the risks surrounding 
the display. From an organiser’s point of view, Chamier felt that ‘the risks are very much 
less than those present at any ordinary flying pageant or by the Air Display at Hendon’.150 
The Air Ministry was similarly confident that ‘[a]ny question of a catastrophe – such as 
might happen at Hendon – may be ruled out’.151 However, Empire Air Day in 1937 involved 
the loss of seventeen lives. Four died in rehearsal for the event in a mid-air collision the 
evening before, while thirteen people, including several civilians, died on the day itself. The 
deaths resulted from mid-air collisions, crashes during aerobatics, as well as one aeroplane 
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crashing into, and setting fire, to a house off the Isle of Man. One woman, who was already 
recovering in bed from surgery, was rescued from the house but later died of her injuries in 
hospital. Her husband and son were treated for burns, although fortunately survived.152 The 
Morning Post described Empire Air Day that year, with some justification, as one of the 
‘blackest week-ends in the history of British aviation’.153 The Hull Daily Mail also depicted 
the accidents in vivid terms, describing the ‘horribly charred bodies’, ‘women and children 
scream[ing]’ with ‘one or two’ fainting from seeing the accidents.154 Another newspaper 
described the ‘horror of the crowd’ when a man’s parachute failed to open during a display. 
It reported that ‘women screamed as the body hit the ground with a sickening thud and 
bounced upwards’. Fortunately, in this case, the figure was a ‘sand-stuffed dummy’.155 
Although an Air Review editorial stressed that Empire Air Day did not ‘demand of 
pilots anything other than they are accustomed to do in normal training for their military 
duties’ the reasons behind the accidents was the source of considerable debate.156 The 
accidents were raised in the House of Commons on several occasions. The cause behind the 
accidents were discussed, as was the possibility of limiting the type of flying which took 
place on Empire Air Day.157 Although Air Review expressed dissatisfaction that the accidents 
were treated as news, a death toll of seventeen was hardly insignificant – especially when 
contrasted with Hendon, which had only seen one death in seventeen years.158 Moreover, 
 
152 ‘13 Deaths Mar Empire Air Day’, Daily Mail, 31 May 1937, p. 3. 
153 ‘Eleven Air Crashes: 17 Deaths’, The Morning Post, 31 May 1937, p. 11.  
154 ‘Tragedies, in Race and Displays, Mar Empire Air Day’, Hull Daily Mail, 29 May 1937, p. 3.  
155 ‘Grim Week-End Toll of Air Deaths’, Ballymena Weekly Telegraph, 5 June 1937, p. 11.  
156 ‘Empire Air Day, 1937’, Air Review, July 1937, p. 32.  
157 Commons Sitting, Royal Air Force (Accidents), HC Deb 31 May 1937 vol 324 cc678-81; Empire Air Day 
(Accidents), HC Deb 28 July 1937 vol 326 cc3095-100 and Empire Air Day (Accidents), HC Deb 30 June 
1937 vol 325 c1955.  
158 ‘Empire Air Day’, Air Review, July 1937, p. 30.  
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such casualties also highlighted a further way in which Empire Air Day saw clashes of civil 
and military spheres in society.159 
 
 
VI. Conclusion  
As this chapter has demonstrated, Empire Air Day represented an important, and largely 
militarised, part of popular civic ritual in the prelude to the Second World War. It has shown 
the ways in which Empire Air Day provides an insight into how members of the public 
engaged with one of the defining technological instruments of the age – the aeroplane – as 
well as how the Air Ministry valued aerial theatre as a tool of propaganda and recruitment. 
Linking themes of nation and empire, the Air League was able to create an aerial theatre 
that, despite its militaristic nature, was supported by large sections of British society, key 
military figures, members of the royal family, newspapers across the political spectrum, and 
by politicians of all stripes. While the Second World War halted aerial pageantry, it did not 
herald an end to such displays. Although the Air League was unable to secure Empire Day 
as the principal day for public air events following the Second World War, it did support the 
organisation of the Battle of Britain ‘at home’ days, which began in 1945, as well as 
continuing to organise its own aerial pageants.160  
Empire Air Day afforded spectators a visual, material, and sensorial engagement with 
weapons of war, outside of conflict. Despite opposition to Empire Air Day, and despite the 
risk involved in the event, popular and cultural forms of militarism centred around military 
spectacle attracted genuine and widespread enthusiasm, especially among youth, in the late 
1930s. Aerial theatre enabled the aeroplane to increasingly come to the British public in new, 
 
159 On public debate surrounding risk, accidents and aerial technology, see Chapter 3 of Rieger, Technology 
and the Culture of Modernity.  
160 See TNA BT 217/1310, Air Display at Blackpool (Squires Gate) Airport by Air League of British Empire, 
1947–1949.  
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dramatic, and often distinctly militaristic ways. Indeed, through Empire Air Day, the Air 
League helped ensure that ‘millions of eyes were turned skywards’.161 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
161 ‘81,000 Visit R.A.F. Stations’, The Western Morning News and Daily Gazette, 25 May 1934, p. 7. 
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Conclusion  
Reflecting on his organisation’s work throughout the interwar years at its Annual General 
Meeting in July 1939, Sutherland claimed that ‘the Air League has done a great deal to 
awaken the public and the government to a full recognition of the fact that the greatest threat 
to our security comes from the air and that precautions have to made against such a threat’. 
He was satisfied that ‘we need now fear no military competitor in the air’ and felt that this 
in part resulted from the ‘campaign which has been unremittingly carried on by the Air 
League since those dark days when the air forces of this country were cut down almost to 
vanishing point’. Furthermore, Sutherland regarded the changing attitudes towards aviation 
in the 1930s as ‘the greatest success that the Air League has, or could have, achieved’, being 
‘the result of steady and unspectacular propaganda’. He thought Britain’s military 
preparedness and the support for aerial supremacy was particularly remarkable ‘in a 
democratic nation wedded to the cause of peace’.1 While Sutherland’s pronouncements may 
have somewhat overstated the Air League’s influence, through aerial theatre and pageantry 
in particular, its propaganda often was spectacular and ventured far beyond conventional 
pressure-group practices.  
Only a month earlier at the Navy League’s Grand Council Meeting, Lloyd was 
similarly self-congratulatory. Addressing those in attendance, Lloyd stated that ‘the name of 
the Navy League carried a particular weight to-day. I doubt if there is any other patriotic 
organisation to-day that has such a solid and respected name in its own sphere.’ Lloyd did 
stress, however, that the League’s work was not complete and that it could not allow anyone 
to forget that ‘on naval defence, fundamentally, primarily and finally depends the security 
of these islands, and that, therefore, the work of the Navy League is required as much to-day 
 
1 ‘The Duke’s Speech’, Air Review, September 1939, p. 8.  
315 
 
as it ever has been before’.2 While the tone of Lloyd’s address was slightly more reserved 
than Sutherland’s, he was likewise satisfied with the Navy League’s work. He felt that the 
League had played an important part in awakening the British public to the significance of 
seapower, concluding that it had contributed ‘something solid to this awakening, and the 
further security of the country, and the people, and the Empire’.3  
It is clear that the leadership of the Air and Navy Leagues held their work in high 
regard. Yet, neither organisation was able to attract large memberships, despite boasting an 
array of influential political and military figures among its supporters. On the other hand, 
however, the activities of each organisation were able to mobilise public and political 
support on a mass level and they were able to carry out their work largely as suggested above. 
Moreover, assessing the legacy of each League through membership numbers alone would 
be to ignore the significance of both organisations in the political and associational culture 
of the interwar period.  
Each League’s influence can, in part, be measured by the opposition they faced. Key 
liberal internationalist figures – particularly Cecil, Noel-Baker, Murray, Davies, and Angell 
– all came into conflict with the Air and Navy Leagues as did the LNU more broadly. Other 
figures on the political left such as Brockway, Attlee, and Laski similarly opposed the Air 
and Navy Leagues. Anti-war, pacifist, and other left-leaning organisations, including the 
ILP, the Labour-controlled LCC, the UDC, the PPU, and the CPGB, all likewise objected to 
the policies or activities of each League. Newspapers on the left, particularly the Daily 
Herald, were also frequently critical. Most of this opposition was principally directed at the 
character and nature of each League. The Air and Navy Leagues were accused of being 
militarists, scaremongers, alarmists, jingoists, appendages to the ‘merchants of death’, and 
 
2 ‘The Navy League Grand Council Meeting’, The Navy, July 1939, p. 237. 
3 Ibid., p. 238.  
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even warmongers by their detractors. In the context of the peace-mindedness of the interwar 
years, such opposition is fairly unsurprising. Certainly, it seems to suggest that ‘British 
distaste for militarism and patriotic excess was unmistakeable after 1918’.4 However, the 
fact that such organisations and figures deemed it necessary to counter Air and Navy League 
propaganda highlights that, despite a distaste for it, organised militarism had at least some 
resonance. In fact, there existed a peculiarly British militarism in the interwar years. Peculiar 
as it relied on two technological arms – the RAF and the Royal Navy – rather than more 
traditional and conventional forms of Prussian militarism, but also peculiar in the context of 
the strength of liberal internationalism, pacifism, and anti-war sentiment in the period. 
Finally, it is peculiar because, according to numerous scholars, there was simply no place 
for militarism, in any form, in the interwar years. 
While neither organisation was able to attain a broad membership – and faced 
hostility from a number of groups and figures on the political left – they were able to gain 
the support of a number of influential political figures and members of the establishment. 
Individuals such as Churchill, Amery, Curzon, Baldwin, and even MacDonald all supported 
the activities of the Air and Navy Leagues. So, too, did members of the royal family, who 
supported or spoke in favour of Empire Air Day, Trafalgar Day, the SCC, and the ADCC. 
Although neither organisation ever formally abandoned its non-party status, Liberal or 
Labour engagement was fairly low. While neither the Air nor Navy League was merely an 
auxiliary for the Conservative Party in the interwar years, each had strong links. As has been 
detailed, each organisation also had a number of strong ties to the far right during this period. 
Most of these affinities were kept private – and it is difficult to trace their bearing directly 
 
4 Hendley, Organized Patriotism, p. 225.  
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on League policy – but they certainly did not stop the Air and Navy Leagues lobbying for 
increased aerial and naval armaments.  
While the Army League was unable to gain the support of the War Office, the Air 
and Navy Leagues clearly had the backing of the Air Ministry and Admiralty respectively.5 
Londonderry, Swinton, Wood, Trenchard, Jellicoe, Beatty, Keyes, and a number of others 
all spoke out in support of the Air and Navy Leagues, or supported the schemes of both. The 
Air and Navy Leagues were able to cultivate the support of the political and military elite 
and were able to carry out activities on a local, national, and imperial scale as a result. The 
Air Ministry and Admiralty undoubtedly saw the propagandistic value of each organisation 
and worked with the Air and Navy Leagues in their educational activities, their youth 
organisations, and in the promotion of aerial and naval theatre. Neither League acted simply 
as a conduit for the dissemination of official views, but as many members had served in the 
Air Ministry and the Admiralty, as there were a number of shared aims and objectives, and 
as the Air and Navy Leagues relied upon official support in a number of schemes, neither 
were persistent critics of the service departments.   
Although the Leagues may not have had any decisive impact on the formation of 
military policy and grand strategy, their activities and propaganda undoubtedly contributed 
to the military preparedness of the nation upon the outbreak of the Second World War. Both 
the SCC and the ADCC were involved in civil defence at the start of the conflict and tens, if 
not hundreds, of thousands of boys were recorded as taking an active role in the services in 
wartime. Of course, both the Air and Navy Leagues attempted to cultivate a sense of 
discipline, duty, and sacrifice among boys, with each Corps representing a militarisation of 
sections of British youth. Empire Air Day, as we have seen, allowed spectators to engage 
 
5 Mitchell, ‘The Army League’, p. 224. 
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with weapons of war in a number of different ways. Aiding recruitment was one of the ways 
in which Empire Air Day contributed to the military preparedness of the state, but aerial 
theatre more broadly was an acceptable way of promoting popular militarism, rearmament, 
and the military capabilities of the British state in the late 1930s. Trafalgar Day was used by 
the Navy League to emphasise the ongoing relevance of the Royal Navy to Britain. Evoking 
highly idealised Nelsonian principles, it provided the League with a public platform to 
construct naval and national identity and to impress upon both state and society the 
importance of sea power. Of course, both Leagues used more conventional methods to extoll 
the virtues of air and sea power to both state and civil society such as holding public 
meetings, issuing pamphlets, sending letters to the press, as well as lobbying politicians and 
speaking in parliament.  
This thesis has provided the most complete account of the Air and Navy Leagues to 
date. It has advanced our understanding of the place of militarism in interwar Britain, and 
has shown how militaristic leagues, the type of which were an important part of the liberal 
political culture of Edwardian Britain, occupied a similar, if more contested, place in the 
associational culture of the interwar period. It has demonstrated that popular, cultural, and 
institutional forms of militarism were able to flourish despite the rise of internationalism, 
pacifism, and anti-war sentiment. Militarism and militaristic values occupied an important 
place within the Edwardian period and were, in various guises, able to survive the First 
World War. Attitudes towards militarism, military culture, and militarisation were complex, 
contested, and at times ambiguous. However, militarism was able to enjoy resonance and 
even widespread popularity, especially in the form of Trafalgar Day and Empire Air Day. 
Both the Air and Navy Leagues had to negotiate the rise of internationalist sentiment and 
support for disarmament, collective security, and pacifism. In doing so, the policy, nature, 
and very purpose of each organisation was (temporarily) unrecognisable from what had gone 
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before. Each League was briefly beset by internal divisions over the direction of policy and 
activities. However, the apparent abandonment of a policy which supported military 
security, if not always supremacy, was short-lived.  
If one accepts that ‘patriotic and imperialist leagues from the pre-war period 
continued to play a vibrant if reduced role in post-war British society’, then the same is 
undoubtedly true of militaristic leagues.6 As this thesis has demonstrated, the 
historiographical consensus on continuity between pre-war and interwar Britain should be 
extended to include militaristic, as well as patriotic and imperialist, organisations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 Hendley, Organized Patriotism, p. 228.  
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Appendix I 
Air League Executive Committee, 1919–1939 
This list includes the most senior figures in the Air League’s Executive Committee. It is not 
a complete record of the Executive Committee, nor does it contain vice presidents who held 
mostly ornamental positions and are difficult to trace with accuracy for the entire period.  
 
President  
1917–1920: John Douglas-Scott-Montagu, Lord Montagu of Beaulieu 
1920–1922: Major General J.E.B. Seely (later Lord Mottistone)  
1922–1944: George Granville Sutherland-Leveson-Gower, 5th Duke of Sutherland 
 
Secretary  
1918–1927: Douglas G.H. Gordon  
 
Secretary General 
1927–1929: Brig.General P.R.C. Groves 
1929–1931: Lt. Col. N.G. Thwaites (acting secretary general) 
1933–1939: Air Commodore J.A. Chamier  
 
Chairman 
1918–1929: Philip S. Foster  
1929–1931: Dr Gerald Merton  
1931–1932: Captain Frederick E. Guest  
1932–1939: Lord Mottistone  
 
Vice/Deputy-Chairman  
1917–1927: C. Shirreff Hilton (deputy) 
1923–1925: Admiral Mark Kerr (vice) 
1924–1931: Lt. Col. Ivan B. Davson (vice/deputy) 
1931–1932: Dr Gerald Merton (deputy) 
1933–1937: Griffith Brewer (deputy) 
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1937–1939: William.O. Manning (deputy) 
 
Honorary Treasurer 
1917–1927: Sir Edmund Bartley-Denniss 
1927–1929: Sir Henry White-Smith 
1929–1931: Brig. General Sir Charles Delme-Radcliffe 
1932–1938: Sir Basil Clarke (replaced by William.O. Manning in 1938) 
 
Deputy Honorary Treasurer  
1935–1938: William.O. Manning   
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Appendix II 
Navy League Executive Committee, 1919–1939 
As in Appendix I, this list includes the most senior figures of the Navy League’s Executive 
Committee. It is similarly not a complete record of every member of the Executive 
Committee, nor does it contain vice presidents who mostly held only ornamental positions 
and are difficult to trace with accuracy for the entire period.  
 
President  
1918–1922: Algernon St Maur, 15th Duke of Somerset 
1922–1924: George Granville Sutherland-Leveson-Gower, 5th Duke of Sutherland 
1924–1930: Victor Alexander John Hope, 2nd Marquess of Linlithgow 
1930–1940: George Ambrose Lloyd, 1st Baron Lloyd 
 
Deputy President  
1926–1932: Lord Sydenham of Combe 
1932–1936: Lord Carson of Duncairn  
1936–1939: Commodore the Rt Hon. Earl Howe 
 
Chairman  
1916–1922: V. Biscoe Tritton  
1922–1934: Sir Cyril Cobb 
1934–1936: Viscount Lymington  
1937–1939: The Rt Hon. The Earl Beatty  
 
Honorary Treasurer  
1919–1922: V. Biscoe Tritton  
1922–1923: Hon. Lt.-Commander H.W. Wheeler  
1923–1931: Lt. Col. C. Forbes Buchan  
1931–1936: [No honorary treasurer was appointed during this period] 
1936–1937: J.H.C. Burton, Esq.  
1937–1939: A.E. Griffin, Esq. 
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General Secretary  
1919–1922: Rear-Admiral Ronald A. Hopwood  
1922–1924: Lt.-Commander J.N. Benbow 
1924–1925: Guy Eden (Acting General Secretary) 
1925–1932: Commander H.M. Denny 
1932–1935: Rear-Admiral G.O. Stephenson  
1935–1939: H.T. Bishop, R.N.  
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Appendix III 
Air Defence Cadet Corps Committee, 1938 
President 
His Grace the Duke of Sutherland, P.C., K.T. 
Chairman 
Marshall of the Royal Air Force Sir John Salmond, G.C.B., C.M.G., C.V.O., D.S.O. 
Hon. Treasurer 
Simon Marks, Esq. 
Members 
J. R. Ashwell-Cooke, Esq. 
Sir Basil Clarke. 
The Rt. Hon. The Viscount Elibank. 
The Right Hon. The Earl of Jersey. 
Captain R. L. Preston, A.F.R.Ae.S. 
His Grace The Duke of Richmond and Gordon. 
Colonel The Rt. Hon. The Lord Sempill. 
Brig.-General J. F. Trotter, C.B., D.S.O. 
Nigel Tangye, Esq., A.R.Ae.S.I., A.M. Tech.I. (Gt. Brit.). 
 
Council 
Edward Baron, Esq.     Sir Robert Kindersley, G.B.E. 
Major K. M. Beaumont, D.S.O.    Sir John Maffey, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., 
Sir Harry Brittain, K.B.E., C.M.G., LL.D.   K.C.M.G., K.C.V.O., C.S.O., C.I.E. 
Comdr. Sir Dennistoun Burney, C.M.G., R.N.,  Capt. G.F. Meager, A.F.C. 
Sir Malcolm Campbell, KT., M.B.E.   P.H. Mills, Esq. 
Sir Nigel L. Campbell, KT.    Lt.-Col. J.T.C. Moore-Brabazon, M.C., M.P. 
E. F. Cecil, Esq.                                                                          Colonel H.L. Nathan, D.L., M.P.  
W. Chance, Esq.      Squadron Leader Harold Peake. 
R. W. Cory, Esq.      The Hon. Clive Pearson. 
Sir Edward Crowe, KT., K.C.M.G., C.M.G.   J. L. Philips, Esq. 
Hon. Air Commodore E.G. Dixon, O.B.E.,    O.J. Philipson, Esq. 
Sir W. Lindsay Everard, M.P., J.P.    The Rt. Hon. The Lord Plender, G.B.E. 
The Rt. Hon. The Lord Glendyne.    T. W. Robinson, Esq., A.C.A. 
The Rt. Hon. The Lord Gorell, C.B.E. O.B.E.,  Sir George Schuster, K.C.M.G. 
M.C. M.A.       H.O. Short, Esq. 
R. Grant-Ferris, Esq., M.P.     Lieut-.Commander The Hon. J. M. Southwell 
Wing-Commander Sir Louis Grieg, K.B.E., C.V.O.,  A.F.R.Ae.S., R.N. 
R.A.F.        Gordon Stewart, Esq. 
The Rt. Hon. The Earl of Halsbury.    Lt.-Colonel H.M. Stobart, C.B.E. D.S.O. D.L. 
The Rt. Hon. The Lord Hardinge of Penshurst,                      Lieut,-Comdr.  The Rt. Hon. The Lord Strabolgi. 
K.G., P.C., G.C.B.                   Sir Henry Strakosch, K.B.E.  
The Rt. Hon. The Lord Harris, M.C., J.P.    The Rt. Hon. The Lord Ventry. 
Edward Hulton, Esq.     The Rt. Hon. The Lord Weir, G.C.B. 
Lt.-Colonel Sir Francis Humphrys, G.C.M.G.,  Sir Sydney R Wells, M.P. 
G.C.V.O 
L. Kimball, Esq., M.P. 
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Appendix IV 
Navy League Sea Cadet Corps Committee, 1935–1939 
This list only includes those responsible for organising the affairs of the SCC from 1935 
centrally, when the SCC Sub-Committee was formed. Unlike Appendix III, it is not a 
complete record of every member of the SCC’s Committee, nor does it contain vice 
presidents, or those who were responsible for governing the SCC on a local level.  
 
Chairman  
1935–1937: Rear-Admiral G.O. Stephenson 
1937–1939: W.D. Wills 
 
General Secretary  
1935–1939: H.T. Bishop, R.N. 
 
Secretary  
1935–1939: Lt-Cdr E.L. Hill. R.N.  
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